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Abstract 
This thesis concerns the manner in which the enactment and implementation of law and governance is 
changing in the global context. It explores this through a study of the deployment of the global anti-
doping apparatus including the World Anti-Doping Code and its institutions with specific reference to 
professional cycling, a sport that has been at the forefront of some of the most celebrated doping cases 
and controversies in recent years. Critically, the thesis argues that the changes to law and governance 
are not restricted to sport and anti-doping, but are actually inherent to broader processes associated 
with neoliberalism and social and behavioural surveillance affecting all aspects of society and its 
political institutions. The thesis thus engages with concepts and arguments in contemporary social 
theory including the work of Dardot and Laval on neoliberalism, Agamben on sovereignty, Hardt and 
Negri on globalisation and others including Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari and Louis Dumont. In 
addition, the work examines the juridical concepts of the rule of law and sovereignty.
Commencing with the Festina scandal of 1998, the Spanish case of Operación Puerto and concluding 
with the fall from grace by the American cyclist Lance Armstrong in 2012, the principal processes 
examined by the thesis include:
· The increasing crossing of the border between different legal regimes (whether supranational or 
simply particularised) and with it the erosion of what we knew as state sovereignty and 
constitutionalism;
· The increasing use of judgment achieved through the media and how this arrives at new 
configurations of moral panic and scapegoating;
· The creation of a need for rapid outcomes at the expense of the modernist value or version of 
the rule of law; and
· The increasing use of new and alternative methods of guilt, proof and ultra-legal detection.
The thesis seeks to answer a question posed by both Foucault and Agambem that is, given the 
growing primacy of the arts of government, what is the juridical form and theory of sovereignty that is 
able to sustain and found this primacy? It is argued that this question can be understood by reference 
to the shift from a social or public contract that was understood to be the foundation of society, to a 
society that is constituted by consent, private agreement and contract. Instances of individual consent, 
rather than a social contract, now tend to bring forth a global constitution in construction. This system 
appears to exist with the sole objective of creating and maintaining the conditions for competition, 
whether in sport or in the economy. Anti-doping law fits neatly as a paradigm example into the 
Hayekian spectacle of creating the myth of pure competition carried out on a level playing field. In this 
context rather than sport mirroring society what we have is a society that more and more tends to mirror 
the ethos of professional sport.
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… However, I already had in my head a sketch an article, in which I thought 
demonstrated the place where human greatness may be displayed at its fullest, that is,
in sport, the scum also enter, unscrupulous, without ever lifting their head to take a 
serious view of the hero. They only seek their own gain, caring solely for their own 
interest, and at its best, they seek to justify their position by saying that they do it for the 
general good.
Franz Kafka
In the history of cycle sport, fabrications crowded out facts from the very outset.
Benjo Maso
This is the west, sir. When the legend becomes fact, print the legend.
The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance.
If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.
Il Gatopardo or The Leopard.
Nobody starts out wanting to dope, but to survive in this system you must.
Floyd Landis
Macrobius assimilates homo sacer to the statues (Zanes) in Greece that were 
consecrated to Jove with the proceeds from the fees imposed on oath-breaking 
athletes, statues that were in fact nothing other than the colossi of those that had 
broken their word and had therefore been vicariously consigned to divine justice … 
Insofar as he incarnates in his own person the elements that are usually distinguished 
from death, homo sacer is, so to speak, a living statute, the double or colossus of 
himself.
Giorgio Agamben
Led like a lamb into this gloom
Yeah Freud is in the back room with his goons
Now they've got new experiments, the metal groans, the limbs are rent
The anti-heroes’ mock dissent, we market now by mass consent
We swing for the crime everyone in double time …
They swing for the crime everyone in double time
And we hope that you had a good time
Yeah smile as you sign on the line
Because life on your knees can be fun
Are you glad that you're not the only one?
Edmund Kuepper, Chris Bailey.
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PROLOGUE – Before and after Festina 

The Festina Tour 

The day before the 1998 Tour de France was set to start in Dublin, Willy Voet, a 
soigneur (or masseur) for the Festina team, was stopped on a back road border 
crossing between Belgium and France. A search of the team car he was driving 
revealed syringes, a few hundreds of grams and capsules of anabolic steroids, 
as well as 400 bottles and ampules of various products, which included 250 
bottles of EPO, that had come from three laboratories in Germany and 
Switzerland.1 By the time the race had reached France a few days later Voet 
had already confessed to smuggling offences, admitting that it was not the first 
time and that he was acting under team instructions. Voet’s admission caused 
the team manager Bruno Roussel to publicly state that he was ‘stunned’ and 
‘shocked’.2 The next day both Roussel and the team doctor Eric Rijckaert were 
held for questioning by French police. Gendarmes subsequently searched the 
team hotel and Voet was formally charged with drug smuggling. Up until this 
point the team management had continued to deny being involved and the 
Tour de France director, Jean-Marie Leblanc, publicly confirmed that he would 
not expel the Festina team from the Tour.3  

1 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Prologue, Dublin 
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/prol.html.
2 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Stage 3 Roscoff – Lorient, 
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/stage3.html.
3 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Stage 4, Plouay – Cholet, 
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/stage4.html.
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By the following morning things started to change as the International Cycling 
Union (UCI) suspended Roussel.4 Later, that night, following a tearful press 
conference by members of the team, the Tour de France decided to expel the 
entire Festina team from the race.5 That decision followed Roussel’s admission 
that banned substances were used to maximise the team's performance. 
Roussel’s lawyer said that the doping was organised by the team; a practice of 
‘a deliberate management’ of doping products organised by the team officials, 
doctors, support staff and cyclists in order to avoid their dangerous use 
outside of medical supervision. The revelations appeared to upset the Tour 
director who was reported as saying: ‘These few sentences seemed awful to 
us, the organisers of the Tour de France, the greatest cycling challenge in the 
world, because they constituted a confession’.6  
 
Within days other teams, such as the Dutch TVM team were also implicated in 
doping with their team manager and doctor also arrested.7 By the second week 
of the Tour, as the race came out of its annual passage through the Pyrenees, 
and where the Italian Marco Pantani had all but destroyed Jan Ullrich’s defence 
of his title, the riders were holding stop work meetings.  The start of Stage 12 

4 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Stage 5, Cholet -
Chateauroux, http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/stage5.html.
5 Cyclingnews.com, Second Edition News July 18 1998 Special Festina Roundup 
http://ftp.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/jul98/jul18a.html.
6 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Stage 6, La Chatre - Brive-la-
Gaillarde, http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998.
7 Cyclingnews.com, Second Edition News for July 19, 1998, 
http://ftp.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/jul98/jul19a.html, News for July 24, 1998.
The drugs scandal widens, http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/jul98/jul24.shtml,
News for July 25, 1998, The drugs scandal update 
http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/jul98/jul25.shtml.
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was delayed by two hours8 with the subsequent go-slow forcing the race 
organisers to annul the day’s results.  Following the delayed start the stage had 
progressed very slowly and after only thirty-two kilometres the peloton came to 
a halt at the first intermediate sprint. Sitting on the bitumen the riders held 
another stop work meeting and only after their own internal deliberations were 
complete and their representatives speaking to the Tour Director, who himself 
was in discussion with the French Sport's Minister, did the riders start to ride 
again, but still only at pedestrian speed. The peloton decided to ride to the 
finish line in Aix-les-Bains without their race numbers on their backs. Even 
before the arrival at the ‘finish’, the Spanish ONCE9 team had decided to quit 
the race altogether. Shortly after the go-slow recommenced the ONCE riders 
fell behind the convoy of team cars that follows a race and abandoned. Their 
manager Manolo Saiz (whom we shall meet again) said: ‘The Tour is over.’ The 
team leader Laurent Jalabert told reporters: ‘I stop. I made this decision 
knowingly. I was too depressed ...’10

During the late 1990’s for the average antipodean cycling fan, as I was then, 
sitting at home in Darwin, the Tour, and pro cycling generally (if we were really 
lucky), could only be watched by way of daily thirty minute TV highlights 
broadcast the following evening. Mostly we followed the race by live updates 
and coverage on the nascent internet. The drama of the Festina Tour became a 

8 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Tarascon-sur-Ariège - Le Cap 
d'Agde, http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/stage12.html.
9 The ONCE team sponsored by the Spanish association for the blind was later to be rebranded and 
become Liberty Seguros.
10 Cyclingnews.com, Tour de France, Grand Tour July 11-August 2, 1998, Stage 17, Albertville - Aix-
les-Bains http://autobus.cyclingnews.com/results/1998/tour98/stage17.html.
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part of the daily mix and rise of, amongst other things, post-Cold War 
globalisation, the internet and a more aggressive global sports marketing and 
broadcasting machine. For the fan of the daily chronicles of Bill’s 
cyclingnews.com,11 the spectacle brought with it another aspect, namely, sport 
being the subject of a police operation, an operation that had become as 
equally exciting to watch as the race itself. Cycling’s path out of Europe and 
the problematisation of doping coincided with the emergence of the new global 
‘consciousness’ that had been brought into existence by the new conditions. 
As the English cycling journalist William Fotheringham wrote in his forward to 
Willy Voet’s confessionary and classic cycling text, Breaking the Chain, that ‘in 
future cycling might come to be seen in two eras: before and after … Festina’.12 
In many ways Festina marked the beginning of the future for all sport, and, as 
we will see, quite possibly for us all. 
 
For our immediate purposes the importance of Festina was not the spectacle 
that played out, nor the subsequent trial of members of the team and its 
management, but it is that the Festina ‘scandal’ has been characterised as one 
of the principal catalysts for the inception of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA). Danish sports scientist Verner Møller sees the action of the French 
police, acting on the orders of the French Minister for Youth and Sport, Marie-

11 Cyclingnews.com. Professor Bill Mitchell ran cyclingnews.com in these days from his home near 
Newcastle, Australia, coordinating in the early hours of the morning his network of informants. In 1999 
he decided to focus fulltime on his academic work and the Centre for Full Employment and Equity 
(http://e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/). He sold cyclingnews for what would now be considered a meagre
sum. The web site went on to become the largest global source of news for the sport. But it was never 
the same beast after Bill losing its irreverence and incisiveness to become part of the mainstream 
media. 
12 Voet, W., Breaking the Chain, Drugs and Cycling – The True Story, Yellow Jersey Press, London, 
2001, p.ix.
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George Buffet to raid the Tour as signaling the end of the time-honoured 
tradition of self-administration of sport. For Møller these events led to the 
establishment of the new global anti-doping agency, which compromised 
sport’s special autonomy and thus opened up sport and sporting institutions to 
political pressure and vulnerability.13 One of the things we will start to encounter 
,as we move on in our story, is that to promote such a position isn’t really an 
adequate response to the manner in which Government and governance is 
structured in the twenty-first century, nor does it take account of sport’s place 
in that system of governance. 
 
Nevertheless, questions abound as to why cycling and why that time? In 1998 
the Tour started later than its normal first weekend in July, for the reason that 
the football (soccer) World Cup was also being held in France at that time. As 
one former member of the Festina team told me: 
 
Who knows, the apocryphal tale, the sort of the legendary 
background is that the French minister for sport wanted to go after 
soccer in ‘98 but it was the year of the World Cup in France and the 
powers have said no way you are not going to, these are the tales 
from history, so she went after cycling, whatever sport in Europe, 
the French minister of Sport went after … : rugby, absolutely soccer, 
absolutely, they could have gone and raided any club, any cycling 

13 Møller, Verner. The Anti-Doping Campaign – Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity? in Hoberman, J & 
Møller, V, Doping and Public Policy, University Press of Southern Denmark. 2004
pp.145, 146. See also Ulrik Wagner, The World Anti-Doping Agnecy, power and law beyond the state, 
in Wagner, Storm and Hoberman, Observing Sport, Modern system theoretical approaches, Hofmann, 
2010 at 77 and Dag Vidar Hanstad, Andy Smith and Ivan Waddington, The Establishment of the World 
Anti-Doping Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and Unplanned Outcomes, 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 2008 43: 227.
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team, any rugby or football club at that era and would have had a 
similar impact. ... cycling seems to have been leading the way on 
doping throughout its history. …. [But cycling]  is different because 
of the difficulty of the sport itself, this means that pharmacological 
intervention maybe has a greater impact, I suspect, because it is so 
long and so hard, and recovery so difficult, I suspect that cycling 
potentially benefits more than other shorter, faster sports.14 
 
Whatever the reason for the raid, after Festina things would indeed be different. 
Festina provided the catalyst for a new network of technicians and scientists 
(or in some cases the same ones that doped the riders), funded by the State 
and sport and coordinated by the new global agency, WADA, to develop new 
testing procedures to counter the EPO driven practices of blood doping and its 
derivatives. Post Festina, cycling was no longer simply a place populated by 
the sport’s governing bodies, the European based teams, entourages and 
riders and the fans. Cycling becomes a point of intersection between the 
sport’s traditional stakeholders and government, transnational agencies, 
scientists and technicians. It is this post-Festina difference that we seek to 
interrogate here. 
 
An incomplete history of the origins of Cycle Sport 
 
Cycling is certainly different to other sports in many ways and it may be this 
difference that gave rise to its vulnerability. Although professional road cycling 

14 Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware unpublished interview 2010.
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has its origins back in the nineteenth century it has never developed the power 
base of other sports. Unlike other sports, or for that matter track racing held on 
an enclosed velodrome, you can't enclose a road race and hence you cannot 
sell admission tickets. Until the advent of television cycling could not be 
completely seen: it could only be spoken or written. Cycling is neither a team 
sport nor an individual sport. Cycling teams are nomadic, itinerant, changeable 
(unstable) bands of gypsies. They have no home ground or place. Road 
cyclists are like wolves in so far as they both hunt or move solo or in packs. In 
contrast to a football player in a football team, who must necessarily live near 
his or her teamates to train together on nearly a daily basis, a cyclist might not 
see another teamate between races, often training and spending time with their 
‘opposition’ and coming together with each other only from race to race; or 
within a race. Cyclists thus tend more to be lone wolves pursuing a line of flight 
or a chasing, hunting pack. Because of its lack of enclosure, cycling has 
always had to sell something other than itself – newspapers, sponsors 
products, nationalism, or simply dreams. From the very beginning cycling was 
work. Its amateur side developed later than its professional side. It also 
developed in a different context outside of Continental Europe. It was as much 
work and sport as it was a show, a moving advertising hoarding. It was always 
linked to medical or physiological experimentation.15 The links between 
nationalism, the media, money and later the dissolution of national borders all 
were dominant in cycling well before other sports (save possibly Rugby 

15Hoberman, John, Mortal engines: The science of performance and the dehumanization of sport, The 
Free Press, New York, 1992, where he chronicles the early links between cycling and medical research.
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League16). Because of the manner in which it lives no one organisation is able 
to exert complete control over the sport. There is no one dominant sovereign 
power, rather a network of the international union, national federations, 
professional teams, riders, race organisers and sponsors; all of them 
cooperating and competing, albeit, with no one group able to exert total 
dominance.17 
 
From the very beginning the professional peloton has always existed within a 
nexus of commerce, media, athleticism and nation building. The European 
tradition of cycling is a product of the Industrial Revolution and as such bears 
the marks of an era in which nations reformed, mass audiences came into 
being and the daily social and economic life of individuals shifted from primarily 
localised to nationalised and finally globalised. The birth of professional cycling 
and its relationship to the press was in itself part and parcel of what Benedict 
Anderson describes in Imagined Communities as the production of nations in 
modernity. For our purposes the newspaper and the myth of the early 
professional cyclist were two forms that provided the technical means for re-
presenting the kind of imagined community that is the nation.18 Accordingly, 
professional cycling was never not just as a sporting endeavour or a 
competition amongst individuals, it was a process of making, and selling, a 
product – a product of industry and the nation itself.  

16 Collins, Tony, Rugby League in Twentieth Century Britain, a Social and Cultural History, Routledge, 
2006.
17 Cycling in this respect is a long way from Australian or American Football, sports with one peak 
competition, one governing body and in many ways one media voice. In these sports one group 
appears to exert total control and dominance. 
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
Verso, London 1991, p.30.
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From the beginning it was impossible to separate cycling and the media. Benjo 
Maso notes the presence of at least three magazines devoted to the bicycle by 
April 1868, with the Paris based Le Velocipede Illustre gaining dominance in 
the market by organising a 135-kilometre race from Paris to Rouen.19 This was 
merely one year after Pierre Michaux began producing pedal velocipedes for a 
growing French market.20 Notably, though, the race was won by the 
Englishman James Moore. Maso, however, draws attention to the fact that 
Moore actually came second. The actual winner seems to have been lost in the 
mythology that quickly surrounded a race that was, at that point, unique. Le 
Velocipede Illustre funded the race through sponsorship from bicycle 
manufacturers, for whom the spectacle of a long distance race was prime 
advertising (Moore rode a machine built by Jules Suriray, the prime competitor 
of the Michaux owned Compagnie Parisienne). It was possible to gamble on 
the race outcome, with Moore billed as the favourite, and the entire foray was 
specifically designed to attract attention to Le Velocipede Illustre and increase 
its capacity to attract advertisers. Maso’s suggestion is that, somewhere in 
between those various factors, the actual sporting outcome got lost amidst the 
hubbub of who the paper, the bookies, the bike companies and, indeed, the 
wider audience wanted to win. As Maso notes, ‘In the history of cycle sport, 
fabrications crowded out facts from the very outset.’21 The fact that Moore’s 

19 Benjo Maso, The Sweat of the Gods, Mousehold Press, Norwich, 2005, p.3. Much of the following 
history is drawn from the work of Maso and that of Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, The Tour de France: 
A Pre-Modern Contest in a Post-Modern Context, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 
2003, 20:2, p.1.
20 David V. Herlihy, Bicycle: The History, Yale University Press, Yale, 2004.
21 Maso, B., The Sweat of the Gods, Mousehold Press, 2005, p2.
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‘victory’ is still cited as fact a century and a half later says something special 
about myth and truth in professional sport. Moreover, it complicates our 
understanding of it: from commerce as merely a side effect of sporting 
competition towards something that actively shapes it; something that goes 
against the desire to see sport as ‘pure’ by lodging it firmly within a social, 
historical and economic context. 
 
Paris-Rouen was a relatively short-lived venture but its historical impact was 
immense. It proved that there was public interest, and a commercial market, in 
bicycle racing. In its wake, two things happened. Firstly, the bicycle flourished. 
The early velocipedes, with the pedal crank attached directly to the front wheel 
underwent substantial technological development, with the use of lighter steel 
frames and wire spoke wheels. To increase speed, the front wheel continued to 
grow until it reached penny-farthing proportions. In 1885, John Starley 
produced the first widely successful ‘safety’ bicycle – the Rover, which 
replaced the direct connection between the pedal crank and the front wheel 
hub with the chain and gear system that has since become dominant. On top 
of making it possible to attain high speeds without a large front wheel, the 
Rover made cycling far safer and, combined with the cheaper production of 
steel machinery, much more affordable. Between 1885 and the turn of the 
century the bicycle gained what remains essentially its modern form. The 
pneumatic tire was on the market by 1890, around the same time that most 
manufacturers began to focus on the diamond frame that remains standard. 
Fuelled by the technological and manufacturing improvements of the Industrial 
23
Revolution, the bicycle continued to drop in price until, by the start of the 
twentieth century, there existed a mass market and a nascent sport with a 
mass audience. It was also around this time that the term 'peloton' was 
employed to describe the mass of riders taking advantage of the lead riders' 
slipstream. 
 
The second impact of Paris-Rouen was recognition that cycling was a sport 
that could be used to sell newspapers. This was the fundamental means 
through which the sport reached an audience right up until the coming of 
television in the 1950s and 1960s. From the 1840s and the early part of the 
twentieth century readership of newspapers, journals and similar periodicals 
rose into the millions. This growth thus occurred alongside the birth the 
bicycle. Between 1860 and 1900, both the printed word and the bicycle 
became affordable and accessible to a mass audience and both became 
engaged in the production of mass national identities, one by allowing ordinary 
people to traverse distances previously seen as insurmountable without a 
horse and one by rapidly speeding the flow of information. It was a shift that 
was particularly conducive to road racing. Whilst track racing came into 
competition with other stadium sports, most notably soccer, the only way to 
keep track of a 300km road race was to read about it.  
 
The final decade of the nineteenth century marked a distinct separation 
between the rise of professional cycling in Europe and Britain. That division 
drifted out across the Anglophone world and has only been bridged in the last 
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decade and a half. Unlike cycling in Europe, which garnered an increasingly 
working class following, the British National Cycling Union retained a 
conservative, ‘respectable middle class’ ethic, focusing on touring and track 
racing. Thus prior to the first Tour de France in 1903, a major divergence had 
already taken place between cycling in Britain and cycling in Europe. The 
Commonwealth and the United States roughly followed suit, with road racing 
taking a further decline in the face of increased rates of automobile ownership 
from the1930s onwards, particularly in the United States. Road racing, 
accordingly, became almost exclusively a European sport up until it was 
rediscovered by the Anglophone world in the 1990s.  
 
The rise of cycling in Europe and the rise of the Tour de France are 
inseparable. As the Anglophone world effectively removed itself from cycling as 
a professional sport, the Tour marks the point at which the Continent began to 
perfect the formula that remains in place to the current date. The popular story 
of the Tour’s origins hinges on an anti-Semitic publisher, Count Philippe de 
Dion, falling out with his editor over the Dreyfus Affair and starting a new paper, 
employing the equally anti-Semitic Henri Desgrange as its editor. Desgrange 
specified in the first edition of L’Auto Velo (later renamed L’Auto for legal 
reasons) that the paper had no interest in politics and the investors tells as 
much about economic as political interests. Dion, as well as Baron Etienne de 
Zuyen de Nyevelt, and Count Gaston de Chasseloup-Laubat were car 
manufacturers seeking to gain publicity within the newly developed field of 
motor racing. The other investors included Adolphe Clement, a bicycle 
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manufacturer, and Edmond Michelin, co-owner of the tire company, who had 
already used road races to promote his brand, dating back to the 1891 Paris-
Brest.  
 
As editor of L’Auto, and with the considerable help of his assistant Géo 
Lefèvre, Desgrange had the job of both placing his publication into the market 
as quickly as possible and producing an event which attracted sponsorship 
and rewarded the interests of investors. He already had a successful record of 
organising races, and reviving Paris-Brest in nineteen hundred and one had 
been one of his first acts as editor. The quest now was to run something so 
spectacular that it completely dominated the market. Initially the project 
seemed so far-fetched it had trouble attracting serious attention: a three-week 
race, with six stages lasting for around 400kms each. Desgrange, mindful of 
his own reputation, placed Lefèvre in the position of ‘race director’ and on the 
first day, with only a few hundred spectators in attendance for the stage start, 
L’Auto gave its front page to coverage of a motor racing. That said, by the end 
of the first week it was obvious the formula was working. The circulation of 
L’Auto rose from twenty thousand to sixty five thousand. Tour historian 
Geoffrey Wheatcroft remarks:  
 
The first winner of the Tour was a wiry little 32-year old of Italian 
parents, but the true winner may have been Desgrange. His race 
had succeeded far beyond his or Dion’s expectations, with great 
numbers turning out to watch, even when their enthusiasm had been 
tested by the absurdity of the race passing through their town or 
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village in the small hours. When the twenty-one riders who 
completed the race reached Ville d’Avray south west of Paris, a 
crowd of 100,000 greeted them, with another 20,000 at the Parc des 
Princes for the Arrivee.22  
 
One of the major reasons for the race’s success is that both Lefèvre and 
Desgrange knew how to present it. Stage racing itself still lacked any real 
uniform set of rules and Desgrange would spend the next decade altering 
regulations wildly, experimenting with national versus trade teams, banning 
teams altogether, allowing and disallowing the use of different makes of bicycle 
and so on and so forth. However, as Benjo Maso concludes, Lefèvre had 
quickly figured out that to make the race popular he had to turn the 
competitors into heroes. Desgrange, a master of bombastic, dramatic turns of 
phrase, took this to new heights. Maso cites a passage from L’Auto penned by 
Desgrange:  
 
The steepest mountains, the coldest and blackest nights, the 
sharpest and most violent winds, constant and unjust reverses, the 
most difficult routes, never-ending slopes and roads that just keep 
going on and on – nothing has been able to break the determination 
and willpower of these men.23  



22 Wheatcroft, Geoffrey, Le Tour: A History of the Tour de France, Simon & Schuster UK, 2007.
23 Maso, p.21.
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The Convicts of the Route 


By the 1920s the heroic image of the Tour was already being exposed as 
something quite different. The investigative journalist Albert Londres chronicled 
the nineteen twenty-four edition of the Tour. Londres was a correspondent of 
the hells of his world.24 Previously Londres had, in nineteen-twenty, found his 
way into the USSR where he profiled both V.I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky for the 
French press. He later travelled to China and India where he covered 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohandas Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore. After joining 
Le Petit Parisien he went to the penal colony of Cayenne in French Guyana and 
North Africa where he chronicled the horrors of forced convict labour. 
Following his coverage of the Tour he wrote about the abuses of lunatic 
asylums in France and the abuse of African workers in Senegal and French 
Congo.25  
 
Londres dubbed the race the Tour of Suffering and its participants, in keeping 
with his other exposes, the ‘the convicts of the route’. It was his interview with 
the cyclist Henri Pélissier, following the 405km stage from Cherbourg to Brest, 
that Londres exposed the harsh reality of the lives of Desgrange’s heroes. His 
chronicle26 of that day is worthy of complete reproduction as it introduces in 
stark terms the antithesis of Desgrange’s hero; the convict or athletic worker 

24 Londres, Albert, Los forzados de la carretera Tour de Francia 1924, Editorial Melusina S.L., 2009.
p.5.
25 Londres, pp.5-8 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Londres.
26 This is my translation of the Spanish reprint of Londres.
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and the place of drugs in assisiting them maintain their job and to put on the 
show. 
 
 
Henri Pélissier, 1912.27 
 
 
 
Coutances, June 27, 1924 
 
This morning, we set out before the peloton... 
 
We reached Granville as the bells chimed 6.00am. In front 
of us the riders marched. As soon as they appeared, the 
crowd, sure that they had recognised them, shouted 
"Henri! Francis!" Henri and Francis were not in the bunch. 
Everybody waited. Both categories of riders went by — 
first-category professionals and the 'shadow men'. The 
shadow men are the tourists of the road touriste-routiers, a 
bunch of independent gutsy guys, not under contract to 

27 http://www.cyclingarchives.com/coureurfiche.php?coureurid=3583
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the wealthy bike manufacturers. They have a hard life but 
they've got plenty of fight in them. Neither Henri nor 
Francis appeared. The news came through: the Pélissier 
brothers have abandoned. We climbed into the Renault 
and, without a thought for the tyres, drove back up to 
Cherbourg. The Pélissiers are well worth a set of tyres. 
 
Coutances: a mob of boys chattering about the scoop. 
 
"Have you seen the Pélissiers?" 
 
"I even touched them," says one of the grubby little 
urchins. 
 
"Do you know where they are?" 
 
"In the Café de la Gare. Everybody's there." 
 
Everyone was there. I had to push through to get into the 
bistro. The crowd stood in silence, just staring open-
mouthed towards the back of the room where three jerseys 
were installed in front of three bowls of chocolate. It was 
Henri, Francis and the third was none other than the 
second, I mean Ville, who came second at Le Havre and 
Cherbourg. "Did you throw a tantrum?" I asked. 
 
"No," said Henri, "but we're not dogs." 
 
"What happened?" 
 
"It was a problem with some scum, or rather, over a jersey. 
This morning in Cherbourg, a commissaire came up to me 
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and, without saying a word, pulled up my jersey. He was 
checking I hadn't got two jerseys on. What would you say if 
I just pulled up your waistcoat to see if you really were 
wearing a white shirt? I don't like their manners, that's all." 
 
"Why was he bothered about you wearing two jerseys?" 
 
"I could be wearing 15, but I can't leave with two and arrive 
with just one." 
 
"Why?" 
 
"It's the rules. We not only have to ride like animals, we 
also have to either freeze or suffocate. It's all part of the 
sport, apparently. Anyway, I went and found Desgrange. 
'I'm not allowed to ditch my jerseys on the road, is that it?' 
 
"'No. You must not throw away any material belonging to 
the organisation.' 
 
"'It doesn't belong to the organisation, it belongs to me.' 
 
"'I'm not discussing it in the street.' 
 
"'If you won't discuss it in the street, I'm going back to 
bed.' 
 
"'We'll sort it out in Brest.' 
 
"'It all will be completely sorted out in Brest because I will 
slap you in the face before then.' And I did." 
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"And your brother?" 
 
"My brother's my brother, is that right, Francis?" And they 
kissed over their hot chocolate. 
 
"Francis was already on the road with the bunch. I caught 
up with him and said 'Francis, let’s chuck it in'." 
 
"It was like fresh butter on hot toast," said Francis. "Just 
this morning I'd got a stomach ache. I didn't feel at all 
good." 
 
"And you, Ville?" 
 
"Me?" replied Ville, laughing like a baby. "They found me in 
bad trouble on the side of the road. Both my knees were 
seized up, dead, like the bones of the relics of a saint." 
 
The Pélissiers not only have legs, they have a head. And in 
that head they've got good sense. 
 
"You have no idea what the Tour de France is," said Henri. 
"It's an ordeal, a Calvary. Worse still, because there were 
only fourteen stations of the Cross while ours has fifteen. 
We suffer from start to finish. Do you want to know how we 
keep going? Here..." He pulled out a vial from his bag. 
"That's cocaine for the eyes. This is chloroform for the 
gums." 
 
"This," said Ville, emptying his musette, "is liniment to put 
some warmth in our knees." 
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"And the pills? You want to see the pills? Take a look, here 
are the pills." Each one of them pulled out 3 bottles. 
 
"Fact is," said Francis, "we fly.”  
 
Henri continued: "You haven't seen us in the bath after the 
finish. You should buy a ticket for the show. After we get 
rid of the mud, we're white as a funeral shroud, drained 
empty by diarrhoea; we pass out in the water. At night in 
the bedroom, we can't sleep, we twitch and dance and jig 
about like St. Vitus. Look at our shoelaces, they're made of 
leather. Well, they sometimes give out, they break, and 
that's tanned hide. Just think what's happening to our 
skin." 
 
"There's less flesh on our bodies than you'd see on a 
skeleton," said Francis. 
 
"And our toenails," said Henri. "I've lost six out of ten, they 
get worn away bit by bit every stage."  
 
"They grow back for next year," said his brother. The 
brothers kissed once more over the chocolate. 
 
"So, that's it. And you've seen nothing yet; you wait till the 
Pyrenees, that's 'hard labour' [in English]. We put up with 
everything, even with what we wouldn't make a mule do. 
We're not work-shy, but in God's name we won't be kicked 
around. We can take physical torment, but we won't 
tolerate abuse. My name's Pélissier, not Atlas. If I put a 
newspaper over my stomach and set out with it, I have to 
arrive with it. If I throw it away — penalty. When we're 
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dying of thirst, before we put our can under the running 
water, we have to make sure there isn't somebody fifty 
metres away working the pump, otherwise — penalty. You 
need a drink, you do your own pumping. The day will come 
when they'll put lead in our pockets because someone 
reckons that God made men too light. It's all going down 
the chute — soon there'll only be tramps left, no more 
artists. The sport has gone haywire, out of control." 
 
"Yes," said Ville, "mad, haywire." 
 
A young boy came up. "What do you want, lad?" 
 
"Er, well, Monsieur Pélissier, seeing as you don't want to, 
who's going to win now?" 


A few briefs words about the role of the Grand Tours 
 
Originally the Grand Tours (the Tour de France, the Giro d’Italia and the Vuelta 
a España) played a role in marking out and defining the territory, the nation and 
the people. Dauncey and Hare note that the ways in which the ‘mythically 
heroic’28 Tour both maps out and interprets France as a nation and a 
Republic.29 The Tour from its inception was a ‘self-consciously modern project 
in which sport was to become a gigantic crusade, a herald of progress and 
discovery’ where ‘modern concerns with the instrumental role of sport and 

28 Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, The Tour de France: A Pre-Modern Contest in a Post-Modern 
Context, The International Journal of the History of Sport, 2003, 20:2, p.2.
29 Ibid.:3.
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technology coalesced with the fundamentally “pre-modern” gladiatorial 
contest’ and which is ‘increasingly a “pre-modern” contest conveying 
“modern” values in a “post-modern” context’.30  
 
Unlike any other sporting events the three Tours of the year embody the 
dramatics of life played out over a full three weeks. To those involved they 
seem to be a lifetime. These races embody all the aspects of life in such a way 
that they are so much more than sporting events. They are above all human 
dramas of an intense, immense stature. Each is part and parcel of the 
consciousness of societies, and a search for some truth and meaning to the 
human condition. All are built upon an idea of moulding the individual, the land, 
and people through a spectacle of involving superhuman figures that seek to 
mark out their own territories and conquer the boundaries of their precarious 
existence. 
 
In their marking out of a territory, of a nation and of a people, the Tours were as 
much a part of creating the Europe of the 20th century as was the 
documentation and administration of life as Foucault so very well describes in 
his lectures entitled ‘Society Must be Defended’ – the people, customs, fetes, 
fairs and fiestas, each day complete with the local version of cheese, chorizo 
and champagne. The Tours were created and maintained by an alliance of the 
state, industrial capital and the media. In France, the Tour’s impetus was to sell 

30 Ibid.:4. A part of the thesis we will develop here is that, rather than modern values, the Tour and 
sport now conveys postmodern or neoliberal values.
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more editions of a motoring magazine, putting cycling to work in the pay of an 
intersection of the car and newspaper industries. With its resumption after the 
Civil War in 1941 Spain's La Vuelta covered the longest route in its history 
demarcating the victor's territory across the country and particularly the former 
Republican strongholds. For some years Franco restricted it to only Spanish 
participants. In modernity these races all played their role in reinforcing the 
status of a unified territory, a people, a nation and its capital. 
 
The Tours have also been the place that traditionally have allowed Europe to 
think of itself as the place where subjectivity could still ‘do’ rather than the 
place where subjectivity was simply relegated to ‘being’. The Tours were 
centres of action in lands that might otherwise be petrified into museums of the 
old world amongst the chaos of the new world and modernity.31 But with the 
coming of the age of Empire, things changed. It was with the coming of those 
from outside continental Europe that the practices of the peloton and in 
particular doping first become problematised. 
 
It is with the Tom Simpson’s death in 1967 on Mont Ventoux – the Englishman 
whose success, prior to his death, had helped start the process of globalising 
the Tours – that doping first becomes a political matter. Still it remains an 
internal issue, something for the sport to deal with. The mid 1960s also 
coincide with the demise of national teams and the introduction of what are 
known as the trade teams. The late 1990s mark the point at which it becomes 

31Was this the root of Europe’s distaste for the American Armstrong?
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a matter for the Sovereign – it is here with the Festina Tour, with national 
borders being crossed that we see doping becoming criminalised. It is here 
that we first see cyclists being taken from their bikes to the jail cells. But it is in 
the age of Empire, an age that arrives with the American, (and in the age of the 
second Bush Presidency a Texan no less) that things really start to escape 
their bounds. 
 
An aside on Bike Booms – now and then 
 
We have already commented upon the manner in which the bicycle 
became affordable and thus widely available in the late nineteenth 
century and can add observations on the social history of the bicycle 
such as its use by the Imperial Japanese Army in Malaya or Chinese 
peasants and factory workers in Communist China. These situations 
can be readily contrasted with the bike boom of the early twenty-first 
century when bicycles became a status symbol of the middle class 
‘new golf’ and were certainly not affordable. A brief anecdote helps 
position the change. On the train to Melbourne one morning I 
overheard a middle-aged cyclist/lawyer talking to his colleague about 
his desire to sell one of his properties in order to buy a new racing 
bike. It seems that we have gone back to the time of the original 
velocipedes when the bicycle was an expensive plaything of the rich.  
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In this context it is interesting to also note that it was not until this 
same period that, for example, organised sport in Britain changed 
from being a manner in which to keep idle young aristocrats busy, a 
form of 'formation' to deal with changing social conditions, to 
becoming the stuff of workingmen.32 The interesting point vis-à-vis the 
globalisation of cycling and the bicycle is that in modern times it was 
the mass availability and affordability of the bicycle as a tool and 
mode of transport (for work, as work and the path out of work) that 
coincides with the massive growth of the sport within national 
boundaries. However, the contemporary, globalised bike boom does 
not coincide with such affordability. Here the bike becomes a part 
and parcel of the means by which global capital tends to reproduce 
itself, that is through the creation of lifestyles and identities.  
 
In this context the boom in the bicycle has not been the result of a 
boom in sales of something accessible and cheap. With the 
globalisation of cycling in the late 1990s and beyond the price of the 
bicycle soars, this bicycle is no longer a form of transport or a mere 
working tool; it has become the key to a 'healthy' neoliberal lifestyle. 
Cycling, as the add on TV tells us, is not a sport, it is a lifestyle. Unlike 
the modernist boom, with the post modern boom the price of the bike 
skyrockets. At one and the same time the production of the bike is no 

32 See also for a discussion of sport and leisure in the U.S as a nineteenth century upper/middle class 
project in Thorsten Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class, Mentor Books, New York, 1953. See also 
Eric Hobsbawm, Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914, in Hobsbawn and Ranger Eds. The 
Invention of Tradition, Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
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longer artisanal or a product of an industrial regime of production. No 
longer do their French, Italian, or Basque makers handcraft bicycle 
frames. Just as the price increases, so does, the number of top level 
bicycle manufacturers in the new world. The postmodern bike is no 
longer composed of fire and steel but of carbon fibres and moulds. 
The postmodern bike is an out-sourced assemblage – the frames 
mass produced anonymously in Taiwan and henceforth assembled by 
their European, American or Australian manufacturers at 'home'. The 
system of outsourced, networked manufacture, which typifies 
contemporary automobile production, becomes the method of 
assembly of these postmodern carbon machines that help the cycling 
industry create worlds and lifestyles. All of this is accompanied by a 
boom in clothing and accessories that enable the monitoring (heart 
rates, cadence, speed, power, routes) of each and every aspect of the 
cyclist’s life. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
The Armstrong Era – cycling in the age of Empire 
 
In terms of professional cycling, the underlying thesis here is that the changes 
which have occurred in pro-cycling and the problematisation of doping in pro-
cycling cannot be properly understood without considering the broader 
processes at play within what is generally glossed as globalisation.33 
 
To flesh that claim out a bit, we can say that the Armstrong Era was in many 
ways the ultimate vehicle for the globalisation of cycling. That process had its 
seeds back in the 1980’s with the beginning of an increasing Anglophone 
presence within the peloton.34 Despite the ultimate revelations concerning the 
Texan’s doping (see the Epilogue), there is no doubt that his presence played 
its part in the breaking down of the old European bases of the sport. In fact, 
following his fall from grace, the ‘voice of cycling’ Phil Liggett sought to excuse 
him on the basis that he was responsible for cycling’s global growth.35 His 
success was the success upon which the sport spread and ‘grew’ throughout 
the Anglophone world; from Johannesburg to Central Park the new cycling 

33 As will become apparent in the end this new way of the world is the world of neoliberalism and it will 
be that term that shall be settled upon within which to describe and characterise the changes brought 
about in sport and the law.
34 For a coverage of this era see for example Samuel Abt, Up the Road, Cycling’s Modern Era from 
Lemond to Amrstrong, Velopress, Boulder Colorado, 2005 or the more personal story of Alan Pieper in 
his autobiography, A Peiper’s Tale, Mousehold Press, Norwich, United Kingdom, 2005.
35 Open letter from Michael Ashenden to Phil Liggett, 30 August 2012 published on Velocity Nation, 
http://nyvelocity.com/content/features/2012/filthy-business-indeed last accessed 10 July 2014.
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fans inevitably rode a Trek bike (his sponsor’s brand) and more significantly, 
always dressed with an amulet of yellow.  
 
The Armstrong Effect was this globalisation. From 1999 onwards the sport was 
marked by rapid economic growth in the new cycling world, particularly in the 
US, Australia, Britain and South Africa, along with a host of other new and 
emerging markets. Armstrong’s success was central to this breaking down of 
cycling’s European roots and it followed the years of individual Anglo-American 
riders undertaking the solitary task of breaking into the European peloton. 
Finally the tables were starting to turn in respect of Anglo presence. Not only 
was the composition and the language of the professional peloton changing, 
now the sport’s patron was for the first time no longer a European. Along with 
that for the first time its fans began to loudly speak in (American) English. 
 
We will return to Armstrong and his place in this story at the end of 
this work. Within this new world order of cycling, brought into 
existence by its redemption through the miracle of his victory over 
both cancer and the power of old Europe, certain nations began to be 
characterised as being more doping-prone or doping-friendly than 
others. The championing of Armstrong and the coincidence of various 
forces within the sport that rode on his back into these cycling 
greenfields was at the same time accompanied by a deepening 
suspicion and demonisation of the old cycling world. A decade before 
the European economic crisis, the same logic that was later deployed 
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against the PIGS (Portugal Italy Greece and Spain), was deployed 
against the customs and traditions of the old cycling world; in 
particular Spain and Italy. Just as the European economic crisis pits 
lazy Latins against hard working Anglos and Northern Europeans, this 
same logic played out during the Armstrong Era in respect of 
professional cycling and doping. At the same time this distinction 
between good and bad Europe is an old theme, as Dumont notes 
over ‘the course of centuries, the (social) Good was also relativized.  
… “Truth this side of the Pyrenees, error beyond” noted Pascal …’.36 
Nevertheless, throughout the Armstrong Era, that is from 1999 until 
2013, the popular myth sustained was that Anglo and Northern 
European riders were generally touted as being clean, good and 
culturally appropriate, whereas they were opposed and contrasted to 
the southern European and Latin riders, who were regarded as 
(naturally) prone to cheating, dirty and hence culturally inappropriate.  
 
This new age saw the coming of a good Anglo rider, who had overcome the 
greatest of all battles (against cancer); his own personal rebirth was followed 
by the sport’s rebirth and with it came the fulfillment of the sport’s 
globalisation. Importantly for our task, in the process of globalising the sport 
itself, and because of its entanglement with the legacy of Festina and the 
emerging global anti-doping apparatus, cycling found itself bound up with a 

36 Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism, Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986, p.237.
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new form of law that came into being as a part of the wider process of 
globalisation. The law began to loom large over cycling, but the manner in 
which it operated, was deployed or applied, tended to suggest a new manner 
of it being done – a manner of doing law that signified a break with its 
modernist past. As we will see it is this break that is so troubling to some anti-
doping scholars. 
 
Operacion Puerto (see Chapter 2) provides us with the stepping off point for 
our focus and analysis. There was, however, during Armstrong Era a 
fundamental contradiction at work in the manner in which anti-doping was 
carried out in professional cycling which Puerto helps illuminate. On one hand, 
the Armstrong Conspiracy has described to us the networks of power and 
protection that operated to sustain the Armstrong Effect. On the other hand, 
others were sacrificed on the altar of anti-doping to ensure that the public 
pretense of the war on doping was being carried out with its full force. It 
appeared throughout this Era that the deployment of the anti-doping apparatus 
did not treat all equally and fairly on a level playing field. Was it for the simple 
reason that some were more equal and more valuable to economic ends than 
were others?  
 
A note on Terminology 

Before proceeding it is useful to provide some clarity to the development of 
this thesis by defining some key terms with which we will seek to analyse the 
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problematisation of doping in cycling and its relationship to wider processes of 
globalisation. In this work the term Government (with a capital G or the 
Government) is used to refer to the State institution of the Government 
recognised by classical liberal democratic theory as encompassing its three 
branches the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. Having said that, as will 
become apparent when we move to consider Law and administration (see 
Chapter 3) the State primarily carries out its activity of government through its 
first branch of the Executive. In this way the primary face of the Government 
can be seen as the exercise of Executive power through the activity of 
administration and policing. It is important to note, even at this stage, that the 
administrative and policing activities of the institution of Government are 
something quite different to the production of what we might call Sovereign 
Law.  As will become apparent administrative and police power focuses upon 
individual applications of power in the way that the law does not. To borrow 
from Agamben we can say that the bureaucrats – the angels and ministers of 
the Sovereign and not the Sovereign himself - carry out the administration. 
 
The Legislative arm of Government in classical liberal democratic theory is 
responsible for the production of Law, or at least Legislation. Better put the 
Legislative arm prepares the Law as in the end it is brought into being by 
Sovereign will, for example by the Sovereign, whether elected or not giving 
their assent to the Law’s being. Thus Law (with a capital L37) will be used to 

37 In an attempt at consistency, for example terms such as Legislation and Legality will be capitalised in 
the same way as Law when referring to Governmental bodies, instruments or actions, as will be the 
other branches of Government – the Executive and the Judiciary.
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refer to the rules of general application and conduct, whether produced by the 
Legislature or the Common Law, and assented to by the Sovereign, which 
establish a class of circumstances, things and people to which the rule or norm 
that it states applies. The hallmark of this form of Law is a rule of conduct or a 
declaration as to power, right or duty, in which some factual requirements are 
delineated that connect it to a given state of affairs and which are applied 
retrospectively.38 Law does not look to the future in what it judges, but to past 
events. Law does not seek to guide, or conduct future conduct but only to 
decide past events. 
 
The terms government, governance and governmentality (without a capital G) 
refer not to the institution of the State, but following Foucault, the idea of 
government as an activity rather than an institution.39 My purpose here is not to 
engage in any post Foucauldian debate concerning the demarcation and 
differences between for example the terms governance, governmentality, 
discipline, security, control or biopower (see for example in Chapter 4) but 
rather to point to the manner in which all of these terms describe activities, 
including regulatory, administrative and policing activities, that encompass 
institutions beyond the State institution of the Government. These activities of 
government are in fact carried out by a myriad or network of private and public 
institutions and actors, including the governed themselves. The activity of 
government is as such something greater and more wide ranging than the 
institution of the Government. 

38 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 – a decision of the High Court of Australia.
39 Pierre Dadot and Christian Laval, The New Way of the World, Verso Books, London 2013, p.4.
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‘Governmentality’ in the first place was said by Foucault to involve: 
 
the ensemble40 formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit, very complex, power that has the population as 
its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.41  
 
Secondly, he understood governmentality as a tendency for the type of power 
he called government to take precedence over all over forms of power such as 
State Sovereignty or the techniques of discipline. This tendency involves the 
development of specific governmental apparatuses and with them their specific 
knowledge. Finally, he understood it as the process of the Legal State 
becoming the administrative state. Foucault’s sovereignty typical of the state 
points us of course to specific and various apparati of administration beyond 
the State.42 That is to an administrative hierarchy or state that exists and 
operates through and beyond the State. 
 
Importantly for our work Agamben has described the relationship between the 
etymology of the word economy and that of government. For Agamben 

40 An ensemble here is taken to be an apparatus. The position taken is that the use of the term 
ensemble here is a matter of translation and for our purposes does not signify anything different from 
the meaning Foucault’s gave to the tem dispositif, which has been translated as apparatus. In relation 
to this see the following definition of apparatus. 
41 Foucault Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the College of France 1977-1978, Picador, 2007 
p.108.
42 Ibid.:108–109.
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governing involves looking after something and acquires the meaning of 
providing for the needs of life, nourishing.43 The genesis of the term economy, 
Oikonomia refers to the administration of the house – something distinguished 
by Aristotle from politics – the polis and (democratic) politics is opposed to the 
economy of the house and despots. The house in this context is not that of the 
nuclear family, but ‘a complex organism composed of heterogeneous relations, 
entwined with each other’.44 Economic relations in this sense are  
 
linked by a paradigm that we could define as “Administrative” 
[“gestionale”], and not epistemic: in other words, it is a matter of 
activity that is not bound to a system of rules … but to a certain way 
of being … This activity rather implies decisions and orders that 
cope with problems that are each time specific and concern the 
functional order (taxis) of the different parts of the oikos.45  
 
Agamben cites Xenophon who compared the house with an army and a ship 
where the administrator ‘… knows each particular section so exactly, that he 
can tell even when away where everything is kept and how much there is of it’. 
Administration in this sense entails an ability to know the whereabouts of the 
things that are sought to be controlled so that they may be kept in an ‘ordered 
arrangement’46.  
 

43Agamben, Giorgio, The Kingdom and the Glory, For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011:19.
44 Ibid.:17.
45 Ibid.:17-18.
46 Ibid.:18.
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Administration is a ‘functional organization’ that is a force that (following the 
Stoics interpretation) ‘regulates and governs the whole from the inside’.47 It is 
here with this idea of governing the whole from the inside that we begin to 
encounter what we might call the internalisation of government. As Dadot and 
Laval put it to govern is not to govern against liberty, or despite it: it is to 
govern through liberty; that is, to actively exploit the freedom allowed to 
individuals so that they end up conforming to certain norms of their own 
accord.48 Or, as I have written elsewhere, citing Thomas Pynchon: In this day 
and age law ‘for the first time...is put inside. [There is n]o more need to suffer 
passively under “outside forces”...’. 49 
 
The various aspects of governmentality – for example, government, discipline, 
security, biopower or control; are not mutually exclusive from the form or forms 
of Law or Government. All of these activities form a part of a broader and 
overarching apparatus of government in a global society. The ‘complex 
organism composed of heterogeneous relations, entwined with each other’ of 
government exists and is itself intertwined with the Law. The problem, as we 
will soon encounter, is to discern the particular configuration as it stands at any 
particular time, what we may describe as a point in the Law-governance 
continuum, the particular point of place between these two poles.  
 

47 Ibid.:19.
48 Dadot and Laval p. 5.
49 Martin Hardie, Deleuze: Had I Not Done Philosophy I Would Have Done Law, International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law, 2007, 20: 81–106, p.83.
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Before moving on to deal with some of these issues we need to define one 
further term, that of the apparatus. Foucault’s latter work involved not the 
focus upon the traditional approach to power based upon juridico-instrumental 
models but upon the concrete ways in which power penetrates bodies and 
forms of life.50 Rather than institutions Foucault was concerned with the 
dispositifs, the apparatuses of power. 
 
For Foucault the apparatus or dispositif is: 
 
 a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral 
and philanthropic propositions – in short the said as much as the 
unsaid … the apparatus itself is the network that can be established 
between these elements.51  
 
He continues by stating that it is ‘a kind of formation, so to speak, that at a 
given historical moment has as its major function the response to an urgency’.52 
 
Agamben draws out three elements in the Foucauldian definition: 
 

50 Agamben 1998:5.
51 Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh” (1977) interview, In Power/Knowledge Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings (ed Colin Gordon), 1980: pp. 194-228.
52 Ibid. and cited in Agamben 2009:2.
49
a. It is a heterogeneous set that virtually includes anything under the 
same heading: discourses, institutions, … laws, police measures, 
philosophical proposition, and so on. The apparatus itself is the 
network that is established between these elements. 
 
b. The apparatus always has a concrete strategic function and is 
always located in a power relation. 
 
c. As such, it appears at the intersection of power relations and 
relations of knowledge.53 
 
Agamben defines an apparatus as ‘literally anything that has in some way the 
capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the 
gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings’.54 For Agamben 
the apparatus as a pure activity of government is devoid of any foundation in 
being – it is a praxis, a practice, a strategy and always implies the process of 
producing its subjects.55 The apparatus, the dispositif and oikonomia all refer 
‘to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures and institutions that aim 
to manage, govern, control, and orient – in a way that purports to be useful – 
the behaviours, gestures, and thoughts of human beings’.56 What is important 
here to note, other than the managerial or governing function of the apparatus 
is that, although it has no foundation in being, it performs its function in a way 
that purports to be useful. That use as Foucault reminds us is often a use in 
response to some sort of urgency (or for that matter emergency). 

53 Agamben, Giorgio, The signature of all things, on method, Zone Books, New York, 2009:2-3.
54 Ibid.:14.
55 Ibid.:5.
56 Ibid.:12.
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In considering What is an apparatus? Agamben undertakes a theological and 
philosophical genealogy of the term, a task he pursues further in The Kingdom 
and the Glory.57 In the process of this task he proposes: 
 
… nothing less than a general and massive partitioning into two 
large groups or classes: on the one hand, living beings … and on the 
other, apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly captured. 
On one side, then, to return to the theologians, lies the ontology of 
creatures, and on the other side, the oikonomia of apparatuses that 
seek to govern and guide them to good.58  
 
In between these two classes he proposes the subjects, that is, ‘that which 
results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between 
living beings and apparatuses’.59 With the ‘boundless growth of apparatuses in 
our time’ his argument is that ‘there is not even a single instant in which the life 
of individuals is not modeled, contaminated, or controlled by some 
apparatus’.60 Apparatuses are in fact ‘rooted in the very process of 
“humanization” that made “humans” out of animals [a] division [which] 
separates the living being from itself and from its immediate relationship with 
its environment’61. 
 

57 Agamben 2009:08.
58 Ibid.:13-14.
59 Ibid.:13-14.
60 Ibid.:15.
61 Ibid.:16.
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Oikonomia according to Agamben included ‘the ordered organization of the 
human body’62, and ‘oikonomia does not merely concern the management of 
the house, but the soul itself’.63 Deleuze referred to the administration and 
management of life and extended Foucault's disciplinary paradigm to include 
that of a control society.64 Hardt and Negri65 and Lazzarato66 refer to the manner 
in which worlds, lifestyles, and forms of life, are produced and governed in a 
global economy. Dicey referred to administrative law’s concern with the care of 
social interests,67 or Neocleous as the regulation of the internal life of the 
community, the regimenting of social life, or the management and direction of 
the population.68 All of these concepts point in one way or another to a world of 
governance and the contemporary application of power.  
 
In undertaking our study of our particular subject matter we need to be guided 
by the analysis of these concepts, but at the same time recognise that the 
researcher, must abandon the texts that he has been analysing and proceed 
on his own.69 In our case we must proceed to encounter our subject matter and 
in so doing we may produce new concepts and methods. Our task here is to 
do so in the context of the growth of a global anti-doping apparatus. Within the 

62 Ibid.:29.
63 Ibid.:47.
64 Deleuze, Gilles, ‘‘Postscript on the societies of control’’, October 59, winter 1992, 3, 1995, MIT, Press
Cambridge.
65 Hardt, Michael, and Negri, Antonio, Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge   
Massachusetts, 1999. And  Hardt, Michael, and Negri, Antonio, Commonwealth. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2009.
66 Lazzarato, M. From capital-labour to capital-life. Ephemera 4(3): 187. 2004
67 Dicey, A.V.  Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, MacMillan and Co Limited,
London, 1920:328-9.
68 Neocleous, M. Fabrication of social order: A critical theory of police power, Pluto Press, London,  
2000:93.
69 Agamben 2009:13.
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context of our enquiry there are three immediate but overarching questions 
that arise: 
 
1. Within the context of a global form of governance what is it that is 
purported to be useful?  
2. Similarly within the context of anti-doping policy what is it that is 
purported to be useful?  
3. Is there any correlation between the two?  
 
What is it that is useful for a global form of governance that causes it to 
operate through an apparatus of anti-doping, a network established between 
elements with a concrete strategic function that seems to be aimed at 
producing a certain type of subject: the clean athlete? 
 
The New Way of the World 
 
Our immediate subject matter – professional cycling and doping - leads and 
ultimately requires us to ask and consider questions as to what law is in a 
global system, is it in fact ‘Law’ and how is it configured?  
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The global anti-doping apparatus established in the wake of Festina is a border 
crossing assemblage70 of legal and non-legal institutions and mechanisms. In 
essence the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) establishes a hybrid, global, 
transnational form of contractually based administrative law.  It is hybrid in the 
sense that it is made, administered and enforced by a mix of private and public 
interests. It is global and transnational in that it encompasses and transcends 
the Law of any nation. The WADC, its subsidiary instruments of international 
standards such as the International Standard for Laboratories, the rules of 
sporting organisations at an international and national level, such as the 
International Cycling Union Anti-Doping Rules and relevant national laws or 
regulations, such as in the Australian case, the Australian Sports Anti Doping 
Authority (ASADA) Act and Regulations, comprise the relevant components of 
this system of law. The institution known as the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) gives the apparent consistency and rationality of this system and the 
appearance of Law. But importantly CAS does not deal with Law in the sense 
that we have defined it, nor is it a Court. It is at best a private body that 
decides administrative matters by way of contractually based arbitration 
without any significant oversight by the institutions of Government.71 The Code 
is intended to create a system that envisages and depends upon the 

70 Peer Zumbansen, Defining The Space Of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & 
Legal Pluralism, in Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peer Zumbansen (Eds.) Beyond Territoriality: 
Transnational Legal Authority In An Age Of Globalization, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 
2012, P.83, Citing S. Sassen, Territory - Authority - Rights. From Medieval To Global Assemblages, 
Princeton University Press, 2006. 
71 In the Australian system there is a distinct separation between administrative tribunals that decide 
matters on the merits and the judicial organs, the Courts that decide matters based not on their merits 
but only principles of legality. Administrative bodies that have an adjudicative role in this system are 
known as Tribunals. Judicial bodies are known as Courts. Applying this distinction CAS is not a Court 
but a Tribunal. CAS is subject to an appeal to the Swiss Civil Courts. However there is no evidence to 
suggest that this provides anything more than a procedural safeguard rather than subjecting its 
decisions to the Law.
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interactions of private and state bodies, but nevertheless stands apart and 
autonomous from state bodies.72 The anti-doping system, or apparatus, is a 
dispersed network without any centre being in complete control, but it is a 
hierarchy in the sense proposed by Dumont. For Dumont hierarchy does not 
signify a ladder of command, nor is it to be strictly read as mere power or 
authority. Here a hierarchy exists or is introduced with the adoption of a value 
which allows the differentiated elements of the whole to be judged in relation to 
that whole.73  
 
An outstanding question here is what value is it that allows for the 
differentiated elements of the whole to be judged? Or to put it another way, 
following Hardt and Negri and their analysis of Empire, what is the single logic 
of rule74 that brings the networked system together. An immediate answer may 
be given by referring to one of the questions we have posed above – the value 
or logic appears to consist in a concrete strategic function that seems to be 
aimed at producing a certain type of subject: the clean athlete. But this, as we 
shall see, in itself is insufficient. In the end this value or single logic is 

72 See Articles 22.3, 22.4 & 24.3 WADC, Paul David, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code, The Fight 
for the Spirit of Sport, 2nd ed, 2013, p.6, Sabino Cassese et al., Global Administrative Law: Cases, 
Materials, Issues (Institute for International Justice and Law, 2nd ed., 2008, Lorenzo Casini, The Making 
of Lex Sportiva, in International Judicial Lawmaking, On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation 
in Global Governance, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, p 439 at 453 – 456 & 461).
73 Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, The Caste System and its Implications, Paladin, London, 1972, 
pp. 9, 104. A distinction within an identity; See the essay 'On Value, Modern and Nonmodern' in Louis 
Dumont, Essays on Individualism, Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, The University of 
Chicago press, Chicago and London, 1986.
74 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 1999, p.xii. See below: “Our 
basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and 
supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what 
we call Empire”.
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something even more fundamental to the processes we have reluctantly 
described as globalisation. 
 
It is appropriate at this point to consider another term that will become 
important as we progress, a term that will replace globalisation, that is, 
neoliberalism. This will assist us in defining the key value and in guiding our 
enquiry into the Law-governance continuum. For as we will argue it is the value 
of neoliberalism that drives, not only the anti-doping apparatus, but also the 
changes in the Law and governance that we are living. 
 
Dadot and Laval describe neoliberalism as a ‘new global rationality’. Relevant to 
our identification of a value or single logic they go on to state that:
[b]y this we mean that such rationality is global in the two senses of 
the term: it is ‘world-wide’ in that it obtains on a world scale; and, far 
from being confined to the economic sphere, it tends to totalize - that 
is, create a world in its own image through its power to integrate all 
dimensions of human existence. A global rationality, it is at the same 
time a ‘world-reason’.75
Neoliberalism is not adequately defined by privatisation or some sort of 
lessening of state power, Law and state power do not decrease with 
neoliberalism – the point is that their character and strategic function changes. 
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75 Pierre Dadot and Christian Laval, The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, Verso, London, 
2013. p.3.
56
We will develop this further when we consider the Rule of Law (Chapter 3) and 
its neoliberal mutation (Chapter 5). 
 
Capitalism is an economico-juridical complex admitting of a multiplicity of 
unique forms including liberalism and neoliberalism.76 Dumont has said that the 
economy as known under capitalism is an exceptional system, that is it 
constitutes an exception to the forms of organisation that have been dominant 
throughout human history.77 That is, in capitalism all other forms of rationality 
and organisation are subservient to the economy. Following this we could say, 
with a nod to Agamben, that in neoliberalism the exception is brought to the 
fore in a stark light. As Dadot and Laval put it economics is at the base of a set 
of apparatuses for controlling the population and directing it. This experiences 
an unprecedented systematisation in neoliberalism where competition and the 
entrepreneurial model constitute a general mode of government, far exceeding 
the economic sphere in the habitual sense of the term. As they put it ‘that is 
precisely what we see everywhere. The requirement of competitiveness has 
become a general political principle…’78 
 
Significantly for our understanding of the changes brought about for the State, 
the Government and the Law neoliberalism is firstly and fundamentally a 
rationality, and as such tends to structure and organise the action of rulers, as 
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76 Dadot and Laval, p 11. See also Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, Money, Power and 
the Origins of our Times, Verso, London, 2010.
77 Louis Dumont, From Marx to Mandeville, The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1977.
78 Dadot and Laval, p.11.
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well as the conduct of the ruled. 79 Neoliberal governance has assumed a 
political meaning and a normative significance in the context of the practices of 
government subject to the constraints of globalisation.80 For Dadot and Laval 
the political category of governance, or, more precisely, good governance, 
plays a central role in diffusing the norm of generalised competition in such a 
way that it gradually supplants the outmoded, disvalued category of 
sovereignty. The neoliberal state is no longer judged on its capacity to ensure 
its sovereignty over a territory, in accordance with the classical Western 
conception, but on its respect for the legal norms and economic good practice 
of governance.81  The principal characteristic of neoliberal rationality is a 
generalisation of competition as a behavioural norm and the enterprise as a 
model of subjectivication.82 This general principle of government through 
competitiveness precisely represents the extension of the neoliberal norm to all 
countries, all sectors of public activity, and all areas of social existence.83 
 
At the same time as neoliberalism transforms the character of the State, it also 
involves generating a relationship of the individual subject to him-or herself that 
is homologous to the relationship of capital to itself: very precisely, a 
relationship of the subject to him-or herself as human capital to be indefinitely 
increased-that is a value to be even further valorised.84 Both the transformation 
of the State and the transformation of the relationship between the subject to 
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79 Dadot and Laval, p. 4.
80 Ibid.:218-219.
81 Ibid.:218-219.
82 Ibid.:4.
83 Ibid.:13.
84 Ibid.:15.
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him-herself are at play in our immediate subject matter: the anti-doping 
apparatus. Furthermore, as we will see this apparatus displays important 
aspects of the application of neoliberalism including the constitutionalisation of 
competition, a kind of an executive federalism that consecrates the primacy of 
the intergovernmental by public and private institutions and the increasing 
secondary station of social rights.85 
 
Following Dadot and Laval we can come to define neoliberalism as a certain 
type of interventionism intended politically to fashion economic and social 
relations governed by competition.86 This new discourse has generated a new 
governmental rationality that accepts the need for state intervention and 
rejects pure governmental passivity. The neoliberal is opposed to any action 
that might frustrate the operation of competition between private interests.  
 
State intervention here has a converse sense. It does not involve 
limiting the market through corrective or compensatory action, but 
developing and purifying the competitive market through a carefully 
tailored legal framework. It is no longer a question of postulating a 
spontaneous agreement between individual interests but of creating 
the optimal conditions for the interplay of their rivalry to satisfy the 
collective interest. In this respect neoliberalism combines a 
rehabilitation of public intervention with a conception of the market 
centred on competition, it extends the term that shift of the axis of 
liberalism by making competition the cardinal principle of social and 
individual existence… It recognises that the market order is not a 
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85 Ibid.:15.
86 Ibid.:46.
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natural datum, but the artificial product of a political history and 
process of construction.87 
 
Neoliberalism thus adopts ‘a set of discourses, practices and power 
apparatuses aimed to establish new political conditions, to alter the rules of 
economic functioning, to transform social relations in such a way as to attain’88 
the objective of generalised competition as the principal norm of governance. 
Significantly for our understanding of the underlying single logic or value, or for 
that matter the place of sport and anti-doping within this global apparatus we 
must contrast the homogeneity of neoliberalism with the heterogeneity of 
liberalism. Dadot and Laval make the point that: 
 
for a long time, the so-called modern Western subject pertained to 
normative regimes and political registers that were heterogeneous 
and in conflict: the customary and religious sphere of old societies 
[pre-modern forms of particular law]; the sphere of political 
sovereignty; and the sphere of commodity exchange. This western 
subject thus lived in three different spaces: that of the services and 
beliefs of a still rural, Christian society; that of nation-states and the 
political community; and that of the monetary market in work and 
production. … 
 
Liberal democracies have been worlds of multiple tensions and 
contrasting growths. … we can describe them as regimes which, 
within certain limits, enabled and respected a mixed functioning of 
the subject, in the sense that they guarantee both the separation 
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87 Ibid.:47.
88 Ibid.:149.
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and the articulation of the difference spheres of existence. This 
heterogeneity found expression in the relative independence of 
moral, religious, political, economic, aesthetic and intellectual 
institutions, rules and norms. This does not mean that the nature of 
the dynamic that inspired them is exhausted by this feature of 
equilibrium and ‘tolerance’. Two major parallel growths occurred: 
political democracy and capitalism. Modern man was divided into: 
the Citizen endowed with inalienable rights and the economic man 
guided by self-interest; man as end and man as instrument. The 
history of ‘modernity’ has sanctioned an imbalance in favour of the 
second pole.89 
 
Neoliberal life therefore comprises a multitude of human beings who are 
subject to a unitary order;90 it provides the value that brings together the 
hierarchy, the single logic of its Empire. Liberal man was the calculating man of 
the market in the productive man of industrial organisations. Neoliberal man is 
competitive man, wholly immersed in global competition.91 
The Law-governance Continuum 
 
What we will attempt to illustrate throughout this work is that the anti-doping 
apparatus brings to the fore the myriad manners in which we are governed in a 
global system. It is no longer a simple question of simply doing Sovereign or 
State Law and the Government, nor is it a matter of simply doing a new form of 

89 Ibid.:256.
90 Ibid.:88-89.
91 Ibid.:218-219.
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law. Hence a part of our approach here will be to try and explain through this 
particular ‘case’, how law operates, or what it does, or tends to do and what it 
is not, in the present historical juncture. Rather than an essence of Law; which 
involves the eternal (and possibly unanswerable question of what is law?92 
What we are concerned with is the operation or apparatus of governance, 
something that extends well beyond what we might have called, in modernity, 
Law, (See Chapter 3) or even the Government. 
 
Just as this is not a history, neither is it what we might call a Legal analysis. 
The point here is not to set out and ascertain the Legal meaning and status of 
anti-doping law but to consider the state, or shape of the law, in so far as it is 
Law, in the context and circumstances of cycling’s globalisation. Rather than a 
history, or a legal analysis, what is at stake here is more of an archaeology, a 
genealogy, or possibly an anthropology of the anti-doping apparatus. In so far 
as we might be pushed to hang our hat on a ‘discipline’ Comaroff and 
Comaroff have suggested that the task of legal anthropology is being 
inexorably drawn towards interrogating the nature of sovereignty in the twenty-
first century.93 
 
In interrogating sovereignty (clearly we are interrogating something more than 
Sovereignty in the classical sense and following our definition of Law this may 

92 Gralk-Peter Callies and Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global 
Governance, Ratio Juris. Vol 22 No.2 June 2009, 260 at 262.
93 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and 
Sovereignty, in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Julia Eckert, Rules of 
Law and Laws of Ruling, Ashgate Publishing, 2009 at 40.
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be our point of distinction from the Comaroffs) and in describing this apparatus 
as it is deployed in professional cycling, we are led towards the task set for us 
by both Agamben and Foucault concerning the tendency away from the 
primacy of Law and Sovereignty, toward the primacy of governance. On his 
reading of Foucault, Agamben asks: what founds the juridical form when 
governance is primary to Sovereignty?  
 
... up until the seventeenth century one limited oneself to deducing a 
paradigm of government from a theory of sovereignty, it then 
became an inverse process; given the growing primacy of the arts of 
government, it became a case of discovering the juridical form and 
theory of sovereignty that were able to sustain and found this 
primacy.94  
 
As will become apparent this problem - of discovering the juridical form and 
theory of sovereignty that sustains the primacy of governance - goes to the 
core of the operation of the anti-doping apparatus. What founds the legal form, 
what form of legal institution, exists in the context of such an extensive legal, 
disciplinary and surveillance apparatus in a situation where (as we will see) 
governance is primary to Law and Sovereignty? What founds a global 
spectacular and quasi-criminal policing apparatus that exists outside of but 
with, at the same time, the blessing and support of the Sovereign State? Or as 
we have begun to already outline what is the value that founds the hierarchy?  
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94 Agamben, Giorgio, The Kingdom and the Glory, For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2011, p.272.
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The problem posed by Agamben, towards the end of his work, The Kingdom 
and the Glory, arises from his reading of Lecture Seven of Foucault’s College 
of France lectures on Security, Territory, Population.95 In that lecture Foucault 
asks: ‘What juridical form, what institutional form, what legal basis could be 
given to the sovereignty typical of the state?’96 To anticipate our argument we 
could answer Foucault’s construction of the problem by simply stating the 
juridical form is contract, the institutional form is private agreement, and the 
legal basis is consent. Alternatively, we might answer the question by reference 
to what we call the rubric of spectacle (juridical form), exception (institutional 
form) and functionality (legal basis). It may be that we need not be required to 
strictly and literally comply with the formula juridical form - institutional form - 
legal basis, but their worth as signposts for our enquiry should be kept in mind. 
 
Foucault’s construction has one element not immediately present in Agamben, 
what is founded by agreement is a sovereignty typical of the state; not of the 
State, but sovereign nevertheless. This is not to say that Agamben is not 
concerned with the question of sovereignty. It is clear his whole body of work 
is concerned with interrogating this topic and it is one that will continue to 
guide us, especially in respect of the concepts of the state of exception and 
that of homo sacer, but what Foucault’s original gloss suggests is a form of 
sovereignty that exists beyond the State.  
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95 Foucault Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the College of France 1977-1978, Picador, 2007, 
p.108.
96 Ibid.:106.
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The apparatus established, or coordinated by the WADC appears “increasingly 
to evince a will to sovereignty”97 over what, following Agamben, I dub the bare 
life of the athlete as Homo Sacer. As Hardt and Negri’s Empire shows us 
pointing to the holder of this sovereign power in any one instance may not be 
an easy task – it may be nowhere and everywhere simultaneously - the 
problem of the anti-doping apparatus requires us to begin to reconsider what 
sovereignty is, or what sovereignty does in this particular trans or supranational 
situation. Whether or not sovereignty is an adequate term in this context is 
arguable. It may be that what is required here in the end is a term other than 
sovereignty, or at least to distinguish clearly between the Sovereignty of the 
State and this new form of emergent and global sovereignty. However, the 
Comaroffs may provide us with a useful and workable starting point when they 
define sovereignty as ‘the exercise of control over the lives, deaths and 
conditions of existence of those who fall within its purview - and the extension 
over them of the jurisdiction of some kind of law’. However, their definition is 
useful only in so far as it highlights that these writers have not fully captured 
what is at stake in the Law-governance continuum. 
 
What concerns the Comaroffs is, after Benjamin, the relationship between law 
making and power making. In order for power to transform itself into an 
assertion of sovereign authority there is need for an architecture of legalities, or 
their simulacra.  Here this need arises in a situation where authority is 
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97 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and 
Sovereignty, in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Julia Eckert, Rules of 
Law and Laws of Ruling, Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p.38.
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outsourced to non-state institutions and has stretched deep into the 
management of bare life. 98 If the term sovereignty is of any use to us in the 
contemporary context it may be only in so far as it points us to interrogating 
the new conditions and the fact that what is founded by consent and private 
agreement is not a sovereignty of the State but a sovereignty typical of the 
state – that is a new form that exists beyond the State, but within which the 
State is a player. It is for this reason one of the principal aspects of this work 
seeks to interrogate the changing forms of law and their relationship to 
governance, discipline or control – what we describe in shorthand as the Law-
governance continuum.  
 
Hardt and Negri provide us with a more nuanced and useful perspective on 
sovereignty in their analysis of Empire. What is at play in anti-doping law and 
policy is itself a symptom of the coming of what Hardt and Negri have 
described as Empire: 
  
The decline in sovereignty of nation states, however, does not mean 
that sovereignty as such has declined. Throughout the 
contemporary transformations, political controls, state functions, 
and regulatory mechanisms have continued to rule the realm of 
economic and social production and exchange. Our basic 
hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a 
series of national and supranational organisms united under a single 
logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call 
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98 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and 
Sovereignty, in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Julia Eckert, Rules of 
Law and Laws of Ruling, Ashgate Publishing, 2009, p.39 citing Benjamin 1978 [1921], p.295.
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Empire. 
 
The declining sovereignty of nation-states and their increasing 
inability to regulate economic and cultural exchanges is in fact one 
of the primary symptoms of the coming of Empire. The sovereignty 
of the nation-state was the cornerstone of the imperialisms that 
European powers constructed throughout the modern era. By 
‘‘Empire,’’ however, we understand something altogether different 
from ‘‘imperialism.’’ … 
 
The passage to Empire emerges from the twilight of modern 
sovereignty. In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no 
territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or 
barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule 
that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its 
open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible 
hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of 
command.99  
 
What Hardt and Negri recognise is that a variety of contemporary processes 
are emerging to form a new global order which is a ‘network power’,100 which 
brings ‘together an oligarchy of diverse political bodies, including international 
institutions, the dominant nation-states, multinational corporations, continental 
and regional alliances, and so forth, which collaborate to create an open, 
constituent process’. This process is managed by practices and structures of 
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99 Hardt and Negri 2000:xii-xiii.
100 Ibid.:xxii–xiv.
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global governance that provide an extraordinary plural and flexible process.101 
 
As such Empire as a form of pluralistic regulation, established in the network 
and configured by a variable, multimodal, and/or polycentric geometry which 
includes: 
 
an idea of the key constitutionalization and the governmentilization 
of ‘dispositifs’ of the production of law that takes command away 
from sovereignty, makes it adequate to the market, and distributes it 
among variety of actors.102  
 
For Hardt and Negri Empire is the paradigmatic form of governance and is a 
system, in the making, with a new logic and structure of rule. Sovereign power 
has taken on a new form, and the consequence of its composition and its 
single logic is that State or national organs become mere local conduits of 
power, administration and management, of this global single logic. As Empire 
does not depend upon fixed boundaries or barriers it is a decentred and 
deterritorialising apparatus of rule that seeks to progressively incorporate the 
entire global realm and all forms of life within that realm within its open and 
expanding frontiers – it is a modulating network of command - and 
administrative law of a cosmo-political society that completely over-determines 
domestic Law. We can see this configuration clearly in the world of anti-doping 
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101 Ibid. 2009:226.
102 Hardt and Negri, Commonwealth, 2009:226-227. Dispotif is translated to English as apparatus.
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law and policy, with a multiplicity of organisations, hybrid, public, private, 
sporting, international, national that each exercise authority over the situation. 
 
What is clear is that the activity of governance does not fully replace Law – for 
example, discipline and control are superimposed as technologies that focus 
upon the body and the mind; Law continues to play its part, although as we will 
see (Chapter 5) a new part within the apparatus, the question is one of 
articulation not of binary opposites. Given these new forms of law and new 
forms of governance tend to operate upon forms of life and life itself was 
Bataille pointing us along the right path when he located sovereignty within the 
body?103 But as we will see these new forms of law operate to legitimise and 
‘regulate’ governance thorough both more formal and informal mechanisms. 
The technologies of governance and Law thus rather than being exclusive are 
and must be articulated with each other. In such a situation all the various 
machines of law exist and operate at the same time, with varying degrees of 
weight and dominance.104 
 
As we progress with our enquiry we will see that there are further questions 
that arise for our consideration. These questions push us to consider either the 
role, or better, function of both law and governmentality within a global, 
transnational or supranational system. What is it that both Law and governance 
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103 If biopower is taken as the defining feature of contemporary governmentality with its focus on the 
body Bataille here can be seen clearly as paving the way for the later work of Foucault and others.
104 Deleuze, Gilles,  & Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1987.
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strive to achieve within what I will dub the society of competition? To repeat 
what we have already posed above, within the context of a global form of 
governance and within the context of a global anti-doping policy and 
apparatus, what is it that is purported to be useful? For that matter, what is it 
that is useful for a global form of governance that causes it to operate through 
an apparatus of anti-doping, that is a network, established between elements 
with a concrete strategic function, that seems to be aimed at producing a 
certain type of subject: the clean athlete? What does anti-doping tell us about 
how this global form of governance is configured and for that matter how law is 
configured? How does it differ from the sovereignty model of modernity? Is it 
that in the end we see laid bare before us the relationship between the athlete 
and the sovereign(s) in this global form of governance? Why is it that the 
Sovereign comes to lick the feet of the wolf (see Chapter 6)? Despite what we 
might call their privileged position can we really characterise the professional 
athlete as ‘bare life’? Or does this in some way do an injustice to the 
‘traditional’ conception of ‘bare life’ as being the poor and excluded of global 
society, whose archetypical figure is that of the refugee? It may be that we do 
not directly or adequately answer each and every one of these questions, but 
the purpose is at least to open them up for further consideration. 



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The End of Modernity? 

In seeking to tackle these questions at times we take up as our academic 
proximate ‘enemy’ the work of the Danish anti-doping scholar, Verner Møller. 
Møller’s work provides us with a counterpoint or launching off point in a 
number of chapters and allows us to situate our analysis and critique. In many 
ways it was in response to my reading of Møller’s The Anti-Doping Campaign – 
Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity?105 that initially drove the trajectory of much 
of this enquiry. Whilst the author shares, amongst other things, some sympathy 
with the issues raised by Møller, one of the tasks, taken on here in response, is 
to set out an analysis that highlights the way in which the liberal approach fails 
to take into account the fundamental changes that are at play in the world 
today. But one should not make too much of Møller’s status as the enemy 
here; for in the end he is not. We share too many similar views and attitudes, 
but we do differ on parts of our analysis. By casting him as our proximate 
enemy, it helps illustrate the point that if we remain tied to old logics and tools, 
we cannot come to terms with the problematisation of doping in an adequate 
way. If there is indeed an enemy to be found here, it is that which I will dub 
neoliberalism and its ‘society of competition’. It is within the ‘society of 
competition’ that we can begin to uncover the common or single logic or value 
that pervade both the global logic of governance, economy, sport and the anti-
doping apparatus itself.  
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Møller, V, Doping and Public Policy, University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
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Before turning to Møller more fully, it is probably opportune to distinguish this 
work from others that have considered sport in the context of capitalism, 
globalisation or Neoliberalism. Brohm’s classic Marxist text Sport A Prison of 
Measured Time is one that many liberal sports scholars reject because of what 
they perceive as its rejection of bourgeois individual autonomy and its focus 
upon the athlete as being exploited by the capitalism order. For some the fact 
that the French Minister for Youth and Sport, Marie-George Buffet responsible 
for the raid on the Festina Tour was a Communist (and hence ipso facto a 
paternalist) and saw the riders as exploited workers does not assist in the 
reception of ‘left’ or critical reflections on sport by the mainstream of liberal 
anti-doping or sport scholars.106 Both Brohm and more recently, Collins107, have 
considered the birth of modern sport and its links to the growth of industrial 
capitalism, the creation of sport by capital in its own image produces a playing 
field that is as much factory as it is a game. 
 
Collins, as with other contemporary critics, importantly seeks to describe the 
linkages with the media – from print to satellite TV; and with global 
corporations and Empires. The use of corporate power and technology for 
marketing and sales purposes of both sport itself and its associated 
paraphernalia is also the subject of much work in this field. LaFeber’s Michael 
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106 See for example Verner Møller, The Anti-Doping Campaign – Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity? 
p.150.
107 Collins, Tony, Rugby League in Twentieth Century Britain, a Social and Cultural History, Routledge, 
2006.
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Jordan and the New Global Capitalism108 examines the dominion of companies 
such as Nike over a global marketplace brought about by an alliance of a 
triumphant capitalism and new technologies. The recent volume edited by 
Andrews and Silk, Sport and Neoliberalism, Politics, Consumption and 
Culture109, does begin to explore the relationship between sport and the 
neoliberal state and the manner in which sport becomes a vehicle for public 
governance. But we must distinguish ourselves even from this work in that in 
the end we will seek to posit sport as not just being another thing subject to 
neoliberal governance, but that it constitutes under Neoliberalism one of the 
highest forms of governance, thus leading us to ask whether in fact it is society 
that now mirrors sport rather than the opposite? Importantly, it appears that no 
one work has yet considered sport in the context of the particular shift from 
Law to governance in the manner that we have begun to outline above. It is 
here that we find our friend Møller as useful; not because he does, but because 
this particular Dane smells that something is rotten in the kingdom of sport. 

Møller’s characterisation of contemporary anti-doping law and policy as 
signaling the end of modernity is founded upon the view that the challenge 
manifested by the state’s and the WADA’s intrusions into sport’s ‘long tradition 
of self-governance’ signals a ‘growing lack of confidence in and an unease 
about the very project of modernity itself’. What Møller is bemoaning here is of 
course the loss of one of the heterogeneous spaces identified by Dadot and 
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108 Walter LaFeber, Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism, W.W. Norton & Co, 2002.
109 Andrews and Silk eds, ‘Sport and Neoliberalism, Politics, Consumption and Culture’, Temple 
University Press, 2012.
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Laval that characterised liberal society, namely the autonomy of sport from the 
Government. What his analysis misses is the basis of this loss and the 
fundamental and homogenous nature of the new conditions. This unease, and 
the will to impose order that accompanies it, both exert pressure upon 
fundamental bourgeois legal principles and ideals of freedom and give rise to a 
call for their return.110 One symptom Møller immediately identifies with this 
rupturous passage is the growing incidence and acceptance of trial by media. 
In this situation the ends seems always to justify the means and anecdotal 
evidence seems to replace the sort of evidence that might previously have 
needed to withstand the modernist test of standing up in court. Møller correctly 
identifies this tendency towards trial by media and anecdotal evidence as 
gaining acceptance and support in so far as it is ‘in the service of the virtuous 
campaign against doping’.111 Møller’s position, or fear, is that what we are 
currently witnessing within sport ‘may be a portent of a more general departure 
from the ideals on which the modern world is based’.112 Such a view should not 
seem farfetched and it, as has much of this thesis been reinforced, if not 
confirmed with more recent events in Australia with the media coverage of the 
ASADA and Australian Football League’s case against the Essendon Football 
Club.113 In the end we suggest that this portent has further effects that extend 
beyond trial by media. 
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111 Ibid.:148.
112 Ibid.:149.
113 This is a matter that will have to be taken up elsewhere.
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If the assumption that we have come to the end of modernity (as a period in 
history or as an organising concept) is correct, the question that we need to 
begin be consider is whereabouts are we now? Operación Puerto assists us in 
coming to terms with the situation as it introduces for us one example of how 
the media crisis and trial by media have taken over from the niceties of 
modernist law practice. As such one way of understanding this, and of 
highlighting the points made by Møller, is by reference to the saga of 
Operación Puerto. Understanding the context and facts of Operación Puerto 
also assists us in setting the scene for the consideration of the various anti-
doping strategies undertaken in its wake and the manner in which law and its 
forms appear to be in a process of transformation. But, as we will see, it also 
contains one of the essentials of our rubric of analysis – spectacle, exception 
and functionality. 
 
In the light of Møller’s thesis and our consideration of Operación Puerto we 
move on to consider the question of Law in modernity and in the light of a 
tendency towards a form of governance that itself appears as an exception to 
the Law. This sets the stage both for a later consideration of new or emerging 
forms of law and for an analysis of two specific anti-doping tools deployed as a 
part of the apparatus in the wake of Puerto – the Whereabouts system and the 
Biological Passport. Here, we not only bring to light these specific techniques 
of governance, but also, begin to see disciplines become indistinct; are we 
talking about Law or not law? Is it Law, science or even the spectacle that 
decides and adjudicates? Here one of the symptoms of the passage that 
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Møller has identified comes to light - all things, Law, politics, the economy, 
science and sport; tend to merge into a zone of indistinction.114 The boundaries 
between the old disciplines are no longer clear and in such a situation it may 
even be unhelpful to try and isolate one from the other in a manner in which we 
may have in modernity.  
 
It is from here that we begin to question the basis of Law in the contemporary 
age. References to the Rule of Law tend to be references to a static ideal, but 
what we try to describe is that the Rule of Law itself is not immutable and that 
our whereabouts may be better ascertained by considering another form of the 
Rule of Law that too has its roots in the shift away from Law to governance. 
Neoliberalism’s form of law, or the society of competition, appears to be aimed 
at biopolitical production, or immaterial labour,115 at producing lifestyles. Here 
production becomes more and more the production of affect (or 
governmentality) and we are able to see is a space where the 'economic' or 
'Marxist' critique of the causes of doping can be mapped onto the more 
individualistic or affective understandings of the problem as put forward by 
Møller on other occasions;116 sacrifice, the communication of intensities 
becomes what is produced, reproduced, bought and sold in a new economy. 
What is produced and sold today are, at their most basic, lifestyles, and here, 
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114 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 1999 
and The State of Exception, The University of Chicago Press. 2005.
115 See Michael Hardt, & Antonio Negri, Commonwealth, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 2009 and for example Lazzarato, M., From Biopower to Biopolitics, Pli, The Warwick 
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116 Verner Møller, The Doping Devil, International Network of Humanistic Doping Research, Aarhus 
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at least, the sporting lifestyle, and in this context an analysis of the doping 
problem which seeks to continue to treat sport as some pure isolated (and 
autonomous) phenomena unconnected with the heady world of global 
business or politics is of little use to us.  
 
Even if we just view professional sport with its emphasis on results, on faster, 
higher, stronger, Møller may be close to the mark when he remarks that ‘there 
is no valid argument against doping that is not at the same time an argument 
against sport itself’.117 However, as we will try to show (see Chapter 5), 
arguments against doping are not necessarily against sport or competition, but 
in their own way and within the particular logic of Neoliberalism, actually serve 
to bolster both sport and the society of competition. 
 
Before continuing to develop this line of enquiry the point that needs to be 
raised is if we are experiencing fundamental changes in the way we ‘do’ law, 
we need also to think about the role and purpose of what might be called 
‘sport criticism’. Konig has criticised sports ethics as being a ‘bad idealism 
with an antiquated knowledge’118 and in some ways this is the point I seek to 
open up for further investigation. If what we are witnessing is, as Møller has 
highlighted, the end of modernity, and if we are going to deal with this juncture 
and all that it portends, we need to go beyond viewing anti-doping policy as 
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117 Verner Møller, The Anti-Doping Campaign – Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity?, p.151. See also E. 
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just a matter for sport and only concerning mere sporting rules. To take Konig 
seriously we need to stop playing long enough; or really to play with it some 
more. We need to locate sport both historically and within the power relations 
affecting society now and not in some ideal of what is should be seen through 
the eyes of the nineteenth or twentieth century. Sport and its rules can only be 
understood against the background of the development and changes 
occurring within global capital and not by reference to a set of values that 
arose in a different place and at a different time.119  By recognising that what is 
at stake is not the purity of sport, but the control of the athlete, as labor and as 
commodity, and, fundamentally at the same time, the operation of the athlete 
within the spectacle as an expert, ambassador or minister of the society of 
competition, we might be able to start to tackle the problem. It might just then 
be possible to begin the task of constructing a useful critique of sport and 
doping policy that seriously takes into account the new conditions sensed by 
Møller. 
 
Møller’s assessment of anti-doping policy as the end of modernity immediately 
raises a number of issues which are at the heart of this work and which have 
ramifications that spread beyond the milieu of the world of sports, law and 
doping. Importantly, what Møller puts on the table for discussion is the end of 
the modernist idea of the Rule of Law and the coming of the what has been 
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119 L. Bryson, 'Sport, Drugs and the Development of Modern Capitalism'. Sporting Traditions, May 1990, 
No. 2, p. pp.135-136.
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termed the permanent state of exception; 120 it includes the idea of Law’s 
rationality becoming law’s functionality; and it includes the increasing playing 
out of these matters within a global society of the spectacle which adopts the 
tactics of a Just War where ‘public pillorying (becomes) unmistakably 
punishment’.121  
 
In one form or another it is these three factors – spectacle, exception and 
functionality, that come bundled together under the rubric of a Just War - that 
serve as this work’s rubric of analysis. The spectacle of trial and governance by 
media over-determining legal processes is apparent in many deployments of 
the anti-doping apparatus. Operacion Puerto or for that matter the expulsion of 
Michael Rasmussen, so painstakingly documented by Møller (see Chapter 4) 
serve as two emblematic of the spectacular examples herein. The Armstrong 
Era and its final playing out are also steeped in spectacular aspects. But, in the 
light of what has followed in other arenas (such as the case of the Australian 
Football club Essendon throughout 2013 and 2014) these examples, whilst 
telling and setting the future path, may be seen as shining only faint light on the 
what was to come.  
 
The law of anti-doping operates so as to move beyond and over-determines 
Sovereign power and its boundaries. It is a policing power that appears more 

120 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 1998 
and The State of Exception, The University of Chicago Press, 2005.
121 Verner Møller, The Anti-Doping Campaign – Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity?, p.149.
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as an aspect of a global administrative or executive power than as a form of 
Law that has its source and place within modernity’s separation of powers. 
Spectacle and Exception are held together by Functionality. So long as the 
deployment of the apparatus is functional to the global system its extra-legal 
methods find their justification. Anti-doping sensed though the rubric of 
Spectacle - Exception - Functionality herald, as Møller has sensed, a change in 
the way we do law in a post modern age. These factors are also consistent 
with many of the symptoms identified by Hardt and Negri as signaling the end 
of modernity and the coming of Empire (see Chapter 6).122  
 
The fascination of Møller and other liberal commentators with preserving the 
autonomy of sport and its ‘long tradition of self-governance’ is in many ways 
not a project of modernity or its form of legality. The fascination is one of the 
contradictions at the heart of the liberal analysis of sport and law. The liberal 
demands all to be equal before the Law of the Sovereign whilst at the same 
time demanding that sport, at least in principle, remain autonomous from the 
Law of the Sovereign. Preserving such autonomy can just easily be seen as a 
throwback to pre-modern times and at the same time a precursor of things to 
come. Sport’s autonomy was itself an exception to the universalisation of the 
law characterised by modernity. One of the most basic tenets of the legality of 
modernity is the notion of all being equal before the same Law – something 
that this long tradition of self-governance challenges.  
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122 Michael Hardt, & Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 
2000; Multitude, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2004,; and Commonwealth, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2009.
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In the contemporary context what the liberal analysis misses in its cherishing of 
the autonomy of sport is the changing nature of the Government and 
governance. It might be enough to point to the former East Germany and cry 
out that sport must be autonomous from the Government, but this clearly 
misses the point that the government of the population now extends beyond 
the formal structures of the Government.  
 
There are at least two things at play here when we talk about equality before 
the Law. Firstly, there is the level playing field of a society where all are equal 
before the same Law – the modernist’s vision of the Law. Secondly, there is 
the question of, what Møller likes to refer to as, the level playing field of anti-
doping. This is the liberal idea that somehow the global anti-doping apparatus 
constructed upon the framework of the WADC somehow seeks to treat all 
those that fall within its realm as equals and seeks to treat them equally. What 
should become apparent is that the exceptional nature of anti-doping law 
challenges both these ideas. Firstly, it is only the athlete and not the citizen that 
is subject to this particular form of law. Secondly, within the exceptional zone 
of the anti-doping apparatus not all are treated equally. Functionality and not 
Legal rationality determines treatment to a large extent. In the light of this I 
propose that, following Hardt and Negri, rather than equal application of the 
Law, what is at play within the realm of the anti-doping apparatus is the 
achievement of the flexible management of difference. Difference is managed 
within the framework of functionality aimed at the construction and 
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maintenance a global market; in this case a global cycling market, and more 
generally, the society of competition itself. From this position it becomes 
apparent that not all are equal before their particular sovereign, nor that of 
global cycling, nor the market. 

Chapter Summary 
 
Throughout this work we will seek to describe the manner in which the law of 
the anti-doping apparatus is characterised by a move away from, a mutation 
of, the traditional concept of Law and the Rule of Law. We will introduce and 
deal with this latter concept, the Rule of Law in detail in Chapter 3 and develop 
it further in the neoliberal context in Chapter 5. The manner that law and 
governance is played out through: 
- the movement of the place of adjudication beyond the state sphere and 
its sovereign boundaries to an exceptional, modulating and 
supranational Lex Doping and the spectacle (Chapter 2); 
-  the end of modernity and the transgression of the separation of powers 
characteristic of liberalism through forms of policing, administration and 
governance (Chapter 3); 
-  the intensification of Panoptic and Control mechanisms of governance 
and policing along with exceptional transformations of the place of the 
expert in the law (Chapter 4); and 
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-  the instigation and subjection of all of society to the rules of competition 
(Chapter 5) are all examples of this.  
 
In describing Operacion Puerto and the Valverde cases Chapter 2 seeks to 
highlight that the exception to the Law, that takes place within the anti-doping 
apparatus, is in fact a permanent exception to the Law of the Sovereign State 
that reigned throughout modernity’s high water tide. The Valverde cases show 
us how a cyclist’s consent, manifested by them joining a cycling club, or taking 
out a racing licence, sets in place a policing and disciplinary procedure in 
which Sovereign boundaries are traversed and dissolved. Within the logic of 
the anti-doping apparatus State action in pursuit of the infrastructure and 
networks that contribute to doping on a systemic level are regarded as not 
being functional to the ends of the apparatus. Spanish law with its procedures 
based upon the Rule of Law, and which thus regards the preservation of the 
integrity of criminal procedures as taking precedence over disciplinary or even 
civil procedures, is treated as a hindrance and barrier to the Just War on 
doping. The same is said for principles of International or European Human 
Rights (things that proceed only from State agreement); where they are in 
conflict with the war on doping, that Just War takes precedence. Furthermore, 
Operacion Puerto tells us how this primacy of the exception manifests itself 
increasingly by the spectacle’s justification of both the ends of the war on 
doping and the inability of State Law and Sovereignty to be able to adequately 
deal with the task. 
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As a reflection on aspects of the end of modernity Chapter 3 seeks to highlight 
the fact that within modernity itself there was a tendency away from Law 
towards governance. Here the works of Weber and Dicey, which in many 
respects are used as foundational stones for the liberal vision of the Rule of 
Law and the rational Law bounded State, appear to have been written at a high 
water mark of liberalism and modernity, such that from their lookout these two 
were capturing a glimpse of what was to come. Instead of describing what was 
set in stone, the vision of the Rule of Law and the rational State takes on the 
character of an Owl of Minerva123 moment where what is being described as the 
Now is in fact very much the Past. It is for this reason that we move in Chapter 
3, from Weber and Dicey to Foucault, Hardt and Negri, Agamben and others 
such as Neocleous, in order to describe or pose some of the problems for an 
analysis that does not take into regard the shift along the Law-governance 
continuum and all its ramifications. 
 
Chapter 4 describes two principal arts of government employed by the anti-
doping apparatus – the Whereabouts and Biological Passport systems. 
Through mechanisms of discipline, control, biopower and security, the body 
and life of the professional cyclists has become the object of power in 
unprecedented ways, monitoring both the bodies place and position but also 
its internal functioning and normality. Chapter 4 sets out for us aspects of how 
the cyclists’ life is governed, piloted and fashioned. Furthermore its shows us 
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123 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right Oxford University Press, 2008, Preface: "the owl of Minerva 
spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk".
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how its administrative and policing machinery actively searches out 
abnormality, rather than as was the case with the Law, waiting for and 
responding to the occurrence of a legal offence.  
 
Chapter 5 sets out what appears to be, according to the logic of Neoliberalism, 
and a theory of sovereignty that is different in form to that which preceded it. 
The transformation of the State into just another economic actor has given rise 
to a theory of sovereignty that we might call Homo Econonimus or the Society 
of Competition. No longer is it a question of the general will brining forth the 
State and its system of Sovereignty, but of individual will consenting to the 
injunction of having to be an entrepreneur of the self. Throughout the history of 
the State sovereignty has slowly but steadily moved from being vested in a 
transcendent God, to being vested in the figure of the Monarch as God’s 
representative, to being vested in the figure of the Law of the State, up until the 
contemporary context where above all else, sovereignty appears vested in the 
economy. No longer do we move to the invisible hand of God, as within the 
new politico-theological structure of Empire we are now moved and governed 
by the invisible hand of the economy. It is at the most basic level that this 
theory of sovereignty performs the role of a single logic of rule or value that 
guides and governs the operations of everything else within its domain. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes by positing the place of the athlete and the anti-doping 
apparatus within the society of competition. Both sport and neoliberalism seek 
to create the image of a level playing field. Both activities are shrouded in the 
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great mist of the level playing field of pure competition. With the passing of the 
noble amateur the conditions for competition in sport are maintained by way of 
the application of the anti-doping apparatus. In the context of sport, and of 
global governance, the anti-doping apparatus brings into play a hybrid mix of 
actors, sport, corporate and private associations, that seek to explicitly control 
the competitive environment by denominating and isolating good competition 
from bad competition. In doing so the anti-doping apparatus never seeks to 
address the root, systemic or structural, conditions of the bad forms of 
competitive behaviour.  
 
In this world, it is the athlete that is posed as the (or at least a leading) expert of 
the society of competition. It is the athlete that embodies the injunction to 
become the entrepreneur of the self on the level playing field of life. The athlete 
is held up as an example of the possibility of living the dream and of making it 
on the global playing field of life. In this fantasy world of generalised 
competition, it is not greed, but factors such as hard work, dedication and 
integrity, and resilience, that have allowed them to not come up short. We may 
not all be able to achieve their privileged status, their success in the global 
sporting spectatcle, but, we can learn from their attitude and their ethic, the 
manner in which they have thrown themselves at the mercy of competition. 
 
Chapter 6 serves as our conclusion to the main body of this work and seeks to 
bring together the entire edifice of neoliberalism’s permanent state of 
exception, its new forms of law or quasi law carved out of spaces beyond 
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State Sovereignty, its administration and its policing operations and its 
spectacular and arbitral adjudications. We highlight that all these new forms of 
government are backed not by Sovereign command and Law but by individual 
consent and contract. At its most basic we can characterise our theory of 
sovereignty itself as one of the Permanent State of Exception. What grounds 
this element of the exception, along with all others is consent by contract. 
Contractual governance124 or government by private agreement appears in our 
case study as the juridical form that supports and finds its basis in the theory 
of sovereignty we have identified. Consent by contract or otherwise gives rise 
not only to the border crossing or dissolving assemblage of private arbitration, 
but, it also founds and justifies the panoply of governance tools we have 
encountered. Consent also appears by itself to not only justify the banishment 
of a violator but also their public pillory. Consent grounds the police – here the 
privatisation of the police is not the outsourcing of State policing functions to 
private corporations, but it is our consent to have our body and its location 
monitored and assessed and in the end banished upon grounds that do not 
easily sit with the Rule of Law or the rational state of modernity. If anything 
grounds the end of modernity here it is our consent to be governed by the 
economy. 
 
If we identify the juridical form as contractual governance we can also identify 
the institutional form as that of the police and the administration, possibly 
better described in this case as contractual policing. Here we highlight that the 

124 Peer Zumbansen, Private Ordering in a Globalizing World: Still Searching for the Basis of Contract, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies vol. 14 No. 2 (summer 2007) 181.
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Law and the police are different animals; the former clearly a mechanism of 
Sovereignty, the latter appearing not only on the governance side of the 
continuum, but being a form of governance in which we ourselves actively 
participate. 
 
In our Epilogue we return to the figure of Lance Armstrong and pose him as the 
paradigmatic figure of the neoliberal athlete. Lance 1.0, the young, driven pre-
cancer version who seized the opportunity provided by the society of 
competition and played the game with verve and vigour. He was already a 
privileged expert and ambassador, already a minister or angel of the new order 
in construction. Being a player was the ticket to fortune and to a life free of the 
trailer park in which he was raised. Lance 2.0 was organised, disciplined and 
resilient, backed by a machine he overcame death to enforce a form of victory 
and dominance that gave him the status of the sport’s patron, but also as an 
archetypical figure for us all – an inspiration. Lance 3.0 was the sovereign who 
returned to give us all hope. Even when he was pursued Lance acted as a 
sovereign; as someone beyond the law, refusing right up until the end to 
recognize the law’s power over him. But there is no post-confessional Lance 
4.0. In the end Lance as the outcast, as homo sacer, is simply the bare life, that 
is lance after he stops having to be Lance. 
  
88
Chapter Two - Operación Puerto – it’s not about the 
blood. 

Operación Puerto  

Operación Puerto (Operation Mountain Pass), is the name given to a criminal 
investigation conducted by the Spanish Guardia Civil125. In many ways the 
events and commentary surrounding Puerto encapsulate and set the future 
trend for the manner in which the reality of the material processes occurring in 
anti-doping have become hidden and confused by both media crisis and an 
emerging form of law and governance. The portrayal of the Spanish 
investigation and trial by both the media and by many in positions of power 
within cycling and anti-doping brings into stark view Møller’s concerns related 
to the end of modernity, including that of trial by media. For administrators and 
policy makers, their aims – rational and good administration and the making of 
good policy - appeared at times to have taken second position to a perceived 
need to engage in the maintenance of an ill-informed and self-interested 
slanging match that sought to denigrate and override the niceties of the 
mechanisms of modernist justice. Rather than being a simple black and white 
question as it is generally portrayed, polarised around the binaries of 'clean' 
and dirty, or 'fair play' and 'cheating', what Puerto reveals is that the issue is 
one of critical complexity. Here the public stance and the media's portrayal of 
the situation belie the forces and movements at play as cycling’s helmsmen 
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125 For comment on Operación Puerto see: Atkinson and Young, 2008; Hardie 2007; Lippi 2007; 2008; 
Møller 2008; Pottgiesser, 2007; Rebeggiani 2008; Strulik, 2008; Rosen, 2008.
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sought to transform it into a global commodity. Puerto reveals a space of 
critical opalescence, where rumour, suspicion, media, law and politics all 
converge into a media constructed zone of indistinction.126 Puerto reveals a 
space where the global system in construction pushes forth, utilising the tools 
of the spectacle, exception and functionality, brought together by the logic of 
Just War to over determine modernist values and Law. It characterises as a 
hindrance, as tardy, as dysfunctional, as an outdated formality, the grand 
institution of modern Post-Franco Spanish justice.  
 
In May 2006, the Spanish daily newspaper, El Pais published a series of stories 
concerning the Guardia Civil investigation of a network involved in the medical 
preparation of a number of professional cyclists and other athletes.127 At the 
centre of the storm was the Madrid based gynaecologist, Dr. Eufemiano 
Fuentes. It is cycling history now that the reporting of El Pais subsequently sent 
the cycling world into turmoil as the extent of Dr. Fuentes' preparation 
programs were revealed and the affair quickly took on a life of its own. At first 
the focus was on the Spanish team, Liberty Seguros,128 whose title sponsor 
quickly withdrew their financial support. The riders of the team, directed by 
Manolo Saiz, were forced to cover up their sponsor’s name with tape as they 
competed in the 2006 Giro d’Italia.129 Drama such as this had not been 
witnessed in a cycling race since the Festina Tour. Almost immediately other 
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126 Agamben 1998; 2005; Hardie 2007; Galison 2003.
127 Arribas 2006; Hardie 2009.
128 Liberty Seguros was the name for the team after it changed sponsors from ONCE at the end of the 
2003 season.
129 Hood 2006; Tan 2006.
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famous cycling names began to emerge, such as Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso, 
with the effect - not only calling into doubt their performances in that edition of 
the Giro - but also cutting list of favourites of that year’s Tour de France to 
shreds.130 
 
Following the initial drama the media's focus shifted to identifying all of the 
cyclists involved and the matter of how they should be punished. This was also 
the main focus of the UCI and WADA; a constant calling for the riders to be 
disciplined in a manner that, deliberately or not, misunderstands what Puerto, 
as a criminal and judicial process, was all about. Hence this line of attack was 
not only reserved for the media; senior officials of both the UCI and WADA did 
nothing to shed light on the complexity of the situation.131 But to begin to 
understand Puerto one needs to consider why in the first place the police had 
been engaged in the surveillance of Fuentes, Saiz and others.  
 
By piecing together the police and court documents it appears that this 
surveillance emerged out of the intersection of two seemingly unrelated 
concerns in Spain. The first was the ongoing investigation by the Spanish 
Guardia Civil into the importation of prohibited medicines such as Insulin 
Growth Factor 1 (IGF-1) from Australia in Operación Mamut (Mammoth).132 
Mamut had uncovered a network of importation and distribution of IGF-1 from 
an Australian company, Gropep. That company, which is based in Adelaide, 

130 Cyclingnews 2006.
131 Cyclingnews 2009b; Hood 2009; Stokes 2009.
132 Guardia Civil 2004.
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South Australia, was originally funded by an Australian governmental authority, 
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 
and the University of Adelaide. During the lead up to the Sydney Olympics in 
2000 there had been stories circulating that Gropep was the source of 
substances used by Australian athletes in their preparation for the games.133 At 
the time of the investigation Gropep had in fact planned to licence the right to 
manufacture IGF-1 to the suspects in the Mamut investigation. Following the 
trail of Gropep’s IGF-1 importation and distribution throughout Spain eventually 
led the Guardia Civil to the doors of Dr. Fuentes and his cohorts. In the first 
instance it was this illegal importation and subsequent supply that the Guardia 
Civil were interested in cracking. Their interest was not Fuentes, Saiz nor their 
collaborators. Even more clearly it was not the cyclists involved. However the 
fact of the matter was that it was the trail of IG-F1 from Adelaide that led the 
Guardia Civil to Fuentes and his collaborators. It was a trail that received no 
interest from either the Australian authorities or media. 
 
During the course of the Mamut investigation the Guardia Civil became aware 
of the declarations of the ex-Kelme cyclist, Jesus Manzano, which had been 
published in the Spanish sports daily, AS.134 Manzano set out in great detail his 
views on the system of rider preparation that existed within his former team, 
Kelme – Communidad Valenciana. This system, Manzano claims, was driven 
not by the individual cyclists but those that managed and ran the team. 
Included amongst those were the team's various Director Sportifs, including 
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the principal Director, Vicente Belda. Belda later stood charged alongside 
Fuentes and Saiz in the Puerto process.  
 
In late 2005 the Mamut investigation intersected by chance with the disaster 
that arose for Spanish cycling after Roberto Heras's positive test for EPO in 
2005 in the Vuelta a España (Spain’s cycling Tour).135 The repercussions for 
Unipublic, the race's organisers, sponsors, and the Spanish state were 
enormous. For a complex array of reasons, Spanish cycling was in crisis 
following Heras’ positive test.  
 
At the end of the 2005 and in the dawn of what was then thought to be a post-
Armstrong World, Heras was the only real Spanish possibility to conquer the 
Grand Tours (Giro d’Italia, Vuelta España, and the Tour de France). But he was 
in disgrace. The loss to Unipublic as a result of Heras’ positive test drew into 
sharper focus the perceived problem of doping in Spain and the alleged 
attitude of impunity that existed there.136 It may be possible to speculate that it 
was also this loss of credibility, both in the public eye and in terms of possible 
future sponsorship and television coverage, which drew the hunt of the 
Guardia closer to Fuentes. The Guardia files show that they certainly took note 
and commenced to take a closer look. 
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The evidence given by Liberty Seguros’ Director Sportif, Manolo Saiz, both 
when he was detained by the Guardia Civil and later at the trial, provides some 
insight into both how the Vuelta disaster came to be and how the Liberty team 
became entangled in the ongoing investigation into illegal importation. Saiz had 
been under video surveillance by the Guardia Civil and was arrested with a bag 
of cash to allegedly pay his team's outstanding account with Fuentes. The 
cash was in the mixed denominations of Euros, Swiss Francs and Australian 
Dollars. The Dollars supposedly being money left over from the team’s per 
diem payments by the organisers of the Tour Down Under in Adelaide earlier 
that year. Saiz has had a long history in professional cycling, but unlike most 
other team directors he had never been a professional cyclist himself. 
Nevertheless, his contacts extended far and wide throughout the cycling world 
and he has been for many years one of the most successful and complete 
Director Sportifs. Saiz was the mentor (or, at least, inspiration) for Lance 
Armstrong's Director Sportif, Johan Bruyneel, who rode and served his cycling 
apprenticeship with Saiz during the 1990s. Saiz also has close connections 
with ex-Australian professionals and cycling powerbrokers such as Neil 
Stephens and Stephen Hodge. In Spain his followers and contacts are known 
collectively as the ‘Manolo-istas’ and they are anecdotally regarded as being 
closely linked to those that at the time brokered the power behind the UCI. It is 
of no surprise then that Saiz was also significantly a prime mover, along with 
former UCI President Hein Verbruggen and his protégé Alain Rumpf, in the 
creation of the Pro Tour (now World Tour) model adopted by the UCI. Saiz was 
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also a key figure in mustering the numbers for the election of Pat McQuaid as 
Verbruggen’s successor as UCI President in 2005.  
 
When he was interviewed in detention, Saiz said that he had known Fuentes 
since his stint with the Spanish cycling team ONCE in the early 1990s, a time 
when his team was populated by a number of high profile riders many of whom 
are still involved in the sport as administrators or Directors Sportif. Saiz said 
that after Fuentes left the team they had occasional personal contact but that it 
was, in 2004, with his signing of Roberto Heras, that the relationship 
recommenced on a more than friendly level. Saiz said that, on his arrival at 
Liberty from the US Postal Service team (USPS), Heras had asked that he be 
able to have Fuentes, as his personal doctor. According to Saiz, Heras wanted 
to deal directly with Fuentes. At first Saiz said had refused the request, as it did 
not seem to him to be the best way to manage the team. After much insistence 
on the part of Heras, Saiz gave in, but it seems that he decided to try and 
manage the relationship as best he could. Saiz was insistent in his evidence 
that it was Heras and other riders in his team, some of whom had also 
previously been in Kelme that pushed for the Fuentes connection. There of 
course was no love lost between Saiz and Kelme's Director Sportif Vicente 
Belda. During the previous years Saiz had been instrumental for pushing 
through the Pro Tour and Kelme's exclusion from it. This exclusion had in part 
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been brought about by Saiz and others insistence that Kelme was still engaged 
in cycling's old ways. 137 
 
The author interviewing Roberto Heras, Durango, 2004 (photo Iban Gorriti). 
 
After Heras’s positive test the Guardia Civil appear to have thought it 
worthwhile to see if there was any link between the substances being used by 
cyclists and their investigation of importation and distribution in Operacion 
Mamut. This of course was not the only event that had led them to the 
consulting rooms of Fuentes. The year before the Vuelta had been hit by two 
positive doping tests for blood transfusions. The first to break was that of Tyler 
Hamilton, another ex USPS rider, who tested positive following his September 
11 time trial victory, over his soon to be teammate, Floyd Landis, in Valencia.138 

137 Bike Radar 2004; Hardie 2004.
138 Hardie 2004a; Hardie 2004b; Jones 2004. On the day of the September 11 time trial as a part of his 
journalistic duties the author waited patiently outside of the Phonak team bus in an attempt to speak to 
Hamilton. Hamilton was unusually distant that day. A week or so later, driving from Granada to Caceres 
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The second involved the post-race revelations concerning Hamilton's 
teammate Santi Perez.139 On the road the Phonak team was managed by ex-
Kelme Director Sportif, Alvaro Pino.140 And of course, seemingly outside of the 
Fuentes affair, the next doping incident to really rock cycling was that of 
another ex-USPS rider, Floyd Landis.141 These events involving Heras, 
Hamilton and Perez drew the Guardia Civil closer and closer to their stakeout 
of Fuentes.  
 
Puertas Abiertas  
 
In May 2006 the Operación Puerto story broke when El Pais published details 
from the leaked Guardia Civil files. Not only were Liberty Seguros embroiled 
but also so were Hamilton, Perez, a host of Kelme riders and two of the main 
challengers for that year's Tour de France – Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso. All of 
this is old news. Most that follow cycling are now all too familiar with the 
stories of the blood bags, the nicknames142 and the speculation that still 
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throughout that race was to ghost write the race diary of Floyd Landis. Six years later and not that long 
after his accusations of doping in the USPS team and by Lance Armstrong, Landis travelled to Australia 
to attend a conference organized by the author to discuss doping. That conference coincided with the 
2010 World Road Cycling Championships in Geelong Australia. The conference was to be held at 
Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute but was moved off campus at the insistence of the Vice 
Chancellor as a result of commercial and political pressure arising because of the attendance of Landis.
139 Abt 2004.
140 Maloney 2006.
141 Ballester and Walsh 2006; Cyclingnews.com 2006c; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2006; 
Velocity Nation 2009b; Walsh 2007.
142 Barthes is right in that he tells us that there is an onomastics of the Tour. But in the time since 
Barthes, in a manner the semiotician may not have envisaged, that onomastics has descended from 
the heights of myth and epic having the status of Greek gods. They have descended from being these 
lofty signs of the valor of the ordeal, of beings signs of old European ways and ethnicity – Brankart le 
Franc, Bobet le Francien, Robic le Celte, Ruiz l’Ibere, Darrigade le Gascon; to being patronymics of the 
biopolitical, of homo sacer and the spectacle that sustains Empire. See Roland Barthes, The Tour de 
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continues over them. Bags of the evidence have come to light regarding 
Fuentes and the methods he practiced. The riders both implicated and 
suspected and the subsequent disciplinary and criminal proceedings against 
many of them have all been in the news.143  
 
Many seemed to believe that there was something else that Spanish justice 
needed to resolve, other than the prosecution of Fuentes and Co., which would 
assist cycling's ‘renewal’. This was the continual line pushed by the media, the 
UCI and WADA. But the point that is often forgotten in the fog is that as far as 
the Guardia Civil investigation and the Spanish courts were concerned the 
cyclists have never been suspects. Sure there were bags of evidence 
implicating various riders in the Fuentes' scheme, bringing to light for the first 
time the details of planning and administration that went on to help produce 
some 'great' rides144 but never was any cyclist charged, or likely to be charged, 
with a criminal offence in Spain as a result of Operacion Puerto.  
 
In this context the consistent media reports of riders being cleared of any 
involvement by the Spanish judiciary are meaningless. The cyclists were 
always witnesses and in some ways possibly the victims of the network 
focused around Fuentes.  
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France as Myth and From Barthes to Foucault and beyond – Cycling in the Age of Empire. A paper to 
be delivered at Foucault: 25 Years On Conference – University of South Australia, 25 June 2009, 
available at http://esodoweb.net/pdf/agempire.pdf
143 Cyclingnews.com 2009.
144 For examples see Hardie 2004b; 2004c. 
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The approach of the Spanish courts is abundantly clear even from the reports 
in the cycling media. For example one report has even sets out in detail the 
questions that Investigating Judge Serrano intended to ask cyclists when 
giving evidence.145 The questions point to the status of the cyclists as victims 
rather than perpetrators. The questions were:  
 
1. Is the witness still a professional cyclist?  
2. For which teams has he ridden since 2002?  
3. As a professional cyclist, does he know the doctors Eufemiano 
Fuentes, Yolanda Fuentes, or Alfredo Córdova? Has he received 
blood transfusions? If so, in what laboratory and with whose 
authority?  
4. During his career as professional cyclist, has he ever been sent by 
his doctor, manager, or other person to the laboratory of Dr. Merino 
Batres in Madrid?  
5. Has he ever ridden for a team for which Manolo Saiz was 
technical director or manager? Did he receive blood transfusions 
during that time?  
6. Assuming that he had suffered health disadvantages as 
consequence of the treatment by the doctors Fuentes and/or 
Córdova and/or the actions of Saiz, has he suffered any damage 
that he could claim in this process? 
 
Their status as such is further illuminated by the comments made by one of the 
accused Merino Batres when he told the Guardia:  
 

145 Cyclingews.com 2006d.
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Poor Mancebo, I believe that we swindled him a bit. He didn't need 
the transfusions for anything. He had such a high natural 
Haematocrit that we couldn't do half as much for him that we did for 
the others. 146  
 
Batres recounts how Fuentes and himself swindled Francisco Mancebo to the 
tune of 50,000 Euros in 2005 alone. As a result of being caught up in Puerto 
(that is implicated but never charged with a criminal or doping offence) 
Mancebo’s income fell from 1,000,000 Euros in 2006 with the French team 
Ag2r to a low of 10,000 Euros when he was riding in Portugal during 2008.147  
 
In these circumstances instead of pursuing the riders, what Spain sought to do 
was to deal with the public health issues arising from doping in sports and to 
deal with the supply of doping substances flowing into that country, from 
ironically what is regarded as a part of the new (and by implication ‘clean’) 
cycling world. The interest of the Guardia Civil was, and always remained, the 
importation of potential doping products and their distribution and 
administration throughout Spain. The Guardia Civil believed that Fuentes was 
probably in collaboration with other sports doctors implicated in doping 
practices and that these doctors and the groups that they formed constituted 
independent but interrelated criminal groups; acting independently but related 
through their shared objective of providing medical assistance to cyclists. 
These groups were interlinked with those seeking to import, manufacture and 

146 Arribas 2009. Author’s translation.
147 Ibid.
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distribute the substances. Simply put, Spain had gone after the dealers and the 
pushers and not the end users or the victims. This however has never sat well 
with the media and WADA who wanted to catch cheats. Their focus was 
always individualistic not systemic. 
 
Figure 1 Dr. Fuentes Doping Plan for Roberto Heras 2005
 
The conclusion reached by the Guardia Civil was that Fuentes, and his gang, 
developed and were involved in the practice of doping, which they described 
as the integral preparation of the riders based on illicit methods using 
medicines in a manner contrary to Spanish health laws. The illicit preparation 
methods of Fuentes used products which were imported into Spain without 
passing the normal controls applied to the importation of medicines, they were 
using the medicines for purposes other than those that they were designed, 
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and that many of the products used were beyond their use by date. The 
January 2009 appeal decision in Puerto has highlighted the grounds upon 
which the case against Fuentes and his cohort would proceed.148 These 
include that the practice endangered public health in:  
 
- that they did not extract blood and conduct transfusions in 
adequate premises;  
- that they did not transport blood in adequate recipients;  
- that the identity of the donors were not adequately recorded;  
- that there did not exist a system to guarantee that the blood was 
stored at the correct temperatures or that the fridges and freezers 
had adequate back up electricity in the case of black out; and  
- that the operation of extracting and transfusing blood was 
conducted in a clandestine manner. 
 
 
Fuentes, Pantani and Chaba 
 
The effect of Fuentes’ practices on the health of the riders was one of the 
issues raised by the continuing post-appeal Guardia Civil investigation. It 
remained the focus of the matter when it finally came to trial in 2013. As the 
story of Pantani's relationship with Fuentes suggests these practices of 
preparing cyclists clearly raise other important public health concerns. As does 

148 Audienca Provincial de Madrid, 2009a.
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the death of Jose Maria Jimemez. These deaths were not the stated reasons 
for the Guardia Civil to continue to pursue the charge of endangering public 
health but they serve to highlight the risks. Although there have been 
suggestions that the Guardia Civil may have investigated the links between 
Fuentes and Marco Pantani and Jose Maria Jimenez, the references to these 
two riders in the Puerto files have not been widely speculated about in the 
media. What the files do call into question is the assumption by Matt Rendell in 
his book, The Death of Marco Pantani, that in his final year Il Pirata (as Pantani 
is referred to) was not doping.149 
 
Rendell documents Pantani’s life during his last year in some detail: the plastic 
surgery, the outcome of the criminal and disciplinary trials and appeals, the 
visits to the psychiatrist and his doctors in Italy, the hospitalisations, the crack 
and cocaine binges, on to his retirement and final death on 14 February 2004. 
During this time it was thought that Pantani was, for racing purposes, clean, 
although he was using crack and cocaine after his retirement. Rendell recounts 
how doctors in Italy had warned him that racing itself might not be the best 
thing for his mental or physical health but that racing doped was far more 
dangerous.  
 
Nevertheless, it was in this same period, painstakingly documented by Rendell, 
that the Puerto investigation tells us Pantani was also visiting Madrid and Dr 
Fuentes. During Pantani’s last season on the bike, the one immediately before 
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149 Rendell 2006.
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his death, commencing late January 2003, Fuentes equally painstakingly 
records an intense calendar of preparation including EPO (almost daily for over 
a month), IGF-1, T3 Levothroid (a hormone used in the treatment of 
menopause) and Insulin. The program lasted from late January until Pantani’s 
retirement in June 2003.  
 
The coincidence between this program and Pantani’s documented incidents of 
mental instability during his final year raises significant causes for concern as 
to the health implications of doping. These coincidences or mis-incidences of 
events in Pantani’s last year of life have never fully come to light. Another 
Fuentes patient who also suffered from depression and instability, Jose Maria 
Jimenez, died a little over 2 months before Pantani.  
 
Figure 2 Dr. Fuentes Doping Plan for Marco Pantani 2003
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
Figure 3 Annotations to Dr. Fuentes Doping Plan for Marco Pantani 2003

 “We Don't Want to Know.”  
 
The Spanish judicial process, like any other judicial process, was not a linear 
affair. Interlocutory steps and appeals by various parties, including the UCI and 
WADA, all had their effect on the course of the proceedings. As did, from the 
outset, the interventions of ASO, the company that controls the Tour de France 
and the UCI, in demanding that a list of names be given to them prior to the 
2005 Tour and before the investigation itself was complete. In 2007 the 
Investigating Judge Serrano shelved the inquiry.150 His finding was that he did 
not have enough evidence to obtain a prosecution against anyone involved, as 
doping was not then a crime in Spain. As well as that, in the Investigating 
Judge's view, the facts as presented did not fit within the concept of a charge 

150 Juzgado de Instruccion 2007.
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of endangering public health. At that point it seemed that, to all intents and 
purposes, in Spain Operación Puerto was finished. Nevertheless, the damage 
rolled on as the riders who had been implicated, some of whom who had been 
‘cleared’ by their national cycling federations or national anti-doping agencies, 
found it difficult to obtain a ride in a top tier team.  
 
Some were sanctioned, with Basso being the highest profile rider involved. 
Others ended up either retiring, racing in lower level teams or racing as 
refugees in places such as Portugal and the United States until things blew 
over.  Out of the approximately fifty cyclists named or referred to in one way or 
another, probably as few as five have had meaningful careers post Puerto, 
despite the majority of them never being prosecuted or disciplined. 
 
In the end the sanction imposed on most of them has not been that meted out 
by the courts, nor their federations. It has, however, been dealt to them by the 
management and sponsors of the Pro Tour teams and the race organisers. 
This is evidenced by Mancebo’s case referred to above, and as many of the 
other cases show, retribution for involvement in Puerto is not legal in the way 
we used to think about such things. Whatever the legal outcome might be 
retribution manifests itself in one form as an inability to obtain a contract with a 
decent team. Both ASADA and the Royal Spanish Cycling Federation (RFEC) 
respectively, found that those involved had no case to answer. The comparison 
between Spain and Australia is telling, as in all the rhetoric one is painted as 
being ‘out of step’ and the home of the old ways of cycling, whilst the other is 
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‘in step’ and a home of the new ways of cycling, but both decisions were made 
on identical grounds. The comparison is also telling given the manner in which 
one Spaniard, Alejandro Valverde was singled out for attention. 
 
The issue is complex and defies the simple explanations concerning the old 
and new cycling worlds. On one hand, there is the position that Judge Serrano 
had refused to formally release evidence to the relevant sporting bodies until at 
least the criminal process against Fuentes and his collaborators had been 
completed. This order of the Court has itself been highlighted in the media 
wars as further evidence of Spain not being in step with the new cycling 
culture. As we will see it has also formed the basis of, or evidence of, the 
divergence between the law of anti-doping and that of the Spanish 
Constitution. There is no great conspiracy here. It is the simple application of 
ordinary principles of (modernist) justice in which disciplinary proceedings are 
suspended pending the outcome of criminal hearings. The Provincial Court of 
Madrid confirmed this approach in December 2009,151 as did the Court in the 
final judgment in the case (see The Puerto Trial below). It is also consistent with 
fundamental principles of law and natural justice and to not be bound by them 
would place the integrity of the criminal trial at stake. On the other hand, the 
UCI received a bundle of 56 files encompassing the bulk of the then Operación 
Puerto documents then in the possession of the Guardia Civil. The UCI 
retained a consultant to deal with the Puerto files and in early 2006 
subsequently passed these on to the respective national cycling federations. It 
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was on this basis that, for example (the Italian Olympic Committee) CONI, 
disciplined Ivan Basso.  
 
In the Australian case, of the 56 bundles of documents sent to the federations, 
it appears that only one page actually made it to the independent anti-doping 
body ASADA.152 Without more than this one page consisting of a calendar 
accompanied by some handwritten and coded annotations, it is of no surprise 
ASADA found that there was no case to answer. The question that must be 
asked is where the chain of custody for these documents broke down. How 
did Cycling Australia, if that is indeed where the chain broke, fail to pass on all 
of the relevant documents? Nevertheless the UCI continued to hold out 
Australia as one of the representatives of the new cycling culture who have 
dealt with the Puerto problem is a comprehensive way, whilst Spain is 
characterised as an example of the old ways.  Ways that must change. 
 
In February 2008 the Provincial Court of Madrid reopened the case.153 The 
three Magistrates of the Court found on appeal that there was sufficient 
evidence for the charge of endangering public health to be pursued and they 
directed Judge Serrano to reopen his investigation into that charge. However, 
it may be that an equally important finding of the Provincial Court was that the 
cyclists had never engaged in fraud in respect of their employers or sponsors. 

152 ASADA’s independence, or lack of it, has been an ongoing issue in relation to its cases against the 
players of the Rugby League Club Cronulla-Sutherland and the Australian Rules Club Essendon 
throughout 2013 and 2014. But this is an issue to be tackled elsewhere.
153 Audienca Provincial de Madrid 2008.
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This decision is important, not only for the riders, in so far as they continued to 
suffer at the hands of administrators and sponsors who feared the sullying of 
their good names, but also the continuing schizophrenic and paranoid manner 
in which Puerto and, more broadly, doping policy continued to be dealt with in 
cycling (or, for that matter sport in general). The Provincial Court finding 
suggests in fact that these very same sponsors and administrators have been 
all too well aware of the practices within their respective teams for too long – 
and thus are not in a position to have either their name sullied or to have been 
defrauded.  
 
The 2008 Provincial Court decision rejected the argument of fraud as being 
openly artificial and stated that it was not realistic to try to fit acts such as 
those in question in Puerto within the Spanish law of fraud. Fraud in Spain, as 
with most jurisdictions, requires that either those contracting the cyclists (the 
teams) or those running publicity campaigns in concert with the cyclists (the 
sponsors), to be deceived, and to be deceived seriously, hence the concept 
and the offence of serious fraud. The court stated that:  
 
when it is notorious that for many years there has been talk of 
irregular practices, when there have been cyclists who have died 
from the consumption of drugs, frequent disqualifications and 
sanctions, when cycling is the mirror into which other sports look 
with fear, when it is known that the caravans and logistic premises 
of cycling teams have been searched for stimulants, when random 
controls are necessary after each race or stage, and the cycling 
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teams have their own specialist doctors, to affirm that the cyclists 
have defrauded those who have contracted them is to close one's 
eyes to reality. ... there is at least an “I don’t want to know” attitude, 
and that is incompatible with the idea of serious fraud.154  
 
The implication of this finding is clear. The Provincial Court felt that the 
sponsors, and the sport's administrators, had knowledge of the fact that there 
had been a number of doping cases in cycling in recent years and that doping 
existed within cycling. The further and more important implication is that both 
groups had been happy to turn a blind eye whilst it was in their interests. This 
finding undermines somewhat the simplistic rhetoric of (individual) cheating 
and fair play, often repeated by members of both these groups. This rhetoric 
pervades the discussion around doping in cycling in contemporary times and 
the arguable hypocritical situation whereby it is only the cyclists who are taking 
the blame for the problem (we will return to the individualisation of the problem 
later in this work). For all the talk of cultural change in cycling, there has still 
been little acknowledgment from the various levels of the sport's administration 
and sponsors that whilst many of them whom continue to build their own 
careers, they too were a part of cycling's old ways (for example see the 
Epilogue to this work). The Landis allegations and subsequent investigation by 
U.S. Federal authorities and USADA reinforce this.  
 
The Puerto files refer to various media reports, doping cases and allegations of 
such, that of Roux, Manzano, Heras, Hamilton and Perez in particular. All of 
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this suggests that the widespread use of performance enhancing substances 
in cycling was common knowledge. Drugs in cycling have a long history 
starting with the sport’s birth in the nineteenth century.155 As we know, it was 
Simpson's death156 that brought the health and safety of the cyclists into focus 
as anti-doping controls developed during the 1960s.157 It was also with 
Simpson's death in 1967 – the Englishman who helped start the process of 
globalising the Tours - that doping first becomes a political matter but it still it 
remained an internal issue, something for the sport to deal with. As we have 
noted above it is the late 1990’s that mark the point at which it becomes a 
matter for the State and it was with the Festina Tour, with borders being 
crossed that we see doping first becoming criminalised. Even at the time of the 
Festina affair the ethos behind anti-doping measures was health and safety. 
Only recently, as the pressures of a global market demanded, has that focus 
shifted to the risk management backed by the rhetoric of fair play and cheating 
to be monitored by a bio-political passport regime (see Chapter Five).  
 
Puerto also reveals a new post-Festina 'post-modern' approach to the 
organisation of doping. Festina became criminalised because of the seizure of 
various illegal substances in Willy Voet's team car.158 The riders, including 
Australian Neil Stephens, were held in police detention for days, with the 
almost ‘blind’ Swiss rider, Alex Zuelle even being deprived of his glasses. The 
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155 See Hoberman, J.M., 1992, Mortal Engines: the science of performance and the dehumanization of 
sport, The Blackburn Press, where he chronicles the early links between cycling and medical research.
156 Fotheringham 2003.
157 Houlihan 1999.
158 Voet 2001.
111
Festina affair exposed the old team- based practices of preparation, where 
team doctors themselves were responsible for the team's doping program. In 
the aftermath of Festina that system began to break down and it seems that it 
was replaced by a more networked and outsourced preparation system. 
Operación Puerto exposes the outsourced network model that came into 
existence in cycling in great detail. It also suggest that Liberty returned to a 
more team-based approach as Saiz was aware of the dangers to his rider's 
health, not to say the team's reputation, if they were left alone and allowed to 
do their own thing. Journalist and ex-professional Paul Kimmage has argued 
that rather than dealing with its history and the problem of doping, in a post-
Festina world these practices only became further perfected.159  
Spectacle, Exception and Functionality.  

Spain and Australia, in the guise of Valverde and Davis, were the unfortunate 
focus of another Operación Puerto sideshow that was played out in advance of 
the 2007 World Cycling Championships in Stuttgart.160 Although at that point 
there was only speculation and rumour as to Valverde's involvement in Puerto, 
the Stuttgart Organising Committee decided that this was enough to cause 
them to not want Valverde to compete in the 2007 World Championships to be 
held in that city. This involvement, they said, was sufficient to exclude 
Valverde; his presence was not consistent with the city's plans to give cycling 
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159 Velocity Nation 2009b.
160 Cyclingnews.com 2007a; 2007b; 2007c
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a new start. The UCI quickly fell into line with their hosts and announced that, 
not only were they prohibiting Valverde from riding, but also that they would 
commence disciplinary proceedings against him. The problem for the UCI and 
Stuttgart was that they had opened a can of worms in that other riders who 
had been listed to start at the World Championships were in a similar or even 
worse position than Valverde in relation to their documented Puerto 
involvement. The problem here is clearly not one of proven guilt, but of 
suspicion of doping itself being sufficient for an athlete to be sanctioned. The 
Stuttgart organisers didn’t want to be associated with the smell of disrepute 
that the media had whipped up. Rumour and notions of disrepute figure again 
in the later exclusion of Michael Rasmussen from the Tour de France (see 
Chapter Five) and away from cycling it was disrepute and the Kafkaesque 
claim that Essendon Football Club could not prove that they had not doped 
that drove the Australian Football League (AFL) though the crisis of its own 
making in Australia in from 2013 and 2015. 
 
On having the inconsistency of their position brought to their notice the UCI 
quickly decided that the cases of Davis and Valverde were the same and that 
both, along with the Czech, Rene Andrle, they all would be excluded from the 
race.161 It did not matter that the Court in Spain had restricted the use of the 
Puerto evidence until that case was concluded, nor that the RFEC and ASADA 
had found that both Valverde and Davis had no case to answer. The law, or 
force of law, was now being simultaneously made, interpreted and applied by 
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161 McQuaid 2007.
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the UCI, the Stuttgart Race Organising Committee and sponsors of the World 
Championship. Even the agreement between the UCI and the RFEC to mediate 
the dispute in the CAS rather than the RFEC seeking an injunction in a civil 
court did not bring about a result that the race organisers found to be 
satisfactory or binding. Davis also commenced proceedings in CAS and the 
matters seemed to be effectively resolved with the CAS Arbitrator considering:  
 
…that a ban imposed on a cyclist, not yet recognised as guilty of 
doping, from participating in the World Championships constituted a 
form of advance sanction. … the UCI was prevented from 
implementing the type of procedure which would allow it to 
pronounce such a severe sanction whilst maintaining in an adequate 
manner the rights of the cyclist.162  
 
In short, CAS found that the Organising Committee and the UCI had sought to 
deny the riders natural justice. Unimpressed by the outcome, the German 
Interior Minister froze the government's subsidy to the organisers of the race.163 
The crisis created in the spectacle was in the end not resolved by law, even 
sporting or anti-doping law, but by the application of the exception in order to 
achieve the functional outcome of cycling’s perceived clean start.  
 
Law, Beyond a Boundary 
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163 Bike Radar 2007.
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As we will come to see, when Puerto finally came to trial, the presiding judge, 
Justice Santamaría Matesan restated the earlier decisions by various Spanish 
judges and courts refusing to allow access to and the subsequent declaration 
of invalidity concerning the access gained by the CONI to one of the blood 
bags comprised in the evidence.164 These orders were central the particular 
sideshow of the Spanish Puerto process that featured Alejandro Valverde and 
involved his prosecution by the Italian authorities for doping. It is in fact much 
more than a sideshow, being in so far as the UCI and WADA were concerned, 
the main game. 
 
Figure 4 Dr. Fuentes Doping Plan for Alan Davis 2005165
 

164 Juzgado De Lo Penal Nº 21 De Madrid, Juicio Oral nº 52 de 2012., Doña Julia Patricia Santamaría 
Matesanz, Magistrada-Juez del Juzgado de lo Penal nº 21 de Madrid, SENTENCIA Nº144/13, 
procedimiento abreviado nº 4293/06: Eufemiano Claudio Fuentes Rodriguez, Jose Ignacio Labarta 
Barrera, Vicente Belda Vicedo,Manuel Saiz Balbas, Yolanda Fuentes Rodriguez, hereinafter Sentencia 
Final pp.328-329.
165 There are no similar documents of Dr. Fuentes that relate to Alejandro Valverde.
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On 16 March 2010, three years before the finalisation of the Spanish criminal 
process in Operación Puerto, and two and a half years after the Stuttgart 
events described above, the CAS delivered its award banning the Spanish 
cyclist Alejandro Valverde from competition for a period of two years. That 
decision was the result of what Martinez describes as a complex maze of 
administrative and arbitration processes.166 For our purposes this maze raises 
issues central to the administration of anti-doping law and its interaction with 
the Sovereign Law of the State. It is at this point that we will begin to more 
clearly distinguish the operation of Law in the Sovereign and modernist sense 
from the transnational, or supranational, form, or force, of law called forth by 
the anti-doping apparatus. 
 
The core question raised by Valverde’s case, which itself provides the reason 
why it was so tenaciously pursued by WADA, is that it squarely raises (and 
decides) the question as to whether a sovereign state’s domestic Law, its 
Constitutional rights and guarantees or even International or European 
standards of Human Rights, are overridden or over-determined by the 
transnational anti-doping apparatus. As we have seen along with the complex 
Legal issues, this problem immediately gave rise to the charges that ‘Spain is 
an open bar for doping’ and that ‘in Spain there are all kinds of obstacles 
placed in the way of punishing athletes for doping violations’.167 To be clear the 
particular obstacle placed in the path of the Just War on doping that was being 
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166 Martinez J.,L., El Caso Valverde: Un complejo entresijo de decisions y actuaciones legales. Analisis  
del laudo TAS 2009/A/1879, 42 RJDE30 A310: 413, 2010
167 Martinez 2010:413.
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complained about was the Spanish system of Law based upon post-Franco 
notions of a Soveriegn Estado de Derecho (a State governed by Law, that is in 
the Anglo sense, the Rule of Law). 
 
The Valverde cases, involved not one but three separate proceedings brought 
against him in or appealed to CAS. The maze of decisions are further 
complicated by some of the proceedings being heard together. It must also be 
recalled that so far as the Spanish criminal proceedings were concerned, 
neither Valverde nor any other cyclist was ever treated as a suspect. In order of 
their date of decision the three CAS decisions are:  
 
 WADA & UCI v Alejandro Valverde & Royal Spanish Cycling Federation 
(RFEC) (CAS 2007/A/1396 & CAS 2007/A/1402) decided 10 July 2008 
(Valverde 1); 
 Alejandro Valverde Belmonte v Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano 
(CONI) (2009/A/1879 CAS) decided 16 March 2010 (Valverde 2); and 
 WADA & UCI v RFEC & Alejandro Valverde (CAS 2007/A/1396 & CAS 
2007/A/1402) decided 31 May 2010 (Valverde 3).  
 
In summary, the first and last decisions concerned the refusal by the RFEC to 
initiate disciplinary proceedings against Valverde for alleged doping offences 
arising from the criminal investigation into Operación Puerto. The second 
decision concerns the proceedings brought against Valverde in relation to 
117
Operación Puerto by CONI and which sets the stage for the global ban 
imposed upon him in the final decision. It is the detail of the decisions of March 
16th and 31 May 2010 that highlight for us some of the challenges brought 
about by the anti-doping apparatus and their effect on principles associated 
with notions of State Sovereignty.  
 
Since about 2004 Valverde had emerged as one of the most exciting 
professional cyclists on the scene – being competitive on all terrains except 
maybe the individual time trial; he had, in his Tour de France debut, 
successfully challenged Lance Armstrong in the Alps on stage 10 from 
Grenoble to Courchevel in the 2005 Tour de France.  Many saw him as the 
emerging star of professional cycling. He brought style and passion to a 
cycling world that was dominated by the robotic Armstrong machine. One of 
the early occasions I saw him race brought that feeling of euphoria and goose 
bumps one has witnessing something exciting, if not, marvelous. Valverde was 
also a product of Vicente Belda’s Kelme team and not a protégé of the Saiz 
dynasty with its strong connections to both Armstrong’s Director Bruyneel, and 
the UCI hierarchy, its President Pat McQuaid and cycling’s godfather, Hein 
Verbruggen. 
 
When in May 2006 the Guardia Civil seized blood bags and plasma and 
arrested, among others, Dr. Eufemiano Fuentes, they found him to be carrying 
a business card from a hotel that had on the reverse side a notation: 
"Valverde". Another business card found in the possession of Fuentes was that 
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of the Head of the UCI Medical Commission, Dr. Mario Zorzoli. Strangely, one 
of the few comments made by Fuentes to the Guardia Civil as they completed 
the search of his premises was ‘did you find everything on Valverde?’ Along 
with the business card, Report No. 116 of the Guardia Civil in the Operación 
Puerto documents referred to a bag of plasma bearing the code "18 VALV. 
(PITI) ', -' bag No. 18 ". It was this bag that above all others becomes the 
centre of attention in the Puerto media spectacle and it was this bag amongst 
others that would be later analysed by the Anti-Doping Laboratory in 
Barcelona, an analysis that detected high levels of erythropoietin recombinant 
(EPO). When and where the blood was extracted, when, where and in what 
circumstances the EPO was added were never explored by either the media or 
CAS. 
 
As we have already seen in October 2006, Investigating Judge Serrano had by 
two orders prohibited the use of evidence in the Spanish criminal proceedings 
in any disciplinary or administrative processes until such time as the criminal 
processes were concluded. We have already dealt with this and mentioned the 
final orders of the Puerto Court that again refused WADA access to the blood 
bags held as part of the evidence. But as will become evident it is the refusals 
and subsequent orders annulling access to Blood Bag No. 18 that the CAS 
decisions revolve around.  
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Valverde 1 

The decision of CAS in Valverde 1 begins by reciting the view that although the 
applicability of UCI’s anti-doping rules ultimately derive their source from the 
membership of Valverde to the RFEC, that is by way of private agreement, that 
nevertheless they ‘may be more in the realm of a statute or a bylaw, or general 
conditions to a contract than a contract between the parties’.168 This distinction 
was not determinative of the manner in which CAS dealt with the first of the 
two interlocutory issues before them, which related to the time in which an 
appeal should be commenced. But for your purposes what it points to is that 
on joining a sporting federation an athlete is said to accept implicitly or 
explicitly to be bound by the rules found in the WADA Code and reproduced in 
their own sport’s rules. Furthermore, although that agreement is expressed by 
contract, and that the WADC is regarded as a being a species of contract and 
not an international treaty169, what is brought forth by the Code is an institution 
carrying with it, effectively for the lives of the athlete, constitutional powers. As 
we will continue to see this single act of joining a sporting club brings with it a 
whole new universe of law and governance. 
 

168 WADA & UCI v Alejandro Valverde & Royal Spanish Cycling Federation (RFEC) (CAS 2007/A/1396 
& CAS 2007/A/1402) decided 10 July 2008 (Valverde 1).
169 US Olympic Committee v International Olympic Committee, CAS 2011/0/2422, states that the 
WADC is not an international treaty but a contractual instrument that binds its signatories in accordance 
with private international law: see paragraph 8.2.1. For a discussion of the Lausanne UNESCO Treaty 
and the origins of WADA see Dag Vidar Hanstad, Andy Smith and Ivan Waddington, The Establishment 
of the World Anti-Doping Agency: A Study of the Management of Organizational Change and 
Unplanned Outcomes, International Review for the Sociology of Sport 2008 43: 227.
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The second issue before CAS in Valverde 1 is of direct interest to us in telling 
this particular part of the story. That issue concerned the request by the UCI 
and WADA to have Valverde subjected to the collection of a biological sample, 
such as hair or nail clippings, for the purpose of carrying out a DNA analysis. 
The point of WADA and the UCI requesting the DNA analysis was to enable 
them, if possible in the future, to carry out a comparison of Valverde’s DNA 
with that of Blood Bag No.18 held by the Guardia Civil as part of the evidence 
collected in Operación Puerto. CAS rejected the application for a biological 
sample, leaving open the matter to be revisited in the future. Their reasoning 
behind the rejection turned upon the fact that at the time of this decision the 
evidence gathered in Operación Puerto, particularly the blood bags, were not 
available for use in sporting disciplinary matters because of the orders of the 
Investigating Judge Serrano and his answer to a letter from CAS of 1 April 
2008. Given the blood bag was not available as evidence until the Spanish 
criminal proceedings were determined, CAS decided that there was no point in 
the taking of the biological sample at that time as no comparison could in fact 
be made. Nevertheless, the question of access to Valverde’s DNA and blood 
would not go away. 
 
An Italian passage 

On the day Valverde 1 was handed down Valverde himself arrived second on 
the road in stage six of the Tour de France from Aigurande to Super-Besse 
Sancy. He had already won the opening stage of the Tour and was, along with 
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Cadel Evans, one of the two main favourites for that Tour which was eventually 
won by the veteran Spaniard, Carlos Sastre. The victory in stage six would later 
be awarded to Valverde after the Italian Ricardo Ricco tested positive for CERA 
(Continuous Erythropoiesis Receptor Activator) a week or so later.170 I had sat 
in a bar in Barcelona airport, awaiting a connection to Bilbao; my Basque 
companion’s comment on Ricco’s incredible win was given in the form of him 
mimicking an injection into his arm. After the race in Bilbao when I spoke to 
Ricco’s team director he told me that after seeing the win he grabbed the 
Italian and asked him ‘what have you done?!?!’.  
 
Eleven days after the CAS decision in Valverde 1 that had denied the 
application of WADA and the UCI for a bodily sample, stage fifteen of the Tour 
de France travelled 125 of its 183 kilometres through Italian territory. Australian 
Simon Gerrans, who after advising his breakaway companions that he would 
not commence the finish, did exactly that, and won the day; one of his 
breakaway companions Egoi Martinez later questioned the integrity of the 
Australian. Valverde had finished that day in the main group of contenders for 
the overall classification about four minutes behind the Gerrans-Martinez 
group. It was on that Sunday 20 July 2008, after the completion of the eighty-
three kilometres from Embrun in France to Prato Nevoso, that an official from 
CONI performed an in-competition anti-doping control on Valverde. The 
control included a blood test. The test was the routine sort of in-competition 
test that cyclists are subjected to daily after they race. For all immediate intents 

170 http://velonews.competitor.com/2008/07/news/road/riccardo-ricco-tests-positive-saunier-duval-team-
withdraws-from-tour-de-france_80269.
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and purposes these tests are to be used to determine if an athlete is doping in 
that particular competition. The test was negative and it gave rise to no 
evidence that suggested at the time Valverde was in fact doping. At the time 
Valverde might have though nothing more of it. He may not have even 
recognised the name of the person, Dr. Tiziana Sansolini, who took the test, 
but nevertheless, it is this test that sets the scene for WADA, the UCI and CONI 
to outflank the Spanish and the decision of CAS in Valverde 1. 
 
If we fast-forward six months, to January 2009, Investigating Judge Serrano is 
on vacation from his chambers in Madrid, and in his place is Acting Judge 
Jimenez. On the basis of apparent letters rogatory received from Italy, 
Investigating Judge Jimenez authorised the Italian judicial police to proceed 
with an extraction of blood samples from the Blood Bag Number 18 in the 
laboratory in Barcelona where the evidence was held. At the time there was 
some confusion as to whether the request in the letters rogatory were actually 
made by the CONI prosecutor or by the criminal prosecutor of Rome. Letters 
rogatory are a formal request from court to a foreign court for some type of 
judicial assistance, commonly in the case of service of documents. What will 
later become an issue is on whose behalf were the letters rogatory issued – 
was it CONI, an Italian governmental sporting body or from the criminal 
prosecutor of Rome? In order to overcome any such legal barriers the Italian 
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police deputised, as acting Carbineri, the same Dr. Tiziana Sansolini, the CONI 
official that had taken the sample of Valverde’s blood in Prato Nevoso.171  
 
As a result of gaining access to the blood, in February 2009, CONI analysed 
the DNA from blood obtained in the Tour de France in 2008 and the DNA 
content of the plasma in Blood Bag No. 18, and concluded that there was a 
match. The scientific or evidentiary basis of the match does not seem to have 
been explored in CAS (see below the discussion of the use of DNA evidence in 
respect of the Biological Passport Chapter 4). Thus begins CONI’s accusations 
against Valverde for doping, which quickly were picked up by the cycling 
media and where the allegations take on a life of their own. 
 
But this is not the end of the story, on his return from holiday Judge Serrano 
issued an Order of Revocation172 on the basis that CONI was not a judicial 
authority and that, under the Judicial Assistance Convention of May 29, 2000, 
such orders are only available in the case of public authorities. CONI’s 
apparent status as a private sporting organisation meant that in the eyes of the 
Spanish system that they were not entitled to seek such international judicial 
cooperation. The effect of this Order of Revocation under Spanish law was that 
the use by CONI as evidence of Blood Bag Number 18 was not valid; and the 

171 Adding to the confusion is the fact that previously Serrano had authorised two letters rogatory in the 
case of blood bags allegedly corresponding to the Italian rider, Ivan Basso and the German, Jan Ulrich. 
This authorisation had allowed the cyclist’s respective federations to take disciplinary action against 
them. Probably from Serrano’s perspective he treated these foreign nationals as being in a different 
position to a Spanish national subject to RFEC’s jurisdiction.
172 Dated February 18, 2009.
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cooperation procedure with CONI was declared to be null and void. It should 
be noted that this order came following the previous order prohibiting the use 
of the Puerto evidence in administrative or sporting disciplinary procedures 
until the criminal process against Dr. Fuentes et al were concluded. CONI 
appealed the Revocation Order in the Spanish Courts and the Audiencia 
Provincial de Madrid dismissed their appeal on 18 January 2010.173 
 
Notwithstanding this on May 11, 2009 the CONI’s Tribunale Nazionale 
Antidoping (TNA) had already gone ahead and sanctioned Valverde giving him 
a two-year ‘prohibitive’ or ‘precautionary’ ban from competition in Italy. The 
TNA decided that the various orders of the Spanish Court had no effect in the 
case of a proceeding taking place under the auspices of Italian sports law. 
Despite orders and latter appeal decisions by Spanish Courts, and the 
subsequent rejection of CONI’s appeal, the TNA position was that the request 
for cooperation came from an international judicial authority (the police 
Prosecutor’s Office of Rome) rather than CONI. The implication was that there 
was an existing criminal investigation into Valverde’s activities by the Italian 
police. There was however never any criminal prosecution of Valverde in Italy, 
nor in any other place for that matter. In effect a sporting tribunal, the TNA, 
decided that they could adjudge a Spanish citizen, for offences that allegedly 
occurred on Spanish territory, despite rulings of a superior Spanish Court 
prohibiting the use of the evidence, and on the basis of a matrix of 

173 Martinez  p.439.
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circumstantial evidence not entirely related to the issue. All of these matters 
come to be agitated before CAS in Valverde 2 & 3. 
Valverde 2  
 
In June 2009 Valverde appealed the TNA decision to ban him from competition 
within Italy to CAS. Consistent with CAS jurisprudence on the WADA Code 
CAS found that given CONI had discovered the asserted violation and thus the 
matter would have to be decided according to the CONI rules and not those of 
WADA or the UCI.174 The effect of this is that the appeal by Valverde was 
restricted to the preventive ban imposed under the CONI rules and not any 
possible further ban that might be sought to be imposed under the WADC or 
the UCI rules. Apart from this the question of what facts made out the violation, 
including when and where it had actually occurred is not one that has been 
ultimately decided with any clarity by any of the CAS decisions.175  
 
It needs to be recalled that at this point Valverde’s case had been considered 
and decided by the sporting authorities within Spain. The RFEC, as did ASADA 
in the Australian instance of Davis, decided that there was no evidence 
available upon which to proceed with any disciplinary action against the 
various cyclists. To Valverde, his case had been heard and decided in his 
favour and having to be prosecuted again by CONI amounted to a form of 

174 Valverde 2 para 76.
175 See Valverde 2 para 78, 81, 82, 94.
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double jeopardy. Valverde maintained this argument throughout the various 
CAS proceedings, along with this he claimed that his prosecution was contrary 
to the guarantees of equal treatment under the Law provided by both the 
Spanish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, and that 
there was no admissible evidence available to prove any case against him. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, and following hearing evidence from former 
Kelme rider, Jesus Manzano, who stated that Valverde had been involved in 
doping practices with Dr. Fuentes at their former team, and from a Spanish 
journalist, Enrique Iglesias, who gave evidence that Valverde owned a dog 
named "PITI", on March 16, 2010, CAS confirmed the two-year preventative 
ban imposed by CONI in Valverde 1 that prevented him from participating in 
competitions in Italy.   
 
The reasoning of CAS highlights a problem that is central to our thesis: to what 
extent did this new form of law, this new global constitution that Valverde 
contracted to, take precedence over the Law of Spain and for that matter the 
Human Rights guarantees of the European Union. To what extent was the law 
of anti-doping autonomous from those systems and the principles that they 
were said to enshrine. Putting to one side the question as to whether the CONI 
prosecution constituted a form of double jeopardy – both cases, RFEC and 
CONI, involved the alleged use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or 
method, with the latter having the added element of the DNA ‘match’ - what is 
significant in terms of traditional conceptions of State Sovereignty is whether, 
or on what basis, CONI could exercise jurisdiction in respect of a possible 
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violation that was committed by a Spanish national wholly within Spanish 
territory. From a traditional perspective of Sovereignty what is raised here is 
the extent to which a Sovereign is able to prosecute violations of the law by 
non-citizens that have occurred outside of its own territory. The simple answer 
to this problem is given Valverde’s consent to the contract to play sport gives 
rise to an exception to State Sovereignty with the result that the WADC carves 
out a new juridical space within which power to sanction is distributed and 
modulated on principles very different to that of territorial Sovereignty. 
 
In relation to jurisdiction, CAS reasoned that the purpose of the CONI rules was 
to prevent individuals, including foreign athletes, who had committed 
violations, from participating in sporting activities in Italy. The problem of 
course was that at the point in time of CONI prosecuting Valverde he had not 
been found to have committed a violation. CAS found the necessary 
connection between Valverde and the CONI rules to be the fact that he 
participated in races within Italian territory. But they said less about any 
necessary connection between the actual or alleged violation and Italy. The 
closest we get to a discussion of this is that it is sufficient for CONI to have 
discovered the violation. In the eyes of CAS the violation is stated to be the 
attempted use of a prohibited substance or method that continued up and until 
the seizure of the blood bags by the Guardia Civil.176 The violation is said to be 
constituted by its discovery and not by its occurrence and the identification of 
specified actions of Valverde, or even Fuentes, at any specified time and place. 
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176 Valverde 2 at 82.
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There is no specified guilty act, only a discovery of an asserted attempted 
violation. In a literal reading of the CONI Rules CAS found that they did not 
provide for any limitations regarding the place where the violation was 
committed.177 That is CONI’s rules were not to be read against the backdrop 
and context of the rules of State Sovereignty but on the basis of the 
functionality of a new constitutional apparatus. Given that Valverde had 
participated in the past and probably would participate in the future on Italian 
territory CAS regarded CONI’s actions in asserting jurisdiction as being 
justified.  
 
Furthermore, as we have seen the RFEC had decided that given the 
prohibitions upon the use of evidence by the investigating Judge there was no 
case for Valverde to answer. This latter element raised a related question of law 
regarding the use of both the documentary evidence and the blood bags held 
by the Guardia Civil.  
 
In determining the questions relating to the admissibility of the evidence, 
including the Blood Bag No. 18, CAS directly considered questions relating to 
State territoriality and the limits of Sovereignty. Rather than using these 
concepts as having a limiting effect, CAS turned them into tools to broaden, or 
at least justify their reading of the extent of, CONI’s power. Noting that Puerto’s 
Investigating Judge Serrano had revoked the orders in relation to the supply of 
Blood Bag No. 18, CAS considered that these orders had no effect beyond 

177 Ibid.:94.
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Spanish territory.178 At its core CAS regarded the use of the evidence, in the 
face of the Spanish Order of Revocation, as not being inconsistent with 
principles akin to what we might call natural justice or due process and the 
Rule of Law.179 Furthermore, CAS was adamant that its jurisprudence was clear 
in so far as it was not bound by the decisions of other (Sovereign) courts or 
tribunals with jurisdiction, nor was it bound by the rules of evidence.180  
 
But to get to the grist of the CAS reasoning we can put to one side the 
question of the legitimacy of the Italian Criminal proceedings,181 the manner in 
which the principle of territoriality is dealt with (the same principle appears at 
once to restrict Spanish power whilst expanding Italian power)182  and the 
manner in which evidence was deemed admissible or reliable. The logical 
kernel of the CAS reasoning might well be identified in the statement towards 
the end of their decision where they find that ‘the fight against doping is … 
preponderant over the Athlete’s interest’. Whatever the merits of Valverde’s 
reliance on Spanish or European Law prohibiting the use of the evidence the 
preponderance of the ‘fight against doping’ took precedence. In a nutshell 
what CAS was making explicit was that the Just (and transnational) War 
against doping justifies any breach of the norms traditionally associated with 
the Rule of Law, the principle of territoriality and human rights.  
 

178 Valvedre 2 at 97 – 98, 102, 123, 124, 130, 131, 139.
179 Ibid.:102.
180 Ibid.:123.
181 Ibid.:130.
182 Ibid.:131.
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In the end, the only issue for CAS was that the DNA identification of the plasma 
in Blood Bag No. 18 was sufficient to prove the violation of use or attempted 
use of a prohibited method or substance.183 It is the mere collection of the 
blood (at a time that is never identified) for non-therapeutic use that constituted 
the relevant violation. 184  It was on this basis that CAS confirmed the 
preventative sanction imposed by CONI preventing Valverde from participating 
in Italy for a period of two years commencing 11 May 2009. 

Valverde 3  
 
Valverde 3 concerned the appeal by WADA and the UCI from the decisions of 
the Spanish Comite Nacional de Competicion Disciplina Deportiva (CNCDD) 
and the RFEC, made on 7 September 2007, not to open disciplinary 
proceedings against Valverde. As noted above similar decisions were made by 
other national cycling federations and anti-doping organisations in respect of 
other cyclists, such as Australia’s Allan Davis. By the time of the hearing, the 
primary purpose of Valverde 3 was for WADA and the UCI to seek to extend 
the CONI preventative sanction, confirmed in Valverde 2, into a worldwide ban 
under the WADC and UCI Rules. In doing so CAS found again that the relevant 
violation occurred on the discovery of Blood Bag No. 18 in Dr. Fuentes’ freezer 
on 6 May 2006.185  
 

183 Valverde 2 at 165.
184 Ibid.:167.
185 Valverde 3, para 7 and para 111.
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Valverde 3 recounts familiar ground as to that in Valverde 2, in respect of the 
admissibility of the documentary and blood bag evidence. CAS does not 
deviate from the position in Valverde 2. In dismissing the objections to the use 
of the evidence and submissions on the effect of the Spanish Court orders, 
CAS noted that this was a case where they felt it was ‘appropriate to prevent a 
national federation [i.e. RFEC] from being too lenient’.186 In recounting the 
findings in Valverde 2, CAS approved of the reasoning used to decide that the 
evidence could be used: 
  
… even if it was collected with violation of certain human rights, … 
there is an overriding interest at stake. In the case at hand, the 
internationally accepted fight against doping is a public interest, 
which would outweigh a possible violation of Mr. Valverde’s 
personal rights.187 
 
After considering the various strands of circumstantial evidence before it, the 
CAS Panel finds that there was no violation of Valverde’s rights and ‘even if 
this was different, the overriding interest of the fight against doping would 
warrant this’.188 Note that the ‘public’ interest to be served here is one derived 
from a private interest, that is a sporting contract and that it overrides any 
rights that are themselves derived from Public Law. The public interest in 
maintaining fundamental Legal, Constitutional or Human Rights are overridden 
by a newly privately created ‘public’ interest. What exactly meant by the 

186 Ibid.:para 38.
187 Ibid.:para 60.
188 Ibid.:para 71.
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international accepted fight against doping as a public interest is something 
that will be left for us to interrogate in the latter part of this work. But it is clear 
that this new public interest arises by way of private agreement and not 
Sovereign command or Law. 
 
As a result, on May 31, 2010, CAS decided in Valverde 3 to extend the Italian 
sanction and suspend Valverde from all competition worldwide for two years 
based upon his involvement in Operación Puerto. The finding was primarily 
based upon the DNA ‘match’ alleged by CONI, which CAS found to be in 
breach of Article 15.2 of the UCI Anti-Doping Rules. Valverde was declared 
ineligible to compete until January 2012.  He made his return to racing in the 
Tour Down Under in Australia that January and went on to win that year’s 
Vuelta a España.  
 
As a member of a foreign (that is non-Italian) sporting federation (the RFEC), 
which in turn is affiliated with a foreign Olympic Committee, in his defence 
Valverde rejected the jurisdiction of CONI to prosecute him. How is it, asked 
Valverde, that a foreign sporting body, to which he was not affiliated, adjudge a 
Spanish citizen, for offences that allegedly occurred on Spanish territory, 
despite rulings of a superior Spanish Court prohibiting the use of the evidence? 
Here is what interests us – the CAS decisions squarely raise the supra-
territorial nature or transnational character of the anti-doping apparatus. The 
CAS decisions highlight the issues relating to territoriality of national Laws and 
Sovereignty and how these modernist legal principles are at odds with the 
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process of private arbitration that take place within this ‘consensual’ 
supranational jurisdiction. In this context it is the sporting spectacle’s need for 
a speedy result that drives its own autonomous administrative and disciplinary 
procedures. Apart from questions of territorial Sovereignty and questions 
relating to traditional Rule of Law principles as opposed to private 
administrative practices, the manner in which evidence is accepted and 
evaluated and the manner in which facts are found based upon that raise 
fundamental Rule of Law questions. We will turn again to the manner in which 
evidence is transformed in Chapter Four below. 
 
CONI is an Italian body that in effect administers the Italian sports law system. 
CONI’s position is that by virtue of private agreement it is responsible for 
taking action which included making preventive and banning orders, against 
both Italian and foreign athletes who are unaffiliated with Italian sports 
federations and who breach regulations in force in Italy. These breaches are 
not required to have taken place in Italy but are discoverable by Italians. The 
purpose of CONI’s anti-doping powers is said to be to ensure the protection of 
athlete’s health and to ensure that athletes do not distort results to the 
detriment of just sporting competition. Other research we have conducted 
suggests that the relationship between health and doping is at best only a 
rhetorical one.189 
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189 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. I wish I was twenty one now, beyond doping in
the Australian Peloton. Geelong: Auskadi Samizdats.
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Nevertheless, in the case of Valverde 2 no violation had occurred within Italian 
territory. Despite this fact (the doping control undertaken during the 2008 Tour 
de France did not return any positive result and only provided a DNA match to 
Blood Bag No. 18) in both Valverde 2 & 3 CAS rejected Valverde’s arguments 
on jurisdiction. The reasoning of CAS proceeded on the basis that the version 
of the Italian rules in force in May 2006 provided for the imposition of an 
injunction against athletes not affiliated to the Italian federation. It appeared no 
territorial connection was necessary in order to enliven CONI’s powers. They 
could it seem decide to prevent an athlete who had not been disciplined 
elsewhere from participating in Italy. 
 
The reasoning of CAS appears to be informed by a reading of specific 
provisions of the WADC. The first Article 22.3 involves each government to 
respect ‘arbitration as the preferred means of resolving doping-related 
disputes’. The second, Article 24.3, states that the WADA Code shall be 
interpreted as an independent and autonomous text and not by reference to 
the existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments’. It may be that 
this second provision would raise constitutional problems in some States, 
however, judicial deference to sporting autonomy and the attitude of CAS 
seem to suggest that any such limitations would be rare in their application. 
 
Based upon these provisions the CAS Panel reasoned that the mere fact that 
Valverde had in the past participated in Italy, and would probably in the future 
compete in Italy, or in foreign races that passed through Italian territory, was 
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sufficient for CAS to consider that CONI was justified in adopting restrictive 
measures. There is within this reasoning a kernel of a logic whereby Valverde is 
a potential threat to the integrity or reputation of competition, and that he must 
be made an example of because of the state of Spanish cycling, doping and 
anti-doping, the leniency of the Spanish sporting authorties and the tardiness 
and the errors of the Spanish judicial system. 
 
In the context of neoliberalism it is important to point out that what the WADC 
provisions that give precedence to the rules of the body discovering the 
asserted violation achieve is to introduce the principles of competition to the 
investigation and prosecution of the anti-doping process itself. We will later 
consider the relationship between the society of competition and the anti-
doping apparatus, but for present purpose Dadot and Laval’s observations 
about neoliberalism’s form of law are apposite. Dadot and Laval note that in 
the neoliberal world the market itself becomes a principle of selection of the 
laws made by States and that in such a system the establishment of this 
competition between jurisdictions must itself be consecrated.190 For them there 
exists a principle that there must be competition between legal systems,191 and 
it is this principle which itself appears to be enshrined in the WADC and which 
gives rise to the condition whereby private sporting and State institutions, 
compete transnationally to be the first to discover a violation and thus assert 
jurisdiction. Those that do so are able to sustain their institutions as being 
purveyors of good governance, itself a principle that supplants the political 

190 Dadot and Laval p.212.
191 Ibid.:211.
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category of governance, or Government, which was based upon a State’s 
capacity to ensure its sovereignty over a territory. As Dadot and Laval put it: 
 
good governance, plays a central role in diffusing the norm of 
generalised competition.… It thus gradually supplants the outmoded, 
disvalued category of sovereignty. This state will no longer be 
judged on its capacity to ensure its sovereignty over a territory, in 
accordance with the classical Western conception, but on its 
respect for the legal norms and economic good practice of 
governance.192 
 
The point is that to be considered functional or ‘good’ a State must apply the 
rules of private law to themselves. Harmonisation (something which the WADC 
explicitly seeks) is achieved through this type of transnational competition 
causing what Dadot and Laval characterize as an evacuation of liberal 
democracy ‘by depriving legislative powers of their main prerogatives’.193 
Harmonisation is achieved and derives not from above (that is sovereign 
command), but through the operation of markets and competition. 

The Puerto Trial 
 
Following the conviction of Valverde all eyes moved back towards Madrid for 
the final stages of the Puerto process. In a strange twist of fate it is prior to the 

192 Ibid.:218-219.
193 Ibid.:212.
137
Puerto trial that the Armstrong Era finally unravels in late 2012. For our 
purposes, it is also useful to jump forward to the final resolution of Operación 
Puerto by the Spanish Courts in early 2013. In a Madrid courtroom, during the 
middle of January 2013, the lengthy case against Fuentes and his co-accused 
is finally heard. At the same time, across the Atlantic in Hollywood, Armstrong 
is no longer in denial and heads to Oprah to confess and seek forgiveness from 
the people (see Epilogue).  
 
On 29 April 2103 and after a three-month hearing that had considered the 
20,000 pages of evidence collected by the Guardia Civil and numerous 
witnesses, Judge Santamaría Matesan, in Madrid Criminal Court No 21, 
delivered her verdict concerning the crimes alleged to have been committed by 
Dr. Fuentes and others against public health. In its judgment the Court found 
that the case against two – Fuentes and the former Kelme coach Labarta - of 
the five accused had been proven.194 The Court imposed a suspended 
sentenced on Fuentes of one-year jail as a perpetrator of a crime against 
public health.195 Fuentes was also disqualified from the practice of sport’s 
medicine for  a period of four years. Labarta was found to be an accomplice to 
Fuentes and was also given a suspended sentenced of four months prison. He 
was also disqualified from pursuing his work as a sporting coach or any 
professional activity related to cycling for period of four months.196 Yolanda 

194 Sentencia Final, pp12 ff & p.357.
195 Art. 361 of the Spanish Criminal Code.
196 Sentencia Final p.357.
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Fuentes, Vicente Belda and Manuel Saiz were all found to not have any case 
against them proven.197 
 
What is clear from the case is that the Spanish criminal justice system pursued 
and obtained jail sentences (albeit suspended) for the principal actors that had 
organised and operated a sophisticated network of doping within sport. The 
case was the first that saw a jail term given to a Doctor (and his accomplice) for 
operating a doping network. The fact that the sentences were suspended is 
not a sign of any leniency on the part of the Judge but recognition of the fact 
that Spanish law immediately suspends sentences of less than two years jail.
 
Puerto surpassed the acquittal of Richard Virenque and the suspended 
sentences of Voet and the team manager, Roussel, handed down in the 
Festina criminal trial some thirteen years earlier. Just as the Festina Court had 
taken aim at the inactivity of the sport’s governing bodies in dealing with 
doping, as we have seen the Madrid Appeal Court also criticised the head in 
the sand attitude of the sport’s sponsors. In the Festina case the UCI, the 
French Federation and the Société du Tour de France had sought symbolic 
compensation for the damage to their image caused by the affair. The 
damages claim had been rejected with the Court blaming the applicants for 
their slow and weak approach to the doping problem. The court noted that this 
approach of the ‘authorities’ had influenced the light sentences given to the 
accused. Noting that EPO had been prevalent in the sport from as far back as 
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197 Sentencia Final p.15.
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1993 with the knowledge of the sports governing bodies, the Festina Court 
stated:  
 
The court deplores that they remained for several years almost 
inactive before deciding on 1996 mainly to care about the excess of 
EPO. They never considered stopping competitions in a sport so 
plagued by doping and thus avoiding the harm to their image which 
they are complaining about.198 
 
Despite the anecdotal evidence that the French government had targeted the 
1978 Tour de France, Festina had been a chance discovery by customs 
officials on a back road border crossing. Prior to this, and during the first 
decade of the operation of the WADA Code, the preferred method of 
discovering violations had been through testing urine, and later blood, 
samples. Importantly, Puerto prefigures the investigatory turn that anti-doping 
authorities will seek to pursue in the wake of the end of the Armstrong 
Conspiracy. The case against Armstrong also started life as a criminal 
investigation headed by the Federal Investigator Novitsky, but as we will later 
see (Epilogue) that criminal case did not proceed to prosecution, in fact there 
were claims that the criminal case was derailed because of overt political 
interference.  In the wake of this we should note that the US Legal system was 
not subjected to the attacks visited upon the Spanish Legal system throughout 
the whole Puerto process. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the success of 
the Puerto investigation which dismantled an extensive global network of 

198 Jones 2000.
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importation, distribution, supply and administration of doping products, a 
network that apparently extended beyond cycling, and the jail sentence 
handed out to its principal, the Puerto decision was immediately derided by the 
foreign and cycling press and by WADA. Once again the criticism focused 
upon what Puerto was not about. Despite the obvious importance of the case 
against Dr. Fuentes, the fact that no cyclists (or other athletes) had been 
sanctioned meant to many eyes that the decision was seen as inadequate. For 
the main, the criticism of and subsequent appeals centered on the decision of 
the Court to not hand over the blood bags to WADA. The Guardian headlined 
was consistent of the tone of the outrage: 
 
Doping doctor Eufemiano Fuentes' sentence shocks anti-drugs 
bodies - Anger at decision not to hand blood bags to drug 
agencies199  
 
Of all the post Puerto commentary the piece that possibly best highlighted the 
‘us against them’ logic was written by a self appointed campaigner for a 
changed cycling in a post-Armstrong world. The intervention by Jamie Fuller, a 
Tasmanian businessman, who has made his fortune by selling lycra tights to 
athletes and others that seek to live their particular dream, is significant as he 
purports to stand for change in cycling. His organisation or ‘movement’, 
Change Cycling Now proposed a future for the sport based upon 
‘transparency’ and an adherence to rules. His complaint is a shining example 

199 Guardian 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2013/apr/30/doping-doctor-eufemiano-fuentes-
sentence-shock.
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of one that refuses to consider the context of the Spanish case and the 
positive aspects of its resolution. In the end, all Fuller could do was a repeat of 
the standard jingoistic Anglo attitude to Spain, by attempting to lampoon both 
the Judge and her decision. With the lead: 
 
IS SPAIN TRULY CORRUPT? WE CAN’T BE BLAMED FOR 
THINKING SO…200  
 
Fuller compares the Puerto Court’s decision unfavourably with those of the 
American TV personality Judge Judy. What could better provide us with a 
worldview that preferences law as spectacle over Law as a process or even 
justice? Fuller tells us that Judge Judy, a ‘fully qualified lady’ … ‘covers real-life 
cases’ and that she ‘uses basic common sense to hand down sensible, 
reasoned decisions.  
 
Of course Judge Judy does not preside over a courtroom, but a reality TV 
show, in which the participants enter into contracts to abide by her 
‘arbitration’. Judge Judy’s courtroom, unlike the one in Madrid, is scripted or at 
least partly so. Judge Judy does make ‘decisions’ in her reality TV arbitrations 
and the show’s producers pay any awards she makes against any party.201 As 
one commentator has noted, that: 
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200 http://watercooler.skins.net/2013/05/02/is-spain-truly-corrupt-we-cant-be-blamed-for-thinking-so/
201 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judge_Judy.
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while the cases and people may be real, the courts could be held on 
the bridge of the Starship Enterprise and still have the same effect. 
It’s all just part of the collective hallucination we call television.202  
 
Nevertheless, for Fuller, Judge Judy’s common-sense reasoned decisions 
provide us with some guide by which we can compare the dispensation of 
justice by, and the level of corruption within, the Spanish judiciary. For Fuller, 
Justice Santamaría Matesan: 
 
makes Judge Judy look like the real deal [as she on his version of 
reality] has courted her own publicity by effectively overseeing the 
biggest cover up in sports history. 
 
The ‘biggest cover up in sports history’ according to Fuller was constituted by 
the decision not accede to the applications of WADA, the UCI and CONI, to 
have the blood bags handed over for further analysis. Unlike Judge Judy’s 
reasoned decisions, Fuller claims that the decision to not hand the material 
over and to have it destroyed was implicitly unreasoned and hence 
outrageous. For him the decision follows ‘years of leg work and pushing shit 
uphill’ by WADA, and prevents ‘them from receiving crucial information that 
could help make monumental advances in their work against the drug cheats’. 
For Fuller, the ultimate question is not whether or not serious inroads had been 
made into the practices of international doping networks stretching from 
Adelaide to Madrid, or even to Texas, but whether or not WADA can work 
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efficiently with corrupt or inept judges, such as Santamaría Matesan who put 
unreasonable obstacles in their way. The upshot for him is a repetition of the 
past – a reaffirmation that Spain is soft on drugs in sport and that the country’s 
criminal system (and Constitutional guarantees) undermine the message of 
unity of the anti-doping crusade. It is noteworthy that people such as Fuller use 
the word ‘crusade’ without flinching in this context. As we have seen in the 
Valverde cases this crusade takes preeminence. For Fuller a suspended 
sentence and being struck off for four years from practicing the profession of 
doctor is no deterrent. In the end the Puerto decision is a lost opportunity for 
Spain to show itself: 
 
in a positive light in the fight against doping, but instead she’s 
(Matesan) crucified their reputation with her final order”. He 
concludes “… she was the judge for f#$k’s sake…..
 
The simple and best answer to Fuller’s rant is of course a perusal of the 
decision of Santamaría. Fuller could have satisfied himself more fully as to 
whether it stands up to the high standards displayed by Judge Judy and her 
reasoned collective hallucinations. But this is something we doubt he would 
have had the inclination or patience to do. But to start with the particular part 
of the judgment that deals with the applications to have the evidence handed 
over to WADA comprises twenty-eight pages of the three hundred and sixty-
one page decision.203 Throughout this part of the judgment there is a 
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203 Sentencia Final pp.316-344.
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consideration of the relevant facts, the previous decisions in the case leading 
up to the trial, including those of the Madrid Appeal Court, along with the 
decisions and jurisprudence of Spanish and European Courts. In carrying out 
this task the Court makes it clear that when it comes to deciding questions of 
Law:  
 
just as in sport, not everything goes. 
 
 The court is clear that it can only exercise power by respecting its 
jurisdictional limits: 
 
limits that are constituted by scrupulously respecting the applicable 
limits of judicial power, and in particular our Magna Carta [the 
Spanish Constitution], and very especially the fundamental rights 
proclaimed in that Constitution.204 
 
It is on a considering of these limits, expounded in both Spanish and European 
decisions, that the Court found that the: 
  

204 Indeed, Art. 103 of the Spanish Constitution establishes that "Public Administration objectively
serves the general interests and acts accordingly with the principles of efficiency, hierarchy, 
decentralisation, deconcentration and coordination, fully complying with the relevant legislation and the 
law", while Art. 117 proclaims independence and tenure of judges and magistrates, "submitted only to 
the Rule of Law" and to whom corresponds to "exercise the power within jurisdiction in all kinds of 
action, judging and having judgments executed" according to rules that govern the powers and the 
procedures prescribed by Law.
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the application (by WADA and others) to have access to the 
biological samples (blood, plasma and concentrated red cells) 
cannot succeed205.  
 
The Puerto Court made it clear that is had no doubt as to the legitimacy of 
WADA’s application and that it was satisfied that the the fight against doping in 
sport had a dual purpose; not only to pursue fraud in the outcome of the 
sporting competitions but also the protection of the health of the athletes. The 
Court did not doubt the good faith of WADA in seeking to pursue disciplinary 
cases against athletes, but it was not convinced that the clearly stated purpose 
of the WADA request, that is: the future opening of disciplinary cases against 
athletes who may have engaged in practices prohibited doping was the issue 
that it had before it to decide. For the Court, the issue before it was the fate of 
the evidence, that is the biological samples ( blood, plasma and concentrated 
red blood cells), and whether their handing over to WADA or another body, 
could violate the fundamental rights of the defendants or others, such as 
cyclists or other athletes, who may be indentifiable following an analysis of the 
samples.206 On its assesment of the Law the Court could not be concinved that 
there would be no such violation. It is apparent to any reader that this position 
– one firmly based within the principles of Legal modernity and its conception 
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205 Sentencia Final p 331. A number of grounds are given for the Court’s refusal of the application. 
Some turn on the extent of Spain’s obligations to cooperate with other European judicial authorities 
(which neither WADA, the UCI nor CONI are) and the generally recognised problems of interference in 
criminal processes by concurrent or subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Relevant also is the 
distinction between judicial and administrative powers that is in many ways vital to Continental 
jurisprudence.
206 Ibid.:321-322.
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of the Rule of Law; is in stark contrast, if not conflict with the findings of CAS in 
Valverde 1,2 & 3. 
 
In its conclusions the Court stated in realtion to the requests for the evidence 
for the purpose of obtaining the blood bags to open disciplinary proceedings 
against athletes, whose identity had not been specified, and who have not 
been accused in the case, that it could not allow a prospective investigation 
(that is a ‘fishing expedition’), or attempt to open a sporting law case that was 
incompatible with the constitutional principles and the Rule of Law.207 Both the 
Spanish Constitutional and Supreme Courts were cited as authority for the 
proposition that the Rule of Law in a democratic society is incompatible with 
merely prospective activities, without there being a general requirement to 
satisfy the limitations on the interference with fundamental rights208. As we will 
increasingly see the anti-doping apparatus, unlike the Law, tends to take on a 
prospective rather than restrospective aspect. 
 
Nevertheless, in all the hubris surrounding the Puerto decision, one striking fact 
seems to have escaped those that point to Spanish corruption, or simply just 
its bad decsion making. The events that form the basis of the Puerto 
prosecution span from at least as early as 2002  until May 2006. The WADC 
carries with it an eight year limitation period from the date the violation is 
asserted to have occurred, outside of which no action may be commenced 
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207 WADA put forward no facts and allegations upon which they stated the evidence was relevant –
their application was in lawyers parlance merely a ‘fishing expedition’.
208 Ibid.:340.
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against an athlete or other person for an anti-doping rule violation. Even if 
WADA had obtained the sought after evidence in 2013 at best it would only be 
able to be utilised in pursuing athletes who may have doped, at best, between 
May 2005 and May 2006, and not previously. This is not to say that there may 
not be potential suspects that fall within this period. But it is also the case that 
many that may fit this class have already either been disciplined or been found, 
by their respective anti-doping agencies to have no case to answer. The 
relevance of the dates might have also been important for example if CAS had 
thought it important to identify the date of Valverde’s alleged violation and the 
question as to whether any involvement he had had with Fuentes was prior to 
him leaving Kelme at the end of 2004 or whether the attempted use in question 
arose after that date. But in the end such Legal argument is not our focus. For 
us what is probably of most importance important to highlight is the border 
crossing nature of the anti-doping apparatus and the direct challenge it mounts 
to traditional or modernist visions of sovereignty and the Rule of Law. 
 
It is in this manner that we can conceive of Puerto existing within the 
framework of the abandonment of old notions of Law and the construction of a 
new functional global system. It starkly places into view the contrast between 
the principles of the Rule of Law (Estado de Derecho) and Constitutionalism 
and the needs and ends of the transnational apparatus and system of law in 
construction. As is apparent anti-doping, as it has been played out in relation 
to Operación Puerto, exemplifies Møller’s fear – this is the end of modernity 
and law is in fact made in the media as much as it is made in the courts. In 
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Operación Puerto we begin to see not only the contours of a new form of law 
and its clash with the old, but at the same time we find an example of the 
distance that exists between the rhetoric of the media crisis surrounding 
doping and the actual reality of the material processes that are occurring 
during cycling’s process of global structural readjustment. In the case of 
Puerto it is the media crisis that has driven sports policy and not the Rule of 
Law or Legal principles: it is this media crisis or a moral panic and the Just War 
on doping that it drives that has defined what Puerto is about.  
 
At its most basic those engaged in the rhetoric surrounding Operación Puerto 
have painted a picture of Spanish justice being slow and out of step with the 
cultural change, which the purported ‘new cycling world’ is trying to embrace. 
Whether it was the then UCI President Pat McQuaid, or his self-anointed critic 
Fuller, the Spanish authorities or just Spain has been criticised for being simply 
‘too lenient in their approach to doping’.209  
 
The rhetoric is not only simplistic it is misleading, if not intellectually dishonest. 
It misses the point that Legal decisions, just like ‘sporting’ decisions are meant 
to be, are bounded by rules. But it also misses the point that it was not just the 
Spanish that can be accused of not dealing with the problem ‘properly’. As 
noted above the same criticism could also be alleged against those countries, 
such as Australia, that are said to represent the new cultural change within 
cycling. In the light of all this, if there is one cyclist that has come to personify 
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209 Renee 2008.
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the assertions of corruption in Spain in relation to Operación Puerto, it is of 
course Alejandro Valverde. But more importantly Valverde provides us with the 
figure of a person who, unlike others, could not escape the grasp of the 
expanding supranational apparatus. 
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Chapter Three – Form(s) of Law. 
 
Forms of Law - Whereabouts are we? 
 
In the previous chapter which focused upon Operación Puerto we tried to 
place Møller’s End Of Modernity thesis,210 which, to restate it briefly, argues 
that the coming of global anti-doping law signals an end to ‘Enlightenment 
principles’ into some factual context. In order to make my point clearer, and to 
avoid any misunderstanding, it is appropriate to do so again. The immediate 
response by some to this problem appears to consist of an argument, that if 
this is the case, and if current anti-doping policy is ipso facto ‘irrational’ – that 
is contrary to the logic of modernity - the problem can be resolved by a return 
and adherence to such ‘Enlightenment principles’ and furthermore the principle 
of the Rule of Law. This is not my position; I do not believe we can turn the 
clock backwards in such a way. In saying this I do not disagree with Møller’s 
insightful assessment that anti-doping law does signal a new way of doing law 
or governance. I do not disagree - in fact I have tried to begin to outline 
through the preceding discussion of Operación Puerto - that there does in fact 
exist a moral panic in the form of a Just War that surrounds the question of 
doping in sports. But this must be only the beginning of any enquiry. To state 
that there is a moral panic or crisis, and that anti-doping constitutes a new way 
of doing law, is in many ways doing no more than merely stating the obvious.  
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If an anti-doping critique is to mature beyond simply pointing out the obvious, 
we need to firstly come to grips with the present conjuncture, analyse how it is 
different from the past, and only after that, can we then begin to think about 
other ways of doing law, or anti-doping. It is in this way that we can, at least, 
try to avoid the trap of a romantic longing for a return to the glory days of a 
bygone era of ‘Enlightenment principles’ or some pure and/or objective theory 
of the Rule of Law. 
 
Is the answer to this irrational policy and this moral panic adequately countered 
by a call to return to ‘Enlightenment’ principles? To the logic and rationality of 
European modernity?  My position, which I will attempt to further illustrate 
here, is plainly, no, this is not the case. Underlying my argument is that such a 
response itself is as emotional, irrational and as romantic as the panic it seeks 
to criticise. For present purposes, I do not wish to tackle headlong the received 
wisdom that there is only one set of objective rational principles which we can 
derive from the Enlightenment, or that as such there is only one rationality and 
one logic that is applicable to thinking about the world. In the first place I 
regard this approach as an overly Eurocentric view of the world, bordering, in 
fact, on a racist model. Browning for one reminds us that modernity is a highly 
generic term and that key components of modernity, such as the 
Enlightenment and reason, are interpreted in various ways.211 More relevantly is 
the description given to neoliberalism by Dadot and Laval above where they 
describe neoliberalism as a ‘new global rationality’ and it is from this rationality, 
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not one from a past era, that we must judge and assess the anti-doping 
apparatus. Thus my response to those that hark call for some return to 
modernist rationality is to argue that they fail to grasp the totality of the 
contemporary context in which ‘globalisation’, generally, and anti-doping 
policy, particularly, is taking place. In many ways the problem is that raised by 
Agamben when he suggested those who sought a return to the rational forms 
of the law of the sovereign state have lost the keys to the scriptures of law, and 
appear as such themselves lost in our contemporary age.212 
 
My position should be clear: yes, moral panic in the guise of Just War – backed 
by the state of exception and the police, and played out in the global society of 
the spectacle - is one of the principal forms of contemporary governance. 
Nevertheless, before turning to the question of governance in more detail, it is 
first appropriate to describe how the tendency towards the pole of governance 
itself arises out of a transformation of the Rule of Law. Below, I will seek to 
introduce and outline two principle forms of law, which we might dub, with 
ease of shorthand, but for want of a better description, modern and post-
modern, sovereign and administrative, or even State and Imperial. In doing so 
it may be suggested that it is not clear on which side of the fence I sit – which 
form of law I favour. But, it should be apparent, from what I have already stated 
above, that this response is itself misconceived. This is not an argument as to 
one form of law being better, or more ‘just’ than another. Rather, the point is to 
attempt to highlight, which form of law is presently and apparently tending 
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towards becoming dominant and emerging as such on a global basis, or in 
other words, whereabouts we currently are able to locate ourselves in 
reference to the Law-governance continuum. If pushed, my position is that, 
neither form of law is preferable, and the task is not to accept one or the other 
as a given: that is to strive to return to the past, or to accept the other as the 
way things are inevitably now done. The point is, simply, that with an 
understanding of both (or all) forms of law we might just then be able to begin 
to conceptualise a version of justice that is ‘better’ equipped to deal with a 
global and hybrid world.213 But this is not our present task and it is part of the 
circular search for justice and a problem that has been unresolved for two 
thousand years.214  
 
Our present is therefore to begin to contextualise the tensions we have already 
observed and in so doing begin to interrogate the Law-governance continuum 
more fully. This will set the stage for our consideration of the extension of the 
anti-doping apparatus beyond the realm of Law, and enable us to consider the 
place of particular forms of governance within anti-doping that concern the 
administration, the police and the deployment of an array of measures, an 
apparatus of discipline, control and biopower. This passage will assist us in 
answering the question we have set for ourselves as to what founds the 
juridical in an emerging supranational system. 

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213 Aristotle1981:pp.197-200.
214 Jose Gil, Metamorphosis of the Body, Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 12, Minnesota University 
Press, 1998.
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Weber and Formal Law  

Our ideas or conceptions about what law is, or, how we define law, are 
influenced in many ways by a form of Law that found its high-water mark in the 
nineteenth century. It is this conception of law that informs Møller’s vision of 
the law. Two strands serve as examples. In the Anglo system Dicey’s 
conception of the Rule of Law is pervasive. On the continent, Weber conceived 
of a form of Law that was consistent with what he called Modern Rational 
Capitalism. Below, we will consider aspects of this formal form of Law, as 
understood by both Dicey and Weber and upon which our popular conceptions 
of law are based.  However, as we will see, given their position at modernity’s 
juridical high water mark both were aware, in one manner or another, that this 
form of Law was itself in the process of deformalisation. Furthermore, Dicey’s 
consideration of Continental Administrative Law assists us in understanding 
how the Rule of Law itself was construed differently in the Anglo system and 
on the Continent. This not only highlights the influence that the Continental 
system of Law has had on Law’s continued deformalisation generally, but also 
points us directly to law’s future.215  
 
Along with the separation of powers of the Executive, Legislative and Judicial 
branches of Government, one of the principle and recognisable characteristics 
of both these conceptions of the form of Law, include that such a system of 
Law emanates, and derives its force from Sovereign command. In particular, 

215 Weber 1978:pp.880ff.
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this form of Law emanates from a national Sovereign who has exclusive power 
to rule and command over a definable territory and people. Already, it should 
be apparent that this particular criteria is not consistent with the situation we 
are attempting to deal with – the regime constituted by the WADC is not one 
that emanates from a single sovereign Source, nor an agreement between 
Sovereigns in the sense of Public International Law. Valverde’s saga recounted 
above places this within our full view. 
 
Law in such a situation also acts by way of a generality – it establishes a class 
of circumstances, things and people to which the norm that it states applies. 
The hallmark of this form of Law is a rule of conduct or a declaration as to 
power, right or duty, in which some factual requirements are delineated that 
connect it to a given state of affairs and which are applied retrospectively.216 
Law does not look to the future in what it judges, but to past events. 
Importantly, the Rule of Law applies equally to all those who find themselves 
within that definable people and territory. Subsequently, all those who are 
subject to this form of Law have recourse to the national system of courts 
existing within the given territory of the Sovereign. These courts decide 
disputes after they arise – they decide past events according to Legal principle. 
This notion of Law being retrospectively applied resonates with the 
considerations of the Puerto trial court we have considered above. In the end it 
is the independence of the Sovereign courts that provides the entire system of 
Law with its means of legitimisation. 
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216 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 – a decision of the High Court of 
Australia.
156
 
The fact that Law applies equally to all within the territory of a single Sovereign 
is one of the characteristics that Weber points to in order to distinguish it from 
the forms of law that preceded it. According to Weber, modernity’s, or Modern 
Rational Capitalism’s Law was preceded by particularist modes of closed, 
private and consensual forms of law. These forms tended to be either 
patrimonial or magico-religious, and they operated by way of the differential 
application of rules to different social groups, in different localities, within, and 
which transcended in certain circumstances, the boundaries of the nascent 
State: Guilds, the church and local custom were prime examples. 217  Lex 
Mercatoria was another example that clearly transcended state boundaries.218 
 
Weber believed that the creation of the rational (national) capitalist market 
economy (which we can later distinguish from later forms of capitalist 
organisation) required the demise of the particularist mode of creating law that 
had prevailed in the Middle Ages, or the granting of privileges of monopoly to 
certain closed organisations, for example printers monopolies over books in 
early copyright law or the clergy and ecclesiastic law. Weber’s rational 
capitalism abhorred different laws for different social groups or orders. The 
movement away from the particularist mode of creating law reduced the 
autonomy of organised status groups in two ways: by regulating non-state 

217 Weber 1978:pp.880ff.
218 Hardt & Negri 2004:pp.169ff.
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organisations, and secondly, by restricting the power of persons to create law 
by private ordering.219  
 
Weber argued, that what rational modernity required, and hence what it 
produced, was a calculable and uniform form of Law. Such a stable and 
uniform Legal environment was necessary to guarantee the needs of the 
growing markets. Calculable Law comprised abstract formal rules and 
regulations, non-arbitrary adjudication of Legal questions, especially relating to 
economic production, enforceable contracts, and predictable economic rights. 
With this calculable Law the market economy could flourish. Calculable Law 
was accompanied by the rational bureaucratisation of the State, which itself 
reduced the autonomy of the forms of particularist law and limited the ability of 
those who had participated in them to create law by means of engaging in 
private agreement. Rather than law created by private agreement, henceforth 
rational Law would emanate from the single Sovereign source of a Parliament. 
Thus, the transformation of these particularist, autonomous systems was 
driven politically by the growing strength of the State, and economically by the 
formally free competitive struggle of a market economy. The privi-leges 
(privatised law) attached to the old forms of autonomy where perceived as not 
being functional, to either, the Law or the market, and as such the 
consolidation of Modern Rational Capitalism. Calculable and formal(istic) Law, 
calculable accounting and market relations, all of which applied equally to all: 
that is, citizens (of a Sovereign nation) who themselves were formally equal 

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before the general Law and the market. Such a form of Law emanated from a 
single Sovereign source, and underpinned the consolidation of Weber’s 
Modern Rational Capitalism.  
 
Here it is timely to recall the concern of Møller that anti-doping signals the end 
of modernity because it compromises the autonomy of sport and its ‘long 
tradition of self-governance’. Was the autonomy of sport really both a project 
of modernity and at the same time an exception to that project? The autonomy 
of sport only appears to arise as an issue in the context of modernity’s struggle 
to rationalise law. Sport as it arose and was organised in the nineteenth 
century was not a pre-modern institution, but its organisational autonomy does 
appear to hark back to the pre-modern forms that concerned Weber. The 
fascination with the autonomy of sports has its place at the heart of the liberal 
analysis of sport and law; however, from this perspective the autonomy of 
sport was not a project of modernity or its form of Legality.  It may also be that 
sport as an activity that occurs in a sphere outside of what we might call 
normal life gives rise to its special or exceptional status. Anderson uses the 
term ‘qualified immunity’ to describe the manner in which sport became or 
maintained its special status in regard to the application of aspects of the 
general Law. 220 The rise of sport in industrial society saw a change in the nature 
and function of games or sport. From customary or folk games, sometimes 
with a very different ethic to modern sport, developed more rule based, 
organised form of sport aimed at developing a specific type of person, whether 

220Anderson, Jack, Modern sports law: a textbook, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010, para [1.07].
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it be aimed at the idle aristocracy or workers with leisure time, and whether it 
be couched as either a civilizing process221 or a form of Muscular Christianity222. 
The proposition put forward by Anderson is that with the increasing 
organisation of sport (his example is the birth of Association Football in the 
U.K.) and with the recognition by both the State and sporting bodies that sport 
had a role to play in civilizing or educating the public at large there was in 
effect a quid pro quo: 
 
the newly emerging sports governing bodies of the mid to late 
nineteenth century had received a reward for submitting to he 
civilizing process: the withdrawal of the threat of further legal 
intervention and the largely unrestricted liberty to self-regulate.223 
 
What we can take from all of this is that from its inception in industrial society 
sport and sports administration has enjoyed some form of immunity and 
autonomy from the general Law. Furthermore this immunity came about 
because of sport’s role in the process of government. But whilst this immunity 
gives rise to something that Møller champions, it is equally this autonomy that 
give rise to what he fears – that is Law’s deformalisation. Anderson continues 
to note that it is with the increasing commercialisation or commodification of 
sport that has caused the Law surrounding sport to increase, and hence in 
some ways for its autonomy to be lessened. However, importantly it appears 
that the intrusion into the space of sport’s autonomy has not been brought 

221 Elias, Norbert ,The Civilizing Process, Blackwell, Oxford UK, 1994.
222 MacAloon, John J. (ed.), Muscular Christianity in Colonial and Post-Colonial Worlds, Routledge,
Abingdon, 2008 (Sport in the Global Society).
223Anderson, Jack, Modern sports law: a textbook, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010.
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about by an expansion of the modernist project of State building, but in the 
end by the proliferation of other forms of law and governance that both involve 
and exclude the State. 

Dicey and the Law of Constitution. 
 
Patrimonial, magico-religious, local or particularist autonomy was perceived as 
involving discretion, which was equally perceived as being beyond measure 
and calculation, and was hence characterised as abhorrent to the needs of 
Modern Rational Capitalism. Discretion itself was identified with absolute 
power, and in particular royal or monarchial prerogatives, exercised without the 
control of parliaments or the courts. Dicey viewed the exercise of discretion as 
something contrary to the Rule of Law, and it is not without coincidence that 
during this period, others, such as Bentham, argued against the Common Law  
- and its system of judge made (read arbitrary) Law; and in favour of 
codification.  
 
Like Weber, Dicey saw Law as being impersonal – that is it applied to or by an 
authority based upon an office and not a person – a position summarised by 
the phrase, which has its origin in Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana, 
- a government (or empire) of laws and not of men.224 Law as such is embodied 
in abstract rules, which are applied universally to all, and, are not aimed at any 

224 Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, 1656:35.
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particular individuals, groups or classes of people. As a result, and importantly, 
it is this abstract notion of transcendent Law that governs things and not the 
whim of mere fallible mortals, or for that matter an administrative practice. 
 
A.V. Dicey advocated a theory of the ‘Rule of Law’, which still holds, without 
question for the most part, a very strong currency today. In fact the Rule of 
Law has been adopted (and transformed) by the ‘international community’ as 
one of its principles tools of intervention in States tying it to principles such as 
good governance and accountability.225 Nevertheless the fact of whether this 
rule of law is Dicey’s Rule of Law is never brought to light. Similarly, it is also 
an idea of Law which some on the ‘left’ pronounce their faith in as an 
‘unqualified human good’, along it seems, with some anti-doping academics, 
have fallen back upon as being the only available bulwark against perceived 
authoritarian, discretionary or arbitrary rule.226  
 
At the core of the Diceyan definition of the Rule of Law are three kindred 
concepts, each of which had a particular consequence. The first of these, 
already noted above, was the idea of the absolute supremacy of Rule of Law. 
The Rule of Law thus consists of a regular and consistent application of power 
and is opposed to arbitrary decision-making, that is any wide and discretion 
uncontrolled discretion. Secondly, the Rule of Law required that all persons 
were considered equal before the Law, and that this equality before the Law 

225 See Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader, Plunder, when the Rule of Law is Illegal, Blackwell Publishing, 
2008.
226 E.P. Thompson Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, London: Allen Lane, 1975, p.266  
and for example the works of Scheuerman cited below.
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required that government, administrators and ordinary persons were all subject 
to the same Law. It is the corollary or analogue of Weber’s opposition to the 
particularist modes of closed, private and consensual forms of law. Its 
particular consequence was that all persons are bound to follow the same Law. 
This is the basis of the criticisms of the WADC as not providing a level playing 
field of the law.227 The third concept was that the particular constitution of any 
State is not the ultimate source of Law. This is probably the most overlooked 
and controversial aspect of Dicey’s concept of the Rule of Law, as it implicitly 
challenges the received wisdom of the supremacy and Sovereignty of 
parliament.228 At is most basic the consequence of this statement is that there 
is something more that stands behind positive Law itself. It opens up the 
debate around things such as natural law and equity that we might say have 
raged since the time of Antigone 229  and continues today in the work of 
Agamben.230 Any enquiry as to what might stand behind the law - some just-i-
fiable good or just-ness; and how it is relevant to the current topic is an 
important task - but it is not the purpose of this particular work; it is something 
that must come as a consequence of knowing whereabouts we are now.  
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227 Møller 2011.
228 As we will see in neoliberalism we might say consistently with Dicey that the society of competition 
and not a State’s Constitution is the ultimate source of the Law.
229 Sophocles, The Three Thebian Plays, Antigone, Oedipus the King, Oedipus at Colonus, Translated 
by Robert Fagles, Penguin Classics, 1984, p.82.
230 Agamben 2005 & 2011.
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Dicey’s Critique of Administrative Law 
 
The words "administrative law," which are its most natural rendering, 
are unknown to English judges and counsel, and are in themselves 
hardly intelligible without further explanation.231  

Dicey went to great length to distinguish the English conception of the Rule of 
Law from French Administrative Law (droit administratif), which, he saw not 
only as being an arbitrary form, but also as a form which breached the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.232 Administrative Law, whether in the Continental 
model, or in the way it has developed in the Anglo system since Dicey, is by its 
very nature concerned with Executive power. It is a form of Law that 
countenances and allows Executive discretion, whilst at the same time, 
seeking, at least procedurally, to regulate it. Forms of Administrative Law have 
also developed in a way so that they now apply to a variety of particular and 
specialised areas – for example immigration, broadcasting, mining, 
workplaces, and of course, sport233. On their face, and especially in cases 
where supervision by the ordinary courts is lacking, these forms of 
Administrative Law appear inconsistent with the form of Law as described by 
both Weber and Dicey.  
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231 Dicey 1920:p.326.
232 For a contemporary survey of this system see Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of 
the Conseil d'Etat, Wiley, 2009.
233 In Australia the ASADA Act is a form of State Administrative Law.
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The WADC system, which seeks to establish a transnational or supranational 
autonomous form of law, not subject to the supervisory powers of national 
courts is a case in point. The law of the WADC does not emanate, nor derive its 
force from the command of a single national Sovereign, nor does it apply 
equally to all those who find themselves within that definable people and 
territory. The WADC establishes a particularist and autonomous global system 
of law, in which its text clearly states, that it is not to be read in the light of, or 
bound by the conditions that governed the Law of Modern Rational 
Capitalism.234  
 
The anti-doping system established by the WADC is one of the preeminent 
examples of the new global form of administrative law that is being 
constructed in the process of globalisation. WADA has been described as 
being ‘a body that is emblematic of the emergence of the new forms of hybrid 
private-public governance mechanism in the global sphere’.235 The WADC is of 
course a particular form of law that applies only to athletes and their support 
staff, and prohibits for them only things that are not generally prohibited in the 
wider society. Moreover, it limits their recourse to a non-judicial body, 
controlled and established by the global executive of sport. It is not intended to 
be subject to the supervision of the national Sovereign’s courts. 
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234 Recall Article 24.3 of the WADC:  The Code shall be interpreted as an independent and autonomous 
text and not by reference to the existing law or statutes of the Signatories or governments.
235 Casini, Lorenzo, The Making Of A Lex Sportiva - The Court of Arbitration for Sport “The Provider”, 
IILJ Working Paper 2010/5 Global Administrative Law Series, New York University School of Law, 2010.
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One demand resulting from the WADC’s global reach is the requirement for 
some flexibility in its application by its various state and sporting princes. 
Flexibility and discretion are necessary, and allowed, in order to maintain the 
system’s single logic (which I suggest may be something other than the 
integrity of the spirit of sport; whatever that might mean) and to achieve its 
local effectiveness. Thus, rather than by way of the general application of Law 
to all, the WADC operates and achieves local effectiveness by way of the 
flexible management of the differences it encounters. Harmonisation of laws 
should not be confused with all being equal before the same law. The opening 
paragraphs of the WADC clearly supports this proposition, stating that it is: 
 
specific enough to achieve complete harmonization on issues where 
uniformity is required, yet general enough in other areas to permit 
flexibility on how agreed-upon anti-doping principles are 
implemented. 
 
For Weber the increasing use of discretionary powers and the specialisation of 
law for different classes and sectors of society is, on this view, a sign of the 
deformalisation of Law. In his consideration of droit administratif Dicey 
observed the: 
very contrast between administrative law as it exists in France … 
and the notions of equality before the law which are firmly 
established in modern England.236  
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This contrast stemmed in part from the privileged position this form of Law 
possessed as a result of it being situated and administered within the 
Executive arm of Government and not being subject to the Anglo conception of 
the constraints inherent in the concept of the separation of powers. Dicey’s 
concern, in part, was the manner in which the French system “juridialised” 
prerogatives of the Crown that had existed under the ancien regime and placed 
servants of the government outside of the purview of the ordinary courts of 
Law. As such he argued that the French system was in stark contrast to the 
English system and was not in accord with:  
 
the full meaning of that absolute supremacy of the ordinary law of 
the land … which we have found to be a salient feature of English 
institutions.237 
 
Searching for an adequate definition he turned to the works of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, and his contemporaries, French jurists such as Aucoc, who 
defined droit administrative as: 
 
(i) the constitution and the relations of those organs of society which 
are charged with the care of those social interests (interets collectifs) 
which are the object of public administration, by which term is meant 
the different representatives of society among which the State is the 

237 Ibid.:325.
167
most important, and (2) the relation of the administrative authorities 
toward the citizens of the State.238  
 
For us the function of Administrative Law as being the constitution of organs of 
society charged with the care of social interests and public administration and 
the relation of these organs towards and with the citizenry is of particular 
significance. As an emerging form of a supranational, hybridised and 
globalised form of administrative law, neither fully public, nor fully private, 
which has been brought into being, not solely by state actors but by an alliance 
or apparatus of non state and State actors, the anti-doping apparatus has at its 
raison d’etre the administration and care of what is defines as social interests. 
The supranational care of social interests is achieved by Law, law and what 
Agamben described as law, that is governance. 239  This transnational or 
supranational form of law is not International Law in the sense of Public 
International Law, which was a system that was based upon the notion of the 
inviolability of Sovereign States and their free agreement. Furthermore, this 
emerging or new form of law, rather than a pure Sovereign method of rule or 
right, is a form of trans-national governance, achieved both through means of 
Law, law and of not law, which both Agamben and Dicey describe as having an 
‘exceptional character’.240 Dicey had already foreshadowed in his own way the 
manner in which concepts such as governance, economy, the police, the 
exception and biopower, all aimed at the ‘care’ of social interests are 
embedded in the concept of administration.  
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The French system was, according to Dicey, based upon a fundamental 
misconception, which he attributes to Montesquieu, as to the meaning of the 
separation of powers. In the Anglo system, the separation of powers seeks to 
maintain the independence of each branch of Government by effectively 
placing the Parliament and Executive under the supervision of the Judiciary, in 
so far as their actions must be consistent with both Constitutional and Legal 
principles. On this view the separation of powers is inextricably woven into the 
concept of the independence of the Judiciary – a condition that underpins the 
legitimacy of the whole sovereign system. But it:  
 
means, in the mouth of a French statesman or lawyer, something 
different from what we mean in England by the ‘independence of the 
judges,’ or the like expressions. … it means … the government and 
its officials ought … to be independent of and to a great extent free 
from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts.241 
Thus, for Dicey within the realms of Administrative Law, firstly, not all were 
equal before the same Law, a special form of law or privileged attached to 
legal persons because of their status, and, secondly, and as a corollary of that, 
unlike the Anglo position where the separation of powers placed the Law 
courts in a supervisory position, whereby they controlled and kept within their 
Legal powers both the Executive and the Parliament (as the case may be), on 
the Continent, the separation of powers was construed (or misconstrued) as 
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meaning the courts had no such power to interfere with the workings of the 
other branches of government. Unlike the Continental misconception, the 
independence of the Judiciary, rather than the independence, or the immunity, 
of the other branches of Government from interference from the Judiciary, is 
fundamental to contemporary conceptions and rhetoric surrounding the Rule of 
Law. 
 
The Continental system stemmed from the view that ‘judges must never be 
allowed to hamper the action of the government’.242 To allow courts to judge 
the Executive impinged upon that particular view of the separation of powers.243 
Tocqueville’s assessment of the situation carried with it as much (or even 
more) trepidation as Dicey’s assessment, Tocqueville wrote of Judicial power 
being expelled from the sphere of Government: 
 
into which the ancient regime had most unhappily allowed its 
introduction, but at the very same time, as any one can see, the 
authority of the government has gradually been introducing itself into 
the natural sphere of the Courts, and there we have suffered it to 
remain as if the confusion of powers was not as dangerous if it came 
from the side of government as if it came from the side of the 
Courts, or even worse. For the intervention of the Courts of Justice 
into the sphere of government only impedes the management of 
business, whilst the intervention of government in the administration 
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of justice depraves citizens and turns them at the same time into 
revolutionists and slaves.244  
It is important for us to consider the ramifications of this position in the 
contemporary context. According to this conception of the separation of 
powers a global sovereign or executive power requires, and is justified in 
having, complete and unfettered discretion, a free reign in governance, a 
discretion which is not to be brought into question by existing national courts, 
or for that matter, international of transnational tribunals in construction, or at 
least other than those anointed by that Sovereign or Executive. As in Imperial 
France ‘[j]udicial functions must remain separate from administrative 
functions’245 and thus Judicial functions must not interfere with government or 
governance in the construction of Empire. We have already seen echoes of this 
logic in the reasoning of the CAS Panels in Valverde 1, 2 & 3. 
 
Dicey was careful to note the changes in the nature of droit administrative 
throughout the nineteenth century246 which was ‘the outcome of more than a 
hundred years of revolutionary and constitutional conflict’247, he was of the view 
that it established: 
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a condition of things fundamentally inconsistent with what 
Englishmen regard as the due supremacy of the ordinary law of the 
land.248  
 
Droit administratif straddled the ancient regime, the revolution, the Thermidor 
and its successors.249 These observations of Dicey’s are relevant in considering 
the form of global law we face in the contemporary context. In constructing the 
new regime, the Imperial or Bonapartist model, sought to obtain the ‘least 
interference by the Law Courts with the free action of the government’. 
Although Dicey later accepts that over time droit administratif took on a form 
which possessed some similarities to English Law, that it became more Law 
like, more Judicial and less a direct arm of Executive power.250 The important 
point is that it is this very transformation that belies the observation of Hardt 
and Negri concerning the contemporary context: 
 
Eventually a new judicial function must be formed that is adequate 
to the constitution of Empire. Courts will have to be transformed 
gradually from an organ that simply decrees sentences against the 
vanquished to a judicial body or system of bodies that dictate and 
sanction the interrelation among the moral order, the exercise of 
police action, and the mechanism legitimating imperial 
sovereignty.251 
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Law’s Deformalisation & the need for Speed 
 
As already noted Weber recognised that his formalistic description of Law, as a 
rational and calculable system, was already giving way to a new form of law 
and to its deformalisation. The germs of this new form are what today is 
arguably becoming the norm; this is in part the lesson of Agamben.252 We have 
introduced one clear aspect of deformalisation which has been the increasing 
use of discretion and the growth of administrative and particularist forms of 
Law. Weber recognised was that Modern Rational Capitalism’s formal and 
calculable Law was undergoing a process of entropy - deformalisation of Law 
was the thing of the future. Weber’s Continental vantage point, possibly, 
allowed him to perceive of this deformalisation before Dicey, who of course 
was bound by the self-acknowledged island of ‘scrupulous legalism’ and 
‘pedantic absurdity’ of English lawyers.253 
 
Weber recognised the fact of the deformalisation of Law was related to 
transitions within the capitalist form. The late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century saw the emergence of the crisis of liberalism, monopoly 
capitalism and later as one reaction to these things the growth of the welfare 
and social democratic State. In this context Law became increasingly made 
and addressed to particular social groups. As the State became increasingly 
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252 Agamben 1998 & 2005.
253 Dicey 1920:p.358.
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complex and compartmentalised, so too did the Law and this growth itself also 
brought about a growth in forms of Administrative Law; quasi-Legislative Law 
such as Delegated Legislation, quasi-law such as policy and rule making, and 
the increasing grant and use of discretionary powers. Each of these measures 
led to Law making being further removed from the daily life of Parliament and 
placed it in the hands of the Executive and its bureaucracy. Parliament, it might 
be said, has been reduced to the creation of framework agreements under 
which the Executive and bureaucracy wielded real political and Legal power.  
 
At the same time the increasing complexity of society meant that Law started 
to merge with other disciplines such as science, technology and economics, 
and those disciplines themselves began to influence what had been previously 
purely Legal reasoning. Thus, towards the end of his career Weber came to 
qualify his rationalisation of Law thesis. In Economy and Society254, and in the 
light of a number of developments he observed in the late nineteenth century 
such as the development of a division of labour and vocational interest groups 
with their own lawyers - labour law, corporations lawyers, etc., all contributing 
to an apparent regression back to the feudalisation of law. Different specific 
privi-leges applying to different status groups accompanied the development 
of a new privileged class of bureaucrats with the technical ‘know-how’ and 
who thus became indispensable to the administrative process.  
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254 Weber, M, Economy and Society, Volume 2, University of California Press, 1978.
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William E. Scheuerman has questioned the traditional belief in an elective 
affinity between economic liberalism and the Rule of Law. He argues that today 
it obscures the manner in which the process of economic globalisation 
threatens core features of the Rule of Law. For Scheuerman because of its 
high-speed nature and its tendency towards deterritorialisation, contemporary 
capitalism is vastly different to its predecessors and that as such the 
fundamental relationship between capitalism and the Rule of Law has itself 
been transformed. Because global capitalism consistently and constantly 
revolutionises the temporal horizons of economic action, its reliance on a 
robust model of the Rule of Law diminishes.  Social acceleration and 
deterritorialisation have diminished the dependence upon traditional Rule of 
Law virtues and as such traditional modes of liberal Law decreasingly figure in 
the operations of the global economy. Soft law, and international arbitration, 
private ordering and increasing executive discretion have far more prevalent 
forms of governance than traditional forms of law.255 We will turn to consider 
the changes brought about by neoliberalism to the Rule of Law (Chapter Five) 
but for now it is sufficient to note that one aspect that becomes necessary is 
that rather than the machine like production of the formal and calculable law of 
Weber’s modernity, which matched its machine like form of production, what is 
required today, rather, than calculability and equality before the Law, is 
increasingly flexibility.  
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255 William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time, The John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore and London, 2004, p.145.
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Aristotle suggested in Antiquity that law in its normative form was inherently 
defective because of its need to state matters generally. Scheuerman notes 
that Locke proposed a similar thing in the instance of the body of the prince. 
Locke’s argument was that the most sensible answer to the Legislative 
power's inherent tendency to commit mistakes in predicting the future is to 
place: 
 
power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good, in 
such cases, which depending on unforeseen and uncertain 
occurrences, certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct.256 
 
This proposition is that Executive discretion is a real necessity in the Law, 
precisely for the reasons that Aristotle introduced equity as the fulfilment of 
justice. Scheuerman writes:  
 
Law is prospective because only rules announced beforehand can 
provide legal security, but also because legislation in its very nature 
is concerned with the task of predicting and coordinating future 
needs. The ‘exigencies of the times’ are ‘impossible to fore-see’ with 
perfection, however, and thus legislative power is inherently 
flawed.257 
 
What is important about the contribution of Scheuerman is that he recognises 
that the condition of speed that characterises the contemporary global 
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condition further accentuates the defective nature of Law. The necessity of 
Executive discretion to act beyond and even against the Law thus derives not 
merely from the necessity of acknowledging the limitations of inflexible and 
rigid Legislative statutes, but, from an even more fundamental need, to make 
sure that the present is free from an unduly slavish dependence on the dictates 
of the past. Here the rigidity of Law is merely a manifestation of the domination 
of the present by the past. Although future-oriented, Legislative activity 
inevitably generates rules that soon represent (past) predictions about the 
present and future, because ‘things of this world are in so constant a flux, that 
nothing remains in the same state’.258 Since the Legislature ‘is usually too 
numerous, and too slow’ only the Executive is likely to prove able effectively to 
break with the letter of the Law for the sake of rapidly adjusting Legislative 
authority to the dictates of a changing world.259 
 
Scheuerman’s point is that presuppositions about the space and time horizons 
of human activity shape many conventional assumptions about liberal-
democratic decision-making. Referring to Montesquieu and to Locke he 
observes that in liberal-democratic theory (unlike in Judge Judy’s courtroom) it 
is the slow moving nature of deliberation and decision-making that contributes 
to its reasonableness and rationality.260 He also noted and how networked, 
checked and balanced forms of government, such as the American republic, 
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258 Ibid.:37.
259 Ibid.:37-38.
260 Throughout so many sporting and particularly anti-doping cases we have seen that speed and the 
needs of the economy overdetermine Legality. Valverde’s case and the example of the Stuttgart World 
Championships is one we have addressed here. The manner in which the AFL Commission dealt with 
Essendon’s ‘governance’ issues is an even starker example.
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were conceived as protecting democratic forms by decelerating the pace of 
political exchange. Referring to Hume he argues that along with both:  
 
bicameralism and the separation of powers can be interpreted as 
tools for the sake of heightened cognitive merits.261 
 
Ideas of majority rule also rest upon these same presuppositions of time and 
space, as do basic elements of the western system of Law, such as 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law.262 The future orientation of law making 
and the stability it seeks to engender becomes: 
 
problematic given the multiplication of settings in which legal rules 
inevitably encounter a greater variety of ‘permutations and 
combinations of events … which were never contemplated when the 
original rules were made’ …  [N]ew instruments of production, new 
modes of travel and of dwelling, new credit and ownership devices, 
new concentrations of capital … all of these factors of innovation 
make vain the hope that definitive legal rules can be drafted that will 
forever after solve all problems. As such when human relationships 
are transforming daily, legal relationships cannot be expressed in 
enduring legal form. The constant development of unprecedented 
problems requires a legal system capable of fluidity and pliancy.263 
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262 Dadot and Laval argue that in fact liberalism and the Rule Of Law are anti-democratic or anti 
majoritarian.
263 Scheuerman, op. cit. pp.56-57.
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According to this view, as the Legislature’s capacity for generating clear and 
binding laws that are able to guide future action ‘tends to decay’ leaving the 
gaps to be filled through the exercise of Judicial discretion. However, what 
Scheuerman does not address in this instance, given his desire to resurrect 
liberal democracy; is that the other holder of discretionary power, the Executive 
through the myth of a representative Parliamentary democracy, seems to do all 
that it can to defeat the exercise of Judicial discretion which it does not control 
itself. Nevertheless, he recognises the result that:  
 
However attractive from a normative standpoint, the classical dream 
of a relatively airtight legal code in which judicial discretion is 
rendered unnecessary tends to be systematically undermined by 
time and space compression and its resultant increases in ‘the 
speed of movement of goods, people, information, messages, and 
the like’.264 
 
The nineteenth century hostility to discretion continues today as being a 
dominant force within the Law, despite the global condition taking on an 
increasing form of speed and interconnectedness that presents an ever-
increasing challenge to the traditional model of Executive-Legislative relations. 
Traditional Rule of Law rhetoric appears incapable of adequately addressing 
the problem of speed and time and space compression with the resultant 
production of what Scheuerman fears, as a misfit between the time and space 
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horizons of legislative activity and social and economic life.265 Such a misfit is 
made all the greater as government has moved from a laissez-faire role 
through the welfare era, to one of a being a manager or regulator of the local 
conditions of a global market and society. In such a situation national 
Legislatures: 
  
are expected to do nothing less than react effectively to a 
multiplicity of rapid-fire changes in social and economic life while 
simultaneously maintaining fidelity to the traditional notion of its 
legitimacy as resting on wide-ranging forms of unhurried debate.266  
 
In such a situation, contemporary Parliaments abandon their Law making 
duties to both national and global executives which are envisioned as better 
equipped to grapple with the imperatives of speed. To the extent that the 
Legislature's ability to coordinate future activities is drastically curtailed by the 
process of time and space compression, the scope of discretionary executive 
authority grows accordingly. Indeed this development has taken place, as the 
range of exceptional and even emergency executive authority has become 
sizable even in relatively stable liberal democracies. In our high-speed social 
world, the Legislature's inability ‘to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all 
accidents and necessities, that may concern the public’ is probably a main 
source of the ubiquity of Executive discretion in modern-day liberal 
democracy.267 In short, the slow-going character of deliberative Legislatures, or 
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for that matter Sovereign courts, increasingly leaves them poorly suited to the 
regulatory challenges of modern social and economic life. It is in this context 
that Carl Schmitt’s diagnosis of the becoming of ‘motorised legislator’, 
operating in the context of an accelerated world where speed is at a premium, 
foreshadows both the more simplified and more complex apparatus that is 
tending to become commonplace.268  The reduction of the classical liberal 
Legislature to a rapid-fire mechanical instrument for coordinating social and 
economic affairs was for Schmitt a consequence of ‘liberalism's congenital 
misunderstandings about politics’, but it also signals contemporary 
capitalism’s indisputable need for rapid-fire regulatory activity269 Scheuerman’s 
point is that the rise of the motorised legislature heralds the disintegration of 
the classical attributes of liberal Law making and most importantly, its fidelity 
to the Rule of Law. Rather than a transcendent government of Laws and not of 
men, Law, or law, functions as a technical device for overseeing high-speed 
economic affairs. For this reason contemporary liberal Lawmaking increasingly 
consists of vague and open-ended resolutions, exceptional and emergency 
norms, and poorly crafted statutes possessing a limited half-life. 270  In 
accordance with high-speed temporality of society:  
 
law making procedures become ever faster and more 
circumscribed, the path towards the achievement of legal regulation 
shorter, and the share of jurisprudence smaller.271 
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In our study what we have seen to date is that the requirement for speed 
manifests itself in an avoidance of the tardy processes of national Law courts, 
a preference for private arbitration, flexibility and the application of a 
modulating ‘sovereign’ power. Private agreement creates a particular, 
autonomous form of law, is the basis of the system’s authority, not 
independent courts. Arbitration takes place in the context of disciplinary 
matters arising from contract and in a situation in which the accused has none 
of the substantive rights and liberties of a citizen under neither the Rule of Law, 
nor do they have even the ability to defend or even properly mitigate an 
offence. The strict liability regime of anti-doping requires that the only recourse 
available be of a formal procedural type. Furthermore, rather than the 
application of an autonomous and strict Legal principle and Legal supervision 
by independent, national courts, the WADC calls upon Sovereign states to 
privilege private arbitration, such that decisions are made and arbitration is 
carried out by way of recourse to technical, economic and scientific standards, 
toggled onto the spectacle of a Just War against doping as the guiding 
principle of governance.  

Private Governance and the growth of arbitrative demand  

The prive-lege of anti-doping law and of arbitration place our contemporary 
context well outside of the Weberian and Diceyan conceptions of Law. Private 
arbitration has replaced the courts as a bastion of  ‘judicial’ decision making, 
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with consent giving rise to a system unrestrained by Constitutional, Rule of 
Law or Human Rights restraints.  Foucault foreshadowed the relationship 
between biopower, neoliberalism and the growth of arbitrative demand.272 As 
we have seen what is at stake for us in the first instance is the manner in which 
the consensual agreement to play sport includes the agreement to have 
disputes settled by an arbitration process that stands outside of the traditional 
Legal system. 
 
According to Foucault eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism and its 
conception of the primacy of the Law required a reduction of the judicial 
function to the pure and simple application of the (transcendent) Law. Foucault 
sees this as being transformed with the coming of neoliberalism, such that now 
what stands as being the law is no more than a set of rules of the game, in 
which each remains master regarding himself and his part (we will consider this 
in more detail in Chapter Five). But this according to Foucault requires the 
juridical function, instead of being reduced to the simple function of applying 
the Law, to acquire a new autonomy and importance. The particular status of 
neoliberal man as the man of enterprise - itself being a way of behaving in the 
economic field in the form of competition - and a society that allows individuals 
the possibility of behaving as they wish in the form of free enterprise, gave rise 
to a growth in the multiple forms of the typical enterprise unit. Correspondingly 
it gave rise to an increase in the number of surfaces available for friction and 
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272 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008, p.175.
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hence an opportunity for the occasions for litigation multiply. Foucault’s point 
is that the social regulation of these conflicts calls for a form of interventionism 
that tends to operate as arbitration, importantly, within the framework of the 
(particular) rules of the (particular) game;  something other than the Law.  
 
Neoliberalism’s reduction of the number of functionaries (of the State) and its 
increased dynamic of enterprises, produces the need for an ever-increasing 
number of ‘judicial’ instances, manifested increasingly as instances of 
arbitration. The problem identified by Foucault is whether this arbitration 
should be inserted within already existing Judicial institutions, or whether it is 
necessary to create new institutions. For Foucault this is one of the 
fundamental problems faced by liberal societies where there is a multiplication 
of the ‘judicial’ and instances of and the need for arbitration.273 What we have 
already seen in the case of sport and the anti-doping apparatus increasingly is 
that arbitration is increasingly a private affair removed from the sphere of 
influence and restriction of the State. 
 
Globalisation indicates shifts in the kinds of controls over corporations, people 
and markets. Michael Hardt and Toni Negri identify three general categories 
that are in constant interplay in order for the globalisation process to be 
undertaken: private agreements, regulatory mechanisms, and general norms 
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273 Ibid.:176. The need for regulation also increases; the more ‘liberalised’ the market becomes the 
greater the need for regulation. See for example Harcourt 2011.
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operating at an international or global level.274 The first level of private 
agreement is characterised by emerging forms of private authority whereby 
business govern global economic activity outside the control of nation States or 
other Governmental structures. Hardt and Negri refer to this emerging form of 
private authority as the new global form of Lex Mercatoria which they credit with 
the ability of players involved to make contacts independently in areas outside 
of State controls and based on shared customary legal understandings. As the 
authors state, Lex Mercatoria, originally referred to the legal structures that 
governed trade among merchants in mediaeval Europe at centres outside the 
jurisdictions of all the Sovereign powers. The new Lex Mercatoria provides a 
legal framework within which one is not dependent upon any national Legal 
system or systems. Its purpose is to function outside of, and to be a supplement 
to, national structures in the realm of global business. For Hardt and Negri this 
Lex Mercatoria is not validated by nation States but simply constructed by the 
law firms that serve the multi- and transnational corporations.275
There is now doubt that contemporary Lex Mercatoria is much more extensive 
than in the past, not only in its territorial reach, and its speed of operation, but 
also in its subject matter, whereby even the social reproduction of the 
population becomes a subject of this new form of law. We can clearly see that in 
the domain of sport and in particular its anti-doping rules, where the 
reproduction of a certain type of population is at stake and where private 
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185
agreement has become the ‘constitutional' norm. Importantly, this new form of 
law provides the minimum conditions under which the business of sport is 
capable of taking place. It is a regime that is internal to the sporting body itself 
which at the same time purports to be an arm's-length consensual agreement 
by all those that wish to partake in the game.276
The second point made by Hardt and Negri is that private authority emerges 
only with the backing of the political authorities. In one way or another Lex
Mercatoria depends upon Public Law to guarantee its existence, obligations and 
sanctions.277 In the case of the particular aspect of Lex Sportiva or Lex Doping,
established by the WADC and with CAS at its peak, it is Swiss Federal Law that 
guarantees its force of law. In Australia the Commonwealth’s ASADA Act inserts 
itself into the supranational regime but in a manner that’s seeks not to act as 
any guarantee of Legality. But this in itself tells us nothing about who or what 
exercises sovereign power. Nevertheless, the WADC arrangement still required 
the agreement of the interested governments in the form of the Lausanne 
UNESCO Treaty278 and most importantly the various international and national 
sporting federations, along with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), for 
it to come into being. Thus at this second level identified by Hardt and Negri, we 
find bilateral and multilateral agreements that tend to and in fact do create truly 
global forms of authority, which are in turn given deference by and backed by 
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278 Lausanne Declaration on Doping in Sport, Adopted by the World Conference on Doping in Sport
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both public and private institutions. Not only do we have an interregnum halfway 
between the national and the transnational, but it is also one halfway between 
the public and the private, and that acts to create a new global form of 
governance supported by a vast array of legal authorities, normative systems, 
and procedures. For this reason it appears as both supranational and 
transnational and in a manner that priveleges the private, ‘consenual’ basis of 
its constitution. It is also this array of authority systems and procedures that 
come together to form the anti-doping apparatus. In Chapter Four below we will 
consider specific deployments of this apparatus.
The third level of arrangement, discussed by Hardt and Negri, are the 
supranational or transnational institutions that emerge as a result of multilateral 
agreements.279 The focus of the authors in their work is on institutions such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For our purposes the two 
primary institutions that we have encountered and have authority within the new 
global transnational system are the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport. But again even in this situation the bearer of sovereign 
power modulates. The competition between anti-doping and sporting agencies 
exemplified by Valverde’s case is a testament to this modulation of power.
In contrast to what we might term Rule of Law romanticists, Goldman has 
analysed the place of globalisation in the Western legal tradition by examining 
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what he calls recurring patterns of law and authority. Of particular interest to 
Goldman is the manner in which pre-modern forms of law, contrary to the 
principles of modernity, were themselves of a particularist or local nature. We 
have already described Weber’s view on these forms of law. In examining the 
emergence of private agreement in the age of globalisation of interest to 
Goldman's is ‘the nature of the contractual mechanism for triggering arbitration 
and the institutionalisation of authorities in adjudication outside the state’.280
Within these realms of private agreement or governance, Goldman identifies a 
tendency towards a ‘useful universalism’ within the particular universe 
established by the contract in question.281 It is this useful universalism’ within the 
particular world in question that we would call the functionality required by what 
Hardt and Negri describe as the systems ‘single logic’, or in the language of 
Dumont, the system’s value that gives rise to the hierarchy formed of the 
dispersed elements of the whole. For Goldman contractual arbitration 
mechanisms conjure a problem of logic: a paradox of self-reference, which,
without more, affects its enforceability.282 Hardt and Negri identified the need for 
State or public backing in order to ensure enforceability. Goldman also notes 
that voluntary compliance based upon peer pressure contributes to an 
acceptance of a particular process in order to preserve their livelihood.283
In effect, the societal context of the international commercial contract
can become a substitute authority by creation of the parties, tending 
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to exclude domestic law, as the parties 'autonomise' their legal 
relationships. Such privately created law may be enforceable by 
government although not necessarily requiring that level of 
coercion.284
For Goldman:
the transactional community creates allegiance from the shared 
history and prospective reward of future deals. … The externalisation 
of the resolution and enforcement process in an independent 
arbitration institution … adds perceived political objectivity to the 
process. These factors combine to ground the contract in the interior, 
moral consciousness of individuals, by virtue of the personal, 
contracted creation of the process. Contracting itself can then 
become for this community a source of law with validity at a global 
level.285
This source of law, or power, operates at a paralegal or extra-State level.286 It 
also raises in our minds some of the arguments of some neoliberal legal 
scholars such as Posner, around the utility of social norms as a more efficient 
means of governance.287 It is for this reason that Goldman recognises that 
globalisation ‘represented by the accelerated interconnections amongst things 
that happen in the world’ is stimulating a new facet of jurisprudence reflected in 
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the semantic shift from the word Government to governance.288 Along with it we 
find a world constructed in relative freedom from State coercion and which 
appears autonomous enough to avoid the need for the redress redistributive 
effects, or the guarantees for that matter, State law. In this context the Diceyan
idea of the universality of Law becomes confined to the needs of a particular 
universe of a particular community and importantly unconstrained by ideas of 
territory and traditional conceptions of the Rule of Law.289 It is no longer a 
transcendent form of Law that governs but an immanent contractual 
arrangement that is interiorised.
 
It should be apparent form this reflection on Weber and Dicey that we no 
longer live in the world of Modern Rational Capitalism and its Law. We tend 
more and more to move in a system in which the Sovereigns of modernity 
continue to reign but no longer govern. The fundamentals of both Weber and 
Dicey’s system have clearly changed; Law is no longer solely the product of a 
single Sovereign source that governs a definable people and territory under 
their control. The Sovereign’s courts, in a growing instance of situations, are no 
longer the courts of final recourse. Governance is carried out, more and more, 
at the behest of networks of international organisations and corporations, on 
the basis of technical, economic and scientific standards, leaving the remnants 
of the state to perform an implementation and management role in respect of 
global policy, and of primarily ensuring through its presence as an institutional 
backer, its local effectiveness.  
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That there is a fundamental change in the nature of global organisation and the 
deformalisation of Sovereignty and its form of Law should not be in doubt. And 
despite the misgivings of many it will continue to have, profound ramifications 
for what until now we have called Law and Legal principle. What we are 
witnessing with the construction of the global system could be described on 
one level as, and by way of analogy, an increasing return to pre-modern 
systems of particularist, specialist and compartmentalised law, along with a 
subsequent and increasing use of arbitration, rather than Judicial processes. It 
is a return to dispute resolution by way of private agreement, rather than 
recourse to the Sovereign’s courts. But added this mix is the increasing 
reliance on technical, economic and scientific standards, as the guiding 
principle of governance, rather than Legal method, which involved the 
retrospective application of autonomous and strict Legal principle in order to 
resolve disputes. 
 
The lesson of Foucault, and more recently Agamben, is that more diffuse 
mechanisms and apparatuses now perform these functions. Governance tends 
to become a question of biopower (the administration and management of 
bodies) within a global society of the spectacle, rather than a question of mere 
sovereign command. In this system of global governance, rather than an 
international form of Law agreed upon by equal Sovereigns, things and 
mechanisms that are not themselves Law (law) appear to have the force of 
Law. The question may well become not, is it Law? or does it operate 
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according to Legal principle, or for that matter the Rule of Law? – but - 
following, Deleuze and Guattari; what does it do? How does it work? Even, 
does it work like Law? That is, does it have an e/affect in the way in which we 
have previously conceived of the role and function of Law?  

The Police  
[T]he Rule of Law continues to play a central role in the context of 
the contemporary passage: right remains effective and (precisely by 
means of the state of exception and police techniques) becomes 
procedure.290  
 
Consent to private arbitration looms large as the central aspect of the 
construction of a global system or systems of law and governance that we are 
encountering. The other aspect that we have begun to touch upon is the 
manner in which consent does not appear to construct a system that mirrors 
the rights and guarantees of modernity, but rather seems to carve out a space 
for the exceptional care of social interests. The administration and discretion 
bleeds into policing and it is the activity of global policy that demonstrates the 
real effectiveness of the new Imperial order described by Hardt and Negri. The 
two initial coordinates of the authority of Empire are the juridical power to rule 
over the exception and the supranational capacity to police. In this context 
whilst right remains effective, by way of the operation of the exception and the 

290 Hardt and Negri, 2000, pp.26-27.
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police, there is a continuing role for the Rule of Law, not as a substantive 
guarantor of rights, but as merely a guarantor of formal procedure. Consistently 
with this the only rights given to athletes in the WADC are only of a procedural 
nature – a right to doping free sport and a level playing field and the right to 
certain formal procedural guarantees in the testing system. We will return to 
the former in more detail below. In respect of the latter most departures from 
these procedures are not of themselves sufficient to invalidate any process. 
These elements of imperial rule – police, exception and right conceived of as 
procedure - provide us with better-equipped tools for the task of 
understanding the anti-doping apparatus. Police power better illustrates the 
function of discretion and procedure, than does Legality and the Rule of Law. It 
also provides a focussed lens through which we can begin to understand the 
concept of exception, or in other words the tendency towards the governance 
pole of the Law-governance continuum. Here the work of Neocleous, on the 
police, is instructive, for it allows us to conceive of a genealogy of the practice 
and procedure of the global administrative apparatus. With such an 
understanding we are also better able to contextualise particular instances of 
its deployment. 
 
Neocleous points to the roots of the word ‘police’ in French-Burgundian and 
how it spread and was adopted throughout Europe in the fifteenth century. The 
meaning, or function, he gives to the police has interesting parallels for us with 
Foucauldian concepts of biopower and discipline and with Dicey’s definition of 
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droit administratif referred to above. The meaning of police has remained 
constant:  
 
denoting the legislative and administrative regulation of the internal 
life of a community to promote general welfare and the conditions of 
good order … the regimenting of social life … the management and 
the direction of the population by the state.291 
 
Although the meaning is constant (save that we would say that the police, or 
the concept of policing now extends beyond that of being a State institution) 
the reach of the police has been over time capable of encompassing all of 
society, and as such there is no human problem that cannot become the 
proper business of the police.292 The institution of the police is the Diceyan care 
of social interests by an administrative power. In the end the police function is 
that of the administration and management of life.293  
 
Neocleous goes on to question what he refers to as the parallel myth between 
Law and order in that ‘policing is considered to be related to order via law: the 
police maintain order by enforcing the law’. 294  Contrary to this position 
Neocleous argues cogently: 
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291 Mark Neocleous, Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power. Pluto Press, 2000, 
p.1. Emphasis added.
292 Ibid.:93-4.
293 Deleuze 2000:92, Foucault 1998:89-90.
294 Neocleous, 2000, p.94.
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the way in which the police institution is consistently collapsed into 
‘law’ is fundamentally misleading. If we are to think of policing as a 
form of political [rather than legal] administration … We need to 
consider at greater length the administrative nature of police power 
… as historically policing was an exercise of administrative power as 
much as anything else … the police function should be seen through 
the lens of administration as much as the law  … the lens in question 
should be the law-and-administration continuum. This is because it 
is through the continuum of law and administration that the state 
administers civil society politically as part of the fabrication of social 
order.295  
 
Neocleous is concerned with the concept of the police within the context of the 
State, but his argument, despite his reluctance to align himself with Hardt and 
Negri, is apposite to a consideration of the role of the police in the global 
context of Empire. Furthermore, his consideration of a ‘law-and-administration 
continuum’ rather than a simple binary of law and not law is capable of being 
read consistently with the thought of Foucault, Agamben, and Deleuze and 
Guattari, where law and governance form two poles between which practice 
fluctuates. An interrogation of the ‘law-and-administration continuum’ is what 
is at stake if we are to take up the task of legal anthropology and interrogate 
sovereignty. It is what is at stake if we are to interrogate the juridical form and 
theory of sovereignty that is able to sustain and found the primacy of 
governance over Law. 
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Neocleous distinguishes the Rule of Law model, from that of policing, and 
notes that in the: 
 
crime control model in which crime prevention is the most important 
police function and to which other issues, such as individual rights, 
can be regarded of secondary importance.296  
 
Through an analysis of the power of arrest in England and its relationship to a 
subsequent prosecution, Neocleous shows how the administrative function of 
the police gradually colonised the practice of prosecution process without any 
Legal authority. Arrest which was originally a mechanism to bring a person 
before magistrate in order to determine whether a prosecution could proceed – 
a practice that supported the idea that the police act purely according to Law - 
gradually became a practice whereby the police themselves took control of the 
prosecution process, such that by the mid-nineteenth century the police not 
only apprehended an offender, but also prepared the case against him.297 The 
practice, and importantly the tension, between the police and Legal authority 
was not a nineteenth century curiosity, and when the practice was found to be 
illegal in first half of the twentieth century the tension was resolved on the side 
of the police by their assumption of powers that the Law denied them, merely 
because they felt them necessary and that there was a ‘moral justification for 
getting around the rules’.298  
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296 Neocleous, 2000, p.95.
297 Ibid.:96.
298 Ibid.:96-98.
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In pointing out that the Law is very much a product of the police, Neocleous 
refers to Laws (for example Vagrancy Acts as early as 1824) which introduced 
stop and search powers, reversed the traditional presumption of innocence 
and introduced concepts such as strict liability, in which the suspect might 
only be able to, if in fact at all, prove their own innocence.299 All of these now 
have familiar descendants in the global anti-doping apparatus, and are, of 
course, readily criticised by anti-doping critics and academics as being 
contrary to the Rule of Law. But, what is important is that the content of legal 
rules, and the conception of fundamental legal principles, which formed a part 
of the Rule of Law, changed because of the necessities of police practice, and 
not some higher abstract ideal of the Rule of Law. These practice-based 
changes are generally accompanied by calls to some overriding moral 
justification. They point back to our rubric of spectacle, exception, and 
functionality in the context of the Just War on doping. 
 
Discretion is the key feature of the practice of police power – Lord Scarman 
cited by Neocleous stated that: ‘the exercise of discretion lies at the heart of 
the policing function’.300 Discretion is such a central concept to policing:  
 
that one cannot understand the police function without 
understanding the place of discretion in the police role. First, 
because the discretion of law enforcement agencies is near 

299 Ibid.:105.
300 Ibid.:99.
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absolute. Second, because … individual police officers have the 
legal right and duty to enforce the law as they see fit, including 
whether to arrest, interrogate and prosecute … And third because 
identifying some of the issues surrounding discretion reveals some 
of the key features of police power.301  
 
Absolute discretion is, of course, perceived to be at odds with the Rule of 
Law’s notion of equal treatment before the Law, of a level, Legal playing field. 
Discretion as a form of selective Law-enforcement and order maintenance is 
inherently discriminatory, its application is group specific, and it is intended to 
be so. Discretion shares:  
 
a common root referring to the act of separating, distinguishing and 
judging. By definition the exercise of police discretion defines who is 
a deviant in any social context and how that deviant is controlled. 
Some laws may be enforced more strictly against some groups than 
others, while at other times certain techniques of maintaining order 
will be utilized for different groups.302  
 
Furthermore, the act of taking control of the body of a suspect, and its violation 
in order to demand bodily samples, in whatever form, is the quintessential act 
of police discretion. It is not by reference to medical ethics or concepts such 
as consent to treatment that we should try to understand anti-doping 
instruments, such as the Biological Passport (see Chapter Four), but by 
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301 Ibid.:99.
302 Ibid.:99-100.
198
reference to the nature of police power and its role in the biopolitical 
governance of populations. 
 
The citizen who is deemed to be suspect stands stripped of his 
canopy of rights, and the police can lawfully take control over and 
work on his body and mind … The fact that discretion is so integral 
to the exercise of police powers tells us something important about 
the police and its relation to state power, for discretion is a key 
feature of state power generally. … While liberal jurisprudence tends 
to treat discretion entirely in terms of its place in judicial decisions, 
police discretion can in fact be understood only by considering 
policing less as a form of juridical power and more as a form of 
political administration.303 
 
The exercise of discretion, as a type of administrative or Executive power, is 
entirely consistent with the growth of new administrative forms that have 
developed since Weber first grasped the signs of law’s deformalisation and its 
production of quasi-judicial forms. It also allows us to begin to understand the 
importance of the Schmittian phrase ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception’ - discretion as an Executive, rather than Judicial function, points 
squarely to the power of the Sovereign to decide the Law, or more precisely, 
the exception to the Law. Agamben’s discussions of Schmitt begin in fact with 
a discussion of the development of new forms of Administrative Law in the 
early twentieth century, the same passage foreseen and described in outline by 

303 Ibid.:101. Emphasis added.
199
Weber and Dicey.304 Furthermore, Agamben’s concept of the state of exception 
refers to more than an exercise of an administrative power; it also 
encompasses a situation in which the old boundaries of disciplines, institutions 
or powers tend to blur into a zone of indistinction or critical opalescence. This 
place that straddles borders, is also where Neocleous locates the police. The 
difficulty of where to place the police in the traditional Rule of Law institutional 
structure arises because rather than:  
 
sitting uncomfortably in both judicial and executive spheres, the 
police … straddles the boundary between these spheres naturally, 
operating most comfortably in the ‘open border’ between the 
spheres of state power and giving the police an independence which 
no other institution of the state appears to have. 305  (Emphasis 
added). 
 
The concept of the police operating in a global zone of indistinction is a much 
more adequate manner in which to conceive of the practice of anti-doping law 
than by way of reference to Legality and the Rule of Law. Policing appears as a 
border crossing assemblage in a way that the Law and Rule of Law does not. 
 
Discretion allows the exercise of power with law standing at arm’s 
length, deferring to the power of administration but using its own 
symbolic and political significance to confirm the same power.306  
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304 Agamben 2005: p.7, pp.11ff.
305 Neocleous, 2000, p.106.
306 Ibid.:103.
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In the case of anti-doping law we are no longer in the midst of an exercise of 
State power but the constitution of a form of global hybrid State/non-state 
administrative power. To continue to critique it as not conforming with the Rule 
of Law, is, to sadly miss the point – in anti-doping we are dealing with the 
global administration and management of a form of life – with its policing.
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Chapter Four – A Global Apparatus of Control 

Anti-Doping Law and Global Governance 
 
As we have already noted and as we have tried to contextualise by our 
furlough into and beyond Weber and Dicey, one of the more forceful criticisms 
levelled by liberal commentators of anti-doping law and policy is that the 
manner in which the system established by the WADC operates is not 
consistent with traditional notions of the Rule of Law and the separation of 
powers. It is the premise that, to a large part, underlies Møller’s analysis of the 
scapegoating of Michael Rasmussen, and is made explicit in the quoting of the 
United States journalist Hiltzik: 
 
What has evolved to protect competitive purity since then [the 
establishment of WADA] is a closed, quasi-judicial system without 
American-style checks and balances. Anti-doping authorities act as 
prosecutors, judge and jury, enforcing rules that they have written, 
punishing violations based on sometimes questionable scientific 
tests that they develop and certify themselves, while barring virtually 
all outside appeals and challenges.307   
 
Møller's book on Rasmussen is important as it sets out in detail the manner in 
which the UCI, the directors of the Tour de France, the media and 
Rasmussen's team, Rabobank, handled, or mishandled the administration of 
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the Whereabouts system that operates in that sport. Møller painstakingly 
documents the manner in which the 2007 Tour de France leader, and at that 
point probable winner of the race, was 'retired' by his team for no better reason 
than to quell a media storm played out in Debord's Spectacle.308 Møller's 
documentation shows us that Rasmussen was not in breach of any rules that 
justified his exclusion from the race. He had not received the three 
Whereabouts warnings necessary to constitute an Anti-Doping Rule Violation 
(ADRV) and a two-year ban from competition. Furthermore, contrary to the 
Whereabouts rules, details of his file were leaked to the media by the Danish 
anti-doping authorities. In I Wish I was Twenty One Now - Beyond Doping in 
the Australian Peloton there appeared one quote in respect of the Rasmussen 
case.309 The question and the response of the interviewed professional cyclist 
put into context the gravity of the events that took place in Pau in July 2007: 
 
Q: Are you ever amazed that Rasmussen is still alive? I actually think 
sometimes, I really seriously am amazed that he hasn’t committed 
suicide. 
A: Yeah, that was I think an oversight on Rabobank’s point of view, I 
don’t know. I was there and I’m part of that team and I don’t know 
enough about that. But I think it was an oversight on them when 
they kicked him out of the Tour, to leave him alone that night. They 
put him in a hotel room 100km up the road or something, with that, 
driven there by a PR lady or something. Really, somebody should 
have been on suicide watch. 
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308 Debord, G. 1995. The society of the spectacle. New York: Zone Books, p.147
309 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. I wish I was twenty one now, beyond doping 
in
the Australian Peloton. Geelong: Auskadi Samizdats, p.110
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Q: Well, I’m still amazed about it. 
A: Taking the Holy Grail away from somebody. 
 
This chapter is not about the Rasmussen case, but nevertheless his case does 
help us situate the operation and effect of the Whereabouts System and how 
Møller's theoretical perspective fails to consider the mutations and the different 
logics or rationalities of the Rule of Law. Furthermore, his analysis doesn't take 
into account the manner in which the emphasis of government has moved from 
one of Law in the formal sense, towards a question of governance. It is the 
zone of indiscernibility between Law and governance within the anti-doping 
apparatus that we will now focus upon.  
 
It is probably by now apparent that one aspect of this general movement from 
Law to governance that interests me is the manner which within a global world 
of generalised competition, sport itself acts as a form of general global 
governance. We will turn to this as we move on, however, what I wish to 
develop here is a more particular or localised example of governance drawn 
from cycling and deployed in its full intensity in the wake of the Operación 
Puerto revelations in 2006. Rather than the deployment of mechanisms of the 
arbitration of disputes what concerns us here is the manner in which the daily 
lives, activities and bodies of professional cyclists are increasingly themselves 
governed by way of two principal instruments or tools, the Whereabouts 
System and the Biological Passport. What is it that these tools tell us about the 
changing relationship between Law and governance? 
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In order to understand these instruments of the global anti-doping apparatus 
we need to descend into the hidden abode of the athlete's world, and in 
particular the manner in which this apparatus deals with, or supervises and 
governs their daily lives and activities. What follows in this part is an overview 
of the manner in which the individual cyclist, by their membership of the global 
population of cyclists, is made the object of an intense regime of testing and 
surveillance. By doing this we can begin to uncover the manner in which the 
operation of these two anti-doping instruments contribute to making the 
private lives and bodies of professional cyclists visible to those that function as 
administrators of this apparatus. In doing so the hidden act of doping is itself 
sought to be made visible, not by way of strictly legal mechanism but by 
administrative measures which in turn challenge and transform legal principle. 
In considering these two tools we will again use as our counterpoint for 
analysis the work of Møller and his critique of anti-doping scholarship that 
sought to justify the Whereabouts System by reference to Foucault's work on 
the Panopticon. This approach helps us understand what is at stake and 
highlights the political nature of these tools. It points to the limitations of the 
different stands of liberal analysis and suggests that a closer reading of 
Foucault's paradigm of the Panopticon is in fact applicable to the Whereabouts 
System and to the anti-doping apparatus more generally. My point is that the 
paradigm of the Panopticon, and its extension through concepts such as 
biopower and the society of control, do in fact assist us with a better 
understanding of what is actually at play. They help us grasp how the 
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apparatus makes the invisible act of doping visible and in its process how the 
Law is again transformed. They also point us back to the concept that seems 
to underpin this policing – consent. 
 
Before undertaking that task it is worth making the point that this apparatus 
forms a part of what Marazzi has described as a wider ‘experiment in post-
Fordist governance’.310 Like myself, Marazzi is concerned with ‘the gradual 
transformation of politics into administration’ and the place of the ‘emblematic 
problems of post-Fordist societies’ in this transformation, among which he 
includes drugs.311 These issues go to the heart of the problem raised by the 
Law–governance continuum and the interrogation of sovereignty that we have 
set as our task. For Marazzi the manner in which these problems are dealt with 
become technical (rather than legal or democratic) problems in which the: 
 
drug addict strays from the consensual and 'discursive' democracy, 
… to consider him as a citizen would be contradictory in terms of 
representative democracy. The drug addict is incapable of 
representing the whole of civil society: he is in fact, a marginal, he is 
not included in a representative democracy whose rules he does not 
abide by, he is an 'impossible subject,' irreducible to the norms of 
common living. As such, he can only be considered an 
'administrative subject,' outside of the democratic debate on the 
deeper causes of his existence … the question of democracy … 
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310 Christian Marazzi, 2011. Capital and affects, the politics of the language economy. Los Angeles:
Semiotext(e), 2011, p.136.
311 Ibid.:135.
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(has been) liquidated through a purely technical approach to the 
issue of drug addiction.312 
 
Marazzi's point is that public measures against drug addiction reflect larger 
issues relating to the post-Fordist construction of a: 
 
democracy 'without rights' … the drug addict, the refugee, the 
unemployed are the 'human material' on which to experiment with 
the new technologies of social control ....313  
 
To the conception of ‘democracy 'without rights' we can add that of 'law 
without rights' which itself operates as a technical or administrative measure, 
as a form of governance. My point is that this system of law without rights not 
only includes, what we might call, parts of the population of the global poor, 
but also those who seemingly inhabit a space reserved for the global elite or 
aristocracy. In this manner it is not just, for example, the drug addict, the 
refugee, or the unemployed - who may at the same time be seen as potentially 
impossible subjects or for that matter figures of Agamben's homo sacer.314 In 
the case of the anti-doping apparatus the experiment is also being carried out 
on those that, simultaneously, perform a role in the governance and 
propagation of the generalised system of global competition. The broader 
context and ramifications of the anti-doping apparatus are brought home to us 
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314 see e.g. Hardie 2011 and Kreft, L. 2009. The elite athlete: In a state of exception? Sport, Ethics 
and Philosophy 3(1):pp.3–18.
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by comments such as those by the former Australian minister for Sport, Kate 
Ellis at the 2010 Australian New Zealand Sports Law Conference, where she 
stated that the Whereabouts System was in fact a model which could be 
deployed throughout society. Furthermore the Western Australian branch of 
the Liberal (conservative) Party called upon random drug testing to be carried 
out on welfare recipients, with the proposal that any positive test should result 
in the withdrawal of benefits.315  
 
It is important to note that the anti-doping regime does not differentiate 
between the amateur and the professional, by taking out membership with a 
cycling club and receiving a 'cycling licence' all those who join consent to 
become objects of this regime. The only difference being the professional is 
subject to the extreme intensification of the anti-doping apparatus. It is 
primarily the Whereabouts System and the Biological Passport that constitute 
this intensification and which are at the forefront of this experimentation. The 
two instruments also constitute the primary manner in which the space of 
surveillance is constructed. This space of surveillance not only locates and 
makes visible the physical location of each individual cyclist, it also in turn 
makes visible their internal bodily functions, in this case the composition and 
the fluctuations of the composition of their blood. The combination of the 
Whereabouts System and the Biological Passport thus makes the cyclist 
visible. These systems cannot by themselves cause the actual act of doping to 
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315 Perth Now. 2011 available at http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/dole-drug-tests-
homeswestreform-
proposed-at-wa-liberal-conference/story-e6frg13u-1226447842448. These kinds of proposals continue 
to gain much wider acceptance.
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be identified with any certainty, rather what they do, by casting the place of the 
body and the constitution of its blood in terms of abnormalities, is to suggest a 
probability that doping may have in fact occurred. Increasingly this probability 
determines guilt. 
 
Anti-Doping Offences. 
 
Within the academic literature on anti-doping there is exists a high 
preponderance of psychological analysis that addresses the problem of doping 
as one of moral reasoning.316 According to the logic of moral reasoning anti-
doping targets misplaced motives framed as unacceptable morals and thus 
these authors assume that a doping offence is due to lack of knowledge, 
ignorance or unfairness on the part of the offender. Consistent with the 
individualisation of the problem, the anti-doping apparatus constructs the 
im/moral individual as the sole focus of attention and regulation. This is done 
despite the fact that in some cases the question of whether doping is not a 
moral but a technical question. For example, in the 2009 Tour de France the 
U.S. team Garmin Slipstream (widely regarded as a clean and ethical team) 
made extensive use of the drug pseudoephedrine (known internally as pseudo-
bombs) that at that time was not banned in sport.317 The following year, 2010 
pseudoephedrine was again placed on the List of Prohibited Substances. 

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Similarly, blood doping in its various forms is banned whilst processes such as 
altitude training or methods that reproduce the same effect are not banned.318 
The question of its use was simply one of whether it was on a list of banned 
substances, a technical question and not whether or not its use was in some 
way moral or not.  
 
As the global constitutive or framework document for the anti-doping 
apparatus the WADC establishes two primary norms that may be transgressed 
by an athlete – the presence of a prohibited substance in their body and the 
use of a prohibited substance or method. The individualisation of the problem 
is clear from the text of the WADC and its embodiment of the principle of strict 
liability. Article 2.1 of the 2009 WADC establishes the offence (or properly Anti-
Doping Rule Violation (ADRV)) of the presence of a prohibited substance in a 
bodily sample taken from an athlete. The relevant parts of the article state that:  
 
each athlete has duty to ensure no prohibited substance enters their 
body.  
 
In order to make out the offence: 
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… it is not necessary to show intent, fault, negligence or knowing 
use on the part of the athlete, such that the (mere) presence of a 
prohibited substance is of itself sufficient proof.  
 
Furthermore, in most circumstances (other than certain specified substances) 
the presence of any quantity of the substance constitutes a violation. The strict 
liability principle has been criticised by some as being contrary to accepted 
principles of Law and human rights. 319  This was at issue in the Alberto 
Contador case and which led to the comments by the then President José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero on the government’s Twitter page: ‘there’s no legal reason 
to justify sanctioning Contador’, a position supported by his opponent and 
successor, current President Mariano Rajoy, and by Angel Juanes, the 
President of Audiencia Nacional (the Spanish High Court) who questioned the 
constitutionality of the strict liability principle, in so far as it removed the 
presumption of innocence.320 Soek notes that although the burden of proof is 
on the prosecuting authority (the anti-doping or sporting organisation) to prove 
the offence, the practical effect of the strict liability principal is that the athlete 
appears prima facie guilty whenever a prohibited substance has been shown to 
be or have been present in their body.321 The one exception to the strict liability 
principle, which in reality is not really an exception, as it does not go to 
excusing the offence but only to mitigate any penalty, involves the situation 
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319 See McLaren, R.H. 2006. CAS doping jurisprudence: What can we learn? 1 International Sports 
Law Review (1): 4, Coleman, J.E., and J.M. Levine. 2011. The burden of proof in endogenous 
substance cases: A masking agent for junkscience. In Doping and anti-doping policy in sport: Ethical 
and legal perspectives, ed. M. McNamee, and V. Møller. Abingdon: Routledge.
320 El Mundo. 2011. Cronologia del ‘caso Alberto Contador’. El Mundo Newspaper, 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundodeporte/2011/02/15/ciclismo/1297794357.html. Accessed 31 Dec 2012.
321 Soek, J. 2006. The strict liability principle and the human rights of athletes in doping cases. The
Hague: Asser Press, p.41.
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where an athlete can show how a substance entered their body, that it was not 
intended to enhance performance, and that there was no fault or negligence on 
their part322 If an athlete is able to adduce corroborating evidence of these 
elements, to the standard of conformable satisfaction, any penalty may be 
reduced from the standard two years of ineligibility (ban) from competition.  
 
Article 2.2 of the WADC establishes the ADRV of use or attempted use of 
prohibited substance or method. Accordingly it is each athlete’s personal duty 
to ensure that they do not use a prohibited substance or method, once again 
intent is not a necessary element of the offence, neither is whether or not an 
attempted use was carried through with nor was in fact successful. The 
provisions of Article 2.2 in effect create a wider catch all situation, allowing for 
cases to be proven whereby no substance has been detected in an athlete’s 
bodily sample, or whereby there is evidence of an attempt to dope which itself 
has not been fully acted upon. Although Article 2.1 adopts the principle of strict 
liability, which it is argued is necessary in order to properly carry out the fight 
against doping. Article 2.2 requires evidence other than a positive test result, 
such as actual evidence of use, or, for example, other circumstantial evidence 
based upon the Biological Passport. This as we will see raises another set of 
difficulties in respect of proof. Already in the Valverde decisions we can see 
that such use, or attempted use, can be made out on highly contested, 
circumstantial or even tenuous pieces of evidence. 
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322 Article 10 WADC. This is what gave rise to Contador’s contaminated steak defence.
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In respect of both provisions the standard of proof to be met by the 
prosecuting authority is said to be that of comfortable satisfaction, something 
greater than the balance of probabilities used in civil cases, but generally not 
quite as high as the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The 
standard was adopted by the CAS from the jurisprudence of the Australian 
High Court and its decision of Briginshaw v Briginshaw 323 . We saw in 
Valverde’s case how this standard may not be given its full effect and 
importantly here we will see how the manner in which scientific evidence is 
used in Biological Passport cases effectively lowers this apparent high 
standard of proof.  
 
But the crucial point to be made here is that the WADC ultimately brings its 
disciplinary weight to bear upon the individual and their behaviour.  As 
competition individualises everything, in the end it makes the individual 
ultimately responsible for their own actions and their own body. Dadot and 
Laval324 highlight the individualisation of choice and fate in a neoliberal world 
when they speak of the manner in which the management of the self and 
management of the enterprise and all such practical exercises in self 
transformation tend to transfer the whole burden of complexity and 
competition exclusively on to the individual. In neoliberalism they argue 
techniques of the self and techniques of choice merge completely. Once a 
subject is fully conscious and in control of his choices, he is also fully 
responsible for what happens to him giving rise to an infinite responsibility of 

323 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. A decision of the High Court of Australia.
324 Dadot and Laval p.272.
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the individual for his own fate.325 “To be a personal enterprise assumes living 
entirely in risk” 326 whereby external causes and problems of the system are 
transformed into personal failure.327 The WADC assumes that the individual is 
in a position to access the information required make the correct choice and 
that by establishing what it calls the Prohibited List328  of substances and 
methods what is facilitated is a transfer of risk to the person who chooses such 
that any decision correct or otherwise belongs entirely to the individual.329 In 
the world of the war on the doper there is no such thing as society.330 This is 
the logic that also informs the rejection of the Spanish Puerto case, and its 
focus on the dealers and distribution networks, in favour of a global hunting 
down of the cheats.  
 
The WADC also operates in conjunction with five international technical 
standards issued by WADA. The stated aim of these standards is aimed at 
bringing harmonisation among anti-doping organisations in various technical 
areas, namely, the Prohibited List, Testing, Laboratories, Therapeutic Use 
Exemptions, and Protection of Privacy and Personal Information. WADA states 
that the standards have been the subject of lengthy consultation among 
WADA’s stakeholders and are mandatory for all signatories of the Code. Given 
their mandatory status the norms articulated in the standards seep into the 
decisions of both sporting and State anti-doping documents and decision-
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325 Ibid.:274.
326 Ibid.:275.
327 Ibid.:277.
328 The Prohibited List and its catch all provisions are notoriously difficult to interpret.
329 Dadot and Laval p.278.
330 Thatcher, M. 1981. Interview for the Sunday Times—The first two years. The Sunday Times.
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475. Accessed 31 Dec 2012.
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making.331 Any departure from the norms must be proven by an athlete on the 
balance of probabilities, but even when this is possible, certain provisions of 
the WADC, UCI Rules and, for example, the ASADA National Anti-Doping 
(NAD) Scheme, contain 'no invalidity' clauses that seek to ensure that 
departures from the norms do no invalidate any positive doping test results.332 
Straubel argues that the WADA system is ‘nearly incapable of addressing the 
inherent imbalance of power between athletes and their accusers’333 and that 
under the current WADC an athlete must prove both a departure from the ISL 
and that the departure was likely to have caused the positive result constituting 
‘an exhibition of unchecked power’.334  
 
Whereabouts Surveillance  
 
Paul Dimeo 335  sets out in great detail the history of anti-doping and the 
development of the drug-testing regime in sport. For our purposes what 
interests us is the transition that occurred in the late 1980’s from purely in-
competition anti-doping testing, that is testing that took place only at sports 
events, to unannounced out-of-competition testing, that is testing that could 
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331 Berman, P. 2005. From international law to law and globalization. Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 43: 485, p.510.
332 See e.g. XZTT and Anti-Doping Rule Violation Panel. (2012). AATA 728. 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AATA/2012/728.html and Anti-Doping Rule Violation Panel v 
XZTT [2013] FCAFC 95 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2013/95.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=xztt Accessed 19 Nov 
2014.
333 Straubel, M.S. 2009. Lessons from USADA v. Jenkins: You can’t win when you beat a monopoly.
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 10(1) 119.
334 Ibid.:138.
335 Dimeo, P. 2007. A history of drug use in sport, 1876–1976, beyond good and evil. Abingdon:
Routledge.
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take place at any time and place outside of events.336 The Whereabouts System 
was introduced ostensibly as a mechanism to improve the administration of 
out-of-competition doping tests. In cycling the system is linked in its operation 
and purpose to the Biological Passport such that it is regarded as a necessary 
and complementary tool without which the Biological Passport would not be 
complete. Whereabouts is said to target out-of-competition testing by requiring 
individual athletes to state their physical location within set timeframes and, 
thus, make themselves available for the collection of both blood and urine 
samples. These tests, in turn, provide information for the Biological Passport, 
which itself contributes to the refinement and better targeting of such testing. It 
is because of this that the UCI regards the information gathered though the 
Whereabouts System as being imperative, in that it is said to enable anti-
doping tests to be conducted anywhere in the world, at any time.337 From 2008, 
the requirement to complete Whereabouts information was extended to include 
a large section of the professional cycling peloton. As such, all members of 
UCI professional teams and those in the Registered Testing Pools of their 
National Anti-Doping Agency (NADO) must provide online to the UCI or their 
NADO, a schedule of their Whereabouts. In doing so riders are required to 
complete their Whereabouts information in advance and in quarterly blocks.  
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336 Houlihan, B. 1999. Dying to win: Doping in sport and the development of anti-doping. Strasbourg:
Council of Europe Publishing, p.151.
337 UCI, 2008a. UCI (2008). Whereabouts & location forms 
http://www.uci.ch/templates/UCI/UCI2/layout.asp?
MenuId=MTI1Njk. Accessed 31 Dec 2012.
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The information provided by the athlete is intended to be strictly confidential 
and must only be used for the ‘relevant purposes’ and, once the three-month 
period has elapsed, the information must be destroyed. As the relevant 
purpose is the planning, coordinating and conducting of out-of-competition 
testing, the strict application of the rule would mean, for example, that after 30 
March the information provided for the three months preceding is required to 
be destroyed as it is no longer relevant. Given the privacy concerns, one might 
expect these rules to be strictly interpreted – in a similar way that punitive or 
criminal provisions are always strictly interpreted so as not to impinge upon 
fundamental rights. However, Møller’s work on Rasmussen shows that this rule 
has not always been followed. His analysis of Rasmussen's case illustrates that 
the requirement of confidentiality may be overridden by the arbitrary 
requirements of the Spectacle.338  Despite Møller’s objections Rasmussen’s 
expulsion would no doubt be justified by claiming that the fight against doping 
warrants such a breach even if confidentiality was expressly set out in the 
rules.  
 
The provisions of the rules339 relating to Whereabouts Information require riders 
to provide the UCI, at a minimum, with an one hour time slot each day where 
the cyclist guarantees to be available for an anti-doping test, their residential 
address for each day - that is, the place where they will be sleeping, their 
training schedule, their competition schedule and their travel schedule. The 
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338 Møller 2011b Møller, V. 2011. The Scapegoat, about the expulsion of Michael Rasmussen from the 
2007 Tour de France and beyond. Aarhus: Akaprint.
339 UCI Regulations, Chapter V of Part 14, Rules 81-119.
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information must be provided for each day of the year and before the 
commencement of each quarterly period and it must be updated whenever the 
cyclist becomes aware of a change to their schedule. The required information 
is entered online by the cyclist into the Anti-Doping Administration and 
Management System (ADAMS). Interestingly and in a seemingly Orwellian 
manner, the US Anti Doping Agency considers the staff they employ to enforce 
the requirement to complete this information as one of the ‘athlete services’ 
they provide. 
 
As set out above Article 2 of the WADC details the provisions that deal with 
ADRVs. Pursuant to Article 2.4, a failure to provide proper Whereabouts 
information may constitute an ADRV. Under the provisions, any combination of 
three missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month period, as 
determined by anti-doping organisations with jurisdiction over the athlete, shall 
constitute an ADRV. The explanatory notes to the WADC go on to state that a 
failure to provide proper Whereabouts information may also constitute a 
breach of Articles 2.3 and 2.5 which deal with refusals and failures to submit to 
a test and tampering with an anti-doping control, respectively. Violations of, for 
example, Article 2.4 carry with them, pursuant to Article 10.3.3, a minimum of a 
one-year and a maximum of a two-year period of ineligibility (ban).  
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Mr.ADAMS By Pedro Horrillo*
Mr. Adams entered my life at the same moment as we started the New Year, on January 1st,
2008. To tell the truth, I never approved of him, but he didn't seem to care: he had come to stay 
and was aware that I knew it. Also, he certainly knew that I could never reject him. Ours has been 
since then a relationship full of ups and downs – something predictable in any forced relationship-
but keeping no secrets at all. I have always told him everything I have done, whom with, where, 
when, whenever I come and go... Of course it is not the case, but if by any chance it occurred to 
me, let alone lying to him – that would be really serious – but hiding something from him or telling 
him just a half-truth – it is the same for me – God help me if he ever finds out! Then I would be 
risking the whole family and their bread and butter. Mr. Adam's shadow is very long, extremely 
long.
So you'd better not take it to heart, as living with Adams is not easy at all. That's why we cyclists 
usually make jokes about the matter and mean to send a message to brother Adams when we 
think of going to the pictures, for instance. Of course you are free to go out without telling him, 
although in that case you'd rather pay attention to your mobile phone, select the silence mode 
and be ready to leave the cinema, may he happen to visit your house. To go to the pictures, for a 
walk with some friends, play with the kids in the park, have dinner in a restaurant, ... in any 
situation you like you have to act the same way.
And now a year since our first encounter, in another turn of the screw, Mr. Adams makes me give 
him daily notice of the exact place and the time that I will be available for him. 
If he turns up and I am not there, I will have a big problem, even if my absence is justified.
So that´s how things stand. To begin with, I am of the opinion that random drug testing is one of 
the most effective ways to fight against fraud. Even though most of them are mere red blood cell 
extractions for the biological passport program and not doping tests, strictly speaking. But Adams' 
demands wear me out; they overwhelm and saturate me to the extent that sometimes, out of 
rebelliousness, I just provide him with the minimum necessary information.
What a rebellion! You might think. Still I can't nor should complain about it, as we, the cyclists 
have accepted taking part in that program and its consequences. And on the other hand, being a 
sportsperson, I have undertaken the same commitment with my team under contract.
The irony of fate! I started riding the bike because nothing else had ever given me such sense of 
freedom before. I carried on cycling, free as a bird, and eventually managed to make a living (of 
it). It is everybody's dream to be able to work in something you love. And all thanks to the bike.
However, I have never felt so inhibited like now when it comes to make decisions. I am not free to 
improvise in my own life, to hesitate, to make hasty and last minute plans. That is over, freedom 
is no longer there. Well...not exactly, some people say, you always have the option to get a 
computer, search for a connection and voilé! Adams is changed. Or even better, to send an sms. 
For some people it is basically the same thing, but not for me. If you'll pardon the expression, I 
call this the being given the third degree. 
So that is how it is and far from complaining, I chose to accept it. Given the choice between adapt 
or die, I prefer the first one, because I want to be a cyclist as long as possible, therefore, I won't 
pay heed to your attempts to put off my desire to continue, Mr. Adams.

*Adams: Antidoping Administration & Managing System
Translated by Martin Hardie, Original published in El Pais in Spanish
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/senor/Adams/elpepisoc/20090210elpepisoc_2/Tes

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Panopticism? And the Internalisation of Control  
 
Predictably, part of the liberal reaction to Whereabouts System has been a 
critique of its impact on personal privacy and debates regarding whether it can 
be defended as a ‘morally’ valid system of surveillance. On the other hand, 
work with Australian professional cyclists has observed a tacit acceptance of 
the system as a necessary evil.340  In that study it was observed that the 
Whereabouts System was widely considered as an imperfect, but still largely 
useful and moderately successful deterrent and detection system for otherwise 
virtually undetectable doping methods. The following excerpt from the 
interviews conducted in that project suggest that the 'paperwork' involved in 
complying with the Whereabouts System is regarded by some to be of the 
same nature as other forms of regulation that one might need to comply with 
as a small businessperson or entrepreneur, that is, they are just facts of doing 
business:  
 
I have to do Whereabouts and I have to do this, things can always 
be better sure but it doesn’t seem like it’s that big a deal. I think any 
vocation you’re going to have this paperwork to deal with and all this 
bullshit or licensing and stuff like that.341 
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340 Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2012.
341 Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2010 unpublished interview.
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Legal or ethical issues generally took second place to a pragmatic acceptance 
that Whereabouts was essential to a working anti-doping apparatus. One 
former cyclist commented that: 
 
It addresses a key method that people have used to avoid control, 
so I would have thought it is an eminently reasonable expectation if 
you have an anti-doping program because that is the way people 
have got around controls: not being there.342 
 
What is clear from these interviews was that, even at their most negative, there 
wasn’t any clear objection on what we might term ethical or moral grounds to 
the Whereabouts System itself. Even at its worst, the system was regarded as 
a necessary evil, and was generally rationalised by the interest in notions of 
rider health, fair play and, most importantly, the economic necessity of 
presenting a ‘clean’ sport. Most complaints arose initially at a technical level 
that may be understandable given that managing data on the daily movements 
of any given individual is a mammoth task.  
Discussion of whether the system is 'morally justifiable' becomes more 
pressing when it is considered that three failures to comply result in an ADRV – 
that is a two-year ban from competition or worse it can mean the end of a 
contract, reputation and in the end career. It is from this perspective that 
academic analysis has concentrated - the question as to how is the regime to 
be justified vis à vis an athlete’s human rights or civil liberties. Below I wish to 
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342 Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2012:93.
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consider two articles, both by leading anti-doping scholars, which have both 
discussed Foucault’s concept of Panopticism in the context of the 
Whereabouts System. Hanstad and Loland were the first to consider this issue. 
343 They used as their starting point Foucault’s concepts of a surveillance 
regime. Later Moeller responded to their analysis.344  
 
To start with Hanstad and Loland accepted that athlete reactions to the system 
as a form of unacceptable surveillance seemed more cogent than criticisms 
based upon perceptions of justice.345 How the two concerns – unacceptable 
surveillance and injustice; are so neatly separated was not made clear, but the 
authors concluded: 
 
We began by asking whether WADA’s compulsory reporting system 
can be defended on moral grounds. Our answer is conditionally 
affirmative. The arguments against the WADA-system do not seem 
powerful enough to reject it. Everyday surveillance of individuals is 
far more extensive, it is concealed and also more problematic. The 
WADA requires active participation from the person being watched. 
Hence, the system does not seem to involve undue violation either 
on the principles of justice or on athletes’ autonomy and right to 
self-determination.346 
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343 Hanstad, Dag Vidar and Loland, Sigmand. 2009. Elite Athletes’ duty to provide information on their
whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime? European Journal
of Sport Science 9(1)3-10.
344 Moeller (2011a). Møller, V. 2011. One step too far—About WADA’s whereabouts rule. International 
Journal ofSport, Policy and Politics 3(2): 177.
345 Hanstad, Dag Vidar and Loland, Sigmand. 2009. Elite Athletes’ duty to provide information on their
whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime? European Journal
of Sport Science 9(1): 3–10.:7.
346 Ibid.:9(1):9.
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Hanstad and Loland’s conclusions regarding the Whereabouts system seem to 
rest upon two propositions:  ‘Everyday surveillance of individuals is far more 
extensive, it is concealed’ and that the ‘WADA requires active participation 
from the person being watched’. In their analysis of the system the authors 
referred to the claims of some Norwegian athletes that Whereabouts 
constituted a ‘Big Brother system’, a perception they believed was 
‘strengthened by the system not only affecting the individual’s life as an 
athlete, but also their whole lives’. 347  Hanstad and Loland accepted that 
surveillance regimes have increased in scope and complexity and that the 
‘need to regulate can go too far’. In considering this aspect and in pursuit of 
striking a balance they turned to Foucault’s work for a ‘critical approach’.348 
 
Their analysis commences with an acceptance of the proposition that 
Foucault’s work on the Panopticon ‘appears as a model for the development of 
Western society’.349 They note Bentham’s ‘good intentions’ in drawing up his 
plans for the model prison, and that Foucault points to opposite 
consequences: ‘far more subtle, disciplining and “normalizing” processes that 
more effectively reduce the individuals opportunity for autonomy and right to 
self-determination’. 350  Interestingly, and possibly without fully grasping 
Foucault’s point, they argue that in the light of the Norwegian populations 
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347 Hanstad, Dag Vidar and Loland, Sigmand. 2009. Elite Athletes’ duty to provide information on their
whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime? European Journal
of Sport Science 9(1):7.
348 Ibid.:8.
349 Ibid.:8.
350 Ibid.:8.
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reported lack of concern of the misuse of personal information the claim of 
opposite consequences is a paradox.351 Rather than being a paradox, the 
apparent acceptance of surveillance and the mis/use of personal information 
may in fact be one of the consequences of such regimes that Foucault himself 
suggested. That is the docility of the population brought about by techniques 
of discipline results in them not being concerned, in their tacit acceptance of 
the fact that they are being observed and that the fruits of this observation may 
be used not only for their benefit but also contrary to it.  
 
In the context of the prospective nature of the surveillance, Hanstad & Loland 
then note that unlike convicted criminals or others, who are controlled 
following their release from prison: 
 
athletes have committed no crime or rule violation … [having] to 
meet the demands of compulsory whereabouts reporting just 
because they might violate the rules … is without doubt unusual.352  
 
It is correct that the only other members of society subject to similar location 
surveillance and reporting appear to us to be persons serving jail sentences, 
such as home detention and convicted but released paedophiles. In the 
interviews done by Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware one participant 
commented on the situation as follows: 
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Q: Do you think other people in society should be subjected to 
surveillance like athletes are? 
A: No. 
Q: No? So nobody should be subjected to that sort of surveillance? 
A: No. But I think we are, though. 
Q: We don't have to report. You know we might be with cameras 
and all that, but I don't need to report in. I don't even have to tell my 
boss where I am any more. But who are the other people who are 
subject to such a reporting scheme? 
A: Criminals. 
Q: Not even criminals. Just paedophiles who have been released. 
A: Probationary people. 
Q: Yeah. They've obviously got this one going. 
A: It's like saying everyone's guilty before they've even done the 
thing.353 
 
Another participant in that study commented: 
 
Q: Who else in society do you think is subject to such a …? 
A: No one. 
Q: Paedophiles? 
A: Yeah, exactly, that’s probably it, sex offenders … but I don’t think 
theirs is as strictly watched as ours. 
Q: No. It says something about your role in society, I think, yeah? 
A: I guess so.354 
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353 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. I wish I was twenty one now, beyond doping in
the Australian Peloton. Geelong: Auskadi Samizdats.:102-103.
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Subjecting athletes to such measures of surveillance and location reporting, 
despite the fact that they have not actually violated any norm, is no doubt an 
exceptional measure within the bounds of what is perceived as a liberal 
democratic society.355 If one turns to the original text of Foucault it is apparent 
that he considered this type of surveillance to be an aspect of the Panopticon 
that in facts perfects power, by allowing it: 
 
to intervene at any moment and because the constant pressure acts 
even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed 
… [in these conditions, its strength is that it never intervenes, it is 
exercised spontaneously and without noise, it constitutes a 
mechanism whose effects follow from one another].356 
 
However, in their analysis Hanstad and Loland either ignore or do not pick up 
on this normalising aspect of the Panopticon and its 'pre-crime'357 operation. 
The authors then go on to point out what they consider two significant 
differences that distinguish Whereabouts from other forms of surveillance and 
which in fact tend to legitimise it. It is necessary to cite in full their proposition, 
as it deserves close analysis and comparison with the original text of Foucault: 
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355 Waddington, I. 2010. Surveillance and control in sport: A sociologist looks at the WADA 
whereabouts system. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 2(3): pp.255–274.
356 Foucault, M. 1991. Discipline and punishment, the birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books, 
p.206.
357 Pre-crime was the term used in the 2002 film Minority Report set in a future where a special police 
unit is able to arrest murderers before they commit their crimes.
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First, athletes themselves have to submit all the information about 
where they are, and second, violation of the regulations is followed 
by clearly defined consequences. This can hardly be described as a 
Big Brother-system where the athletes are being watched covertly. 
The whereabouts system is clearly detectable and open, and all 
athletes know the consequences of violation. There is a difference 
here between the criminal being electronically monitored as well, 
since athletes can withdraw from the surveillance. The point argued 
by, among others, Rune Andersen of the WADA, of sport as a 
voluntary practice in this fundamental sense is a relevant one.358 
 
In essence the differences between criminal surveillance and Whereabouts 
(which it is argued tend to legitimise the latter) rest upon four propositions. 
Firstly, sport and thus submission to the regime is voluntary or contractually 
based. Secondly, that the surveillee actively participates in the process (that is 
by providing the necessary information and as a consequences of the first 
proposition voluntarily). Thirdly, surveillance is not covert but known (and 
because of one and two – accepted). Finally, the consequences of any 
violation are known and open. On this basis, the implicit position of Hanstad 
and Loland is that the Whereabouts System is not an example of the 
Panopticon and thus can be justified as ‘morally’ legitimate. Alternatively, at 
best, if it is an example of the Panopticon, the good intentions and beneficial 
nature of the system mitigate against its possible opposite consequences. The 
fight against doping of course warrants the internalisation of control. But the 
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358 Hanstad, Dag Vidar and Loland, Sigmand. 2009. Elite Athletes’ duty to provide information on their
whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime? European Journal
of Sport Science 9(1):p.8.
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problem with this ‘critical’ analysis is at its most basic that their interpretation 
of Foucault’s Panopticonic paradigm does not do justice to the original text. 
 
We have accepted the proposition that sport is a voluntary activity and that 
submission to anti-doping rules is a matter of contract.359 We have also sought 
to outline how private agreement tends to form an increasing part of the body 
of global law and that it increasingly underpins the general organisation of 
neoliberal society. Furthermore, even Foucault noted that although the 
disciplinary paradigm of the Panopticon was ‘not under the immediate 
dependence or a great extension’ of the juridico-political structures of a society 
‘it is nonetheless not absolutely independent’.360 The rhetoric of contract has in 
fact formed the ‘ideal foundation of law and political power; Panopticism 
constituted the technique … of coercion’. 361  In these passages Foucault 
described the disciplines as both an ‘infra-law’ and ‘counter-law’, mechanisms 
that constituted the law but on a different scale creating: 
 
between individuals a ‘private’ link, which is a relation of constraints 
entirely different from contractual obligation; the acceptance of a 
discipline may be underwritten by contract; the way in which it is 
imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the non-reversible 
subordination of one group of people by another, the surplus of 
power that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality of 
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359 Reference was also made to this point in our work with Australian professional cyclists (Hardie, 
Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2012:p.61.
360 Foucault, M. 1991. Discipline and punishment, the birth of the prison. New York: Vintage Books, 
pp.221-222.
361 Ibid.:222. Note also on the coercive nature of contract, Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: 
Governance through Contract, (2007) 14 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 191 (2007) 191.
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position of the different ‘partners’ in relation to the common 
regulation, all these distinguish the disciplinary link from the 
contractual link, and make it possible to distort the contractual link 
systematically from the moment it has the content of discipline. We 
know, for example how many real procedures undermine the legal 
fiction of the work contract: workshop discipline is not the least 
important.362 
 
What better description is there of the manner in which the contract to 
voluntarily participate in sport is transformed into a disciplinary (or control) 
mechanism by the incorporation of the Whereabouts System? From a reading 
of the text we can see that it is in fact the voluntary nature of the acceptance of 
surveillance by contract, rather than distinguishing the Whereabouts System 
from the Panopticon paradigm, in fact supports the application of Foucault’s 
model of power to it. 
 
If it is accepted that what is at stake in anti-doping is fundamentally an 
administrative or policing activity, what we can begin to contemplate here is 
the instrumental manner in which discipline or control is in fact internalised by 
way of an agreement. That is an agreed submission to be policed. In this 
respect the privatisation of the police constitutes a form of the publicisation of 
private life in a manner that finds its analogue in the privatisation of public life. 
Thus, in this context the privatisation of the police can be understood, as not 
only being constituted by the out-sourcing of, for example, policing activities to 
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private security firms, but also as this process by which we consent, by way of 
a voluntary private agreement, to being surveilled by a transnational policing 
apparatus. In this situation it is our own individual consent that constitutes the 
privatisation of the police. 
 
This brings us to the second factor by which Hanstad and Loland’s distinguish 
Whereabouts from the Panopticon. Their argument was based upon the fact 
that the surveillee actively participates in the process of their own surveillance 
by providing the necessary information that allows them to be observed. It is 
the corollary of the first, contractual based, voluntary proposition dealt with 
immediately above. To argue that a system is not disciplinary because 
individuals actively participate in a subtle process of surveillance and 
normalisation appears to miss the point of the Panopticon paradigm as a 
whole. Rather than being the paradox referred to by Hanstad and Loland 
above, the effect of the Panopticon is ‘far more subtle, disciplining and 
“normalizing” processes’ – a ‘body is docile that may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved’.363 The docility and normalising process can only be 
magnified when discipline and control is internalised and when it becomes a 
part of a project undertaken by the athletes themselves. Within the Panopticon 
of Whereabouts, the athletes are ‘caught up in a power situation of which they 
themselves are the bearers’.364  
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Without the athlete participating in the system the body is not normalised, 
which is the point of the whole operation – knowing that one is under 
surveillance is a key to its operation and one participates actively in this 
normalisation. The ‘pain in the arse’365 of continually providing and updating 
information to the computerised ADAMS system, is one of the mechanisms by 
which the desired disciplinary effect is achieved. This, combined with the 
inability to know when the anti-doping controllers may arrive at one’s door, to 
undertake either a blood or urine test, manifestly reinforces the disciplinary 
effect. The athlete must always be on guard, to ensure that their Whereabouts 
is reported fully and without any fault or mistake, always ready, at any time, for 
the tap on the shoulder or the knock on the door: 
 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles: he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection. By this very fact … the more 
constant, profound and permanent are the effects …366 
  
Hanstad and Loland’s third proposition, again a consequence of the first two, 
is that Whereabouts is not the Panopticon because the athlete knows that they 
are being watched. As can already be seen the fact that surveillance is not 
covert severely misreads Foucault’s paradigm. The point is not that 
surveillance is covert, but it is the relationship between visibility and invisibility 
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366 Foucault, M. 1991. pp.202-203.
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that is crucial. The observed in the Panopticon is fully aware that they are being 
observed; there is no covertness at play. The architecture of the paradigm is 
such that the observed is always actually or potentially visible to the observer. 
This visibility is the very trap of the Panopticon: ‘the mechanism arranged 
spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize 
immediately’.367  
 
What then is the immediate purpose that is served by the Whereabouts System 
other than the ability to constantly see and recognise where an athlete is at a 
given time in order to undertake an anti-doping control. The athlete's daily 
activities, breakfast, stretching, the gym, shopping, training on open roads, 
visiting friends, going to a restaurant or the movies, sleeping, all become visible 
by way of their reporting of their Whereabouts. The athlete does not see the 
controller until and when the controller wishes to be seen. But at the same time 
the athlete is always on the alert for the ever-present possibility of this 
occurrence. Hence the cyclists complain that they provide a time when they 
are available to be seen, but the controller always seems to arrive at another 
time: ‘He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a 
subject in communication’.368 The athlete in the system knows this, and they 
know that failure on their part to be visible brings with it severe consequences. 
The invisibility of the anti-doping controller is the guarantee of order.369 The fact 
that the system is not covert is in fact its very point. The major effect of the 
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Panopticon is to induce ‘a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power … surveillance is permanent in its 
effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action’. It may well be that an athlete 
subject to Whereabouts is hardly ever, or even never, tested as a result of their 
reporting their location, but it is this perfection of power that actually achieves 
and renders testing unnecessary in many cases. This perfection is brought 
about not by the system being covert, but by it being visible, by the athlete’s 
active participation and by the time and place of the arrival of the controller 
being unverifiable ... never knowing when, but always knowing it is possible.370 
 
It should be now apparent that a reading of Foucault’s original text cannot 
support the propositions put forward by Hanstad and Loland. Equally, their 
fourth proposition, the consequences of any violation are known and open is 
similarly unsupportable on this basis. The inmates of the prison, the pupils of 
the school, the workers in the factory, all were more than aware of the 
punishments that might follow from their disobedience to the necessities of 
power. If openness is a criterion with which to distinguish the Whereabouts 
System from the Panopticon the authors have forgotten that one great feature 
of the disciplinary mechanism is its ‘democratic’ nature, its openness 
constantly accessible ‘to the great tribunal committee of the world’.371 As it 
should be remembered it was this great tribunal of the Spectacle and not the 
application of the law that convicted Michael Rasmussen. 
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The Panopticon as Paradigm 
 
Verner Møller has sought to rebut the Hanstad and Loland analysis in support 
of Whereabouts himself by reference to the Panopticon. Møller’s principal 
objection to the application of the Panopticon paradigm to the Whereabouts 
System is framed initially as a response to Hanstad and Loland’s article 
discussed above. In an attempt to distance himself from them he deals with 
what he calls the “Foucault cul de sac”372 and in turn offers Orwell as a better 
theorist of the problem. Both of these arguments are problematic. Firstly, his 
reading of Foucault, albeit for different reasons from Hanstad and Loland, 
appears to be equally flawed. Whilst the Norwegians appeared to have set out 
to bolster the Whereabouts system, Møller clearly wants to demolish it. In 
doing so he takes issue with their reading of Foucault, but on the way he 
unfortunately also seems to miss the point. If he had approached Foucault with 
a more sympathetic or open mind Møller could have demolished the 
Norwegian analysis with much greater rigour. Secondly, his favouring of Orwell, 
whilst interesting in that he foregoes his desired scientific reason to privilege 
literature, raises the question of resistance to power, only to champion a vague 
and ill-defined concept of human nature.373 It is not Møller's use of Orwell but 
his misuse of Foucault that is relevant here. 
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Møller does not fall into the error of arguing that the mere fact of participating 
in and having knowledge of surveillance distinguishes Whereabouts from the 
Panopticon. Møller accepts Foucault’s proposition that inmates in the jail are 
objects of information and that they feel under constant surveillance, without 
having the least idea as to whether in reality they are or not, and that it is this 
that causes the system to become a system of self-surveillance.374 Thus the 
criticisms I have made of the second and third of Hanstad and Loland’s 
propositions do not apply to Møller. Nevertheless, he goes on to state that 
Foucault’s idea is thought provoking but that his ‘analysis does not match up 
to the impact it has had’.375 The error in the use of Foucault according to Møller 
stems from the misapplication of Foucault’s paradigm outside of the realm of 
the prison:  
 
Many people today make use of Foucault without considering the 
range of his analysis. It might, therefore, be appropriate to remind 
ourselves that Foucault was focusing on inmates. He is primarily 
concerned with those who are locked up in prisons. It is true that he 
also mentions the sick, the mentally ill, workers and school children, 
but here, too, his point of departure is internment …376  
 
Hence, our first point of contention with Møller must be his narrowing of the 
Panopticon to merely apply to inmates in prisons or cases of internment.  It is 
by virtue of this claim that Møller is able to go on and dismiss the relevance of 
Foucault. But in doing so Møller commits the error he seeks to lay at the door 
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of others – he doesn't consider the range of Foucault's analysis. It may be 
correct to point out that Foucault’s point of departure was the prison, but this 
of course was not the end of his journey, or the range of his analysis. This is 
more than clear from a reading of the Panopticon text itself, of course it would 
be even further illuminated if we were to proceed to consider the whole of 
Foucault’s trajectory. From this claim Møller then goes on to argue that the 
Panopticon does not have the normalising effects that Foucault suggested, it 
will be seen that this second claim stems from the error contained in the first 
claim. 
 
Møller’s error stems from not being able to distinguish between the panopticon 
as a jail and the Panopticon as an apparatus of rationality.377 What is apparent 
from any fair reading of Foucault and from the plain text of his chapter in 
Discipline and Punishment entitled ‘Panopticism’ is that what he is proposing is 
a model of power, a paradigm of power, ‘a generalizable model of 
functioning’378 that ‘was destined to spread throughout the social body’.379 
Immediately before the paragraph that Møller cites - as proof that Foucault was 
only concerned with prisons - the Panopticon is described as a ‘marvelous 
machine’ which may be put to ‘whatever use one may wish to put it to’380: 
 
… the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is 
a diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its 
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functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, 
must be represented a pure architectural and optical system: it is in 
fact a figure of political technology that may and must be be 
detached from any specific use... It is polyvalent in its applications 
…381 
 
Agamben has directly addressed the idea that what Foucault proposes is not 
one concrete example confined to the range of the prison, but a paradigm of 
power able to be applied in a variety of circumstances. This is plainly clear 
from the text of Foucault cited above. According to Agamben the Panopticon 
functions as a paradigm in the strict sense:  
 
it is a singular object that, standing equally for all others of the same 
class defines the intelligibility of the group of which it is a part and 
which, at the same time, it constitutes. Anyone who has read 
Discipline and Punishment knows not only how the Panopticon, 
situated as it is at the end of the section on discipline, performs a 
decisive strategic function for the understanding of the disciplinary 
modality of power, but also becomes something like the 
epistemological figure that, in defining the disciplinary universe of 
modernity, also marks the threshold over which it passes into the 
societies of control.382 
 
What concerns us, and what is ultimately at stake with the Whereabouts 
System is both the disciplinary modality and the manner in which it marks in 
combination with the Biological Passport, the threshold or passage from 
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discipline to societies of control. The Panopticon is thus both a concrete, 
singular, historical phenomenon, and at the same time "Panopticism": a model 
of functioning which can be generalised, which allows the definition and 
establishment of new sets in the relationship between power and the everyday 
life of man: 
 
To understand how a paradigm works, we first have to neutralize 
traditional philosophical oppositions such as universal and 
particular, general and individual, and even also form and content. 
The paradigm analogy is bipolar and not dichotomic, it is tensional 
and not oppositional. It produces a field of polar tensions which tend 
to form a zone of undecidability which neutralizes every rigid 
opposition. We don’t have here a dichotomy, meaning two zones or 
elements clearly separated and distinguished by a caesura, we have 
a field where two opposite tensions run.383 
 
Contrary to what Agamben refers to as the tensional nature of this analysis – 
something inherent in the tensional concept of a Law-governance continuum - 
Møller criticises Foucault and the success of his ideas such as that of 
discipline normalising and creating docile bodies on the basis that they rest ‘to 
a large extent on his tendency to take matters to extremes’. 384  It is an 
interesting criticism to be kept in mind when we turn to the manner in which 
Møller analyses the problem. Møller adopts a position at the other end of the 
binary spectrum to Foucault (and for that matter Hanstad and Loland). If 
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Foucault says that discipline has a normalising effect, Møller  ‘disproves’ it by 
showing that the opposite exists, and if the opposite exists, thus Foucault’s 
claim is baseless. Taking things to the extreme, to the opposite binary position, 
avoids entering into the complexities of thought, and allows one to take refuge 
in the safety and comfort of their own personal or academic Chestnut Café.385 
Just because people in jail might behave in a certain way as a result of 
surveillance, doesn’t mean people outside of jail will – for Møller this is proven 
by the fact that we still scratch our noses or crotch when under the gaze of 
close circuit cameras or even rob banks so equipped:  
 
… it will be natural for someone to test the power of the tower at 
some time. There might first be minor infringements of the existing 
order. If nothing happens, their audacity will increase just as when 
hungry birds test out a scarecrow.  
 
For that same reason he [Foucault] needs to be read critically. If 
mankind were as capable of being moulded by a system as he 
describes, revolt and attempts to escape would be unthinkable once 
the architecture of the ‘house of certainty’ had been implemented.386 
 
Later, referring to Orwell Møller accepts that the description of Big Brother: 
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comes close to Foucault’s view that the experience of permanent 
surveillance makes those subjected to surveillance internalize it. But 
surveillance as extensive as that which Smith is subjected to ought, 
according to Foucault, to result in resignation and subjection. 
Orwell’s novel shows, however, that human beings respond in a 
different way. While it is true that they develop the ability to conform 
to given conditions in order to avoid punishment, the discomfort felt 
at the inhuman system stimulates resistance.387 
 
Lest I mention the Chestnut Cafe again? But Møller knows too well the story of 
one who has tested the power of Whereabouts System, his work on Michael 
Rasmussen’s expulsion from the Tour de France for alleged violations of the 
system, rather than supporting the ‘if nothing happens’ show precisely how 
attempts to test (to resist) the system are met.388 They have not increased the 
audacity to challenge the system but brought Rasmussen to the very edge of 
his existence, as both an athlete and a living being. The justice of the manner in 
which Rasmussen was dealt with is the very point – his sacrifice reinforced the 
system, its operation, it’s acceptance by others and thus the deployment of 
power. The making of the scapegoat of the one that tested the system 
reinforces, rather than undermines the system.  
 
On another level, this statement by Møller also ignores the whole trajectory of 
Foucault’s work on power and in particular his later work on forms of 
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resistance to power and the importance to Foucault of the power/knowledge 
relationship. It is not possible here to deal with this aspect in detail; 
nevertheless a reading of the original text can refute all the arguments of 
Møller, Hanstad and Loland. But again Møller takes the extreme binary 
position: because resistance may occur or be possible (despite the obvious 
consequences to Rasmussen and the effect on others of those consequences), 
the Panoptic model is of no value for our analysis. This claim, it is not an 
argument, is bolstered apparently by the proposition that it is because 
surveillance itself does not do away with power! 
 
“It is not, however, the surveillance itself that exerts the discipline, 
but the power that lies behind it. The panopticon does not, in other 
words, make power redundant”.389   
 
As is apparent from the above discussion Foucault never argued that 
Panpoticism makes power redundant. Rather his position was that it is a 
mechanism, a technology for deploying and exercising power.390 That is, the 
Panopticon paradigm operates not in order to do away with power but to 
deploy it in more economical ways. But for Møller it is not the deployment of 
power that modifies and normalises but our own enlightened rationality: 
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It is true that the cameras have a preventive effect. For obvious 
reasons, criminals will gravitate to areas where the risks of being 
discovered are smallest. If one bank has an effective surveillance 
system and another has not, then the bank robber will, other things 
being equal, plan to rob the latter. This is rational behaviour that has 
nothing to do with the disciplinary mechanism of anonymous 
surveillance.391  
 
If this is ‘rational behavior’ it is disingenuous to argue that the disciplinary 
system plays no part in it. This so called rational behaviour is in fact the very 
normalising effect of which Foucault speaks. But in any event the purpose of 
the disciplinary machine was never to be the universal panacea for crime. To 
argue that Panopticism does not end crime and is thus inapplicable to the 
situation again misreads the text. In their early forms disciplinary institutions 
were expected to end such dangers to society: ‘to neutralize dangers, to fix 
useless or disturbed populations, to avoid the inconveniences of over-large 
assemblies …’.392 Their focus and their deployment tended to play, not a 
negative role, but a positive role – to increase the possible utility of individuals, 
to fortify, to develop the body, ‘the disciplines function increasingly as 
techniques for making useful individuals. … Hence also their rooting in the 
most important, most central and most productive sectors of society’.393 For 
every dissenting Rasmussen a hundred normalised others are created. 
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The prevalence of mechanisms of surveillance, discipline and/or control within 
the anti-doping apparatus of sport is focused upon making the athletic body 
useful within the global Society of the Spectacle. To say this is to say that this 
productivity extends beyond the actual and singular body and its ‘fitness’ per 
se. It extends beyond the conditioning and disciplining of the physical body. In 
the society of competition, where governance extends beyond the producing 
the docile, it has an economic and governance function. In so doing, the effect 
of the disciplinary measure transcends the immediate effect upon one 
individual. At the point where disciplinary society and biopower converge both 
the individual and the population, generally, and here specifically the sporting 
population, are the subjects of these technologies. Rasmussen’s sacrifice may 
show that resistance or dissent exists394 - that not everybody buys fully, with 
their heart and soul, into the system - but what these instances also show is 
that overall there is an increasing acceptance and ‘improvement’ of the 
individual and the population. The docile athlete, like the docile soldier, is a 
useful athlete – in fact what is being produced is a kind of docile activity, a 
certain kind of activity. Nevertheless, it is in this way, the Panopticon of 
Whereabouts plays a role of amplification – it arranges power, it makes power 
more economic and effective (to the point that in some cases their application 
are rarely or never needed). In so doing it strengthens the social forces 
involved in sport – increasing the production of the myth of fair competition on 
a level playing field, developing the virtue of the pure athlete, the economy and 

394 Or for that mater the interviews in Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2012.
243
education. Neither power nor crime is made redundant, its aim is to ‘raise the 
level of public morality; to increase and multiply’.395  
 
On any fair reading of Foucault's text it is clear then that the Whereabouts 
system fulfills the triple objective of the Panopticon. Firstly, the cost/benefit 
objective - to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost; 
secondly, that of intensification and expansion – allowing the effects of power 
to obtain their maximum intensity and extension; and finally, the productive 
objective – of linking the techniques to economic growth. 396  But, most 
importantly, it organises and fixes a population in the place that is necessary 
for it to be controlled – it is a centre of observation disseminated throughout 
the society in question,397 it is an anti-nomadic technique398 deployed against 
the nomadic athlete. The docility it contemplates is the consent of the useful; 
those that do not consent are no longer regarded as such, and are thus 
dispensable, expendable. 
 
It is hoped that this examination of Foucault’s text goes some way to showing 
that the paradigm of the Panopticon is a useful tool for the critical analysis of 
the Whereabouts System. It also is hoped that we are beginning to see the 
contours of the governance pole of the Law–governance continuum with a little 
more clarity.  However, in order to properly locate the mechanism of 

395 Foucault, M. 1991. pp.207-208.
396 Ibid.:218.
397 Ibid.:212.
398 Ibid.:218.
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Whereabouts within apparatus of global governance it is necessary both 
consider it along with the Biological Passport and consider the manner in 
which Foucault and others have built upon and extended the Panopticon 
paradigm. For if Møller is correct about one thing, the Panopticon is not the be 
all and end all of the story, in the end it is but one aspect of the apparatus. 
 
Beyond Panopticism 
 
Whatever the limitations of Møller's analysis of Whereabouts what it does 
reveal is that a mechanical application of Foucault's primary text on the 
Panopticon does not give us the complete picture of the paradigm as it 
currently stands. Deleuze referred to the administration and management of life 
and extended Foucault's paradigm to include that of a control society.399 
Oikonomia according to Agamben included ‘the ordered organization of the 
human body’400, and ‘oikonomia does not merely concern the management of 
the house, but the soul itself’.401 Hardt and Negri402 and Lazzarato403 refer to the 
manner in which worlds, lifestyles, and forms of life, are produced and 
governed in a global economy. Dicey referred to administrative law’s concern 
with the care of social interests,404 or Neocleous as the regulation of the internal 
life of the community, the regimenting of social life, or the management and 

399 Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. ‘‘Postscript on the societies of control’’, October 59, winter 1992, 3–7.
400 Agamben, G. 2011. p.29.
401 Ibid.:47.
402 Hardt, M., and A. Negri. 1999. and 2009.
403 Lazzarato, M. 2004.p.187.
404 Dicey, A.V. 1920. pp.328-9.
245
direction of the population.405 All of these concepts point in one way or another 
to the Panopticon paradigm's extension and crossing of the threshold to a 
world of governance. They are all in one way or another relevant to any 
contemporary application of the Panopticon paradigm. I don't want to dwell on 
the detail of these concepts, nor an in depth analysis of what they have in 
common or what differentiates them, but a cursory examination points to their 
relationship to the Panopticon and their relevance to the Whereabouts System. 
 
Michel Foucault dubbed the involvement of state power into the health and 
wellbeing of the population, 'biopower'. Biopower is one of the concepts by 
which Foucault extended the range of his Panopticon paradigm. His aim in part 
was by relating it to other forms of governance to show the manner in which 
these different forms coexisted with each other in different mixtures and 
concentrations at any given juncture.  He did not try to place a wall between 
Law and discipline, or any of these other concepts in order to essentialise 
them, just as one cannot attempt to place a wall between his development of 
the concept of biopower, for example, and his work on the disciplines. 
Nevertheless in considering what they term an anthropology of neoliberal man 
and the apparatus of government Dadot and Laval point out that the very 
concept of government – acting on the actions of individuals who are 
supposedly free to choose – makes it possible to redefine discipline as a 
technique of government peculiar to market societies.  

405 Neocleous, M. 2000. p.93.
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The term discipline may be a cause for surprise here. It implies, 
seemingly at any rate, a certain real orientation vis-a-vis the meaning 
given to given it by Foucault… For Foucault, the model of discipline 
was Bentham’s panopticon. However, far from contrasting discipline, 
normalisation and control, … Foucault's reflections more and more 
clearly reveal the matrix of this new form of conduct of conducts, 
which can vary, depending on the case under construction, from 
imprisoning prisoners to monitoring the quality of products sold on 
the market. If to govern is to structure the potential field of action of 
others, discipline can be redefined more widely as a set of 
techniques structuring the field of action, which differ depending on 
the situation in which individuals find themselves.406
 
Biopower, for Foucault, was the situation where life becomes the object of 
power and in which what is at stake in power is the production and 
reproduction of life itself.407 Having conceived of biopower as having come into 
prominence during the nineteenth century (a position which Agamben has 
sought to refine with his work on for example Homo Sacer and oikonomia) 
Foucault identified two interrelated strands; the development of specific 
technologies of the body and the politicising of the body as a reproductive 
force.408 The shift to biopower signalled a transition in the nature of sovereignty 
from its classical form – where one of the basic attributes of the sovereign was 
the power over the life and death of his subjects (the right of the sword) - 
towards a new form in the nineteenth century whereby power became the right 

406Dadot and Laval pp.168 to 170.
407 It is useful also to note here Arrighi’s notion that the ‘highest form of capitalism’ or at least the one 
currently in formation (which he points to China as an example) seeks to internalise all the costs and 
processes of the reproduction of human beings: See Arrrighi, The Long Twentieth Century.
408 Andrews, D. 1993. Desperately seeking Michel: Foucault’s genealogy, the body, and critical sport
sociology. Sociology of Sport Journal 10(2): 148, pp.157-158.
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to let live and to let die. This shift saw the emergence of techniques of power 
that were essentially centred on the body. These emerging techniques included 
techniques to take control of the body or bodies, and to increase their 
productive force. Jason Reid expands Foucault’s observation that biopower 
was an indispensable element in the development of capitalism in the manner 
that it required the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of 
production and the population’s adjustment to the processes of the economy:  
 
What is essential for Foucault is the manner in which the investment 
of the State into the life and death of the population, the 
environmental conditions of the cities, and the health and longevity 
of the working class in each case is a properly political relation 
forming a biopolitics. In each instance the goals of the intervention 
are political: Biopolitics functions to increase productivity while at 
the same time reducing the conditions and causes for revolt. Thus, it 
is more accurate to say that biopolitics works for both economic and 
political goals, or better, it is constituted at the point at which 
political power becomes inseparable from economic power.409 
 
Reid’s observations will assume a greater relevance as we turn to consider in 
more detail the society of competition, nonetheless, in its emergent forms in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the techniques of biopower involve 
emergent fields and concepts such as the work of early demographers, the 
concept of public health, the medicalisation of society, insurance, risk 
management and the control of the human milieu and environment brought 

409 Read, J. 2003. The micro-politics of capital, marx and the prehistory of the present. New York: State
University of New York Press, p.141.
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together in a economically rational way. This is the whole project of the taming 
of chance.410 Biopower initially determines its field of intervention in this period 
in terms of birth rates, morbidity, various biological disabilities and the effects 
of the environment. What is important or different from what came before is 
that intervention at the population level.  
 
Biopower focuses upon the population as a ‘political problem … that is at once 
scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem’. The 
control of life is a task and a technique of the administration and management 
of ‘collective phenomena with economic and political effects that have become 
pertinent at a mass level’. 411  The techniques of forecasting, of statistical 
estimates and overall measures differ from the technique of discipline as they 
seek to intervene at the level of generality. They appear as regulatory 
mechanisms that seek to maintain a balance and compensate for variations 
within the population. They also, as part of this tendency to intervention, 
require security mechanisms designed to maximise and extract forces from the 
population. In a manner different to discipline, they no longer train the 
individual at the level of the individual body, but take control of life and the 
biological processes of man-as-species and of ensuring that they are not 
necessarily disciplined but regularised.412  
 

410 Hacking, I. 1990. The taming of chance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
411 Foucault, M. 2008. pp.245-247.
412 Ibid.:245-247.
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In the case of the Whereabouts System we can say that it operates at both the 
level of the individual body but at the same time it operates at the level of the 
entire population of athletes. This is what Møller fails to recognise in his critique 
of Foucault's so called cul de sac – the manner in which the System produces 
a regularisation or normalisation of the professional cycling population, even 
though at the same time it might produce instances of resistance or dissent. 
No matter that some may try to beat the system, the overall effect, at a 
population level, is one of compliance, docility and as such an increase in their 
productive force. 
 
Biopower’s regulatory controls encompass a vast array of collective measures 
undertaken to regulate the population. The disciplines constitute their own 
concrete form of domination and means of integration to the social order. 
Disciplines are, in effect, techniques of power that provide procedures for 
training and for coercing bodies. In this way we can consider the emerging 
nineteenth century science of physical education as both a disciplinary and as 
a biopolitical technique. Physical education provides a set of teaching 
methods, principles, and conditions through which a desired set of (individual) 
bodily practices are inculcated.  At the same time the overall effect of physical 
education and its promotion acts at a population level. Thus it operates at the 
interstices between individual (disciplinary) and collective (biopolitical or 
administrative) controls of the body and serves both sets of interest. Thus it 
should be of no surprise that Foucault regarded ‘medical science as the crucial 
link at the level of knowledge between the discipline of the individual bodies by 
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professional groups and the regulation of populations by panopticism’.413 In the 
case of sport and physical activity, the profession of physical education, 
human movement and later sports science and marketing themselves 
accomplish the function of knowledge generation. 
 
Thus discipline and regularisation are not mutually exclusive, the latter does 
not replace the former, but the two are superimposed upon each other with 
one technology focussing upon the body, the other upon life itself. The two can 
be and are articulated with each other; as Deleuze might say there are no pure 
machines … all machines exists and coexist at any given time. In his work 
Foucault gives the examples of housing estates for workers and the question 
of sexuality to illustrate this articulation. It is the example of sexuality that gives 
us something close to what is at issue in sport – or at least that which provides 
us with a starting point to consider the manner in which sport becomes an 
object of power, of science, medicine and the State.  Foucault asks: why did 
sexuality become a field of such vital strategic importance in the nineteenth 
century? We could similarly ask why has the sporting body and the 
problematisation of doping become of such strategic importance in the twenty-
first century? Foucault’s answer to his own question includes a whole host of 
reasons, and it is here that we can see, or at least begin to develop, the 
parallels between the sexual body and the sporting body. In the nineteenth 
century we are told sexuality as an ‘eminently corporeal mode of behaviour, is 
a matter for individualizing disciplinary controls that take the form of permanent 

413 Turner, B.S. 1984. The body and society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.33-35.
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surveillance’. Sexuality also, quite obviously, has procreative effects – it is 
‘inscribed, takes effect, in broad biological processes that concern not the 
bodies of individuals but the element, the multiple unity of the population. 
Sexuality exists at the point where body and population meet. And so it is a 
matter for discipline, but also a matter for regularization’.414 Dadot and Laval 
expand upon this when they discuss both sport and sexuality in the context of 
neoliberalism’s methods of accounting and performance, noting that in the 
instance of sexuality and the ‘vast psychological discourse that analyses them, 
encourages them and surrounds and with every advice of every kind today, 
sexual practices become exercises in which everyone is encouraged to 
compare themselves with the socially requisite norm of performance’.415 
 
It is within this context that biopower’s links with scientific knowledge begin to 
contribute to the tendency towards the medicalisation of society. Stepping 
back from Foucault for a moment we see a similar situation emerging in the 
nineteenth century in relation to sport and in relation to its medicalisation. 
Hoberman’s accounts of the history of doping – of the systematic production 
of ‘mortal engines’416; can be read as a part of the chronicle of biopower taking 
the sporting body and in turn the entire population as its object. Whether the 
object of the production of mortal engines was for sporting, or for other wider 
purposes, what is clear is that the new sciences of modernity – physiology, 
anatomy, economy etc.; all used the sporting body to one degree or another as 
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414 Foucault, M. 2008. pp.249-252.
415 Dadot and Laval p.281.
416 Hoberman, J. 1992. 
252
a testing laboratory for knowledge pertinent to the broader population. More 
recently the French sociologist Christophe Brissoneau417 has considered the 
confluence of the American system of management and doping developed in 
the late twentieth century with the Soviet Bloc's methods of sports training and 
preparation (including doping) which form the basis of contemporary sports 
science and management. 418  He has highlighted the manner in which the 
coming together of these two models was adopted by sports physicians in the 
West as the basis of a new method of managing and preparing the athlete. 
Importantly, in Brissoneau's analysis, these techniques did not stand alone in 
the world of sport, but are inextricably linked to questions of productivity and 
endurance in other sectors of production – including for example the economy, 
industry, the military and space exploration. Hence, it should be of no real 
surprise for us when we discover that the origins of what we now call blood 
doping, the very techniques that the Biological Passport was designed to 
tackle, have their roots in the experimentation by the U.S. Military on dogs in 
the 1970's.419 Similarly, as Agamben recalls in Remnants of Auschwitz, the 
experimentation by SS doctors on the Muselmann, which in itself suggests the 
link between the military and experimentation with endurance as having equally 
sinister roots:  
 
It was December, 1940 …. After a few minutes, we were all shivering 

417 Brissoneau, C. 2010. Doping in France (1960–2000): American and Eastern bloc influences. Journal
of Physical Education and Sport 27(2): p.33.
418 Brissoneau’s example is that of the entry into cycling of the French entrepreneur Bernard Tapie.
419 Horstman, D.H., M. Gleser, D. Wolfe, T. Tryon, and J. Delehunt. 1974. Effects of hemoglobin
reduction on VO2 max and related hemodynamics in exercising dogs. Journal of Applied Physiology
37(1): 97. And Horstman, D.H., M. Gleser, and J. Delehunt. 1976. Effects of altering O2 delivery on 
VO2 ofisolated, working muscle. American Journal of Physiology 230(2): 327.
253
from the cold; they made us run around the room to heat ourselves 
up, until we were all covered in sweat. Then they said, “Sit Down”, 
and we did as they said. Once our bodies had cooled down, and we 
were once again cold, it was time for more running – and so it lasted 
for the whole day.420 
 
Biopower is one manner in which Foucault asked himself the question 
concerning the trajectory of disciplinary societies and the development of 
complementary mechanisms or apparatus. In his Postscript on Societies of 
Control Deleuze identified himself as continuing Foucault's brilliant analysis of 
the use of enclosures to compose productive forces. Deleuze highlighted 
Foucault’s recognition of ‘the transience of this model’ and that ‘in their turn 
the disciplines underwent a crisis to the benefit of new forces’. Deleuze 
adopted ‘Control’, the name proposed by Burroughs ‘as a term for the new 
monster, one that Foucault recognizes as our immediate future’. Citing Virilio, 
Deleuze noted that ultrarapid forms of free-floating control had replaced the 
old disciplines.421 
 
In another work Deleuze wrote: 
 
A control is not a discipline. In making highways, for example, you 
don’t enclose people but instead multiply the means of control. I am 
not saying that this is the highway’s exclusive purpose, but that 
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420 Agamben, G. 2002. Remnants of Auschwitz, the witness and the archive. New York: Zone Books. 
p.170.
421 Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. ‘‘Postscript on the societies of control’’, October 59, winter 1992, 3–7.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp.3-4.
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people can drive infinitely and ‘freely’ without being confined yet 
while still being perfectly controlled. This is our future.422 
 
This is our future, to be able to move freely whilst still being perfectly 
controlled. Controlled in one sense denotes having to pass through gates or 
follow certain paths. Referring to an imagined city of Felix Guattari, Deleuze 
stated that in control societies ‘what counts is not the barrier but the computer 
that tracks each person's position - licit or illicit - and effects a universal 
modulation’.423 A control tends to pilot behaviour. A control is both a method of 
individual discipline but a normalising and regulatory instrument. A control is 
also the word used to describe the process by which athletes are tested within 
the anti-doping apparatus – athletes must pass anti-doping controls. Anti-
doping controls form the basis of the Biological Passport. At the same time 
being subjected to the Whereabouts System controls the fluid and nomadic 
population of the professional cycling peloton. The peloton and its members 
are essentially free to move about, to train and race and to live their lives 
subject to the piloting and control of the anti-doping apparatus. In the case of 
the anti-doping apparatus power and subjective freedom are no longer counter 
posed, the art of governing consists not in transforming a subject into a mere 
passive object but in leading the cyclist to do what he agrees to want to do424:
 …to govern is not to govern against liberty, or despite it; it is to 

422 Deleuze, Gilles. 1998. Having an idea in cinema (trans: Kaufman, E., Deleuze, G.). In New 
mappings in politics, philosophy and culture, eds. E. Kaufman and K. J. Heller. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, p.18.
423 Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. p.7.
424 Dadot and Laval p.282.
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govern through liberty: that is, to actively exploit the freedom 
allowed individuals so that they end up conforming to certain norms 
of their own accord.425 
 
Biopolitical Passports 
 
The Whereabouts System does not stand alone but is integrated into another 
instrument: the Biological Passport; which extends the scope and purpose of 
anti-doping controls. The Biological Passport is by its very nature technical and 
scientific and its method of surveillance and monitoring are probably more far 
reaching than that of the Whereabouts System. Rather than just monitoring 
where a particular body is at a given time, the Passport seeks to actually enter 
the body and measure processes occurring within them. Importantly, by its 
very nature it also challenges traditional concepts of legal proof. Just as the 
disciplines depended upon and modified the operation of sovereignty and the 
law, the Biological Passport adapts and modifies both the nature of 
Panopticism and the law. By going back to Deleuze we can begin to grasp the 
manner in which the Biological Passport manifests the crisis of law itself: 
 
The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary societies (between two 
incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of the societies of 
control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes of 
juridicial life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it's because we 
are leaving one in order to enter the other. The disciplinary societies 
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have two poles: the signature that designates the individual, and the 
number or administrative numeration that indicates his or her 
position within a mass. This is because the disciplines never saw 
any incompatibility between these two, and because at the same 
time power individualizes and masses together, that is, constitutes 
those over whom it exercises power into a body and molds the 
individuality of each member of that body. … In the societies of 
control, on the other hand, what is important is no longer either a 
signature or a number, but a code: the code is a password, while on 
the other hand disciplinary societies are regulated by watchwords 
(as much from the point of view of integration as from that of 
resistance). The numerical language of control is made of codes that 
mark access to information, or reject it.426 
 
As we have noted above the rationale for such an extensive surveillance 
regime as the Whereabouts System is to plan and conduct out-of-competition 
testing. The results obtained from out-of-competition testing have, in turn, 
provided the basis for what is known formally as the Athlete’s Biological 
Passport. The Passport has been heralded by the UCI as a major breakthrough 
and the avant-garde of anti-doping policy. 427  The Panoptic nature of the 
Whereabouts System should not be considered in isolation, as the full picture 
is not drawn without reference to the Biological Passport. According to the 
UCI, the Biological Passport is a new tool that will allow better detection of the 
cheats.428 Although the two instruments are different they stand or fall together. 
The UCI has stated that the provision of accurate and timely Whereabouts 
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426 Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. p.5
427 UCI (2007). Information on the biological passport http://www.uci.ch/Modules/ENews/ENews
Details.asp?MenuId=&id=NTQzOA&LangId=1. Accessed 31 Dec 2013.
428 Ibid.
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information is critical to the success of the Biological Passport429; Whereabouts 
information is used to plan out-of-competition testing which serves to collect 
data for the Biological Passport. One function of the Biological Passport is to 
allow those planning the testing to better target those they suspect of doping. 
As one interviewee with experience in developing the Passport has stated: 
 
… the other thing is, if they see abnormal blood results and it's not 
abnormal enough that they think they can sanction or even take 
further steps, at least they can really be on top of them. They can 
test the hell out of them, they can scare them - they can scare them 
into awareness or into action or be, you know, make their teams 
aware and they will be caught, that's the thing. Sooner or later, if 
that conscience is not there and they're not aware of what they're 
doing, they won't get away with it forever. We've seen riders like that 
in the last couple of years.430 
 
It is of vital importance to emphasise that the Biological Passport is not used to 
detect the presence or absence of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited 
Method. Rather, it is used to detect the effects associated with the Prohibited 
Substance or Method on the human body. The logic of the approach is that if 
effects associated with a Prohibited Method are observable in a tested person, 
then perhaps that person might have been using the Prohibited Method. 
Equally, it must be stressed therefore that the Biological Passport only points 
to a probability that a person might have been using the method. It is only a 
tool for the indirect detection of a Prohibited Method, as no banned substance 
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429 Ibid.
430 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. p.115.
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is revealed nor is any direct evidence of the use of a Prohibited Method 
revealed. All the science seeks and is able to compare are the parameters of a 
test sample, with previous samples, in order to identify any 'abnormal' 
fluctuations in an athlete’s blood values. These 'abnormalities' may in turn 
indicate a probability that a person may have been using the Method. The 
science and the Passport cannot say with any absolute certainty what caused 
the 'abnormality'. The matter of these abnormalities is not a question of strict 
liability as with a positive doping test result, but the use and the privileging of 
one piece of indirect circumstantial evidence consisting of an interpretive 
opinion challenges traditional notions of legal proof. 
 
The Biological Passport is an individual, electronic record maintained for each 
athlete, in which the results of all doping tests over a period of time are 
collated in the ADAMS system. The results are analysed using the Athlete’s 
Biological Passport Software (ABP Software), developed by the Swiss 
Laboratory for Doping Analyses. The ABP Software produces a quantitative 
stream of data that is, in turn, used by the UCI Biological Passport Expert 
Panel to determine the likelihood of doping. The Biological Passport contains 
results of individual urine tests, results of individual blood tests, a 
haematological profile consisting of the combined results of haematological 
parameters analysed in a series of blood samples, and a steroid profile 
consisting of the combined results of steroid levels in a series of urine samples. 
The Biological Passport allows a series of tests from each rider to be organised 
into a profile which enables individual limits for each rider to be established. 
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Rather than a comparison with a population limit, it allows each test sample to 
be compared with the rider’s own individual ‘normal’ haematological levels.  
 
The UCI states that any significant variations can then be assessed for possible 
blood manipulation and argues that a haematological profile created by the 
Biological Passport ‘opens new doors in the detection of riders who choose to 
manipulate their blood’. Importantly the UCI regard the Biological Passport as 
applying ‘similar principles to those used in forensic medical science to 
determine the likelihood of guilt’. 431  The veracity of this claim has been 
questioned432 and is important as it points to the manner in which the law is 
transformed by the use of the Passport. Nevertheless, the procedure adopted 
is that once: 
 
sufficient evidence is gathered which determines guilt at an agreed 
level of certainty, scientific experts will recommend that the UCI 
open disciplinary proceedings for an anti-doping rule violation. It is 
expected that a profile of six tests will enable the detection of blood 
manipulation. In some cases, a fewer number of tests may be 
needed to detect doping.433 
 
The penalty prescribed for such a violation is a ban from competition for two 
years. The accuracy of an inference that a person has used a prohibited 
substance and the role of the scientific experts in giving evidence before any 
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disciplinary committee become crucial steps in the process of proof.  Again it 
must be stressed that the Biological Passport is only an isolated piece of 
material evidence, namely a piece of processed instrumental data and that, 
ultimately, an allegation of doping or manipulation is based only on this indirect 
and circumstantial evidence (measured blood parameters) as opposed to 
direct expert evidence (detection of a prohibited substance in a blood or urine 
sample; which is at Law only itself a form of circumstantial evidence). Any 
opinion in interpreting the instrumental data is, by necessity, heavily reliant on 
statistics434. 
 
Trust the Science 
 
The result is that prior to any hearing, the science and expert commentary is 
determinative at two points – when the ABP Software analysis is undertaken 
and when the Expert Panel conducts its review of the Biological Passport data. 
At the point at which the UCI may have a discretion to open a case (following 
the receipt of the Panel’s opinion) the science would also seem to effectively 
determine the issue. In its promotion of the Passport the UCI made public 
statements to the effect that the national cycling federations have to trust the 
science provided by the Expert Panel. Traditionally, the Law requires scientific 

434 Faber, N., and B. Vandeginste. 2010. Flawed science ‘legalized’ in the fight against doping:
The example of the biological passport. March: Accred Qual Assur. Sottas, P.E., N. Robinson, and M. 
Saugy. 2010. The athlete’s biological passport and indirect markers
of blood doping, doping in sports: Biochemical principles, effects and analysis. Handbook of
Experimental Pharmacology 195: 305–326. Again, these issues were canvassed by Hardie, M., D. 
Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. I wish I was twenty one now, beyond doping in
the Australian Peloton. Geelong: Auskadi Samizdats 138 ff.
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evidence to be of a certain standard and requires it to be presented in a certain 
manner in order to safeguard the fairness of any hearing process.  Thus, in 
Judicial processes scientific evidence should be communicated in such a 
manner as to allow the ultimate decision-maker to be able to weigh it against 
all the other evidence, including other scientific evidence that goes to its 
reliability. On the other hand, the UCI have insisted on the need for national 
cycling federations to trust the science that lay behind the Biological Passport. 
The role of the expert in interpreting data produced by the ABP Software and 
the Biological Passport itself can be readily contrasted with that insisted upon 
by Judicial processes: 
 
Our rules advise them [the federations] to follow a number of steps. 
Obviously, these will be new and difficult cases for them and we’ve 
offered them any assistance the want. They also have access to our 
scientific experts and data. What we’re expecting them to 
understand is that we have the best experts in the world and that 
they’ve reviewed the data properly. The federations have to trust the 
review that has been conducted by our experts. Normally, we give 
them a piece of paper from the lab that says, we’ve found EPO or 
Nandralone, but instead we’re giving them a statement signed by 
three experts with data and rider profiles. We expect them to trust 
us.435  
 

435 Cyclingnews, Benson, D. 2009. Exclusive: Anne Gripper breaks silence on blood passport,
Cyclingnews. http://www.cyclingnews.com/features/exclusive-anne-gripper-breaks-silence-on-
bloodpassport. Last Accessed 31 Dec 2012.
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The Biological Passport does not involve a positive test for a banned 
substance. The national federations (or NADOs or ultimately the CAS), who in 
the end must make a decision in respect of any finding of the UCI, are asked to 
trust the science as proof of doping.  
 
… you can’t expect the National Federation to be able to unravel 
what led to that decision. It’s not as simple as – well, that value’s 
that, that’s there and this here, therefore that’s doping. You can’t 
easily reverse engineer how you got to that decision. So, in that 
sense you’ve got to trust that we’ve been through this process, that 
was our decision, but if you’ve got another argument, you get an 
opportunity to challenge our opinion.436 
 
Thus given the nature of the data, the science and the expert commentary, the 
decision to make visible the alleged act of doping, is an expert’s opinion 
incapable of being communicated in a way that can be unravelled by reverse 
engineering. Notwithstanding, the way it is expressed, the decision of the 
Expert Panel is no more than an opinion, and an opinion as to likelihood of 
doping, but, nevertheless, at this point in the process, it takes on a decisive 
character. 
 
The Expert Panel’s recommendation is couched in terms of the likelihood that 
the cyclist in question has doped – that is as a determination ‘as to the 
likelihood of guilt’. The opinion of the Expert Panel states that there is no 

436 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012. p.120.
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reasonable explanation of the blood profile other than the use of a Prohibited 
Method. It may be given, based on the preliminary nature of the opinion at this 
stage, that there is not a problem with statements ‘as to the likelihood of guilt’ 
by the Expert Panel. Statements phrased in terms of the ‘likelihood of guilt’ are 
not consistent with the principles to those ‘used in forensic medical science to 
determine the likelihood of guilt’.437  Forensic medical science in traditional 
Legal processes does not determine ‘the likelihood of guilt’. Evidence based 
upon forensic science in Judicial proceedings must be set out in a particular 
way so as to guard against the expert’s opinion usurping the role of the 
decision-maker. It must comply with the rules of evidence. The Biological 
Passport cases decided by the CAS have sought to rely upon Article 3.2 of the 
WADC (Methods of Establishing Facts and Presumptions) that states ‘[f]acts 
related to anti-doping rule violations may be established by any reliable 
means’. The explanatory note to that Article states that, for example, a NADO 
may establish an anti-doping rule violation based on ‘conclusions drawn from 
the profile of a series of the Athlete’s blood or urine Samples’.  Similarly, the 
comments to Article 2.2 state that: 
 
[i]t has always been the case that Use or Attempted Use of a 
Prohibited Substance or Prohibited Method may be established by 
any reliable means” and continue that these include conclusions 
drawn from longitudinal profiling, or other analytical information 
which does not otherwise satisfy all the requirements to establish 
“Presence” of a Prohibited Substance under Article 2.1. 
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437 UCI (2007). 
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The WADC appears to studiously not refer or use the word 'evidence' in its 
provisions on the proof of doping. However, both the claims of the UCI and Dr. 
Sottas point to a comparison with the traditional methods of proving facts by 
the use of forensic or scientific evidence. The problem with the reasoning of 
the CAS in these cases is that the reference to ‘any reliable means’ appears to 
widen the scope of the method of proof beyond that which would be required 
for that means to constitute evidence in the Legal or Judicial sense.438 If one 
trusts the science and ignores traditional methods of proving facts by forensic 
science the phrase ‘any reliable means’ appears to be able to roam at large. 
 
The point here is that the reception of scientific evidence and, in particular, 
evidence which interprets data based upon the types of statistical evidence, 
such as that which underpins the Biological Passport, has been strictly 
controlled by the courts in order to ensure that any Legal process is conducted 
fairly and without prejudice to the accused. The courts are also vigilant to 
ensure that the expert does not usurp their position as the decision maker. 
From an examination of the Law it is apparent that if the opinion of the expert 
in a Biological Passport case is phrased in terms of the ‘likelihood of guilt’ then 
it is not used in accordance with the principles applied to the reception of 
forensic medical science by courts. In fact, the manner in which evidence of 

438 The point is not simply to refute this analysis by saying it is permissible because the WADC allows it 
as Despina Mavromati has sought to do, but to highlight the changes in the nature of law that such a 
situation brings about. See Despina Mavromati, Indirect detection methods for doping from a legal 
perspective: the case of the Athlete Biological Passport, International Journal of Sport Policy and 
Politics, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2014, 241-258.
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the Passport is presented is in contradiction to those principles. If this is the 
case, the opinion of the expert would be inadmissible as reliable evidence. Its 
basis as a reliable means of proof in the context of a court must therefore be 
questioned. Redmayne clearly states the distinction between the permissible 
and impermissible manner of giving expert opinion: 
 
The expert's error lay in confusing two different questions, namely: 
(1) What is the probability of finding the evidence, given that the 
defendant is innocent? (2) What is the probability that the defendant 
is innocent, given the evidence? The difference between the two 
questions may not be immediately obvious, but it should become 
clear when two different questions which have the same logical 
structure are considered: (1) What is the probability that an animal 
has four legs, given that it is a cow? (2) What is the probability that 
an animal is a cow, given that it has four legs?'439 
 
The difference between the two ways of framing the evidence of the expert’s 
opinion can be seen if we frame the statements in terms relevant to the 
Biological Passport:  
 
1) What is the probability of the abnormal blood value given the 
athlete has been at altitude?  
2) What is the probability that the athlete is innocent (of an 
ADRV) given the abnormal blood values?  
3) What is the probability of the abnormal blood value given the 
athlete has blood doped?  
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439 Redmayne, M. 1996. Presenting probabilities in court: The DNA experience, 1996–1997.
The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 1:p.187.
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4) What is the probability that the athlete has blood doped (and 
is guilty of an ADRV) given the abnormal blood values? 
 
Statements 1) and 3) would be permissible as evidence, whereas statements 2) 
and 4) would not be permissible. The WADA Guidelines state the Expert 
Panel’s opinion in terms of their being high probability that the athlete blood 
doped given the blood values – that is, in the impermissible form similar to 2) 
and 4). The impermissible form is known as the Prosecutor’s Fallacy. In the 
Biological Passport process, the Prosecutor’s Fallacy is institutionalised at the 
point of the Expert Panel giving their ‘opinion’. The problem for the anti-doping 
apparatus is that it requires a method to make visible something that the Law 
has been incapable of visualising. The functional purpose of the Biological 
Passport is exactly to overcome this problem. The result is that rather than a 
Legal question decided according to Legal standards of evidence, the proof of 
the determination of doping becomes an administrative and technical decision 
based upon scientific and statistical standards. The Biological Passport seeks 
to penetrate a space that the Law cannot. It seeks to see what the Law cannot 
see, or as Agamben has written in the world of biopower ‘the physician and the 
scientist move into a no-mans land which at one point only the law and 
sovereignty could penetrate …’440 The proof of doping is no longer a Legal 
question but a scientific one in which the law can only blindly trust. 
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440 Agamben, G. 1998. p.159
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The Great Observer 
 
Returning to the question of the Panopticon paradigm, Foucault was well alive 
to the coming of control societies. In noting that ‘The ‘Enlightenment’, which 
discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines’,441 Foucault asked: 
 
What Great Observer will produce the methodology of examination 
or the human sciences? ….The ideal point of penalty today would be 
an indefinite discipline: an interrogation without end, an investigation 
that would be extended without limit to a meticulous and ever more 
analytical observation, a judgment that would avoid at the same time 
be the constitution of a file that was never closed, the calculated 
leniency of a penalty that would be interlaced with the ruthless 
curiosity of an examination, a procedure that would be at the same 
time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible 
norm and the asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity.  
The public execution was the logical culmination of a procedure that 
was governed by the Inquisition. The practice of placing individuals 
under ‘observation’ is a natural extension of a justice imbued with 
disciplinary methods and examination procedures. Is it surprising 
that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, 
its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in 
normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, 
should have become the modern instrument of penalty?442 
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441 Foucault, M. 1991. p.222.
442 Ibid.:227-228.
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In constructing this new alliance between doping and the law and in opening 
up a new manner in which the invisible can be visualised many of these 
features of this Foucauldian (or Kafkaesque) Great Observer to come are 
present. The Whereabouts and Biological Passports operate as indefinite 
disciplines and as interrogations without end. They operate and extend without 
limit a meticulous and ever more analytical observation of the daily aspect of 
life and the internal functioning of vital aspects of the body. They constitute 
through the ruthless curiosity of an examination a file that is never closed and 
that seeks to close a gap between the improvable and invisible (at law) act of 
doping; they operate between the invisible act and the inaccessible norm. They 
are the natural extension of the disciplines manifested by the practice of 
placing individuals under permanent observation by experts in normality, who 
assume and multiply the functions of the judge. 
 
In such a procedure and increasingly in a society of biopolitical control based 
upon an accounting of the body and bodies – the administration of bodies 
using techniques such as continual monitoring and surveillance, the 
internalisation of control and an instrumental or functional rationality; the old 
law’s techniques of deciding disputes after the event of their occurrence are 
replaced. Moving away from Foucault, Bauman’s analysis of the Holocaust’s 
rational administrative machinery exposes the connection between the 
bureaucracy, the task of administration and that of biopolitical control: 
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Bureaucracy started from what bureaucracies start with: the 
formulation of a precise definition of the object, the registering those 
who fitted the definition and opening a file for each. It proceeded to 
segregate those in the files from the rest of the population, to which 
the received brief did not apply. Finally, it moved to evicting the 
segregated category from the land of the Aryans which was to be 
cleansed …..443 
 
Bauman's description of bureaucracy can be readily mapped onto the outline 
of the anti-doping apparatus set out above. The elements of this apparatus are 
consistent with the elements described by Bauman. But in this case they are 
distributed throughout a network on a global scale.  
 
Consistently with Bauman we have present a precise definition of the object of 
the ideology: to cleanse sport of the doper who is a threat to the ethical order 
of the level competitive playing field of sport; the identification and location of 
the object: by way of the regime of in and out of competition urine and blood 
testing, including the Whereabouts and Biological Passport systems; the 
opening of a file for each object: ADAMS and the Athlete’s Biological Passport; 
the segregating of those in the files: the sorting of results by the ABP Software 
and then by the Biological Passport Expert Panels; and, the evicting of the 
segregated categories: by way of anti-doping rule violation cases decided by 
disciplinary arbitration, bans imposed or by the spectacle of 
moral/media/institutional/public condemnation.  
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443 Bauman, Z. 1989. Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, NewYork: Cornell University Press, p.105.
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In successfully carrying out these five steps, the three manifestations (and 
perpetrators) of Bauman’s description of instrumental rationality are also 
present and all work in tandem: the machine (The Whereabouts System, 
ADAMS, blood and urine sampling and analysis, ABP Software, and the 
Biological Passport itself); the professional (sports officials, accountants, the 
information technologists, statisticians, blood and physiological scientists, 
psychologists, academics, anti-doping lawyers); and the bureaucracy (the 
National Governments, NADOs, The IOC, national and international sporting 
organisations, corporate and state sponsors, WADA and the CAS). The anti-
doping apparatus and more generally neoliberal bureaucracy constitutes a 
transformation and not a withdrawal 444 , what Dadot and Laval term 
neomanagement ‘is not anti-bureaucratic. It corresponds to a new, more 
sophisticated, more individualised, more competitive phase of bureaucratic 
rationalisation…’.445 
 
Our whereabouts is a long way from the traditional conception of the Rule of 
Law. What we are faced with is a very different machine to that of the boundary 
retained, backward looking and dispute resolving system of the old Law of the 
State system. In this world of biopolitical governance, as described above by 
Foucault, and just like in Kafka or Lewis Carroll, everyone is potentially guilty. 
The system demands, that, rather than waiting for an offence to occur and 

444 Dadot and Laval p.182.
445 Ibid.:262.
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become visible, the anti-doping apparatus must actively search out abnormal 
bodies. The administrative machinery extends globally to all places and all 
times. The system demands that in situations where the processes of the law 
cannot see, that the expert and their commentary visualise the invisible. Thus 
process constitutes the invisible as visible and in turn decides which of these 
bodies are not worthy of remaining within the system, and therefore must be 
segregated.  
 
This space of surveillance not only locates and makes visible the physical 
location of each individual cyclist it also in turn makes visible their internal 
bodily functions, in this case the composition and the fluctuations of the 
composition of their blood. The combination of the Whereabouts System and 
the Biological Passport in making the cyclist visible does not allow the cause of 
doping, or the event of doping to be known or observed, but rather it casts the 
body in terms of abnormalities whose cause cannot be identified with any 
certainty, but which suggest that doping may have occurred.  
 
The ultimate effects are twofold. Firstly, an internalisation and continual 
monitoring of one’s self at a personal and at a population level, coupled with 
the monitoring by the authorities. Secondly, a radical change in the nature and 
the definition of the offence of doping. No longer is it positive evidence of 
doping that is punishable, but what becomes punishable is an abnormality, in 
the cyclist’s location, or their body, which suggests a probability that the 
272
invisible act of doping may have occurred. In the course of this process 
accepted manners of proving an offence through evidence are transformed.  
 
The Whereabouts System and the Biological Passport open up a new manner 
in which the invisible can be visualised. Through its discourse and the 
attendant commentary of the expert a new alliance between doping and the 
law is constructed. It is a redistribution of the way in which the law treats the 
symptoms and the signified act of doping.  
 
Faced with the coming of this apparatus of control, one must ask: ‘Is this our 
future as well?’ 
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 Chapter Five – The Society of Competition 

Another Rule of Law (is possible)? 
 
We have moved from a consideration of the Operación Puerto case and 
questions of the law of anti-doping to consider problems raised for us by Law’s 
deformalisation in post-modernity. After raising the spectre of Law’s 
deformalisation we turned to consider particular instances of the anti-doping 
apparatus in the context of governance, the policing and administration of 
bodies. In doing so we have started to consider the manner in which 
productive bodies are produced by these governmental mechanisms of 
discipline and control. What we need to now turn to do is to put some meat on 
the bones of, what I have already dubbed, the society of competition and its 
particular relationship to the Law–governance continuum. In doing so we will 
seek to show that governance here extends beyond the ‘mere’ control of the 
cyclist’s body, or even their mind, to extend its grip throughout society at 
virtually every level.  
 
The traditional conceptions and accounts of the Rule of Law – Weber, Dicey, 
even Scheuerman; have tended to treat the concept as a fixed and eternal 
standard against which one can measure societies and their law. In recent 
times it has become a ‘democratic standard’ – the gold standard - of 
democracy and global progress against which nations are measured. In the 
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task of international nation building catch phrases such as the Rule of Law and 
good governance guide administration – they become along with principles of 
economy the measure of all justness, good and virtue, the systems single logic 
or value. What we need to do now is to return to the question of the Rule of 
Law and consider its more recent mutations and their place in the genealogy of 
the global project. 
 
Foucault’s lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics at first glance seem not to 
consider this topic in very much detail at all. Instead the focus of direct 
attention is the birth of neoliberalism. Despite this first impression it is clear 
that the achievement of the conditions of neoliberalism which were in their 
infancy at the time of Foucault’s lessons are the terrain upon which a 
biopolitical society are built. What is important for us in a discussion of forms 
of law, and the genealogy of the Rule of Law is Foucault’s description of the 
manner in which Neoliberalism transformed the concept of the Rule of Law. At 
the same time this transformation of the Rule of Law points to substantial 
movements along the Law–governance continuum.  Without neoliberalism’s 
redefinition of the concept the ground is still not set for the complete 
expansion of the biopolitical, administrative or governmental apparatus. For the 
pendulum to swing further towards governance the role of Law and what is 
understood as the Rule of Law had to necessarily change. 
 
The Marxist geographer David Harvey has described Neoliberalism as: 
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… in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 
The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of 
money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal 
structures and functions required to secure private property rights 
and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of 
markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, 
water, education, health care, social security, or environmental 
pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. 
But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State 
interventions in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare 
minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot 
possibly possess enough information to second-guess market 
signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably 
distort and bias state interventions (particularly in democracies) for 
their own benefit.446 
 
Harvey’s description doesn’t really tell us how the Rule of Law in Neoliberalism 
differs from that of liberalism. But what it does do is highlight certain aspects 
that drive its logic, including that the role of the State is that of creating and 
maintaining market conditions. Dadot and Laval’s definition of neoliberalism as 
a new global rationality goes beyond Harvey’s description in important 
respects. They provide the opportunity to enlarge the focus beyond that of the 
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446 Harvey, David, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, 2005, p.2.
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role of the institution of the State and Government. They point out that 
neoliberalism is not merely destructive of rules, institutions and rights derived 
from the State but that it operates to produce ‘certain kinds of social relations, 
certain ways of living, certain subjectivities’. At stake for them in neoliberalism 
is ‘the form of our existence-the way in which we are led to conduct ourselves, 
to relate to others and to ourselves’. In this way the authors highlight in much 
more stark terms the governmental and biopolitical nature of neoliberalism, 
something that Harvey does not, in particular the new existential norm that 
‘enjoins everyone to live in a world of generalised competition’.447 Unlike 
Harvey, and following Foucault, Dadot and Laval highlight that it is not just the 
rulers (the State) that is structured and organised in new ways but also that of 
the conduct of the ruled.448 
 
Of immediate relevance to us here is how the theorists of neoliberalism revised 
the concept of the Rule of Law. It was in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics 
that Foucault directly tackled this revision. It is here that we encounter a 
description of the transformations of the Rule of Law that enable us to begin to 
see more clearly that the traditional idea of one static and eternal conception of 
the Rule of Law is far from accurate. The deeper one digs into Foucault’s 
analysis one sees that even the liberal or modernist conception was not a 
static concept. Already, we have seen the apparent differences between for 
example, Montesquieu, Weber and Dicey, which highlighted the differences 
between the Continental and Anglo conceptions of the Rule of Law, the 
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separation of powers, the role and nature of Administrative Law and the 
increasing focus on managing and administering social interests. These 
differences may be only differences on the surface that only tend to obscure 
the manner in which in each way the different approaches sought to manage 
the same problems. 
  
In the modern, liberal conception of the Rule of Law it is probably fair to say 
that the negative conception is dominant. At the core of the concept is the idea 
that the Rule of Law entails some bulwark, some safeguard to ensure that the 
State does not interfere with the private lives and affairs of individuals to an 
extent that is no more than necessary (e.g. in terms of some notion of the 
social contract). The usefulness of Foucault’s approach to the Rule of Law is 
that rather than just describing its formal or institutional aspects – for example, 
characteristics such as an independent Judiciary, or how the problem of 
Administrative Law was dealt with; he pries open its function and the 
differences in which its function is exercised or constituted at different times. It 
opens up the question of how else might these functions be achieved or 
exercised, or in fact, transformed again in the future.  Questions such as what 
are the principal characteristics and functions of the Rule of Law as a concept? 
What does the Rule of Law seek to achieve at its most fundamental? How 
does its content vary? How does the Rule of Law legitimise the exercise of 
power in each of its reformations? These questions are all put on the table if 
one moves to explore and understand the various permutations and mutations 
of the concept. 
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The First Definition of the Rule of Law given by Foucault in his 1978 course on 
The Birth of Biopolitics has its origins in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century’s and is mirrored with Continental terms such as l’Etat de droit, de 
Rechsstaat, and El Estado de derecho.449 This form of the Rule of Law is in 
essence defined in opposition to two things:  despotism and the police state.  
Despotism is that which identifies the obligatory character and form of the 
injunctions of the public authority with the sovereign’s will such that in 
despotism the sovereign’s will is the source of public power. Despotism refers 
any injunction made by public authorities back to the sovereign’s will and to it 
alone, or, rather, it makes it originate in this will. 
 
The police state, which is different from despotism, is a system in which there: 
 
is no difference in kind, origin, validity and consequently of effect, 
between, on the one hand, the general and permanent prescriptions 
of the public authorities - … roughly …the law – and, on the other 
hand, the conjunctural, temporary, local and individual decisions of 
these same public authorities - … at the level of rules and 
regulations.450  
 
The police state establishes an administrative continuum, which from the 
general Law to the particular measure makes the public authorities and the 
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injunctions they give one and the same type of principle, according it one and 
the same type of value. In the police state there is a special kind of affinity 
between executive and administrative power and discretion and the concept of 
the police. The police state establishes a continuum between every possible 
form of injunction made by the public authorities, whatever the origin of their 
coercive character.  
 
In one manner the police state may be democratic in a way that the 
Sovereign’s will is not – power may flow from some other body other than the 
Sovereign (i.e. in the form of a monarch), for example: Cromwell or the 
Jacobins, or even in some ways the bureaucratic administrative model of the 
state. The police state thus may also rely upon measures other than the 
Sovereign’s Law to achieve its particular ends – discipline, control and other 
biopolitical forms of governance for example.  
 
We are easily able to overlay this description given by Foucault with the one of 
Neocleous above. What the latter suggests is that the police state is alive and 
well in liberal democracy. Nevertheless, in order to respond to these two 
threats – the despotic Sovereign and the police state; the first liberal definition 
of the Rule of Law requires that the actions of public authorities will have no 
value if they are not framed in laws that limit them in advance. The function of 
the Rule of Law is to ensure that the public authorities can only act within the 
framework of the Law. Thus the Law replaces the Sovereign as the principle 
and origin of coercive character of public authorities. The source of power is 
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removed or devolved from the transcendent figure of the Sovereign’s body to 
the transcendent and autonomous figure of the Law. 
 
This first liberal conception of the Rule of Law arose as response to forms of 
power and public Law current at end of eighteenth century. It presupposed a 
difference of kind, effect, and origin between Laws, which are universally valid 
general measures, and in themselves acts of Sovereignty and particular 
(administrative/policial) decisions of public authorities. In such a conception the 
Rule of Law is a state in which legal dispositions, the expression of Sovereignty 
and administrative measures are distinguished in their principle, effects and 
validity.451  From what we know of Dicey’s view of Administrative Law this 
conception of the Rule of Law appears closer to his understanding of the Rule 
of Law and his treatment of the French Administrative system. According to 
Foucault there are therefore two aspects of this definition of the Rule of Law, 
one opposed to despotism and Sovereign power, the other opposed to the 
administrative-policial state. 
 
Towards the second half of the nineteenth century a new conception of the 
Rule of Law emerges.452  In this period the Rule of Law tends towards a 
formulation in which every citizen has the concrete, institutionalised, and 
effective possibility of recourse against public authorities. From one 
perspective it raises the question of democratisation of the Legal process and 

451 Ibid.:169.
452 Ibid.:170.
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with it the problems of elections and of Judicial or administrative review of 
governmental action. The core of the concept of Anglo Judicial review (which 
appears to have slept from the time of Lord Coke’s battles with the Stuarts 
until Chief Justice Marshal in the early nineteenth century US Supreme Court) 
is not something that had been widely acknowledged in the English system 
where the concept of the Sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament took over 
from the Sovereignty and supremacy of the Monarch – which in effect replaced 
one unquestionable (unreviewable) power with another. The beginning of the 
acceptance of judicial review and of early forms of administrative law signal a 
subtle shift in the nature of the Rule of Law. The Rule of Law tended towards a 
situation that requires more than just a State that acts in accordance with the 
Law, and within the framework of the Law. The Rule of Law becomes a State in 
which there is a system of Law, that is to say, Laws, but it also means that 
Judicial power is capable of intervening and deciding disputes between 
individuals and the Government. Foucault discusses this by way of reference to 
the problem of administrative courts and the question as to whether the Rule of 
Law requires that recourse against public authorities takes place (only) in 
specialised administrative courts established to arbitrate for this purpose (the 
Continental position) or whether recourse by citizens against public authorities 
occurs (only) in the ordinary courts (Anglo position). This is exactly the Dicey 
versus France debate we have outlined above. 
 
These first two definitions of the Rule of Law are what we can describe as the 
liberal definitions and they are the starting point for the liberal attempt to 
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redefine capitalism which undergo change in the post World War Two period 
and especially after 1968 and the economic crisis of the early 1970’s. It is in 
this period that neoliberalism's re-configuration of society and the Law begins 
to take hold and what appears is a Third Definition of the Rule of Law which 
appears to fundamentally shift the rules of the game.453
 
The Third Way! 
 
In respect of the birth of neoliberalism Foucault traces two paths, one being 
the Ordoliberal school in Germany and the other the U.S. Neoliberal school. 
The distinctions are not immediately important for our purposes but it is 
probably correct to say that in many respects the to have merged and that 
neoliberalism today is a child of both. In Germany the idea of asserting the 
principles of the Rule of Law in the economy, was a response to Hitlerite state 
in which the State had ceased to be a legal subject. In the Nazi ‘state’ popular 
acclamation had replaced the State and its institutions.  However, the search 
for a redefined Rule of Law was directed at forms of legal intervention in the 
economic order by States – for example in the U.S., the New Deal, elsewhere 
the social democratic Welfare State. By 1968 and its aftermath capital needed 
to reconfigure itself to gain ground on the growing demands of the new 
politics, decolonisation, the peace movement and the strength of the worker’s 
movement. Out of both the ordoliberal and neoliberal projects (especially the 
Chicago School) grew the principle of the Rule of Law in the Economic Order 

453 Ibid.:171.
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whereby the State is justified in making legal interventions in the economic 
order only if these legal interventions take the form solely of what is described 
as the introduction of formal principles.  In the neoliberal conception of the 
Rule of Law there can only be formal economic legislation. This new 
conception was also aimed against the State, it was about about curbing State 
power, but in this case it was against the manner in which the democratic 
State was able to adopt policies that were inconsistent with the ‘economy’ – 
for example the policies of redistribution embodied in the New Deal and the 
Welfare State. The only legitimate policy from this point on would increasingly 
become a formal economic principle. 
 
The neoliberal redefinition of the Rule of Law as with its predecessors is aimed 
against State power, at banishing State power from the private realm, but in a 
manner that is more far reaching than simply requiring the State to act within 
and be accountable within the bounds of the Law. The requirement of only 
formal economic legislation carries with it ‘radical’ consequences for the role of 
the State and of the Law. What does it mean that Legal Interventions have to 
be formal? Foucault answers this question by reference to Hayek.454 For Hayek 
the Rule of Law is the opposite of a Plan.  
 
To the Neoliberal it appears that the word Plan conjures up images of 
socialism, communism and as such threats to the ‘free market’ economy, the 
answer it seems is to banish the plan from the economy and from government 

454 Ibid.:171-3.
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in order to protect liberal values. The Plan was defined as an aim, or the 
adoption of precise and definite economic ends which allows for (planned) 
intervention in the form of corrections, rectifications, suspension of measures, 
alternative measures. In the context of the plan the public authorities have the 
decision-making role and they replace individuals as the source of decisions. 
Under the auspices of the Plan public authorities rather than private individuals 
become economic decision makers themselves (public works). For the 
neoliberal the Plan presupposes that public authorities can actually master all 
economic processes for the fact is that a plan requires a universal subject of 
knowledge who is able to see and oversee the order of the economy. Nothing 
is further from the truth for the Neoliberal and as such the State, the public 
sphere must be banished from the economy. The crux of the Neoliberal 
objection to the plan is that the State, public authorities make policy decisions 
rather than leaving things to individuals. It is from this basic tension between 
public policy and individual choice that the neoliberal idea of the Rule of Law 
develops. 
 
The Rule of Law for Hayek includes five principles. Firstly, that Law has the 
possibility of formulating certain measures of a general kind but that these 
measures must be completely formal in the sense that these measures must 
never pursue an end. The Law only tells people what they must and must not 
do. There is an interesting result here whereby jurists such as Cotterell455 talk 
about the Law becoming increasingly policy based in recent times. It may be 

455 Roger Cotterrell, Law's Community: Legal Theory and the Image of Legality, Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1992), pp. 405-422.
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that there is some affinity between Cotterell’s idea of policy and Hardt and 
Negri’s idea of a single logic of Empire, that is, policy is essentially the core 
logic of neoliberalism. So the qualification might be that policy in Law is 
acceptable if it policy achieves the ends of the Neoliberal project. To put this 
another way we could say, following Dumont, that the core logic or policy is a 
value that underpins the entire system. That value or logic requires that the 
Law’s purpose is always to act in a necessary and normally exceptional 
manner in order to pursue the ends of competition. Even if neoliberalism 
abhorred the Plan its conditions are themselves the subject of a plan, in so far 
as we will see they are constructed. As Agamben456 and others such as the 
transnational jurist, Zumbansen457 recognise the functionality of the Law comes 
to the fore.  
 
Secondly, the Law must be conceived of a priori in the form of fixed rules and 
importantly, these fixed rules must not be rectifiable by reference to the effects 
produced. In this way any collateral damage caused by the implication of the 
known fixed rules is not a relevant consideration for the Rule of Law. Thus the 
Law is known and fixed and those that transgress it, knowingly or otherwise 
know (or are taken to have known) the consequences, no matter how unjust. In 
the case the structural adjustment necessary to achieve the ends of the 
neoliberal project pain is a necessary byproduct that cannot be avoided. 
Thirdly, and following from the second principle, the Law must define the 

456 Giorgio Agamben, 2013.
457 Peer Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of 
Reflexive Law, pp. 769-808, Peer Zumbansen, Defining the space of Transnational law: Legal Theory, 
Global Governance, and legal Pluralism, 2012.
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framework within which economic agents can freely make their decisions such 
that every agent (all agents are now economic) knows that the Legal framework 
is fixed in its action and will not change. This underscores the principle of 
certainty that is required by the market. One could read from this that 
discretion is thus banished. But things are not that simple as it appears that the 
discretion that is functional actually increases in scope, but as the fusion 
debate in equity and its clamouring for certainty over the length of the 
Chancellors boot exemplifies,458 discretion that allows people to avoid the rules 
of the game, or contracts, on the basis of some justness and unforeseen 
consequences is clearly abhorrent to the Neoliberal conception of the Rule of 
Law. Fourthly, the Law binds the State as much as it binds others. This 
ensures the knowledge of economic agents of the certainty of action by public 
authorities. But, and this is crucial, it also reduces the State (and even removes 
it from its transcendent position) to becoming just another individual economic 
actor – this is the world of the contracting state459 and not the Sovereign State. 
Fifthly, and finally, there is no universal subject of economic knowledge who 
could oversee all economic processes. The invisible hand – an intimately 
biblical concept;460 guides everything. 
 
In the three models of the Rule of Law outlined by Foucault we can observe a 
movement and transformation of the concept which can be traced from a State 
in which there was an unquestionable and unconfined Sovereign (pre Rule of 

458 See for example Simon Chesterman, Beyond Fusion Fallacy: The Transformation of Equity and 
Derrida's 'The Force of Law' Journal of Law and Society Vol. 24, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 350-376.
459 Ian Harden, The contracting state, Open University Press, 1992.
460 Girogio Agamben, 2011.
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Law) to a desire to confine the State and its actions by Law (the first liberal 
definition), to a desire to ensure that individuals are able to seek redress 
against the State (the second liberal definition) and finally to a desire to make 
the State and the individual equal Legal or economic actors and to remove the 
ability of the State to impose public policy (the Neoliberal definition). The 
question that follows as a result of this genealogy is what happens to the 
concept of Law having a Sovereign source if the State is no longer the 
universal subject of the law? If in the liberal definition of the Rule of Law moved 
sovereignty from the body of the Sovereign to the body of the law to where has 
it moved to in the Neoliberal definition? If no one can be in control, from where 
does law emanate? Who or what is sovereign? And what in fact is law in this 
context? Is it really useful to refer back to the Rule of Law and its traditional or 
popular liberal conceptions at a time when the Neoliberal model seems to have 
well and truly taken root? 
 
Furthermore, what has all this got to do with sport, cycling and anti-doping? 
What is the connection between what we might term the total subsumption of 
society under the economy, mechanisms of governance and the sport in a 
global economy? The beginnings of one answer might be in the difference that 
Foucault draws out between liberalism and neoliberalism a difference 
embodied in the logic of the game.461 
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461 Foucault 2008:173-4.
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The Rules of the Game.
 
According to the neoliberal the economy and the law are, and must henceforth 
be, a game. Accordingly the Neoliberal conception of its Rule of Law sets out 
the most ‘rational’ framework within which individuals are able to engage in 
their activities in line with their personal plans. Hence the main (or only) 
function of a system of jurisprudence is to govern the spontaneous order of 
economic life. The system of law must develop and reinforce rules according to 
which the competitive mechanism operates. Hence a system of laws is the 
rules of the game and it draws its inspiration not from the Law but the game 
itself. Without a doubt this is a matter immediately relevant in respect of its 
ramifications for our understanding of the Rule of Law, but also in respect of 
the role that sport, and thus anti-doping, plays, its instrumental function as 
mechanisms of governance of global society. 
 
Inherent in the logic of the neoliberal notion of the game setting mechanism of 
law is that what is sought to be accomplished by way of this idea of law is the 
development and reinforcement of rules according to which the competitive 
mechanism takes place. The role of law in the neoliberal rational highlights the 
need to continually create and maintain the conditions of competition. We will 
begin to see that, despite the logic, competition itself is not a natural given but 
something that must be created. Competition itself is not human nature, it does 
not come prior to anything and hence it must be constructed. Karl Polanyi’s, 
The Great Transformation, published in the same years as Hayek’s Road to 
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Serfdom, is instrumental in this regard as it shows us that competition and the 
dominance of the market within society is a very recent construction.462  
 
In relation to the instrumental role of sport is this regard it is more than 
interesting to note that in mediaeval folk or peasant games were driven not by 
a logic of competition or of an individual trying to win, but by the logic of 
ensuring that  not one of the players was left behind; that no one became a 
victim or a scapegoat scapegoats. 463  Cooperation appears here prior to 
competition (in a manner related to debt being prior to exchange?464) What the 
game requires before competition may occur is, in the first place, cooperation. 
All must agree and cooperate in establishing the game and its rules before 
competition is able to take place. As Dadot and Laval put it the: 
 
rules of the game and that apparatus for impartial supervision of 
those rules which are just as necessary for the competition as for a 
sporting contest if it is not to degenerate into a mere riot. A general 
competitive system which is at the same time just, fair and which 
functioned properly cannot exist without permanent supervision of 
the conditions under which competition must fulfill itself as a really 
effective system.465 
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462 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time Paperback,
Beacon Press, 2001. See also of course Louis Dumont, From Marx to Mandeville, The Genesis and 
Triumph of Economic Ideology, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1977.
463 See for example Henning Eichberg, Three Dimensions of Playing the Game: About Mouth Pull, Tug-
of-War and Sportization, in Verner Møller, John Nauright (eds.), The Essence of Sport, University Press 
of Southern Denmark, 2003, Rohan Bastin, Ritual Games For The Goddess Pattini, Social Analysis, 
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464 Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Anti Oedipus, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977.
465 Dadot and Laval pp.86-87.
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The point is that the competitive rational, mechanism, logic or value of 
neoliberalism and the logic of competition is something quite different 
from that which drove both the liberal idea of the Rule of Law and 
economy, namely the idea of exchange. Rather than exchange, which 
commenced from the formation of an equilibrium defined by formal 
conditions, neoliberalism starts from the competitive struggle 
between agents.466 Furthermore, to a certain extent market exchange 
required some form of equality and rights, along with this liberalism 
also envisaged some sort of leveling out to achieve equality – some 
measure of redistribution in order to ensure the security of the market 
system.  On the other hand, Neoliberalism apparently privileges 
growth as the pure possibility of making it. Rather than carrying with it 
some measure of equality, competition is inherently unequal, its 
purpose is to show us who is better, that is, to highlight difference 
and thus to highlight who is more outstanding or unequal than the 
rest. In the logic of competition, as opposed to exchange, it is not the 
players that are equal, but it is simply that the rules are set in advance 
to create, what is touted as, a level playing field, neoliberalism’s order 
‘consist[s] mainly in inequality’.467 In reality the level playing field does 
not create equality and tends more to merely being a set of rules that 
give certainty to the game. The essence of neoliberalism ‘consists not 
in exchange (more equality), but in competition, itself defined as a 
relationship of inequality between different units of production or 
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466 Dadot and Laval p.103.
467 Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism, Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986, p.266.
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enterprises … The idea of the equality is replaced by the level playing 
field upon which unequal players compete’.468 
 
In this neoliberal reality everything and everyone, from the State down to the 
level of each individual actor becomes no more than an enterprise engaged in 
competition with everyone else. The People, and the State are dispensed of 
their public character and become corporations, or better entrepreneurs. In this 
way the State is much more than just the ‘the vigilant guardian of this 
framework, but is itself subject to the normal competition in its own action’. If it 
was otherwise the State could not perform its function ‘there are no grounds 
for the state forming an exception to the rules of law for whose application it is 
responsible. Quite the reverse, any form of self exemption or self subtraction 
on its part can only disqualify it in its role as an inflexible guardian of such rules 
…’. The governmental function of competition thus prevails over Sovereignty 
with the consequence that there is ‘a gradual hollowing out of all the categories 
of public law, which tends not towards a formal abrogation, but to diffusing 
their operational validity’. 469 
 
According to the logic of neoliberalism the State is not removed from the 
picture, it does not necessarily become more democratic, nor does it yet 
whither away, what occurs is that its role and function changes. The political 
order devised and constructed is one where the State is under the supervision 
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of the market, rather than the inverse situation of the Rule of Law’s prehistory 
where the market was supervised by the State.470 Henceforth the only one true 
and fundamental social policy and the political order is economic growth.471 
The result is the emergence of ‘a radically economic state’ completely different 
from the problem of classic liberalism, whereby the existence of the State is 
based upon a non-State space of economic freedom.472 No longer was it a 
matter of cutting out or contriving a free space of the market within a political 
society, but rather: 
 
how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the 
principles of a market economy. So it is not a question of freeing an 
empty space, but of taking the formal principles of a market 
economy and referring and relating them to, of projecting them on to 
a general art of government.473 
 
In neoliberalism competition itself becomes the formal structure and the 
guiding policy. Intervention is carried out by the State (only) in the name of 
creating and maintaining the competitive framework. Competition within the 
rules of the game is opposed to the Plan, which shows how, the resources of 
society must be consciously directed in order to achieve a particular end – that 
is competition. That is there is no particular end, merely the possibility of a 
result within the rules – the end or aim of both law and sport here coincide. 
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This is the great transformation wrought by neoliberalism on the concept of the 
Rule of Law and in these new circumstances an analysis which merely cites the 
Rule of Law as a static, timeless, or eternal concept tends to miss the point – 
when the Rule of Law is spoken of, the question must become: which rule of 
law? As economic processes are decoupled from social mechanisms by the 
idea that the economy is a game the whole of society which is permeated by 
this economic game, accordingly the essential role of the State is to define the 
economic rules of the game and to make sure that they are in fact applied.   
 
What are these rules, their purpose, what do these rules achieve? Firstly, the 
rules must make the game as active as possible and to the advantage of the 
greatest possible number of people. The rules must simply operate on the 
surface of contact without real penetration of the economic and the social, they 
are thus merely supplementary and unconditional. The rules must ensure that it 
must be impossible for one of the partners in the game to lose everything and 
be unable to continue playing, a limiting rule that changes nothing in the game, 
but prevents one from completely dropping out of the game. In this context no 
one originally insists on being part of the game, but at the same time and 
consequently, the rules of the game seek to ensure that no one is excluded 
without ever having explicitly wished to take part. All are virtual players of the 
game in which the only point of contact between the economic and the social 
is the rule safeguarding players being excluded from the game. What appears 
is in effect an inverted ‘social contract’ whereby all those who will the social 
contract, that is those that virtually or actually subscribe to it, form part of this 
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gaming society. That is, and this is the crux of the matter and for our purposes 
where the anti-doping apparatus enters the picture in the case of sport, until 
such a time as they cut themselves off from it by repudiating the rules inherent 
in this virtual ‘social contract’. This is the logic of playing the game and thus 
being able to ‘Live Your Dream’ and ‘Just Do It’. Other than Foucault’s rule of 
non-exclusion – that is the potential of all who are suitable to play to actually 
play - the game itself must follow its own course. Being capable of being 
culturally fit to play becomes the touchstone of this potentiality. 
 
Thus, in liberalism the function of the Rule of Law was for the State to leave 
people alone to live their lives without undue interference by the State. On the 
other hand, in neoliberalism the function of the Rule of Law is transformed in 
order to allow for the management of people on the purely economic grounds 
of pure competition.474 Liberalism’s Homo Juridicius is a very different creature 
to neoliberalism’s Homo Oeconomicus. The interest of Homo Juridicius or 
Liberal Man converged with that of others by way of a social contract – by the 
giving up of rights in return for protections from the state. Homo Oeconomicus 
or Neo Liberal Man is someone who pursues his own interest and whose 
interest is such that it spontaneously converges with the interest of others. The 
Law of the State governs Liberal Man, whereas Neo Liberal Man (and the 
neoliberal State) become governable by the subtleties of the market and self-
interest and not the will of the Sovereign or the people constituted as a polity. 
Self Interest and the Law are not necessarily reconcilable as is exemplified by 
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these neoliberal and liberal figures having a very different relationship with the 
State and hence Law. If they are reconcilable it is through a reconfiguration of 
the Law and law and their relationship to governance. Unlike the situation 
whereby the liberal State is the ultimate source of the Law, the neoliberal State 
is the local agent of the Economy in a situation where the State, and hence the 
Law, cannot know or control the economy.  
 
What happens when the State is marginalised, or better, transformed, in this 
way? When and what new judicial mechanisms are established outside of the 
State structure to manage the rules of the game when all is based around the 
enterprise, competition, and being master of ones own games within the 
framework of the rules? As we have asked ourselves, what juridical form is able 
to form and sustain this system? In the context of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century liberalism, and its primacy of the Law, the judicial was reduced to the 
pure and simple application of an autonomous and transcendent Law. 
However in circumstances where the Law is no more than the rules of the 
game and in which each remains master regarding himself and his part, then 
the judicial, instead of being reduced to the simple function of applying the law, 
acquires a new form of autonomy and importance. This new autonomy of the 
law is at the same time immanent with the economic as Neo Liberal Man is the 
man of enterprise and not that of exchange.  
 
Here enterprise is not just an institution, but, a way of behaving in the 
economic field in the form of competition and in a situation where everything is 
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encompassed or subsumed with the economic field. Enterprise society allows 
individuals the possibility of behaving as they wish in the form of free 
enterprise, with the result that with the multiplication of the forms of the typical 
enterprise unit, there is an increase in the number of surfaces available on 
which friction occurs. The occasions for litigation multiply and the regulation of 
these conflicts and any irregularities of behaviour (that is rule breaking as 
opposed to the spontaneous economic regulation by competition) calls at 
times for judicial and other forms of interventionism that have to operate as 
arbitration or moments of finality within the framework of the rules of the game. 
The Law constitutes the playing field and law becomes the game’s referee. 
With the ever increasing reduction in the size of the State and the number of its 
functionaries driven by the logic of economics and competition and the 
increased dynamic of enterprises, there is produced the need for an ever-
increasing number decisions to be adjudicated. For Foucault one of the 
fundamental problems produced by this dynamic within neoliberalism was 
whether this arbitration should be inserted within already existing Judicial 
institutions of the State, or whether it is necessary to create new institutions.475 
What seems to be apparent since and with the process of globalisation that the 
logic of neoliberalism has increased, is that the adjudicative or better arbitrative 
function in many cases has tended more and more to move away from the 
Judicial institutions of the State and towards instances of private arbitration. 
The logic of competition and the requirement for of rule enforcement within the 
game of the economy places enormous strain on the Judicial structures of the 
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State such that on the basis of this same economic rationality there occurs a 
simultaneous drive to the privatisation and spectacularisation of the ‘judicial’ or 
arbitrative function – of its contracting out and transformation where necessary 
and possible. Posner’s championing of social norms and shaming, as a more 
efficient mechanism for contractual governance over adjudication must be read 
within this context.476 
 
If Foucault is correct in saying that in its various forms that the Rule of Law 
always challenges the State, neoliberalism has reduced the State to being an 
instrument of the economy, another, albeit a very special player in that game. It 
might be possible to characterise the situation as an inversion of the Law–
governance continuum, whereby rather than the liberal model of governance 
being under or subject to the Law, what the neoliberal transformation achieves 
is a situation where the Sovereign and the Law is under, or subject to, 
governance, the administration and in the end, the police. That is the economy 
governs, although it may appear that the Sovereign may continue to enjoy a 
restful reign. Along with this we could say that neoliberalism has also provided 
us with a theory of sovereignty based upon economic man. 
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476 Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms, Harvard University Press, 2009.
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Competition as Government. 
 
From Foucault’s analysis of the neoliberal turn of the Rule of Law a number of 
points arise pertinent to our consideration of the anti-doping apparatus:  
 
 the law’s role in game setting; 
 the privileging of competition as a form of governance; and  
 the increasing need for other non-state forms of resolution and finality 
including a preference for private arbitration over that of Sovereign 
Judicial systems.  
 
What then is the place of the anti-doping apparatus in the wide system of 
global governance? In trying to unpack this it is useful to consider in the first 
place the idea of competition as governance before then turning to the 
question of how it is reflected or relates to the anti-doping apparatus. As we 
are beginning to see, in the context of a study of sport and law, at first glance 
one of the striking things about the analysis of the Rule of Law as game setting 
and its privileging of competition is that these two other fields of play, are in 
themselves based upon similar logics. If we add to that mix the idea of 
competition as governance, we quickly have before us four models of power 
(sport, law, economy, governance) all that privilege, in their own (and in the 
same way), principles of competition. All are brought together by the same 
value.  
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Here the rules are not themselves concerned with just outcomes but with 
establishing a procedure by which the players must abide in order to produce 
competition. The rules of sport, of the economy, of law and of governance are 
thus no more than (‘cooperative’) procedures to be followed to produce the 
outcome; a competitive winner. Justice here ‘is nothing other than the just 
recompense of merit and skill in the struggle. Those who fail owe it solely to 
their weakness and advice’.477 The outcome (that is who wins) is formally 
irrelevant so long as the procedure is known and thus perceived to be itself just 
or fair.  
 
In comparing competition in the economy to sport, examinations, and 
experimentation in science Hayek stressed the nature of competition as 
procedure, ‘first and foremost a discovery procedure’. 
 
There is no pre-determined range of known or ‘given’ facts which 
will ever be taken into account. All we can hope to secure is a 
procedure that is on the whole likely to bring about a situation where 
more of the potentially useful objective facts will be taken into 
account than would be done in any other procedure which we know. 
... we can judge the value of results only by the conditions under 
which it was conducted, not by the results.478 
 
Neoliberalism ‘regards competition in the market as a process of discovery of 
relevant information, as a certain mode of conduct on the part of the subject, 

477 Dadot and Laval p.36.
478 Hayek 1976:III, pp.67-68.
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who seeks to outstrip and proceed others in discovering new opportunities for 
profit’.479 The procedure of competition thus takes into account the most useful, 
the most functional facts, not necessarily the just. The rule of law as a 
discursive machine continues to be present as game setting and with this 
mutation right becomes at the non-discursive level, no more than procedure.480
The law (or politics) ideological idealising of itself as justice manifests itself with 
an insistence at the most on formal procedural concerns - law is not 
synonymous with justice, but with the finality of a result within the rules of the 
game. Agamben describes law’s aim of finality clearly: 
 
As jurists are well know, law is not directed toward the 
establishment of justice. Nor is it directed toward the verification of 
truth. Law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of truth 
and justice. This is shown beyond doubt by the force of judgment 
that even an unjust sentence carries with it. The ultimate aim of law 
is the production of a res judicata, in which the sentence becomes a 
substitute for the true and just, being held as true despite its falsity 
and injustice. Law finds peace in this hybrid creature, of which it is 
impossible to say if it is the fact or rule; once law has produced its 
res judicata, it cannot go any further.481 
 
If, from here, we start to try and theorise both sport and law there is a striking, 
possibly, more than simply illustrative, resemblance between the actual and 
unconscious structure of each. Møller is well aware of this resemblance: 
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479 Dadot and Laval p.103.
480 Hardt and Negri 2000:pp.26-27.
481 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 2002:p.18.
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Cleansed of all its decorations, the essence of sport becomes 
visible. The result is what it is all about.482 
  
If we delve a little deeper, firstly, taking the pure idea of justice as a starting 
point, we find in the end, not an actual incarnation of pure justice, but an actual 
incarnation of law embodied in the result. Justice is not the great determinant 
of the law. Law is exhaustively determined in the result – in the idea of res 
judicata - a bringing to an end, finality in the contest between the disputing 
parties. This law is a function: this is law's function. Justice itself is 
indeterminate, only determinable by reference to the unequal and differential 
relations that exist between the parties to the contest. Law is not determined 
objectively by reference to some higher (transcendental) notion or requirement 
of justice, but it is determined by reference to its objects of experience, its time 
and space, and the relationship of the contestants to this time and space and 
to each other.  
 
In the end law is completely determined with respect to this singular point at 
which the contest occurs and is decided. It is completely determined for here 
and for now without reference to an identity of justice or some inherent legality. 
It is the exception and not the generality, identity or the norm, that is the 
hallmark, the determinant and the motor of the law. The mighty summit of the 
law that we catch a glimpse of, what we perceive and what emerges out of the 

482 Verner Møller, The Doping Devil, INHDR Vol 1, Aarhus, 2008, p.99.
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mist, its actual incarnation, is not justice but the resolution of the contest of 
competition. What we mistake for justice, what we think of as a solution, is the 
result of law's functionality. 
 
Sport is also meant to be fair (we are told again and again by the sport 
scholars and administrators 483 ). A level playing field cannot exist between 
individual players, but sport seeks to create the image of one. It shrouds this 
fact in the great mist of the level playing field of pure competition. The great 
contradiction at the heart of sport that of Citius, Altius, Fortius and fairness is 
embodied in the governing law of sport. Competition is sport’s guiding 
principle, as some might say its essence or true spirit. Writing at a time before 
the neoliberal turn, and in order to aggrandise sport and cycling as an epic in 
the manner of the Greek gods Barthes, in his essay on the Tour de France as 
Epic 484 , called sport ‘the world of total competition’. Despite what the 
neoliberal’s say about the unnaturalness of competition, athletes tend to 
accept, or we might say, have been governed to accept, that this ‘the world of 
total competition’ is in fact a natural state. Interview participants in the 
Australia study often referred to this, for example: 

483 See for example Robert L. Simon, Fair Play, Sports, Values and Society, Westview Press, Boulder, 
1991, Sigmund Loland, fair Play in sport, A moral norm system, Routledge, London, 2002 and Graham 
McFee, Sport, Rules and Values, Philosophical investigations into the nature of sport, Routledge, 
London, 2004. “WADA is a unique partnership between the sport movement and governments, with its 
main aim being to protect the clean athlete and provide a level playing field for all. This unique 
partnership helps foster the combination and complementing of sports’ and governments’ respective 
resources and assets, and results in a coordinated and cohesive approach to anti-doping. Furthermore, 
it underlines the fact that if we, the anti-doping community, are to succeed in levelling the playing field, 
it will require the will of everyone who wants, and believes in, pure and fair sport.” WADA President’s 
Welcome Message, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/who-we-are/presidents-welcome-message,
Accessed 20 November 2014.
484 Barthes, Roland, The Tour de France as Myth, in Barthes, Roland, Mythologies Editions du Seuil, 
France, 1957.
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Sport is a very important part of life.  Sport is everything really.  
Sport is the battle of man against man battling it out, fighting it out 
to see who is the better athlete.  So sport is the instinct we have, the 
competitiveness we have. The competitiveness of mankind, which is 
genetically imprinted in our brain and which enables us to excel in 
sport, but not only sport, it could be education.  Basically mankind 
would be doomed if we didn’t have this competitive spirit. … 
Athletes are competitive in a different way because the battle is 
visual to everyone because it is a one on one battle or team on team 
battle.  It is a primal instinct.  Sport is a primal instinct we all have.485 

 “They are learning” 
 
In considering Foucault’s analysis of Neoliberalism I have stated that 
competition itself is inherently unequal and not based upon equality in the 
manner that liberalism conceived of it. In this regard Lazzarato has written that: 
 
For Neoliberalism, the market is not the spontaneous or 
anthropological expression of the tendency of human beings to 
exchange, as Adam Smith believed. Instead of exchange, they 
underline competition as the organizing principle of the market, 
specifically, competition between enterprises and between workers. 
Whilst exchange relates to equality, competition relates to inequality. 
The new mode of government substitutes the couple 
inequality/enterprise in place of the couple exchange/equality. For 
the neoliberals the market can operate as a regulatory principle only 

485 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012.
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if competition is made the regulatory principle of society. For 
Neoliberalism, competition, like the market, is not the result of the 
‘natural play’ of appetites, instincts or behaviours. It is rather a 
‘formal play’ of inequalities that must be instituted and constantly 
nourished and maintained. Thus, appetites and instincts are not 
given: only inequality has the capacity to sharpen appetites, instincts 
and minds, driving individuals to rivalries.486 
 
Lazzarato is of course pointing out what the neoliberals themselves say. Hayek 
states that  
 
… rational behavior is not a premise of economic theory, though it is 
often presented as such. The basic contention of theory is rather 
that competition will make it necessary for people to act rationally in 
order to maintain themselves.487 
 
He continues that competition: 
 
is as much a method of breeding certain types of mind as anything 
else … Competition is, after all, always a process in which a small 
number makes it necessary for larger numbers to do what they do 
not like, be it work harder, to change habits, or to devote a degree of 
attention, continuous application, or regularity to their work which 
without competition would not be needed.488 
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486 Lazzarato 2009:pp.116-117.
487 Hayek 1976: III, p.75
488 Ibid.:III, pp.76-77.
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In discussing the manner in which Neoliberalism has extended market 
mechanisms to what he terms the ‘lifeworld’ Hilgers highlights its governmental 
aspect ‘Neoliberalism must change people’ he writes: 
 
this is why, from Lippmann to Thatcher’s famous formulation, 
‘Economics are the method, but the object is to change the soul’, 
Neoliberalism is a political project. The necessity of making people 
adapt to a world of generalized competition supposes a radical 
reform that transforms the way in which they perceive their 
destiny.489 
 
The new government of subjects brought about by neoliberalism presupposes 
an instrument and space of competition, in which the subject: 
 
must constantly strive to be as efficient as possible, to appear to be 
totally involved in his work, to perfect himself by lifelong learning, 
and to accept the greater flexibility required by the incessant 
changes dictated by markets. His own expert, his own employer, his 
own inventor, his own entrepreneur: neoliberal rationality 
encourages the ego to act to strengthen itself so as to survive 
competition. All its activities must be compared with a form of 
production, and investment, and a cost calculation. The economy 
becomes a personal discipline.490 
 
Thatcher herself said: 
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489 Hilgers 2012:p.82.
490 Dadot and Laval p.263.
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People have forgotten about the personal society. And they say: do I 
count, do I matter? To which the short answer is, yes. And therefore, 
it isn't that I set out on economic policies; it's that I set out really to 
change the approach, and changing the economics is the means of 
changing that approach. If you change the approach you really are 
after the heart and soul of the nation. Economics are the method; 
the object is to change the heart and soul.491 

Competition is thus aimed at changing, directing, piloting peoples’ behavior. It 
is a manner of governing them. As the Iron Lady said: 
 
‘They are learning’.492 
 
Sport as Governance and the Problematisation of the Individual Doper 
 
And I say to them, don't blame your unemployment on to me. It is 
your fault." People are realising that we live in a competitive world 
and we shall always be up against that reality. It is a manner of 
governing them.493
 
As discussed above in Chapter Four the anti-doping establishment and the 
vast majority of academic literature on anti-doping privileges a form of 
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491 Thatcher 1981.
492 Thatcher, M. 1981. Interview for the Sunday Times—The first two years. The Sunday Times.
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475. Accessed 31 Dec 2012.
493 Ibid.
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psychological analysis which addresses the problem of doping as one of 
individual moral reasoning.494 Competition individualises everything, it make the 
individual responsible for their own actions and their own body. This is the 
basis of the strict liability principle in anti-doping and it helps explain why the 
CONI and UCI prosecutions of Valverde were functional (as they focused on 
the immoral individual athlete) to the anti-doping apparatus in a way that 
Operación Puerto (with its systemic focus) was not.  
 
Although most people would consider sport to be in someway pure and as 
being highly instrumental in enhancing morality, enabling people to follow rules 
and respect each other, and thus make good citizens in everyday life, Long et 
al495  argue that some studies in sport psychology suggest that the game 
reasoning of sport does not necessarily lead to character development but to a 
moral transformation in which an egocentric or self-interest perspective is 
considered a legitimate means of pursuing the goal of competition. We would 
say that this egocentric or self-interested perspective is what is called forth by 
the game of neoliberalism such that contrary to the position of Long et al we 
would say that the ‘bracketed morality’ of the sporting context is not 
distinguishable from everyday life. The moral atmosphere of sport – its higher 
self-centered ego orientation and aggressive tendencies that lower ‘moral 
reasoning’; is the moral atmosphere of the society of competition.Contrary to 
the idea that sport constitutes some sort of bracketed morality Dadot and 
Laval are much closer to the mark when they propose that the:

494 See for example Long et al 2006, Lucidi et al 2008 and Boardley, & Kavussanu, 2008.
495 Thierry Long, et al 2006.
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‘new subject is a man of competition and performance. The self 
entrepreneur is being made to succeed, to win. Much more so than 
the idealised figures of heads of enterprises, competitive sport is a 
great social theatre that displays of modern gods, demi-gods and 
heroes. While the cult of sport dates from the early twentieth century, 
and proved perfectly compatible with fascism and Soviet 
communism, as well as Fordisms, it experienced a major turning 
point when it permeated the most diverse practices from within, not 
only by lending them a vocabulary, but, more decisively, through a 
logic of performance that trend transforms its subjective meaning’.496 
 
Rather than being contrary to wider societal values the character developed 
and brought about by the generalisation of game reasoning in neoliberalism’s 
society of competition in fact seeks to achieve a moral transformation in which 
an egocentric or self-interest perspective is considered not only legitimate but 
the only way of being. Neoliberal man is competitive man, wholly immersed in 
global competition.497  
 
The complementary nature of free competition and anti-doping regulation 
 
Franco Berardi 498  has written that competition ‘implies a risky narcissistic 
stimulation’ whereby ‘many are called but only a few are chosen’. In such a 
situation the society of competition and its ‘fairness’ must itself be justified. At 
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496 Dadot and Laval p.281.
497 Ibid.:255.
498 Franco Berardi, The Soul at Work, From Alienation to Autonomy, Semiotxet(e), Los Angeles, 2009, 
p.99.
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one and the same time self-interest is promoted whilst its excesses that may 
lead to perceptions of ‘market failure’ must be constrained. Excess, ecstatic 
excess, excessive enjoyment and any form of immeasurability beyond the rules 
of the game (and the logic of neoliberalism) require policing and demonisation 
in order to justify failure within this situation and without ‘questioning its own 
ideological fundaments, and even its economic efficiency’499. If we accept the 
characterisation of the role of law put forward by the neoliberals, that the main 
function of a system of law is to govern the spontaneous order of economic 
life, we come up against what, prima facie, may appear to be a contradiction in 
the context of the war on doping and the creation of the conditions for pure 
competition.  For example Savulescu has argued that allowing everyone to 
dope would level the playing field, removing the effects of genetic inequality 
and that thus rather than being unfair, allowing doping promotes equality.500 
The reasoning behind this kind of laissez faireism is that anti-doping is 
essentially anti-competitive. If as I have suggested the spectacle of sport plays 
an important functional role in the creation and maintenance of the conditions 
for such competition, rather than being a contradiction, the argument we are 
developing here is that the anti-doping apparatus in fact, complements and 
contributes to these same instrumental functions and mechanisms of this 
gaming society. That is the anti-doping apparatus is an instrument that 
contributes to the creation of the conditions of competition, not simply 
because it purportedly creates a level playing field, but because it seeks at its 
most basic to justify the image of that level playing field.  If this is the situation, 
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499 Ibid.:100.
500 J Savulescu, B Foddy and M Clayton, Why we should allow performance enhancing drugs in sport, 
Br J Sports Med 2004 38: 666-670.
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questions such as, how is it that transgression of such a seemingly anti-
competitive measure, or better, restraint on the nature of competition 
constitutes repudiation of the rules inherent in the virtual social contract of 
neoliberalism? Leaving to one side why some who transgress are not excluded 
from the game, why and for what purpose is it that those that transgress 
become culturally unfit to play? As already noted above, in the context of a 
study of sport and law, at first glance, one of the striking things about the 
analysis of the Rule of Law as game setting and its privileging of competition is 
that these two other fields of play, are in themselves based upon similar logics. 
Sport, like the economy is meant to be a place where anyone who buys into 
the game can compete as an entrepreneur of the self. The conditions for 
competition in both cases are (meant to be) fair. We are told again and again 
and again that both sport and the economy seek to create the image of a level 
playing field. Both activities are shrouded in the great mist of the level playing 
field of pure competition. The great contradiction at the heart of sport between 
that of Citius, Altius, Fortius501 and that of fairness is embodied in both the 
governing law of sport and the anti-doping apparatus. 
 
As a biopolitical project, competition as governance has at its object all of life 
and all of its intensity – it’s focus is the totality of the population, as well as 
each and every body, that is each and every aspect of life and each and every 

501 Citius, Altius, Fortius ("Faster, Higher, Stronger") the Olympic motto proposed by Pierre de 
Coubertin on the creation of the International Olympic Committee in 1894 is not only relevant to sport 
but also the intensification of work brought about in neoliberalism, see Gollac Michel, Volkoff Serge. 
Citius, altius, fortius [L'intensification du travail], Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, Vol. 114, 
septembre 1996. Les nouvelles formes de domination dans le travail (1) pp. 54-67, cited in Dadot and 
Laval p.289.
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regime or field in which life is played out. Ehrenberg has been keen to point out 
how the increased attention to the values of economic competition and sports 
rivalries have propelled the ‘trajectory-individual’ to a conquest of their 
personal identity and an increase in their own social status. In both the 
economy and sport, individuals, according to Ehrenberg, are commanded to 
surpass themselves in the great entrepreneurial adventure of life.502 As Franco 
Berardi has put it capitalism ‘expects enthusiastic participation in a universal 
competition where it is impossible to win without fully and convincingly 
deploying all of our energies’.503  
 
The injunction to compete is in the end not an invitation, but it is manifestly 
something that must be undertaken, and with a passion. It is a duty; something 
that we ‘have to be’, ‘having to be’ a competitor in the great entrepreneurial 
adventure of life that forms the basis of existence.504 It is in this duty of ‘having 
to be’ a functional member of the society of competition that we begin to 
encounter why Agamben says that the camp is the paradigm of contemporary 
politics; of the way we live post-Auschwitz. If read literally this claim might be 
so easy to dismiss as an exaggeration. But is its kernel contained in the dream 
of Primo Levi, that Agamben refers to:  
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502 Alain Ehrenberg, The Weariness of the Self, Diagnosing the History of Depression in the 
Contemporary Age, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston, 2010, p. xxii
503 Franco Berardi, 2009, p.91.
504 Giorgio Agamben, 2013.
312
‘Wake Up!’ shouted each morning in a foreign voice? In that 
situation whereby each and every day we do things, in effect, that 
we do not want to do? 
 
Both competition and doping arise in the context of this constant and 
perpetual injunction that requires us to construct ourselves as ‘having to be’ 
something within the society of competition. Doping becomes problematised 
as a matter of (free) choice made by those who are too morally weak to 
compete fairly on the level playing field of life. It is moral weakness that has 
lead them to repudiate the rules of the game such that they are now unfit to 
particpate in that game. Neoliberalism does not merely grant the individual the 
freedom to compete and act according to their self interest, it does so at the 
same moment that it considers them ‘incorrigible rogues, potential criminals’. 
As we have seen (Chapter Four) the society of competition inaugurates ‘the 
panoptical moment directed to the glory of the monitoring of each by all and all 
by each’.505 This panoptical moment is necessary in order to reinforce the 
discursive and governmental spectacle of pure and natural competition, which 
glorifies the conduct of pure and natural bodies, all aimed at reinforcing the 
myth of competition as a natural and pure state carried out on a level playing 
field. Only upon this mythical field can we all (have to) be, can we all make it, 
as entrepeneurs of the self. 
 
Boltanski and Chiapello‘s description of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ in their 
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505 Dadot and Laval p.258.
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meticulous study of changes in the language and techniques of French 
management, goes someway in helping us understand the interplay of 
competition and anti-doping. The ‘spirit of capitalism’ they describe as an 
ideology that justifies people’s commitment to capitalism, and which renders 
this commitment attractive. They argue that in its different mutations there are 
three dimensions that play a particularly important role in providing a concrete 
expression for the spirit of capitalism: 
 
a) The first dimension indicates what is “exciting” about an 
involvement with capitalism – in other words, how this system can 
help people to blossom, and how it can generate enthusiasm. This 
“excitement” dimension is usually related to the different forms of 
“liberation” that capitalism offers. 
b) A second set of arguments emphasises the forms of security that 
is offered to those who are involved, both for themselves and for 
their children. 
c) Finally, a third set of arguments (and one that is especially 
important for our demonstration) invokes the notion of fairness, 
explaining how capitalism is coherent with a sense of justice, and 
how it contributes to the common good.506 
 
Although there are clearly elements of excitement and liberation offered by 
both sport and neoliberalism, something that Dadot and Laval refer to as the 
pleasure/performance apparatus and which we will return to shortly, for 
present purposes Boltanski and Chiapello specifically identify this third 
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506 Boltanski and Chiapello The New Spirit of Capitalism, Verso, 2005, and Luc Boltanski and Eve 
Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, Int J Polit Cult Soc (2005) 18:161–188, p.164. Emphasis 
added.
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dimension with the spirit of neoliberal capitalism. It is in the context of this third 
set of arguments surrounding the notion of capitalism as invoking a notion of 
fairness coherent with a sense of justice that we begin to appreciate the role 
that the anti-doping apparatus plays in respect of the generalisation of 
competition as a mode of governance.  Although Hayek was clear that the 
logic of competition (at the non-discursive level) is not concerned with justice 
or fairness, the discursive function of anti-doping invokes and promotes the 
rhetoric of its fairness – of competition as liberty and justice. Hayek relies upon 
Locke, and even Rawls, in support of his proposition, that in neoliberalism, 
what needs to be just are the rule of the game, the rules of the competition 
itself, but the outcome, the result, is not just, but as we have said, inherently 
unequal: it is only the way in which competition is carried on, not its results, 
that can be just or unjust.507 Here the role of the law is to ensure the correct 
procedure. 
 
The Law itself provides another manner in which we might comprehend the 
relationship between competition and anti-doping and the manner in which the 
latter reinforces rather than contradicts the former. As is in the case of Anti-
Trust Law, or Competition Law’s anti-monopoly provisions,508 which seek to 
ensure that monopolies do not develop, anti-doping offers both a spectacular 
claim to the law’s role in providing justice and fairness and at the same time an 
individualised band-aid fix to the excesses of pure competition. As Desautels-
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507 Hayek 1976:II, pp.73-74, p.179n16.
508 There is something very telling about the fact that in the USA the protection of the playing field of 
competition is referred to as anti-trust law!
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Stein has written the of the U.S. legal context the: 
 
paradigmatic example of the manner in which government would 
come to constrain competition was the establishment of a federal 
antitrust law in 1890. With this law and the body of jurisprudence it 
would spawn, the state would explicitly work to control the 
competitive marketplace, isolating “good” competition from the 
“bad”.509 
 
In the context of sport, and of global governance, the anti-doping apparatus 
brings into play a hybrid mix of actors, sport, corporate and private 
associations, that seek to explicitly control the competitive environment by 
denominating and isolating good competition from bad competition. This mix 
of actors, that revolves around WADA and the various anti-doping 
organisations, posses an exceptional power, albeit in perfect conformity with 
neoliberal logic, by conferring power to establish the rules of the game on a 
technical body situated above Governments.510 These institutions that exist 
within the global anti-doping apparatus never seek to address the root, 
systemic or structural, conditions of the bad forms of competitive behaviour. It 
is always one step behind the bad in its detection tools, just in the case of 
‘competition’ law; all that it can propose to do is to deal with the 
consequences of competition and not its roots: 
  

509 Desautels-Stein 2012:pp.427-428.
510 Dadot and Laval p.209.
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This point may at first seem too subtle, but there is a striking 
difference between the two kinds of approaches. The first approach, 
which I label “modern liberal,” refrains until the end from any critical 
analysis of those legal rules which are constitutive of the classic 
liberal style, and focuses entirely on the consequences of that style. 
Thus, the modern liberal style confronts symptoms with no worry 
about causes. The second approach, which might be labeled 
“progressive,” is actually concerned with the deeper and more 
fundamental causes of social inequality. This might mean an attack 
on the classic liberal conception of contract and property rights 
themselves. The modern liberal style does not do this, nor does 
antitrust law. Antitrust law, even at its most ambitious, simply 
responds. It never attempts to re-create.511 
 
On Desautels-Stein’s analysis the band-aid nature of anti-doping law is not 
progressive or modern liberal, as it never seeks to deal with the deeper and 
more fundamental causes of what it has sought to problematise. Neither is it 
classical liberal as it operates at the other extreme of the Law-governance 
continuum. 

The smear of jouissance 
 
Why is it then that the fairness the anti-doping apparatus seems to seek is so 
often promoted and accepted as a just cause or war? Is it here that an analysis 
of the production of subjectivity under neoliberalism may be of real assistance? 

511 Desautels-Stein 2012:p.428
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One of the important questions posed by Madra and Özselçuk is ‘what are the 
subjective conditions that cultivate a passionate attachment to the bourgeois 
axiom, ‘to each according to their contribution’.512 Relevantly to our work, what 
they are exploring is an analysis of the subjective investments that produce 
passionate attachments that in turn provide the conditions for the justification 
and maintenance of neoliberal capitalism.513  
 
In Chapter 4 we discussed Møller’s criticism of the use of the paradigm of 
Panopticism in the context of the Whereabouts System. It was noted at that 
point that whilst everybody may not buy fully with their heart and soul into the 
system, at the same time there is an overall increasing acceptance and 
‘improvement’ of the individual and the population brought about by 
Whereabouts. Madra and Özselçuk theorise that there is an ‘implicit 
behaviourism’ in much of the governmentality literature that stems from a ‘too 
quick ontologization of the behaviorist propositions of Chicago neoclassicism’. 
Their point is that: 
 
even though economic rationality may not hold at the level of the 
individual and even though concrete individuals behave in random 
ways, competitive dynamics, functioning like a selection 
mechanism, will make sure that economic rationality gets realized at 
the level of markets.514 
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512 Yahya M. Madra & Ceren Özselçuk (2010): Jouissance and Antagonism in the Forms of the 
Commune: A Critique of Biopolitical Subjectivity, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture 
& Society, 22:3, 481-497, p.481.
513 Ibid.:484.
514 Ibid.:484.
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It is at this point the biopolitical nature of the apparatus of governance 
overcomes the distinctions between control and discipline operating at the 
level of the individual and biopower operating at the level of society. Homo 
Economicus is the: 
 
working assumption of neoliberal governmentality … it is the grid of 
intelligibility … the surface of contact between the individual and the 
power exercised on him … an interface between the individual and 
the government …. What Foucault offers is an analysis of 
‘governmental reason,’ of those types of rationality that are 
implemented in the methods by which human conduct is directed 
through a state administration.515  
 
For Madra and Özselçuk Foucault’s analysis is not a ‘behavioral assumption 
from which neoliberal reason sees and attempts to engineer the world … 
seamlessly realized in actuality …’.516 Hence, they: 
 
approach subjectivity in terms of social fantasies that … enable the 
constitution of a social link (in Althusserian terms, a ‘‘society effect’’ 
or, in psychoanalytic terms, ‘‘social transference’’) in the face of its 
central and constitutive derailment by the smear of jouissance.517 
 
Key to grasping the analysis of Madra and Özselçuk is what they term the 

515 Ibid.:484-5.
516 Ibid.:484-5.
517 Ibid.:487.
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entrepreneurial injunction518 and its relationship to this concept of jouissance. 
This concept is something that encompasses more than its common English 
translation of enjoyment. As Žižek puts it to enjoy, the imperative of jouissance, 
Enjoy! is ‘something we do as a kind of weird and twisted ethical duty’.519 Dean 
has explained this ethical duty to Enjoy! as:  
 
an excessive, intense please-pain, as that “something extra” for the 
sake of which we do what otherwise seems irrational, 
counterproductive, or even wrong … a special kind of agony, one 
that makes us feel more fully alive than anything else.520 
 
I want to revisit this ‘special kind of agony’ shortly, when viewing the cyclist’s 
sense of drive and passion through the lens of Agamben, that is, the sense of 
‘waiting for Christmas every day and it never comes’, as if an aspect of the 
condition was described by the British-Finnish rider, Charlie Wegelius. 
Nevertheless, before moving to consider this directly within the context of 
sport and anti-doping it must be made explicit that the imperative to Enjoy! 
entails more than this pleasure-pain seeking but also includes ‘the extra 
element of pleasure attached to the painful experience of repeatedly missing 
one’s goal’.521  
 
For Žižek in the construction and maintenance of neoliberalism the imperative 
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518 Ibid.:491-492.
519 Slavoj Žižek, How To Read Lacan, Granta Books, London, 2006, p.79.
520 Jodie Dean, Enjoying Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics 2008 Volume 4, Number 1: 47-72, p.51
521 Ibid.
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to Enjoy! performs a specific ideological function. If we follow Žižek and take 
ideology as something more than a discursive formation that covers over a 
fundamental incompleteness or impossibility, ideology also includes an ‘extra, 
irrational nugget of enjoyment that attaches the subject to a formation’.522 Here, 
in the construction and maintenance of the Real523 of neoliberalism, ideology 
takes hold of the subject by promising to provide the subject with enjoyment. 
In the society of competition this enjoyment, or the hope of it, is manifested by 
the figure of the entrepreneur of the self, one who is able to compete in the 
great entrepreneurial adventure on the ideological fantasy of life’s level playing 
field. The attachment to being a player in this game becomes the attachment 
to the fantasy, and all consuming twisted and weird ethical duty of competition 
on the supposed level playing field of life. 
 
In the construction of this ethical duty of competition the law and the apparatus 
of governance perform a role of delimiting the good from the bad. For the 
lawyer, or the moralist, we are back in the realms of isolating ‘good’ from the 
‘bad’. It is here we begin to move back into the realm of, for example 
‘competition law’, or for that matter and more specifically for our enquiry, the 
law and apparatus of anti-doping. Lacan theorises jouissance in relation to 
law524, ‘the taming of perverse jouissance’.525 Law and governance institute the 
regulation of ‘an infinite movement of desire within a delimited frame’.526 The 
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522 Ibid.: 51-52.
523 Ibid.:52 citing Žižek.
524 Ibid.:490.
525 Lacan, J. 1992. The Seminar. Book VII: The ethics of psychoanalysis. Trans. D. Porter.
New York: W. W. Norton, p.4.
526 Yahya M. Madra & Ceren Özselçuk (2010), p.491.
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essence of the law here is to ‘divide up, distribute, or reattribute everything that 
counts as jouissance’.527 The morality of the law ‘affirms itself in opposition to 
pleasure’528 such that: 
 
in the subject’s unstable relation to a law that demands the subject 
to enjoy, but not to do so excessively … this transgressive 
superegoic injunction to enjoy, which underlies the prohibitive and 
regulative role of public law, is what really makes the subject ‘‘stick’’ 
to the law.529 
 
In the construction and maintenance of the society of competition both the law 
and apparatus of governance perform a dual role, roles that may at first glance 
to the liberal or libertarian appear contradictory, but which are actually 
complementary. They are complementary roles in the sense that the injunction 
to compete must also be complemented by an ideological explanation of 
certain excesses of competition as transgressive immoral moments.  
 
At one point in his work, The Doping Devil530, Møller seems to be suggesting 
that the essence of sport is the result and its existential significance is the 
performance, making a spectacle, the process of active creations, not 
something that is just created. Active creations, and performance on one level 
points us towards Foucault's aesthetics, but we are also led to this condition of 

527 Ibid.:490.
528 Lacan, J. 1992, p.20.
529 Yahya M. Madra & Ceren Özselçuk (2010), p.490. Emphasis added
530 Møller, Verner, 2010. pp.103-110.
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ecstatic excess. Møller’s consideration of Bataille puts on the table the place of 
the anti-doping apparatus in taming the excess that is inherent in Bataille’s 
notion of sovereignty. Even in the festival or sport, where excess is a factor and 
permitted, excessive moments are constrained if they might threaten 
(economically) productive activity.531 From this perspective we might say that 
the apparatus seeks to capture the performance and its excess but only its 
utility, which are its measurable or functional forms. Here the mission 
impossible of both competition and anti-doping – the actual construction of a 
fair and level playing field beyond that of an ideological fantasy of the Real; 
reveal themselves. The law and the apparatus of governance seek ‘to 
administer and domesticate jouissance, [but] these efforts inevitably fail since it 
is impossible to balance out, apportion, or stitch together jouissance’ which 
itself is ‘ambiguous, excessive, and unstable’. It is thus important ‘not to fall 
into a form of reproductionism where jouissance glues all the cultural, political, 
and economic processes snugly together in an everlasting ‘‘institutional 
equilibrium’’’.532 Are we here on the cusp of understanding what the anti-doping 
apparatus seeks to achieve the impossible balancing out of the imperative to 
Enjoy!533 – Is it this and not immoral greed that is the reason, the testers and the 
apparatus is always one step behind the dopers? 
 
The injunction to become the entrepreneur of the self, on the level playing field 
of life, is itself sustained by the false promise that all can in fact achieve full 

531 Verner Møller, The Doping Devil at 103-105.
532 Yahya M. Madra & Ceren Özselçuk (2010), p 490.
533 Ibid.:489.
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enjoyment ‘the mythical figure of the Entrepreneur fills in the empty place’ of 
this false promise, such that ‘the Entrepreneur is a fiction with material effects’. 
In the act of measuring oneself against the fantasy of the Entrepreneur, of 
‘continuously strives toward attaining it’ one always comes up short.534  
 
The figure of the athlete (lets call him Lance) can thus be conceived as those 
that can ‘enjoy (and deserve this enjoyment) on our behalf’. In this manner the 
athlete on one level at least relieves ‘us of our duty to measure up to the 
idealized figure of the Entrepreneur’. For Madra and Özselçuk535 this relief (or 
interpassivity?) assists us in making sense ‘of the resilience with which social 
subjects remain committed to capitalism’.536  
 
Applying their approach to our problem, and to paraphrase a remark towards 
the end of their article, perhaps a realistic and sober explanation for the 
attraction and investment people place in the anti-doping apparatus is that of 
the backlash against the ‘greed’ of the doper is ‘an attempt to isolate it as the 
symptom that blocks the fulfillment of the fantasy of a truly fair, efficient, and 
scientific capitalism’. Approached this way, the shift to near universal support 
for the Just War on doping, it necessity and its truth, is based upon a 
deference to ‘the privileged expert subjects’ of that apparatus ‘who are 
supposed to know how to remedy and regulate the failures and excesses of 
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534 Ibid.:491-492.
535 Ibid.:493.
536 Ibid.:493.
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competitive markets’.537  
 
The Pleasure/Performance apparatus 
 
Before moving to consider the athlete as an expert of the society of 
competition and in order to develop the idea of the injunction to Enjoy! It is 
useful to consider the manner in which the new panoptic moment combines 
both surveillance, especially in the form of forms of management and 
accounting, with the striving for pleasure and enjoyment. In describing 
neoliberalism as a new subjective norm, Dadot and Laval note that what they 
term the neo-subject in the process of being formed ‘is a correlate of an 
apparatus of performance and pleasure’.538 Here techniques of the self and 
techniques of choice merge completely. The correlate of the irresponsibility of 
a world that has become ungovernable by dint of its global character is the 
infinite responsibility of the individual for his own fate, for his capacity to 
succeed and be happy. 539 
 
Not being weighed down by the past, cultivating positive 
expectations, having effective relations with others: the neoliberal 
management of oneself consists in manufacturing a high 
performance ego, which always demands more of the self, and his 
self-esteem paradoxically grows with its dissatisfaction at past 
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537 Ibid.:493.
538 Dadot and Laval p.255.
539 Ibid.:274.
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performance.540 
 
Dadot and Laval’s argument is that we cannot understand the scale of the 
deployment of neoliberal rationality if it is regarded in the way that Møller 
attempted to distinguish the Panopticon by characterising it as (or only) the 
imposition of a mechanical force on society and individuals who are its external 
points of application. The neoliberal subject is undoubtedly one of competition 
and performance being made to succeed and to win. All of life becomes an 
exercise in which all are encouraged to compare themselves with the socially 
requisite norm of performance.541 Performance is measured at every turn, 
whether in calculating our progress and improvement or as we have seen our 
deviation or deviance. Sport: 
 
has become a ubiquitous principle of action and competition model 
of social relations. Coaching is simultaneously an index and a means 
of the constant analogy between sport, sex and work. More so, 
perhaps then economic discourse on competitiveness, this model 
has made it possible to naturalise a duty of performance, which is 
diffused to the masses normal activity centred on generalised 
competition. In this apparatus, the enterprise readily identifies with 
winners…542 
 
Sport is the terrain, or better the method or model of governance in which all 
are ‘requested to produce evermore and enjoy evermore’. Sport is in this way 
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540 Ibid.:274.
541 Ibid.:281.
542 Ibid.:281.
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‘directly connected to the surplus enjoyment that has become systematic. Life 
itself, in all its aspects, becomes the object of apparatuses of performance and 
pleasure … Managerial discourse makes performance a duty and advertising 
discourse makes pleasure and imperative … subjects are enjoined to surpass 
themselves, to push back the limits. …’.543 The striving to Enjoy! constitutes 
from this perspective an ‘extraction of surplus – pleasure from oneself’ or ‘an 
excess of self over self, or boundless self transcendence’ and it is this factor 
that makes the individual and the enterprise in the society of competition 
function.544   
 
There is no end, no final, ‘stable condition of self possession, but a beyond the 
self that is always receding, which is constitutionally aligned in its very regime 
of the logic of enterprise and, over and above that, with the cosmos of the 
world market’. 545 The lack of any stable condition within neoliberalism is neatly 
crystalised in the ‘Journey to Better’ marketing campaign for the Srixon golf 
ball546 where the Northern Irish professional golfer, Graeme McDowell recounts 
that ‘[t]here’s never really a ‘good enough’ in golf. There’s always 
better… We’re always on the journey to better. … That's the thing about better. 
You can't own it. You can only pursue it. Stalk it. But once you've tasted it, 
better is never truly beyond your reach.’547  
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543 Dadot and Laval p.284. They continue: “We are the champions – such is the hymn of the new 
entrepreneurial subject. From the song's lyrics, which in their way heralded the new subjective course, 
the following warning in particular must be retained: no time for losers. What is new is precisely that the 
loser is the ordinary man, the one who in essence losers”.
544 Ibid.:284.
545 Ibid.:284.
546 The Journey to Better http://srixon.com/thejourney/ Accessed 21 November 2014.
547 The Journey To Better - Graeme McDowell (Extended Version) Srixon TVUSA,
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The body in the society of competition is now the product of choice, style, self-
fashioning.548 All of us must work towards a situation where we are able to 
always (try to) surpass our capacity, our performance and pleasure. This ‘same 
discourse equalises everyone in the face of these new obligations: no handicap 
of birth or environment represents an insurmountable obstacle to personal 
involvement in the general apparatus’. 549 Hence, we have sport for all, and 
institutions such as the Paralympics, but crucially we have the athlete as the 
expert of the society of competition, the athlete as the one who can teach us 
how to perform and to Enjoy!. Fairplay becomes an iron discourse in a velvet 
vocabulary. 550 

The athlete - an expert of the society of competition 
 
We have already seen the role that the privileged expert subjects, for example 
in the Biological Passport, play in the justification an fulfillment of the 
ideological fantasy of the society of competition and the effect the effect that 
such expert knowledge has in mutating traditional concepts of Law and Legal 
evidence. Furthermore, the athletes themselves are employed in both the 
service of generalised ambassadors of competition and as ambassadors of its 
inherent purity, naturalness and goodness. The athlete performs (with pleasure 
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CoVE-UN9G4 Accessed 21 November 2014.
548 Dadot and Laval p.295.
549 Ibid.:295.
550 Ibid.:295.
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and privilege) in a ‘great social theatre’ lending the rest of us a vocabulary. It is 
within this realm that we both are relieved of the failures of our inability to 
achieve the fantasy - to live the dream; but at the same time we are continually 
driven to strive to achieve it. The athlete as societal ‘role model’ encompasses 
this inherent contradiction of the society of competition.  
 
On one level the athlete embodies the fantasy of the entrepreneur of the self, 
they are at the same time, given the relief they provide us through their 
expertise, privileged subjects, and in so being, they are measured against a 
idealised norm imposed by the law and the anti-doping apparatus, which itself 
is informed by the fantasy and promise offered by neoliberalism. The privileged 
expert that lives the athletic dream is one of ‘pure performance’ and is an 
entrepreneur of the self, ‘100% me’!551 The clean athlete is heralded as being 
honourable, ethical, sincere, having pledged ‘to do their best using only natural 
talent and hard effort, never using performance enhancing drugs or knowingly 
bringing the sport into disrepute’552. It is not only in the level playing field, but 
also the scientist or the athlete, that is the privileged expert, in whom we place 
our trust in order to found and sustain our commitment to and hope in the 
society of competition. 
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551 Pure performance is the motto, or better mission statement of ASADA, whilst 100% me is that of UK 
Anti-Doping.
552 Bike Pure Rider Honour Code http://bikepure.org/resources/.
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ASADA is a Government statutory authority that has as its stated purpose 
protecting sporting integrity through the elimination of doping and as its vision 
to be Australia’s driving force for pure performance in sport. Former Australian 
Minister for Sport, Mark Arbib stated in launching ASADA’s web based 
educational program that ‘Pure Performance is a world-leading anti-doping 
program that will give our athletes the confidence to proudly compete drug-
free on the world stage’.553 ASADA’s website proudly announces the Pure 
Performance program as a solution for developing ‘a level playing field in 
sport’.
 
Bike Pure is the name of ‘an independent not for profit organization’ which 
promotes honest ethical cycle sport. Bike Pure is ‘strongly opposed to doping 
and stand together in a united position to begin a new era for cycle sport’. It is 
an ‘independent voice for honest, ethical cycling on a global scale, sending a 
powerful message that you don’t have to resort to taking illegal performance 
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553 Senator The Hon Mark Arbib, Assistant Treasurer, Minister For Small Business, Minister For Sport, 
Media Release, 16 February 2012 Most Comprehensive Anti-Doping Program For Australian Olympic 
And Paralympic Athletes.
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enhancing drugs to compete in cycle sport’. It was conceived ‘out of the 
doping scandals that tarnished the 2008 Tour de France’ and with the 
‘profound message of promoting honesty and integrity in sport’. Their web site 
sets out their ‘philosophy’ at length: 
 
The continuous aim of Bike Pure is to help develop and sustain a 
future generation of sincere role models who young athletes can 
aspire to. Our aim is also to help to educate young athletes that they 
can compete and be successful in sport without having to resort to 
cheating against their opponents. ... Bike Pure feel that correct 
guidance given to the next generation of riders will have a 
foundational effect in the decisions athletes make if they are ever 
faced with a decision to dope. .....  We encourage athletes and 
teams to adhere to our ‘Honour Code’, declaring that they are 
opposed to doping in sport. Bike Pure are lobbying for stiffer 
penalties for doping offenders – 4 year ban minimum and life bans 
for repeat offenders. It is through the actions and support of our 
members that we can apply pressure on authorities for these 
measures to be implicated. 
We are not naive to think this is a complete solution, but it is an 
important first element in getting the riders who are opposed to 
doping to join forces with the supporters and lay a foundation to 
protect the mental and physical health of future champions and the 
integrity of our wonderful sport. 
Bike Pure’s Athlete Honour Code: 
•       I pledge to respect and adhere to the rules of my sport. 
•       I pledge to compete to the best of my own natural ability. 
•       I pledge to commit to compete without using banned 
substances. 
•       I pledge to respect my fellow competitors. 
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•       I pledge that as an ethical Bike Pure role model I will adhere to 
clean, honest, ethical sport and not knowingly bring my sport into 
disrepute.554 
 
The UK Anti-Doping Agency is ‘a Non-Departmental Public Body which is 
accountable to Parliament through the [UK] Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport’ and acts as ‘the principal advisor to government on drug-free sport, UK 
Anti-Doping is responsible for protecting sport from the threat of doping in the 
UK’.555  Its website states that: 
 
Substances and methods are banned for a reason. Doping, the use 
of artificial enhancements to gain an advantage over others in 
competition, is cheating and is fundamentally contrary to the spirit of 
sport. Further, doping robs true athletes who play by the rules of 
their right to competition that is safe and fair. 
Doping affects not just top athletes, but also future generations who 
may be influenced by what top athletes do. Only by taking a 
concerted and comprehensive approach to the fight against doping 
in sport is it possible to protect the integrity of sport, the health of 
athletes, and young aspiring sports people worldwide.556 
 
UK Anti-Doping’s principal education program, which promotes a number of 
ambassadors is entitled ‘100% me’: 
100% me: Pure Sport, True Talent 
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554 Bike Pure Rider Honour Code http://bikepure.org/resources/. Accessed 2 November 2013.
555 UK Anti-Doping What We Do http://www.ukad.org.uk/what-we-do/ Accessed 21 November 2014.
556 Ibid.
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100% me is about being a true athlete. It's about being able to say 
my performance is 100% me. There is no secret to my success - 
just hard work, determination and talent.  
From plimsolls to podium 
100% me is here to help you throughout your sporting journey. 
100% me supports, informs and educates athletes throughout their 
careers by providing anti-doping advice and guidance. It is your 
guide to ensure you can ‘be clean and stay clean’. 
100% me ambassdors 
Many of the UK's top athletes support 100% me and champion 
doping-free sport.  .... 
Values of 100% me 
As an athlete you will no doubt also embrace the values of 100% 
me. The 100% me campaign is about being successful, confident 
and retaining the values of clean, fair competition. 100% me 
embodies and celebrates five key values: 
 Hard work 
 Determination 
 Passion 
 Respect 
 Integrity 
… 100% me is here to help you throughout your sporting journey. 
100% me supports, informs and educates athletes throughout their 
careers by providing anti-doping advice and guidance. It is your 
guide to ensure you can ‘be clean and stay clean’.557 
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557 What is 100% Me? http://www.ukad.org.uk/athletes/100percentme Accessed 21 November 2014.
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The logic and the values expounded by these organisations is itself inherently 
biopolitical in their nature – they are concerned with the administration and 
management of life itself. It is a politics that has taken life as its object. 
Furthermore, the values and characteristics it seeks to promote are those of 
the ‘good’, valuable and productive member of the society of competition, hard 
work, dedication, purity, passion and resilience.  Mark Neocleous has 
commented on the rise of resilience during neo-liberalism’s development as a 
significant political category that has:  
 
expanded to straddle the private as well as the public, the personal 
as well as the political, the subjective as well as the objective, and 
so organisational resilience is connected to personal resilience in 
such a way that contemporary citizenship now has to be thought 
through ‘the power of resilience’.  … The anxious citizen is 
acknowledged as the resilient citizen and championed.  …. the 
relationship between the economic development of neoliberal 
subjectivity and the political development of resilient citizenship.558 
 
With reference to the observations of Marx and capitalism’s objective roots in 
uncertainty, instability, restlessness, agitation and change, he notes that: 
… capital thrives on anxiety. The neoliberal intensification of this 
process … has been compounded by this articulation of resilience 
as something personal as well as systemic. Resilience is thus 
presented as a key way of subjectively working through the 
uncertainty and instability of contemporary capital. The neoliberal 
subject can ‘achieve balance’ … can ‘overcome life’s hurdles’ … 

558 Mark Neocleous, Anxious Resilience, Mute, 18 August 2011. Accessed 21 November 2014.
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and just ‘bounce back from whatever life throws at us’ … The 
policing of the resilient citizen coincides with the socio-economic 
fabrication of resilient yet flexible labour. Neoliberal citizenship is 
nothing if not a training in resilience. … anxiety and resilience are 
now core to the jargon of neoliberal authenticity … the jargon of 
neoliberal authenticity is the jargon of neoliberal authoritarianism. 
This is police power at its most profound, shaping subjectivity and 
fabricating order  … coaching us in our resilience. And it is a police 
power par excellence in closing down alternate possibilities: we can 
be anxious about what might happen, but our response must be 
resilience training, not political struggle. We can be collectively 
anxious and structurally resilient, but not mobilised politically. 559  
 
That the athletic expert is a counsellor of resilience is evident from the 
laudatory euphoria evident throughout the media in the wake of Cadel Evans’ 
2010 Tour de France victory. This can be illustrated by reference to a couple of 
blog pieces written at that time, one on ‘better parenting’ and another on 
‘personal bests’. The first speaks of a ‘story that’s come along at precisely the 
right time’.560 Evans is contrasted to our politicians who do not inspire us, who 
are not good role models and who are not trusted by the public. In contrast:  
 
‘along came Cadel Evans, and his winning ride. Finally, there is 
someone worthy of emulation by our kids. He showed all the 
qualities of grit, determination and mental toughness that most 
parents I meet would love their kids to develop.  
 

559 Mark Neocleous, 2011. Emphasis added.
560 Michael Grose, Parenting Ideas, 2010 http://www.parentingideas.com.au/Blog/July-2011/Cadel-
Evans-is-one-tough-hombre,-and-one-great-rol Accessed 21 November 2014.
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Evans is someone who has:  
 
worked long and hard to master his craft. …. He didn’t let 
disappointment deter him. … he didn’t let set-backs and bad luck 
derail him. Learning from these past experiences, and taking lessons 
in preparation from past winners, he came back stronger and more 
determined than ever to make this race his own. … Evans’ feat was 
a shining story of resilience. His ability to hang in both physically and 
mentally when times were tough was astounding.561 
 
Along with his resilience Evans is an example to us all that we are all winners. 
We are all winners because we can always strive to achieve our own personal 
bests (this is why triatholon is the neoliberal sport par excellence): 
 
PB - a term most often associated with sport - describes an 
achievement that surpasses anything an individual has ever 
achieved before. When athletes achieve a PB they are elated. A PB 
taps into one of our most basic human needs - the need for 
accomplishment. A PB is a measure of our performance and also 
represents the realisation of our fundamental human need 
to improve.  … Sport teaches us that being your best is not only 
about skill and talent, but also requires tapping into the vast pool of 
psychological resources available to us. … By way of example, look 
no further back than those three sleep-deprived weeks in July, when 
Australia witnessed one of our greatest-ever sporting moments – 
Cadel Evans winning the Tour de France. The Tour, 3,000km of 
relentless physical and mental endurance, is the most gruelling 

561 Michael Grose, Parenting Ideas, 2010 http://www.parentingideas.com.au/Blog/July-2011/Cadel-
Evans-is-one-tough-hombre,-and-one-great-rol Accessed 21 November 2014.
336
sporting event in the world today. … What does it take to win the 
Tour? Well, apart from the obvious physical capabilities, including 
skill, fitness and stamina, there’s grit, determination, courage, 
persistence, focus, desire, resilience ... the list goes on, and Cadel 
has them all. … But here’s the thing – we may not all be elite bike 
riders (or musicians or scholars or leaders), but every single one of 
us, no matter what our level of skill, talent or circumstances, can be 
better. We all have the capacity to develop these psychological traits 
that give us the edge and help us realise our full potential.562 
 
At its core unlike the liberalism of modernity living in neoliberalism is not about 
specialisation but inspirational and passionate performance, improvement, 
adaptability, multitasking, versatility and resilience. The object is for man to 
change himself in an ‘economy in constant motion adaption … [is] always a 
current task’.563 The intensification of work on the self, brought about by Citius 
Altius Fortius, depends upon a system of incentives and sanctions that give 
rise to controlled autonomy and flexible constraint. The subject, like the athletic 
expert, is one of self-control, always aiming to internalise constraints and the 
new norms of productive efficiency and individual performance brought about 
by generalised competition. The position of the athlete shows us that there has 
not been a reduction of hierarchical controls, but only ‘their gradual alteration 
in the context of a new management that has been able to rely on modes of 
organisation, new accounting, recording and communication technologies, and 
so on’.564 The athlete as expert ‘is reactive, more flexible, more innovative, 
technically more effective, more specialist, less subject to statutory rules’ and 

562 Ibid.
563 Dadot and Laval pp.64-65.
564 Dadot and Laval pp.177-178.
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at the same time subject to an intensification of a global governmental 
apparatus based upon their consent to take part in the performance/pleasure 
apparatus.565 This consent is brought about not so much by Sovereign 
command but by a multiplication of contractual relations that stand beyond the 
State. The athlete is both technical and tactical and like ‘enterprise man are 
economic agents who only respond to the logic of their own self interest’. 566 
The logic of individual calculation is reflected throughout the anti-doping 
apparatus as it is throughout the society of competition of which the athlete is 
the expert and ambassador. The athlete is the archetype of hypermodern, 
uncertain, flexible, precarious, fluid and weightless man today.567 Through his 
compulsory involvement brought about by ‘choice’ and ‘consent’ in the anti-
doping apparatus and his internalised flexible constraint, he is able to seize the 
opportunity to freely fashion his life whilst at the same time eroding everything 
that his stable in his personality. No longer does work provide a stable 
framework, predictable career, and a set of robust personal relations. What the 
athlete as expert normalises is the need to consider nothing but immediately 
utilisable competences. This explains both the need to constantly change and 
to discard as obsolete the past (‘[y]ou've always got to prove yourself; it is 
necessary to start all over again’) as much as it does the rapid obsolescence 
and eviction of those unhealthy, unsuitable or culturally unfit (dopers) for the 
society of competition.568  
 

565 Ibid.:230-231.
566 Ibid.:230-231.
567 Ibid.:255.
568 Ibid.:289.
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In a world where competition is the main lever for enhancing responsibility the 
athlete as expert provides everyone with the model upon which they must 
constantly measure and prove themselves in order to merit the conditions of 
their own existence. ‘Life is perpetual risk management, requiring strict 
abstention from dangerous practices, constant self-control, and a regulation of 
one's own behaviour that blends asceticism and flexibility’.569 The athlete is the 
perfect embodiment of the value of the society of competition they: 
 
have no hesitation in selling themselves to the highest bidder 
without any considerations of loyalty and fidelity. Furthermore, 
maintenance of one's body, self-improvement, the search a 
powerful sensations, fascination with extremes, the taste for active 
leisure, and the idealised overcoming of limits indicate that sporting 
model is not reducible to the entertaining spectacle of the powerful 
devouring one another.570 
 
The athlete is held up as an example of the possibility of living the dream and 
of making it on the global playing field of life. In this fantasy world of 
generalised competition, it is not greed, but factors such as self control, hard 
work, dedication and integrity, and resilience, that have allowed them to not 
come up short. We may not all be able to achieve their privileged status, their 
success in the global sporting spectatcle, but we can learn from their attitude 
and their ethic, the manner in which they have thrown themselves at the mercy 
of comeptition. In the society of competition we can all be winners and achieve 

569 Ibid.:166-167.
570 Ibid. p 282.
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our PB. We mere mortals are told to learn from the athletic expert and to: Just 
do it! 

340
Excursus: Competition, Jouissance and the non language of 
sport 
 
Cycling, Benjo Maso has suggested, can only be written,571 it can never be 
seen in its completeness, and, possibly it cannot ever be said. Even in the 
times of complete television coverage there is an impossibility of bearing 
witness to the whole event (is this why there is always a loathing the television 
commentator for their misstatements and mistakes?). In Maso’s statement, 
and his rationale for the invention of heroic sports journalism,572 there might be 
another suggestion of what is at play in sport, in anti-doping and its relation to 
the state of exception and Agamben’s figure of homo sacer - the unspeakable, 
unsayable zone of indistinction between the animal and the human and 
between the exception and the norm. 
 
In discussing the need for sovereignty to politicise bare life, Agamben briefly 
turns to a passage from Aristotle’s Politics, which situates the proper place of 
the polis in the transition from voice to language. In doing so Agamben equates 
this link to the link between bare life and politics.573 Throughout his work on the 
state of exception, which comes to fruition, but not an end, in his trilogy that 
examines this field, the in/ability to speak plays an important part in capturing 
what is at play within this zone of indistinction. The inability of bare life to 

571 Maso, B., 2005, The Sweat of the Gods, Mousehold Press, p.14, p.20.
572 Ibid.
573 Agamben, G. (1998), p.7.
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speak and the ability of political life to speak are the two poles between which 
the idea of humanity oscillate. In our reading of these texts, this is also the first 
point at which we can start to draw some analogy or an approximation 
between Agamben’s subject of homo sacer and the subject of sport and the 
position of the athlete. Is it that sport is prior to language, or it is itself unable to 
be directly spoken through language. 
  
The Greek word, ἄφατος, (afasia) carried with it the meaning of something not 
uttered, nameless, untold, unutterable, ineffable. It was something 
extraordinary – in the sense of there not been a way to say how something is 
done.574 Denis Hauw has commented on the athlete’s condition of alexithymia 
(from the Ancient Greek words λέξις (lexis, "diction", "word") and 
θυμός  (thumos, "soul, as the seat of emotion, feeling, and thought") —literally 
‘without words for emotions’—is a term coined by psychotherapist Peter 
Sifneos in 1973 to describe a state of deficiency in understanding, processing, 
or describing emotions.575 Hauw et al have considered this condition in the 
context of a review of anti-doping research conducted during the first decade 
of the twenty first century.576 One research priority pursued by some in this area 
has been based around ideas of addiction and sensation seeking. That is the 
addiction or dependence arising amongst some athletes to intense emotional 
experiences and the subsequent post-athletic feelings of emptiness. It is in a 

574 Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon,1889, available at 
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/Reference/MiddleLiddell.html. Accessed 21 November 2014. 
575 Alexithymia Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexithymia. Accessed 21 November 2014.
576 Bilard J, Ninot G, Hauw D., Motives for illicit use of doping substances among athletes calling a 
national antidoping phone-help service: an exploratory study, Subst Use Misuse. 2011;46(4):359-67. 
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context related to this that Hauw has raised the condition of alexithymia. 
 
These two terms, afasia and alexithymia, are both related to an inability to 
speak or express emotions through speaking. It might even be trite to say that 
in sport it is the body that communicates, but, more than that, what it 
communicates is an intensity, an emotion, and thus, something prior to 
language. How many times do we hear that such and such a sportsperson is in 
fact an animal or is animal-like? The Swiss cyclist, Fabian Cancellara rides like 
an animal, Barthes has his heroes of Greek myth, or as Carlos Arribas has said 
the performance of the climber is a matter for the Gods.577 It is here that this 
fundamental categorical pair of politics of Agamben’s – that of bare life and 
political existence; comes into play in the realm of sport. There is politics – that 
is something other than an animal; because man separates himself from the 
animal, opposes himself to his own bare life through language. Is what is it that 
is at play here, both in sport and within the apparatus of anti-doping, in this 
oscillation between animal and human?  
 
How many times are we unable to express in words the feeling or emotion we 
encounter doing or even observing sport? Firstly, what is it that cannot be 
expressed? Does Agamben, again, give us a clue in Remnant’s of Auschwitz578, 
in his discussion of the idea of festus (the festival or celebration). In discussing 
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577 Carlos Arribas The Giro and the Dolomites, 
http://newcyclingpathways.blogspot.com.au/2009/05/giro-and-dolomites-more-on-myth-and.html.
Accessed 21 November 2014.
578 Agamben, G. (1999) Remnants of Auschwitz, The Witness and the Archive, Zone Books.: pp.125-
128.
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the writing of Kimura Bin he identifies three stages of the idea of the festival 
applied to a psychology of the subject. These are post festum, ante festum and 
intra festum.  
 
The concept of Post Festum – the ‘I was’; represents an irreparable past, a 
melancholic state which comes with the arrival of things already done. This 
melancholic state might be equated with the athlete’s feeling post-event. It 
may also be able to be equated with the living death that the athlete 
encounters post-career, whether that career has ended ‘normally’ by way of 
retirement or has been enforced by way of the ban.  
 
Ante Festum involves a state where this direction of the melancholic’s 
orientation to the past is inverted. The ‘I’ here is never a certain possession but 
it is always something to be attained, a potentiality or possibility of being 
oneself in the act of the performance of the event; ‘the essential problem here 
is the problem of one’s own possibility of being oneself, the problem of the 
certainty of becoming oneself, and, therefore, the risk of being alienated from 
oneself’. Here, rather than a melancholic past, one gives primacy to the future 
in the form of projection and anticipation. But this future always risks itself and 
risks not being present at the point of its own celebration. Is it like the state of 
unattainable enjoyment bound up with the concept of joiussance? The waiting 
for a Christmas every day that never comes of Wegelius.579 

579 Charlie Wegelius in Timm Kolln, The Peloton: Portrait of a Generation, Rouleur Limited, 2010.
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Agamben states that Intra Festum one might expect is the point where human 
beings finally gain access to self-presence, but that this is not so, and in 
explaining this he refers to two examples given by Bin that are not celebratory. 
The first is the obsessive neurosis, the condition whereby one attempts to 
document their own presence at a celebration that constantly eludes them. 
This condition suggests the obsessive athlete who never quite achieves it 
despite the (overly) meticulous calculation, management and administration of 
both their ante and intra festum states. Despite their obsession with achieving 
their ‘true’ selves, despite this meticulous planning, they never quite make it – 
the condition of Cadel Evans until he made it to the top of the podium in the 
2011 Tour De France, and where he found himself again after that victory? 
 
The second example proposed by Bin is that of epilepsy, which is a particular 
form of self-loss achieved through a kind of ecstatic excess over presence. 
Agamben asks: why does the epileptic lose consciousness?; and answers: 
because that is the point in which the ‘I’ is about to adhere itself in the 
supreme moment of celebration, the epileptic crisis confirms consciousness’ 
incapacity to tolerate presence, to participate in its own celebration. 
 
Is what communicates to us in sport this ecstatic excess of the celebration? Is 
this unspeakable, unsayable zone of sport and athletic celebration somehow 
related to this supreme moment of celebration where the ‘I’ is able to elude the 
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demand to ‘Wake Up!’? and for a moment only achieves the imperative of 
Enjoy! In Agamben’s consideration of Bin and the festum, there is a reference 
to Dostoevsky:  
 
There are instants that last no longer than five or six seconds, in 
which all of a sudden you hear the presence of eternal harmony, in 
which you have reached it. It is not earthly. But I do not want to say 
that it is heavenly either; only that an earthly man is incapable of 
tolerating it. He must either be physically transformed or die. 
 
One professional cyclist interviewed described the sensations they enjoyed in 
their work as follows: 
  
A: It’s like I enjoy doing my job, that’s why I do it, I enjoy the day to 
day things of it, I enjoy riding the bike in the fresh air, and I enjoy 
periodising, and a big sensation is putting your body … like when 
you’ve just gone out, and just got it dialed, and you just get it 
tweaked, that fine tuning.  That’s what I get a lot of satisfaction out 
of. That’s like mastering your trade you know. Or I get back on my 
mountain bike and I haven’t touched it for six or either months and 
it’s perfect, it’s just how I know it.  I grew up riding, I feel I have 
complete competence at how to control my bike, get down a hill or 
doing a skill you know, that’s what I really like. 
Q: I don’t want to get all, you’re probably as much a hippie as I am 
…, I don’t want to get all mystical on you, but is it sort of like that 
feeling when it’s all dialed, it’s all happening, and you put your body 
on the line, and you’re away in a break, or something’s going to 
happen, whatever it is, is it sort of like an out of body experience? 
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A: Oh absolutely it is. When your form is that good, and probably the 
best seasons I’ve had, and this is why this season has been so 
frustrating for me, I’ve sucked basically all year. Maybe, in every 
other year I’ve had a point, I’ve had a day or two days, or 10 or 12 of 
them, where it’s like perfect you know, you don’t feel anything, 
there’s no pain, you’re in complete control, you are out of body 
pretty much.  I’ve even for example, now you guys are going to think 
I’m crazy, but I go and see a yoga instructor. … I mean I don’t do 
any stretching or anything like that, it’s the breathing stuff, and a lot 
of visualisation stuff, and they basically teach you, and this is how 
those yogi’s and people like that, when they meditate, it’s that out of 
body experience pretty much and that’s when you’re most content, 
you’re just happy with the moment, you know, and when you’re 
doing that and you’ve perfected your skill, your trade, because 
you’ve practiced at it, and you’ve worked over and over, and just to 
get it there, and it all lines up, but you use those principals of just 
being in that moment as they call it. 
Q: Well what you’re presenting is again a really positive image of 
what cycling is or could be. 
A: If I can make a living doing that I’m a happy bloke.  If I can live a 
good lifestyle and have that experience, I’m content you know.  
Does that make sense?  Is that off track to what you...? 
Q: No look, when you were saying that, I remember once chasing 
down a break in the Top End Tour, when I used to race, and I 
remember that feeling of no pain, you just sort of, it’s just like pure 
joy and I thought fuck, I’m in 54/13 here, and I’m just churning up 
the Stuart Highway, chasing these guys down and was just going 
you know, I wasn’t doing anything, I was turning those pedals and I 
was thinking fuck. 
A: The experience, I mean I don’t want to sound like I’ve got an ego 
or something but the one I refer it to, I was junior world champion ...  
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For an hour 20 I was just in bliss, I spent 12 months preparing for 
the event.  Two hours after I was vomiting and shitting and couldn’t 
eat for six hours, and I was in, you know while I’m in the doping 
control, but for an hour 20 I ran at 190 heart rate average and maxed 
at over 200 and did not feel a thing. I was world champion at it. 
That’s the ultimate you know?  That’s mastered, I had it dialed for an 
hour 20 in 12 months and that’s all that mattered. 
Q: You said to me in the email, is this all about your thesis or 
something else?  This is sort of heading towards the stuff I want to 
do in my thesis but there’s something....580 
 
To be in this zone, to be dialed in and to achieve this ecstatic excess of 
celebration, the pleasure and pain of joiussance is the ultimate athletic 
experience. The athletic champion is the world champion of pleasure and pain, 
the champion of the performance/pleasure apparatus. 
 
Is there something at play in the depths of the apparatus of anti-doping which 
seeks to humanise this figure of bare life? To create a human out of an animal, 
or at least to capture and control this animal element in the wider process of 
governmentality? This thing, this condition that alludes the call to ‘Wake Up!, 
the momentary achievement of the imperative to Enjoy! is it too a part of the 
system of administration and management of life for the ends of a global 
economy, is it this that is at stake in the sovereign conception of anti-doping? 
And if so, is there, another way for us to rationalise anti-doping apart from this?  
Is the husk, the shell of competition which the liberal analysis tells us is the true 
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580 Hardie, Shilbury, Bozzi and Ware 2010 unpublished interview.
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spirit, the true essence of sport, simply a blanket with which this is covered 
over and captured. And is this shell or blanket the same one, or at least 
analogous to the shell that clothes Law as justice? Or for that matter the 
ideological fantasy of the entrepreneur in neoliberalism? 

 
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Chapter Six – Conclusion. 
 
Functionality – Exception - Spectacle 
 
One of the principal things that we have tried to describe throughout this work 
is that the law of the anti-doping apparatus represents something different 
from simply doing something that we once knew as the Law. The anti-doping 
apparatus is a part of a general tendency away from, a mutation of, the 
traditional concept of Law and the Rule of Law. This apparatus operates in a 
profoundly different manner to the Law of modernity and carries with it a 
movement of the place of adjudication beyond the state sphere and its 
Sovereign boundaries. Adjudication takes place throughout an exceptional, 
modulating and supranational framework, consisting of an emergent Lex 
Doping, mechanisms of governance, including that of the spectacle. This was 
introduced in the first place in Chapter Two with our discussion of the end of 
modernity and Operación Puerto. In Chapter Three we sought to provide a 
sketch of the modernist conception of the Rule of Law and the Law, whilst 
highlighting that within modernity the seeds of their transgression were already 
present, through forms of policing, administration and governance. Chapter 
Four considered the intensification of these forms of policing, administration 
and governance through Panoptic and Control mechanisms that are 
accompanied by exceptional transformations of the place of the expert in the 
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law. Chapter Five brought us face to face with our contemporary form of law 
and its rule of law with the instigation and subjection of all of society to the 
rules of competition.  
 
However the telling of this brief overview does not by itself answer the question 
we posed for ourselves at the beginning of this study. That is, what is the 
juridical form and theory of sovereignty that is able to sustain and found the 
primacy of governance over Law and Sovereignty? What does our case tell us 
about the configuration of the Law-governance continuum? What answers 
does it offer to the question we have posed? We can set out in a table below a 
schematic answer in order to bring together the various threads woven into our 
story.  
 
Early in this work we proposed the rubric of Spectacle-Functionality-Exception 
in order to point, in shorthand, to significant changes in the way that law is 
done and to express something inherent, or embodied within Moeller’s fear 
concerning the end of modernity. We now develop this rubric further before 
continuing to answer our question. By the term functionality I have intended to 
describe the manner in which the Law or law plays an instrumental role. The 
functionality of the Law is inscribed in neoliberal rationality; it is an instrumental 
rationality that always seeks to adapt means to ends. In doing so it excludes 
the kind of rationality that Møller regards as the cornerstone of modernity and 
Enlightenment principles, that is a rationality that makes reflecting on action a 
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condition of acting properly.581 The end of the Law in neoliberalism is that of 
creating the conditions or we might say constitution for the construction of 
competition as the value or single logic that underpins the totality of the world. 
The goal of generalised competition is the rationale. This is Law’s function in a 
neoliberal world.
 
The originality of this new way of the world is that it replaces the binary 
opposition of intervention/non intervention by the State with a new question 
surrounding the nature of State intervention. 582 It is this change that has had a 
profound effect on the Law of modernity and forms of law that followed it. 
Tangled up in this change is that there has also been a profound change or 

581 Dadot and Laval p.114.
582 Ibid.:121.
A. Given the growing primacy of the arts of government (over the law and sovereignty)  
[Permanent State of Exception] 
 
B.  it is a case of discovering: 
 
I. The Juridical Form and  
[Contractual Governance]   
i.  juridical form  
 [contractual governance] 
ii. institutional form  
[the administration & police] 
iii. legal basis 
[Arbitration, Functionality, 
Spectacle] 
II. The Theory of Sovereignty  
[Homo Econonimus & Society of Competition] 
 
C. that were able to Found and Sustain A       
[Glory [B.II] + Effect [B I.iii ] -> [Permanent State of Exception [A.]]    
- sovereignty typical of the 
state [of exception] 
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affect upon the meaning of what is known as the public interest. As we have 
seen in Valverde’s case, the CAS took the view that the public interest in the 
fight against doping took precedence over the cyclist’s Legal, Constitutional 
and Human Rights. But as we pointed this so-called public interest was one 
that did not proceed from any political or social contract; its source was not 
Public Law in the sense that we have come to know it. Instead for the CAS the 
public interest arose because of Valverde’s personal consent or choice to 
participate in sport. Therefore in this instance the public interest arises 
because of private (not public) agreement – an individual (and not a social) 
contract.583 At play in determining this public interest, and in determining or 
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate intervention,584 is what we 
mean by society. As Dadot and Laval put it ‘at stake is the meaning of a little 
word: social’ such that in the world of neoliberalism the ‘only social objective is 
the market and competition’. 585 In this new way of the world the only value 
underpinning ‘society’ and the Law/law is that of the end of generalising, or 
totalising, competition. 
 
A brief detour into legal theory helps position this shift. Hayek rejected the 
entire lineage of legal positivism of modernity commencing with Hobbes and 
passing through Bentham, Austin and Kelsen that posited Law as emanating 
from Sovereign will. This is the form of Law we described in Chapter Three. For 
instance, and in a similar way to our description of the Law, Hobbes defined 
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583 Ibid.:121.
584 Ibid.:121.
585 Ibid.:122.
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the Law ‘as the command of him that hath the legislative power’. 586 Bentham’s 
view was that the Law is only made by the Legislator, and this explains his 
antagonistic position on judicial discretion and the Common Law. In ‘Hayek's 
view, John Austin and Hans Kelsen merely extended this intellectual tradition, 
which reduces Law to the will of the Legislator, in contrast of the liberal 
tradition, which asserts the precedence of law over Legislation’.587 The law then 
for Hayek was not the Law. Dadot and Laval argue that what is partly at stake 
here is the distinction between the Greek terms nomos and thesis: 
 
It will be recalled that the Greeks carefully distinguish between 
nomos and thesis: private law alone is nomos, whereas public law is 
thesis - which means a public law is ‘enacted’ or ‘constructed’, and 
in this sense constitutes a ‘manufactured’ or ‘artificial’ order, 
whereas civil law is essentially a ‘spontaneous’ order. Rules of 
conduct, which alone make possible the formation of a spontaneous 
market order, are there for themselves derived not from the arbitrary 
will of a few men, but from a spontaneous process of selection 
operating over the longue durée. 588  
 
From this perspective then private law is not the Law emanating from 
Sovereign will, but law, which, as with the market, is a product of a process of 
discovery through competition. The function of private law is nothing other 
than the ordering of the affairs of those within neoliberal society. Not being 
enacted, constructed, or manufactured, and simply being a mechanism of 
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586 See for example Dadot and Laval pp.128-129.
587 Ibid.:128-129.
588 Ibid.:127-128.
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ensuring the operation of the competitive market, private law appears as 
having no end in itself. In this way we can say that neoliberalism’s law, as with 
its market, has no end that stands outside of itself; neoliberalism, the market, 
competition, law, all have no (governing) value other than themselves. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, in this system the only value of the Law and the 
Rule of Law is to create and maintain the conditions for competition to take 
place. Dumont might have said that in this respect what we have constituted 
as a whole is a moribund hierarchy589. We will return to this shortly. 
 
Again Dadot and Laval assist us in illustrating this when they point to Hayek’s 
distinction between the market – which is independent of any goal - and the 
economy. Their description of the economy is one that echoes Agamben’s 
discussion of oikonomia, the market they say must not be confused with the 
economy, the latter is ‘an intentional organization or arrangement … for a 
purpose … which pertains to taxis’. 590 Private law thus pertains to the realm of 
the market; Public Law is on this view a mechanism or institution of 
Government. In this situation the role of the Law (as with the Rule of Law) is 
only to create the conditions for competition, to ensure the cohesion of the 
market order through the making and application of formal rules that apply by 
virtue of their generality. The Law’s only proper role is to construct the 
competitive playing field and to prohibit certain kinds of activity; Public Law 
should go no further than this.591 It is only through prohibition that Public Law 
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589 Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, p. 306.
590 Ibid.:124
591 Ibid.:124-125.
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guides and pilots conduct, it in a similar way to the WADC Prohibited List never 
spells out what one should do, never what is permitted (what Hayek terms a 
command592), only what is prohibited. Public Law is not the conduction of 
conduct. Public Law is the mechanism that establishes and defines the market 
or space of competition; it is in this way that the neoliberal market is 
established and defined by Law. But this is a new kind of Law aimed at 
constituting a new kind of society. 
 
Thus the teleology of Public Law only has one value, simply that of creating the 
conditions for the market, which of course has no value other than itself. Within 
the space of market relations the only bond is that of economic relations – ‘the 
market order is not an economy, but it is composed of economic relations’ 593. 
Economic relations based upon competition are the only social bond, this is a 
society that is constituted by ‘pure performance’ where all are simply ‘100% 
Me’. The economic relation of competition becomes the preeminent tool of 
governance and within this realm the only real (neoliberal) law is private law, 
which itself is based upon or derived from the order of economic relations. 
 
We take Dumont’s concept of a moribund hierarchy to mean a hierarchy that 
forms a whole and that is governed by a totalising value, or a single logic, but 
which has no governing end in or other than itself. Our hierarchy is one totally 
governed and informed by the economic relation of competition. For Dumont 
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592 Ibid.:125.
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the term:  
 
… value designates something different from being, and something 
which, while the scientifically true is universal, is eminently variable 
with the social environment, and even within a given society, 
according not only to social classes but to diverse departments of 
activity and experience …594 
 
In the new way of the world of neoliberalism’s Empire there is no variation of 
value within the social environment and crucially this value posits itself on a 
global basis as the only way of being. Without being provocative, and if taken 
as a set of principles associated with the base word total, we can quite calmly 
say, that the value of competition is totalitarian, or it performs a totalitarian 
function, today. There can be no doubt that the ideology of competition seeks 
to exert total authority over society whilst seeking to control all aspects of 
public and private life. The kind of value represented by competition is not 
really a value at all – ‘the end cannot be its own means’.595 Rather than being a 
value, the single logic of Empire performs the function of: 
 
… annihilating values entirely … ends are reduced to means: having 
construed a category of ‘instrumental values,’ they proceed to deny 
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594 Louis Dumont,,1986, p.239.
595 “ Whatever the peculiarities of the American case, the end cannot be its own means: either what is 
called; operative values’ are not values at all, or they are second-order values that should be clearly 
distinguished from first-order values, or values proper.”  Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism, 
Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1986, p.239.
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the distinct existence of ‘intrinsic values,’ that is, of values proper … 
a dead end of individualism.596 
 
A hierarchy constituted by a single value of the market economy of competition 
is a hierarchy that has no external value – in neoliberalism law has no end in 
itself - the law and the market only have a function. 
 
In describing Operacion Puerto and the Valverde cases Chapter Two sought to 
highlight that the exception to the Law that takes place within the anti-doping 
apparatus is in fact a permanent exception to the Law of the Sovereign state 
that reigned throughout modernity’s high water tide. The Valverde cases show 
us how a cyclist’s consent, manifested by joining a cycling club, or taking out a 
racing licence, sets in place a policing and disciplinary procedure in which 
Sovereign boundaries are traversed and dissolved. Within the logic of the anti-
doping apparatus State action in pursuit of the infrastructure and networks that 
contribute to doping on a systemic level are regarded as not being functional 
to the ends of the apparatus. Spanish law with its procedures based upon the 
Rule of Law, and which as a result regarded the preservation of the integrity of 
criminal procedures as taking precedence over disciplinary or even civil 
procedures, were treated as a hindrance and barrier to the Just War on doping. 
The same is said for principles of International or European Human Rights 
(things that proceed only from State agreement) – where they are in conflict 
with the war on doping; Just War takes precedence. Furthermore, Operacion 
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596 Louis Dumont, 1986, pp.244-245.
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Puerto showed us how this primacy of the exception manifests itself 
increasingly by the spectacle’s justification of both the ends of the war on 
doping and the inability of State Law and Sovereignty to adequately deal with 
the task. 
 
Agamben poses the term (or syntagma) state of exception ‘as the technical 
term for the consistent set of legal phenomena’ that his study ‘seeks to define’. 
Agamben notes that the choice of the term:  
 
implies a position taken on both the nature of the phenomenon that 
we seek to investigate and the logic most suitable for understanding 
it  … the state of exception is not a special kind of law … it defines 
law’s threshold or limit concept. 597  
 
In tackling Møller’s end of modernity thesis we have taken up a position on the 
nature of the phenomenon we face, whether it is described as neoliberalism or 
Empire, and the manner in which it totalises competition as the norm. We have 
also proposed that it is the logic and rationality of this new system that 
provides a more suitable method to understand what is at stake in the anti-
doping apparatus. Thus we have sought to describe implicitly throughout this 
study how the entire edifice of new forms of law (or quasi law) are carved out of 
spaces beyond State Sovereignty, the administration and policing operations 
and its spectacular and arbitral adjudications - all backed by consent and 
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597 Giorgio Agamben, 2005, p.4.
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contract - are in one way or another symptoms of Agamben’s permanent state 
of exception. Furthermore what is at stake is the law’s threshold. The anti-
doping apparatus straddles Law, law and governance. Although we are able to 
distinguish between different aspects – the Australian ASADA Act as Public 
Law, the WADC as private law, the Whereabouts and Biological Passport 
systems as governmental tools brought into being by private law, and the 
governmental mechanism of competition itself – they and the apparatus as a 
whole exist and operate to a large degree within a zone of indiscernibility. It is 
this zone of indiscernibility that defines ‘law’s threshold or limit concept’. 598  
 
In the end it is an apparatus that seeks to ‘conduct conduct’, to establish the 
conditions for competition and pilot individual behavior, from within and 
without, towards the ‘pure performance’ of each individual ‘100% Me’. In such 
a world ‘the rules of private law must prevail universally’, they must govern the 
totality of existence to the extent that not only the individual, but even the State 
is subject to them. 599 The transformation of the Rule of Law under neoliberalism 
is what guarantees the order of this system – it is ‘therefore not a rule of the 
law, but a rule concerning what the law ought to be, a meta-legal doctrine or 
political ideal’. 600 Below it and constrained by it sits the realm of Public Law 
and Government which in turn creates, maintains and contributes to the 
policing of the state of the market based on the totalising norm of competition. 
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598 Ibid.:4.
599 Dadot and Laval p.133.
600 Ibid.:135
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At its most basic we can characterise our theory of sovereignty itself as one of 
the Permanent State of Exception; an exception to all Law and social policy 
other than that based upon the economic relation of competition. Viewed 
through the lens of the history of human society this ‘consistent set of legal 
[and governmental] phenomena’ that we have sought to investigate is an 
‘exceptional variant of the general model’; there is a hierarchy but one that is 
contradicted or devoid of any value.601 The exception here is founded by the 
privileging of economic relations based upon an individualism and a conversion 
of the public nature of society into a purely private manner that ‘when seen 
against the background of the other great civilisations that the world has 
known, is an exceptional phenomenon.’ 602  
 
What grounds this element of the exception, along with all others is consent by 
contract. Contractual governance603 or government by private agreement 
appears in our case study as the juridical form that supports and finds its basis 
as a theory of sovereignty grounded in the exception. Here we can begin to 
uncover in more detail a response to our question: what is the juridical form 
and theory of sovereignty that is able to sustain and found the primacy of 
governance over law and sovereignty? Chapter Five set out what appears to 
be, according to the logic of Neoliberalism, a theory of sovereignty that is 
different in form to that which preceded it. The transformation of the State into 
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601 Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism, Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1986: “… the modern model is an exceptional 
variant of the general model and remains encased, or encompassed within it. Hierarchy is universal; at 
the same time it is here partially but effectively contradicted.” p.265.
602 Ibid.:23. 
603 Peer Zumbanesen, Private Ordering in a Globalizing World: Still Searching for the Basis of Contract, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies vol. 14 No. 2 (summer 2007) p.181.
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just another economic actor has given rise to a theory of sovereignty that we 
might call Homo Economicus or the Society of Competition. It is no longer a 
question of the general will bringing forth the State and its system of 
Sovereignty, but of individual (‘sovereign’) will consenting to the injunction of 
having to be an entrepreneur of the self. Throughout the history of the State 
sovereignty has slowly but steadily moved from being vested in a transcendent 
God, to being vested in the figure of the Monarch as God’s representative, to 
being vested in the figure of the Law of the State, up to the contemporary 
context where above all else, sovereignty appears vested in the economy. No 
longer do we move to the invisible hand of God, as within the new politico-
theological structure of Empire we are now moved and governed by the 
invisible hand of the economy and our own consent. It is at the most basic 
level that this theory of sovereignty performs the role of a single logic of rule 
that guides and governs the operations of everything else within its domain. 
There is no value that sits outside the Rule of Law, Public Law, Government, 
private law, or the tools of administration and governance other than the value 
of economic relations based upon competition. Everything is geared to the 
creation, maintenance and policing of that value. 
 
Consent by contract, or consent otherwise, gives rise to the border crossing, or 
dissolving, assemblage of private arbitration, which as with other hierarchies, 
this state of exception ‘takes no account of the territorial factor, it ignores it and 
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encompasses it’.604 At the same time it also founds and justifies the panoply of 
governance tools we have encountered. Consent also appears by itself to not 
only justify the banishment of a violator but also their public pillory. Consent 
grounds the police; here the privatisation of the police is not the outsourcing of 
State policing functions to private corporations. It is our consent to have our 
body and its location monitored and assessed and in the end banished upon 
(exceptional) grounds that do not easily sit with the Rule of Law or the rational 
State of modernity. If any one thing marks the end of modernity, it is our 
consent to be governed by the economy. It is this consent that grounds the 
exception manifested by law’s functionality. 
 
In the world of the anti-doping apparatus any questioning of its operation, its 
mechanisms or its sanctions is often met by the glib response that the athlete 
consented to the rules when they made the choice to play sport. This response 
operates of course from the position that we are all individuals and islands 
upon ourselves with the inherent ability to be able to decide freely without the 
action of outside forces upon us. But is this consent itself illusory? For 
Dumont:  
 
… the conception of man as individual entails the recognition of a 
wide freedom of choice. Some of the values, instead of emanating 
from the society, will be determined by the individual for his own 
use. … The absence of prescription which makes choice possible is 
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604 Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, The Caste System and its Implications, Paladin, London, 1972, 
p.83.
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actually commanded by a superior prescription. … value is 
embedded in the configuration of ideas itself.605 
 
Where value is prescribed in the system itself and forms a governing 
function in the way that it does in neoliberalism the logic of pure 
consent is tenuous at best. Frédéric Lordon and his analysis of 
consent in the context of neoliberalism is useful to us here. For 
Lordon the total enlistment of the body under neoliberalism, the 
manner in which it makes the work of the subject their total vocation 
means that there ‘is no such thing as voluntary servitude. There is 
only passionate servitude.’606 On his analysis regimes of desire must 
be inscribed into individual psyches such that they consent to the 
total investment of their lives within the society of competition. In our 
example the athlete performs a function of expressing the desires and 
affects and provides the specific imaginary necessitated by the 
society of competition.607 For us the athlete in the society of 
competition operates on the playing fields where the social game 
converges and constitutes one of the very forces that drive the 
engagement with it. 608 Work and life itself in the society of competition 
‘must be reconstructed, but objectively and in the imagination, as a 
source of immediate joy. The desire to find employment should no 
longer be merely a mediated desire for the goods that wages 

605 Louis Dumont, 1986, p.260.
606 Frédéric Lordon, Willing Slaves of Capital, Spinoza and Marx on Desire, Verso, London, 2014, p.17.
607 Ibid.:49.
608 Ibid.:50.
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circuitously permit buying, but an intrinsic desire for the activity for its 
own sake’. 609  Following Lordon we can say that the athlete as expert 
of the society of competition ‘assumes the specific task of producing 
on a large scale desires that did not previously exist, or that existed 
only in a minority … desires for happy labour, or, to borrow directly 
from its own vocabulary, desires for ‘fulfilment’ and ‘self-realisation’ in 
and through work’. 610 As a passionate economy neoliberalism relies 
on free will ultimately as ‘the surest way to obtain unreserved action 
from employees, that is, the surrender of their power of acting in full’, 
but this free will or consent for Lordon is a form of involuntary 
servitude. 611 Consent is part and parcel of the art of neoliberal 
government; it surrounds the ‘mystery of power as ‘actions on 
actions’, as the art of making others do something … the false 
transparency of consent is a symptom of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity …’ 612 But from the Spinozist point of view the governed 
body is incapable of being authentically individual such that ‘if the act 
of giving consent is the authentic expression of a freely self-
determined interiority, then consent does not exist.’ 613 The authentic 
consent of the athlete becomes nothing more than the movements of 
desire motivated within the society of competition, 614 such that the 
athlete as expert is moved not by consent but by the effect of 
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affects.615 Neoliberalism’s strength is this harnessing of the joyful 
affect provided by the athlete and the totalisation of the desire to be 
totally invested in one’s life/work across society. The power of the 
athlete consists in a certain part of affecting and governing by 
directing the subjected bodies of neoliberalism to move towards the 
object of the norm of totalised competition.616  
 
[T]o be happy with one's chains is evidently not the same 
as to be saddened by them. ‘Coercion’ and ‘consent’ are 
simply the names of the respective effects of sadness and 
of joy assumed inside institutional situations of power and 
normalisation. … Coercion and consent are forms of the 
lived experience (respectively sad and joyful) of 
determination. To be coerced is to have to been 
determined to do something but in a state of sadness. And 
to consent … is to live one's obedience, but with its 
intrinsic burden relieved by a joyful affect.617 
 
The consent to take part in the society of competition requires a total 
investment that is always rationalised by those that love their activity 
in the manner of the athlete; it is always their choice and their 
vocation. Subjects are required ‘to “fully invest themselves”, but also 
to be fully invested – invaded – by’ the society of competition. For 
Lordon in this society: 
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it is the extreme nature of the whole claimed over 
individuals that is a hallmark of the neoliberal enterprises 
pursuit of total enlistment. To subordinate the entire life 
and being of employees… so that they serve its ends, in 
short, to refashion their singularity so that all their personal 
inclinations tend ‘spontaneously’ in its direction, such as 
the delirious vision of a total possession of individuals, in 
an almost shamanistic sense. It is therefore legitimate to 
call totalitarian an attempt to exercise control in a manner 
so profound, so complete, that it is no longer satisfied by 
external enslavement – obtaining the desirable behaviour – 
but demands a complete surrender of ‘interiority’. 618 
 
Lordon’s consent is the consent of the anti-doping apparatus. It is the 
consent of ‘Just Do It!’ of the ‘pure performance’ of ‘100% Me’. It is 
the consent that drives the subjection of the cyclists to the arbitration 
of the spectacle and the new forms of law beyond the Law. It is this 
consent that drives their subjection to the Whereabouts and 
Biological Passport systems and the manner in which their lives are 
governed, piloted and fashioned.  
 
If we identify the juridical form that sustains this new sovereignty as 
consensual or contractual governance, we can also identify the 
institutional form as that of the police and the administration; possibly 
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better described in this case as contractual policing. As we have 
attempted to highlight the Law and the police are different animals – 
the former clearly a mechanism of Sovereignty the latter appearing on 
the governance side of the continuum. As we have seen in Chapter 
Four Bauman’s model of the administrative machinery of the 
Holocaust is one that fits comfortably with a description of the anti-
doping apparatus. The machine, the professional and the 
bureaucracy combine in a policing operation in which the object is 
defined, identified and located, surveilled, monitored and assessed, 
segregated and eventually evicted, bringing us face to face with the 
world of Kafka. Everyone is potentially guilty and abnormal bodies are 
actively sought in all places and all times.  
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The rider’s commitment to a new cycling.619 
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An open letter to McQuaid, Pedro Horrillo, Saturday 7 July 2007
Mr. McQuaid, I haven’t had the pleasure of meeting you personally, although to make things clear 
from the start, I am not inclined to so in the slightest. However, it should not be so because, being 
the highest representative of our sport, you should be supported and welcomed by all those who 
are a part of it. But sadly this is not the case.
Maybe at this time you are congratulating yourself on the success of your latest initiative, the 
famous letter entitled ‘Rider’s Commitment to a New Cycling’ that we have just been compelled to 
sign by you. And I am not mistaken in using the verb, compel, because many who have signed 
have done so under duress and threats: the fact is we simply sign, or don’t ride. What seems not 
to matter is whether the riders are in agreement or not, whether we have a debate about the 
issues, and whether we work together for a common objective. 
No, you have simply written the letter without consulting anyone. No, the only thing you care 
about is that we have signed our names – our ‘agreement’ – and that we have jumped through 
the hoops you have demanded. This is the substance of the issue, although you sell it as 
otherwise. Everyone will have their opinion, I’ve specifically signed the letter, but to me it seems 
to be the most absurd letter that has come from a thinking person. Though if I was to get to the 
bottom of the matter, I am in favour of tightening up the fight against doping – the scourge that is 
on track to finish our sport – and I commit myself as a rider to that. But I do not see why as proof 
of this I should refuse to get paid or give away my wages if I am somehow implicated in a doping 
scandal. 
“¿Donde vas? Manzanas traigo” – where you’re going? I bring apples – says the popular Spanish 
proverb. What is the reason? Where did you get such a brilliant idea? It seems to me that the 
reasoning was as simple as… ‘we will hit you where it hurts most: money’. I assure you that you 
are wrong about me. What hurt me the most was that I had to swallow my pride to comply with 
your command, but I know that you do not care about that at all. The fact is that I signed. And by
the way, I signed it knowing that this document is unlawful and undemocratic. That is to say, a 
useless piece of paper. You have a large collection of useless pieces of paper in a folder, but of 
course, all of them are signed just as you wanted. Anyway, my most sincere congratulations. And 
finally, a wish. I hope that with the departure of the first rider in this Tour de France 2007, your 
central role is over and from now on the attention will be drawn back to the rightful owners: the 
riders.
Sincerely, Pedro Horrillo. 
Originally Published in El Pais, Translation by Martin Hardie.

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If the juridical form is contractual governance and the institutional form is the 
police, or contractual policing, are we are able to say that the legal basis is in 
the end a combination of adjudication or decision making (administrative 
arbitral and spectacular), and functionality both of which are given effect in the 
Spectacle? Within the state of exception Law and governance both receive 
their backing from their effect and functionality within the economy and its 
single logic of competition. The legal basis manifested by functionality and 
effect are important in order to found and sustain the system as a whole. Their 
operation is inextricably tied up with the theory of sovereignty itself and the 
manner in which it founds and sustains the primacy of the permanent state of 
exception. The Society of the Spectacle here is not only used to describe the 
manner in which trial by media takes on an adjudicative function or form.  
 
Guy Debord proposed in 1967 that in contemporary society the ‘whole of life 
… presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles’ where images 
‘detached from every aspect of life emerge into a common stream, and the 
former unity of life is lost forever’. Here ‘reality unfolds in a new generality as a 
pseudo-world apart …’. For Debord the spectacle appears at the very same 
time as society itself, as a part of society and as society’s means of unification, 
it is ‘where all attention, all consciousness, converges’ it is ‘not a collection of 
images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by 
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images’. 620 In this way the spectacle constitutes a ‘world view transformed into 
an objective force’ which when understood: 
 
‘in its totality …. It is the very heart of society’s unreality … the 
spectacle epitomizes the prevailing model of social life … the 
spectacle serves as a total justification for the conditions and aims 
of the existing system. It further ensures the permanent presence of 
that justification, for it governs almost all time …’.621 
 
The spectacle performs a totalising function as it expresses “the total practice 
of one particular economic and social formation; it is, so to speak, the 
formations’ agenda. It is also the historical moment by which we happen to be 
governed”. In performing this totalising function the spectacle too appears to 
have no value outside of itself, or that of economic relations, echoing Dumont’s 
moribund hierarchy. Debord wrote the ‘spectacle is essentially tautological, for 
the simple reason that its means and its ends are identical. It is the sun that 
never sets on the empire of modern passivity. It covers the entire globe, 
basking in the perpetual warmth of its own glory’. In this context: 
 
‘as the perfect image of the ruling economic order, ends are nothing 
and development is all – although the only thing into which the 
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620 Guy Debord Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, New York: Zone Books, 1995, 
p.12.
621 Ibid.:13.
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spectacle plans to develop is itself. …[it] is simply the economic 
realm developing for itself …’.622 
 
For Hardt and Negri the spectacle is the ‘glue that holds together the diverse 
functions and bodies of the hybrid constitution’ that is Empire, ‘an integrated 
and diffuse apparatus of images and ideas that produces and regulates public 
discourse and opinion’.623 Here the public sphere evaporates, as all apparati of 
government form a zone of indiscernibility, and any sociality based upon the 
whole, of society is destroyed – everything is individualized, imposing a new 
kind of mass ‘sociality’ a ‘new uniformity of action and thought’.624 In the 
society of the spectacle only what appears exists. 
 
Agamben takes the view that Schmitt’s notion of public opinion (as evinced by 
the Nazi’s particular construction of modernity) and Debord’s work on the 
Society of the Spectacle takes on a new meaning and a new urgency today. 
Agamben’s links Debord's analysis with Schmitt's thesis; a thesis that argued 
that public opinion is the modern form of the Imperial acclamation: 
 
‘the entire problem, of the contemporary spectacle of media 
domination over all areas of social life assumes a new guise. What is 
in question is nothing less than a new and unheard of concentration, 
multiplication, and dissemination of the function of glory as the 
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622 Ibid.:15-16.
623 Hardt and Negri Empire, pp.321-322.
624 Ibid.
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center of the political system’.625 
 
Agamben’s point is that our current context - what he terms contemporary 
democracy - ‘is a democracy that is entirely founded upon glory, that is, on the 
efficacy of acclamation, multiplied and disseminated by the media beyond all 
imagination’ where we are ‘once again caught, orientated, and manipulated in 
the forms and according to the strategies of spectacular power’. This allows us, 
according to Agamben to ‘better understand the sense of the contemporary 
definitions of democracy as ‘government by consent’ or ‘consensus 
democracy’ and the decisive transformation of the democratic institutions that 
is at stake in these terms’. 626  
 
Whether we describe this system as democratic or not, for our purposes what 
Agamben is exposing is the links between totalitarian notions of public opinion 
or acclamation through the global mechanism of the spectacle, in a situation 
where what founds the system is governance by consent. For us what has 
been important in order to ground the state of exception present, or presented 
by in the anti-doping apparatus is consensual or contractual governance. 
Furthermore, we have tried to describe how the spectacle of the athlete as 
expert of the society of competition itself goes to sustaining this new form of 
sovereignty. The glory associated with accomplishing the task of having to be 
an entrepreneur of the self radiates and sustains the mythology of the theory of 

625 Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory pp.255-256.
626 Ibid.
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sovereignty itself. Spectacular glory plus functionality in respect of the single 
logic of rule – the economy; founds and sustains the justification, deployment 
and operation of a myriad of governmental techniques all aimed at producing 
the paradigm of Economic Man we find embodied in the athlete. In the society 
of competition the athlete is the paradigm of what we have to be in order to 
just do it. 
 
The gloss of Foucault on the question we have posed, is that the answer we 
have described gives rise to a form of sovereignty typical of the state. It is 
readily apparent by now that our system of law and governance is not one that 
is of the Sovereignty of the State. That is it is not a system that measures up to 
the image of law in modernity and the Rule of Law or the State of Law. The 
apparatus established, or coordinated by the WADC appears ‘increasingly to 
evince a will to sovereignty’627 over the bare life of the athlete. As Hardt and 
Negri’s Empire shows identifying the holder of this sovereign power, in any one 
instance, may not be an easy task; it may be nowhere and everywhere 
simultaneously. Furthermore, whether or not sovereignty is an adequate term in 
this context is arguable and something that requires a complete investigation 
and consideration of its own. The definition of sovereignty provided by the 
Comaroffs as ‘the exercise of control over the lives, deaths and conditions of 
existence of those who fall within its purview- and the extension over them of 
the jurisdiction of some kind of law’ provides us with some flexibility, but what 
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627 John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Reflections on the Anthropology of Law, Governance and 
Sovereignty, in Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Julia Eckert, Rules of 
Law and Laws of Ruling, Ashgate Publishing, 2009 at 38.
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we are facing is more than a kind of law. Furthermore, it is a modulating kind of 
law that appears to be able to be called forth whenever deemed necessary and 
despite the actions of what we might call competing sovereignties. The 
distinction drawn by CAS in order to get around Valverde’s double jeopardy 
arguments following his ‘acquittal’ by the RFEC and his ‘conviction’ by CONI, 
as to the nature of the violation exemplify the modulating and functional nature 
of this ‘sovereignty’. Without ever clearly dealing with the facts that may have 
constituted a violation on the part of Valverde CAS was able to avoid 
arguments of double jeopardy by characterising the offence as being its 
discovery, manifested by a DNA ‘match’, and not by the actual occurrence of 
extracting blood, adding EPO and storing it for future use. This kind of 
modulating sovereignty potentially allows for cases to be brought successively 
until the right functional outcome can be achieved so long as each modulating 
sovereign is able to make a discovery which they can, however flimsily, 
characterise as an asserted violation. What appears as an abundance of new 
forms of law and sovereignty manifest themselves as incidents of perpetual 
policing. Moving right away from cycling to recent events in Australia, possibly 
nothing bears out this more than the example of the case of the players and 
support staff from the Essendon Football Club who are told that they are 
subject to an ongoing investigation without any apparent end. The fact is that 
the mechanisms of the anti-doping apparatus we have sought to describe are 
themselves systems of perpetual and continual surveillance where no one is 
ever innocent but always a suspect. 
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Cycling in the Age of Empire 
 
The anti-doping apparatus evinces all the characteristics or symptoms 
identified by Hardt and Negri as the principles of Imperial administration. It is 
instrumental in so far as the singularity and adequacy of actions to specific 
ends in the flexible management of difference are paramount. What is 
important is not unity and consistency but instrumental multi-functionality.  
One of the criticisms of Møller of WADA is that it does not live up to what it 
preaches in its Code as it does not treat all athletes equally on a level anti-
doping playing field. For example the differences between the manner in which 
Davis was treated by ASADA and the manner in which Valverde was dealt with 
by CONI, despite the findings of the RFEC, highlight the lack of any 
hypothetical level playing field and the equal application of law. Rasmussen’s 
Whereabouts case extensively dealt with by Møller is yet another example. The 
list could go on, and would not be complete without reference to the difference 
between Armstrong and others. But by WADA apparently treating individuals, 
countries or sports differently at different times and at different places can it 
really be said that WADA is not fulfilling the plain words of the WADC as 
argued by Møller? Does the highlighting of such a difference really point to 
some irrationality or even corruption in the organisations behaviour?  
 
It is evident that the words of the WADC establishes a system that is not based 
upon right in the sense of generality, equality and rationality, as was 
understood by modernist conceptions of law and sovereignty. Instead, what 
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the words of the Code create, and then seeks to administer and manage, is a 
system based upon the flexible management of difference. Thus it creates the 
basis for modulating and hybrid networks of command, discipline and control.  
From this perspective we can say that the WADC establishes a praxis of 
governance based upon private agreement and contract. As Hardt and Negri 
tell us this system of governance is composed of many sovereigns, none of 
whom are the ‘centre’ within this is modulating system of governance based 
upon practice – an apparatus. This is apparent itself from the manner in which 
for example the UCI, WADA, RFEC, CONI, ASADA all compete in the exercise 
of modulating degrees of power or sovereignty. If we do not read the text of 
the WADC in this light we will never be able to understand its operations on 
what might be argued as being a ‘rational’ basis. The WADC does not create, 
or even seek to establish a legal level playing field and thus does not seek to 
create ab initio equality between all athletes on a global basis. This is 
abundantly clear from a careful and plain reading of the words of the text.  
 
PURPOSE, SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD ANTI-
DOPING PROGRAM AND THE CODE 
The purposes of the World Anti-Doping Code and the World Anti-
Doping Program which supports it are: 
• To protect the Athletes' fundamental right to participate in doping-
free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes 
worldwide, and 
• To ensure harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping 
programs at the international and national level with regard to 
detection, deterrence and prevention of doping. 
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Beginning with the opening paragraph above, the purposes of the WADC are 
‘to protect the Athletes' fundamental right to participate in doping-free sport 
and thus promote health, fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide’. We 
must separate two phrases and thus functions in this opening paragraph. One 
is to ‘protect a fundamental right to doping-free sport’. The immediate aim and 
purpose of the WADC is thus to create and protect this fundamental right ‘to 
participate in doping-free sport’. The granting of rights always involves the 
taking of some other right at the same time. The second phrase of this first 
paragraph contains not an immediate purpose, but an aspirational goal, which 
is again evidenced by the plain words of the text and the use of the words ‘to 
promote’. The aspirational purpose is to ‘thus promote health, fairness and 
equality for Athletes worldwide’. It is aspirational in the sense that this is not an 
immediate goal, nor possibly even an achievable goal – but a stated and ideal 
end point of the system. This is not a reality, not an actuality, but a potentiality. 
It must be read as such and in a similar manner as the aspirational goal of the 
promotion of international peace and security in the United Nations Charter, 
something that is clearly not a reality, but a goal of the United Nations system. 
In respect of the level playing field, the second paragraph does in fact seek to 
ensure ‘harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the 
international and national level’. But even on a plain reading this paragraph 
itself has to be read in the context of the qualification contained in the following 
paragraph. The second paragraph also refers to which programs the WADC 
seeks to harmonise, that is programs  ‘with regard to detection, deterrence and 
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prevention of doping’. The purpose here is to focus upon this question of 
flexibility rather than generality and its equal application: the level playing field 
approach.  
 
It is the third paragraph that is crucial to understanding the meaning of 
harmonisation and coordination. This paragraph makes it abundantly clear that 
under the system established by the Code what is regarded as an effective 
program at a national or international level does not depend upon each and 
every program being alike. The opening of this third paragraph makes it is clear 
that the ‘purpose of the Code is to advance the anti-doping effort through 
universal harmonization of core anti-doping elements.’ ‘Core anti-doping 
elements’ are the (single) logic of the system and do not infer a mechanical 
application of the same in each and every instance.  The single logic of the 
system turns on concepts of consent, competition, the level playing field, 
individual responsibility, policing and strict liability. Importantly it also includes 
the removal of the anti-doping apparatus from the realm of State law. Although 
State bodies may play a role in the administration of the anti-doping apparatus, 
in peforming this function, they are subject to the law of the code and not that 
of the State.  Here it is also clear that actual harmonisation, in the sense of 
generality and all programs being alike is, if anything, again an aspiration. It is 
not a right, but it is something to be advanced, and it is not a reality or an 
actuality now. We might even go so far as to state that it is a myth of even a 
fantasy of the Real. Most importantly, the third paragraph states that in the 
process of the advancement of that harmonization, at any given moment, and 
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in any given place or situation, harmonization must be both ‘specific enough to 
achieve complete harmonization on issues where uniformity is required, yet 
general enough in other areas to permit flexibility on how agreed-upon anti-
doping principles are implemented’. That is, it is core anti-doping principles 
that must be implemented, the spirit and not the letter of the Code. Evidently, 
this is not a general and uniform harmonisation, but a flexible implementation 
of ‘core principles’ which recognize the actual differences that exist at a 
national and international level, at different times and between different sports.  
 
To object to this analysis, as some might, on the grounds that this part of the 
Code is open to interpretation – that it is written in rubbery language and is 
thus a pragmatic solution to accommodate nations or sports that don’t 
necessarily take anti-doping as seriously - is to both get, miss and deny the 
point all in one go. Harmonisation of anti-doping is not a one-size-fits-all affair, 
where each and every national anti-doping agency and each and every sport 
must act the same at all times so as to create an actual administrative level 
playing field at the present time. To then argue that what the Code requires is a 
level playing field where all countries, all sports and all athletes must be treated 
the same, or as if they were the same, and thus be treated equally on a level 
playing field of anti-doping law, is to seriously misread the plain and literal 
words of the document. It is a reading that also denies the political and 
institutional reality of the situation in search of a romantic, liberal and modernist 
notion of law and rights. As a form of critique it simply replaces one fantasy 
with another, or the Real with a bygone fantasy. 
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What all of this points to is that the Code is a part of a framework agreement 
which recognises difference and in doing so itself points to the creation of a 
new global system; it is a framework with which to construct a new form of law 
and governance, or if one is not convinced of that, at least a new global legal 
regime. The characteristics of it being a framework agreement recognise from 
the beginning the political realities of existing State power (whatever the 
changing nature of the role of the State may be) and the fact of uneven 
development of this new system. It also recognizes in this context that law, 
power and administrative governance are carried out by both State and non-
state bodies. Hence, harmonisation, as explained above, cannot be read as 
meaning everything is the same – as imposing a generality that we might think 
of in terms of Law as it might have been. The instrumental role of anti-doping 
contributes to and is aimed at the construction of a new global system and 
along with this instrumental flexibility it is procedural, autocentric and always 
functional. It treats each case differently, always operating in a localised and 
contingent manner, in which the heterogeneity of actions is important – there is 
no longer a strategic plan but actions are event and crisis driven. The unifying 
matrix of the Imperial system arises from its local effectiveness and through 
consent to the single logic of rule of the economy. 
 
Hardt and Negri tell us that Empire always comes or acts in the name of peace 
and justice. The logic of a Just War backs Imperial action. In our case the war 
against doping is a Just War and thus exceptional measures are required. In 
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Empire war is reduced to a police action and this police power has an 'ethical' 
function. In pursuit of this Just War the enemy is banalised and thus subject to 
routine policing; and at the same time absolutised as an absolute threat to the 
ethical order in construction. In order to take control and dominate a 
completely fluid situation with no centre it is necessary for the intervening 
authority to have the capacity to define, every time in an exceptional way, the 
demands of the intervention; and the capacity to set in motion the forces and 
instruments that can be variously applied to the diversity of the arrangements 
in crisis. The legitimacy of the Imperial order brought about by its single logic, 
consent and its functionality and its glorification support the exercise of the 
global policing power and it is the activity of global policy that demonstrates 
the real effectiveness of the imperial order.  Hardt and Negri argue that the two 
initial coordinates of the authority of Empire are the juridical power to rule over 
the exception; and the supranational capacity to police. For them Empire is a 
place where the exception has become the norm and where a decision maker 
no longer orients themselves according to a rule or a situation of fact, and no 
longer needs to decide whether a given fact falls within the rule. What is 
decided at once is a rule and a criterion – what becomes 'natural' is a rule that 
decides the fact and decides upon its own application without reference to any 
norm other than being functional within the construction of Empire.  Empire 
and the exception are called into being on the basis of their ability to resolve 
conflicts. Empire is formed and becomes juridically legitimate because of this 
functionality and because of our consent. Consent allows mechanisms of 
command to become more 'democratic' and more immanent to the social field. 
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As we have seen command and control becomes distributed through the 
brains and bodies of citizens. This biopolitical regulation of life from the inside 
can only be effective when it becomes an integral, vital function that every 
individual embraces and reactivates of their own accord.  In Empire as in the 
anti-doping apparatus life has become the object of power.
The Athlete as a paradigm of life within Empire 
 
In Chapter Five we considered the figure, or paradigm of the athlete, as a 
privileged expert or ambassador of the society of competition. In Empire, Hardt 
and Negri proposed the Polybian constitutional model as being closer to our 
Imperial reality than the modern liberal tradition’s transformation of it. Polybius 
recognized an Imperial structure of a monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. In 
today’s genetic phase of power and its accumulation functions are seen and 
rationalised primarily from the angle of relations and materiality of their force 
rather than from some equilibrium of power within a definite and stable 
Sovereign State structure.628 Within this Polybian constitution the figure of the 
athlete as expert of the society of competition falls within and functions as a 
component of the middle tier of the aristocracy. The Imperial aristocracy plays 
its role in the definition of justice, measure and virtue. Whereas the monarchy 
presents itself as a global police629 force the athlete here articulates justice, 
measure and virtue throughout the entire system thereby contributing to the 
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628 Hardt and Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000 at 316.
629 Ibid.:316.
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reproduction and circulation of the single logic of Imperial rule.630 Within Empire 
the command and ordering functions of the aristocratic athlete are deployed 
over the transnational processes of production and circulation631 – in the 
creation of worlds. 
 
As a paradigmatic member of the Imperial aristocracy the athlete appears as a 
privileged figure. At the same time it is their position as ‘governors’ within 
Empire that opens them up to sanction. The athlete is in a way always in debt, 
always, in the words of Lazzarato, indebted man, always the product of the 
‘techniques of fashioning the debtor subject’.632 This athletic or aristocratic 
exposure to indebtedness is recognisable when we consider that for many, 
including themselves, the athlete occupies a privileged position within society. 
Accordingly and because of this privilege they are in the first instance ‘in debt’ 
to that society and liable to repay this debt (which may in fact not be 
repayable) by fulfilling their function of good ‘role models’ and of instilling the 
logics and fantasy of the individual as a enterprise or entrepreneur of the self 
within competition society. The athlete articulates or disseminates the specific 
Imperial conceptions of justice, measure and virtue throughout the system. As 
such the athlete, always in debt, is, in the second instance, in the moment of 
their transgression of the rules of the game, always open to be exposed to the 
threat of social insolvency – the ban. The ban applies if and when they fail in 
their governing role of instilling the ethos of pure competition. The governing 
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632 Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of Indebted Man, An essay on the Neoliberal Condition, 
Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2011.
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function of the anti-doping apparatus in this context of debt regulates the 
allocation of the athlete’s social or sporting insolvency. In so doing it delimits 
the field of pure competition and reinforces the myth or fantasy of natural 
competition on the level playing field of the economy. 
 
Q Do you think there’s a myth...There’s two things you hear in 
relation to the doping stuff. One is that professional athletes are 
privileged people and...  
A I think they are privileged people.  
Q Why do you reckon they’re privileged?  
A I think they’re privileged people because they’re treated like kings 
and they go out and ride their bike for three or four hours and go 
home and sit home, have a massage, watch TV for a week, then go 
to a race and race a week and sign autographs and stay in hotels, 
get their food paid, get everything paid, get their wages paid, do a 
bit of travelling, you know, people are selling photos of them, they’re 
in the front pages of the newspaper. That’s a great lifestyle, but 
obviously there’s a certain amount of sacrifice you have to be to be 
the [wind noise]...To keep a contract is massive. To get a good 
contract is even more massive. Do you know what I mean?  
Q Yeah. [Wind noise]...because if you haven’t invested anything. 
And at times it seems that the fact that it is a person’s, somebody’s 
total lifestyle and something they’ve invested in since they were 
fifteen [wind noise]...  
A Yeah true. It doesn’t seem to be taken into account. But it just 
comes back to a line. Everything comes back to that line in the same 
that you draw. And I mean fuck, you know, a woman has to spend 
fuckin’ eight years and how many years [wind noise]...as a lawyer or 
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how many years you did as a medical student and you had to pay 
back $150,000 of government fees...  
Q I’m still fuckin’ paying it back.  
A Do you know what I mean it’s like, you know, cyclists don’t do 
that. They’ve got to buy a bike and everything’s given to them, OK. 
But having said that, do you know a cyclist’s career is fifteen years 
maximum. Do you know what? They wouldn’t have time to pay 
something like that back. I mean they don’t invest that. They’re 
investing their time, which is money, fair enough. But when stop 
they’re done. The cyclist, every cyclist, I guarantee you right now, 
every cyclist wants to win, right, every competition, every runner, 
every rower, they all want to win. That’s number one right. But in 
cycling, right if you’re the best fuckin’ swimmer in the world, OK 
[wind noise]... you’re going to have a huge endorsements. But like if 
you’re in top thirty in the world, you’re not going to get paid a 
contract unless you’ve got Speedo skin suit. That’s fuckin’ nothing. 
With cycling you can make half a million dollars a year and set 
yourself up for life in eight years and not have to work again. Do you 
know what I mean? And that’s, I guarantee you, what cyclists think. 
OK I’ll win two stages of the [name] I can sign three years with 
Kelme and they’re going to pay me $600,000 a year. I can buy a 
house one year, put the rest away the year after, invest the year after 
and I’m fuckin’ done. [Wind noise]...No it’s reality. 

By supposing that the foundation of the privileged aristocratic expert of 
competition society is based upon the threat of debt insolvency633 we begin to 
see that what we have before us is a case of the close proximity between that 
of the sovereign or aristocrat and that of the outlaw or outcast. Within Empire 
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633 Hilgers 2012:90-91.
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the athlete is not only the privileged expert member of the global aristocracy 
but at one and the same time they are exposed to and capable of constituting 
the bare life of homo sacer. Within our study the athlete has appeared in a 
variety of forms, but all exhibit a status outside of or beyond and before the 
Law.  
 
The athlete as participant in the society of competition is sovereign in the 
sense that they are able to consent and contract in order to allow them to play 
the game of the economy (which after all is everything). They are free as the 
birds (vogel frei) to play the game and to soar to the greatest heights – they can 
achieve the injunction of having to be, they are capable of just doing it. As 
entrepreneurs of the self, and as privileged experts they can live the dream for 
themselves and for us all. As ambassadors of Homo Economicus, or Imperial 
Aristocrats, they already hold ministerial or priestly positions of governance.634 
The aristocratic minister seeks, possesses and teaches the characteristics 
needed to get by in the new economy – hard work, dedication and resilience. 
The athlete may even appear as prince or sovereign of the economy in his or 
her own right.  At the same time the athlete is both governor and governed. 
The privileged status brings with it constant and perpetual policing of every 
aspect of their lives. They both have to do it but are able to do it. The police, 
discipline and control are all internalised and defeat is overcome through 
resilience. But both privilege and exposure to governance gives rise to the 
exposure to the ban. If one is to be free as the birds one is also just as free to 
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634 See Agamben, G. 2011. The kingdom and the glory, for a theological genealogy of economy and
government., 2013. Opus Dei, Archaeology of Duty, 2013.
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be shot down. The governed and privileged athlete can quite quickly turn into 
the outcast, the outlaw or the wolf.  
 
The Sovereign, the Kingdom and the Glory of the Wolf 
 
The athlete as wolf moves beyond the description of the cyclist we opened 
with and beyond the becoming animal of the athletic experience we have 
discussed in our Excursus. The figure of homo sacer in Agamben serves to 
describe a situation whereby a life may be banished by anyone without 
recourse to the Law.635 In our case it is a form of banishment that operates 
beyond the realm of the Sovereign State of Law allowing the functional 
application of power in whatever is the necessary form on a modulating basis.  
Agamben specifically links the figure of homo sacer with that of the wolf636 and 
notes the coincidence of this form with that of the bandit and the outlaw. Homo 
Sacer appears as a man without peace – whom anyone was permitted to kill. 
Banishment itself was equated with death – already considered to be a living 
death even before any legal process (if any at all) takes its course. This status 
means that anyone may harm the banished for he exists within a liminal world 
as a monstrous hybrid, not of a purely animal nature but existing within a 
threshold of indistinction, dwelling whilst belonging to nothing, or better 
dwelling outside of the law. 637   
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One of the points often overlooked in the work of Agamben is that there is a 
close proximity between the figure of homo sacer and that of the sovereign. 
Both exist outside the law. Both reside in this zone or threshold of indistinction 
that is constituted by the Permanent State of Exception. Furthermore, for 
sustenance the Sovereign requires to be fed by its association with the glory 
provided by our wolf; in the age in which we live, power to be effective requires 
a connection with glory for its continued survival. Agamben shows us that the 
roots of theological genealogy are still inscribed in the contemporary apparatus 
of governance. By necessity power must be sustained and maintained by 
liturgy, ceremonies and other forms of acclamation. These may be new forms 
of liturgy, but nevertheless, the theological dimension of both Government and 
governance persists. The validity of both is presented to us in contemporary 
capitalism, as glory, manifested in its ultimate form, in the immense 
accumulation of images in the spectacle. 
 
In the achievement of this glory, and in the pursuit of a seat next to, or possibly 
as the sovereign, the ‘personal’ choice: to dope or not to dope? is inevitably 
determined by the confluence of influences (sporting, commercial, national, 
media) that find their focus on the sporting body. A liturgical society of 
competition is one that demands glory at all times, and in which the athlete is 
never simply seeking an individual goal; but is another cog in the construction 
of a greater machine. Is not the lesson of the society of competition, its central 
fantasy, that the pursuit of self-interest is the best manner in which to produce 
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‘societal’ outcomes? The promise of this fantasy is that everyone will win, that 
there will be no losers. Dean here refers to George, quoting Thatcher: 
 
Because competition is always a virtue, its results cannot be bad. 
For the neo-liberal, the market is so wise and so good that like God, 
the Invisible Hand can bring good out of apparent evil. Thus 
Thatcher once said in a speech, "It is our job to glory in inequality 
and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for 
the benefit of us all.638  

The glory of inequality is what we must seek to overcome through the 
resilience taught to us by the paradigmatic figure of the athlete. But what 
specifically, does Agamben have to say about this requirement for glory, and 
how does it relate to the needs of creating and sustaining the fantasy of a 
society where everybody wins? The goal of national high performance centres, 
such as the AIS in Australia is a glorification factory, its object is to produce a 
glory machine. This factory grew out of the combination of the Eastern 
European method of preparation training and the American model of 
management. In this glory machine the  athlete is placed in the hands of one of 
the orders of new priests, such as the exercise physiologist, who like 
mechanics of beautiful cars, regulate them and make them fit for maximum 
performance. But another priestly order is also at play here, the one that 
manages, scripts and finesses the stories and images of the glorious 

638 Jodie Dean, Enjoying Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics 2008 Volume 4, Number 1: 47-72, p.55.
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achievements of these high performance competitive machines. It is in respect 
of this priesthood that Agamben’s approach become most relevant. 
 
In another Kafkaian turn, Agamben, in the Kingdom and the Glory, treats 
angels as being divided into both those that perform the role of assistants and 
those that are administrators. The angelic assistants are the liturgical choristers 
of glory whilst the angelic administrators are the ministers of government. For 
Agamben it is in the tension between glory and governance that the articulation 
of the Kingdom (Sovereignty) and the government (governance) attains its 
maximum opacity. The question he poses here is, whether the opposition 
between the Kingdom and the Government – between Sovereignty and 
governance; has become so effective that politics ceases to take the form of 
Sovereign action and power but tends towards the pole of Spectacular hymn 
and glory. The ceremonial aspects of power and right he inscribes provisionally 
under the heading of ‘archaeology of glory’.639 
 
It is not by coincidence that the Australian athletes returning from the Olympic 
Games are greeted at the top of the aircraft stairs by the Prime Minister and 
the head of one of the countries leading corporations and Olympic sponsors. 
There is more at play here than just simple old nationalistic fervour or that 
sports are one of the contemporary opiates (or probably more accurately today 
amphetamines) of the masses. Agamben’s archaeology of glory is tied up with 
Schmitt’s concept of public opinion, and the manner in which power is 
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639 Agamben 2011:pp.167-168.
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consecrated through public acclamation. In the context of the exchanges 
between Schmitt and Peterson examined by Agamben acclamation emerges 
as having both a legal and a political meaning.640  
 
The acclamation as an exclamation of praise, triumph, of laudation or 
disapproval, a gesture of the raising of the right hand (or the punching of the 
right fist in the victory salute of the athlete) was present in Roman times in both 
political and spectacular contexts – athletes, actors, magistrates and emperors 
all were objects of the acclamation and the public’s desire for victory, strength 
or salvation.641 The juridical value of the acclamation was for Peterson the 
essential link that united law and liturgy and which expresses the people’s 
consensus.642 It is from this idea of consensus, that for Agamben that the link 
between law and liturgy takes on both its political, but importantly and 
subsequently, its biopolitical significance. It is this biopolitical context that the 
acclamation unites a people and the state (or beyond the state) in a way that 
individual secret voting can never achieve.643 For Agamben, and for our 
purposes here, liturgy and governance are strictly intertwined. What is always 
promised in the glory of the athletic spectacle is a form of salvation that can 
only be provided to us by our partaking in the society of competition. 
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640 Agamben 2011:pp.168-173.
641 Ibid.:169.
642 Ibid.:170.
643 Ibid.:171-172.
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It is through the vehicle of ‘technico juridical meaning of acclamation that 
constitutes the “publicity” of liturgy’ that the multitude takes on its constituted 
or political form. In our context we must remember that our theory of 
sovereignty depends not upon the general will of the social contract but our 
individual wills as entrepreneurs of the self. It might be that through liturgical 
acclamation the multitude enter into and are accepted by the realm of 
biopolitical governance, or as functional players within the economy. At the 
same time those that do not partake in this acclamation who reject its tenets 
are outside of it as outlaws. In this society, acclamation of the expert of the 
society of competition politicises us in so much as we consent to and become 
part of its realm.  
 
From this perspective the need for the Sovereign of Government is also 
required to take part in this acclamation might be explained. Not only do they 
derive and enhance their own support from the athletic expert, but, they too, 
just like the State in Neoliberalism become another player, or citizen, another 
entrepreneur of the self having to be in the society of competition. They too 
must bow before the new athletic sovereign at the start and finish of the race, 
as this is the one who provides the system with its means of construction and 
its sustenance. It is in this context that Agamben refers to Paul and the manner 
in which the economy of glory is expressed in solely optical terms – glory 
irradiates, it emits luminous rays, it reflects upon those that bathe in its light.644 
Why else was the start of a stage of the Tour Down Under in Gawler, outside of 
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644 Ibid.:203-204.
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Adelaide, delayed to await the arrival of the Prime Minister so that he might 
shake the hand of Armstrong before the amassed throng.645 
 
In this context it is not without significance that in the pages following those 
referred to above Agamben discussed the symbols, signs, or in his terms, 
signatures of power. Signatures ‘inhere in other signs or objects in order to 
confer a particular efficacy upon them’.646 He notes that the crown of laurel, 
which was of course the prize given to athletes in the Ancient Olympics, 
became in Rome a technical attribute of sovereignty.647 He then goes on to 
refer to the legal significance of the colour purple as the insignia of sovereignty, 
and how at the beginning of the fourth century its production was 
nationalised.648 Shortly, thereafter, we find a reference to the ‘holy lance’, which 
of course in our context is rendered with a capital L. This Holy Lance also 
reminds us of Sir Lancelot, who was after all the right arm of the king. And of 
course particularly strong arms, carry with them a heraldic meaning. Is it then 
without significance that the symbol, sign or signature of Lance Armstrong was 
a colour that he took and made his own? It is the yellow of the Tour de France 
that he privatised and continues to bear as his signature in heraldic fashion 
even after he has been wiped from their records. The yellow wristband of 
Armstrong, that so many of his acolytes (those that acclaim him) wear (on their 
arms) is an amulet, a thing that renders him present, it is the thing without 
being the thing and yet it is the thing, identical with him and which confers 
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645 Cyclingnews 2010.
646 Agamben, G. 2011. p.181.
647 Ibid.:177.
648 Ibid.:179.
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upon them a certain efficacy.649 By having the thing with them, they too are 
close to Lance and they too are made strong. 
 
As we saw in Adelaide this last January, with the third coming of the 
American, this proximity is such, that it may be, that now it is not the 
wolf that licks the feet of the sovereign, but that, in some cases, it is 
the sovereign that comes to lick the feet of the wolf.650 
 
If as we have posited, our whereabouts is an exceptional one in 
human history - where the economic tends towards being sovereign 
and is one of a permanent state of exception - there is also something 
at stake here in relation to Agamben's analysis of the feast or fiesta.651 
The time of sport in modernity, and its precursors before that, was the 
time of the feast, in many respects the exceptional time away from 
work. It was at this time and competition was able to reign unlicensed. 
However, with the coming of the permanent state of exception, in the 
economic exception of the society of competition, the logic of sport 
spills over and serves as a model for the rest of society. No longer 
does sport mirror society, but rather in the society of competition, it is 
society that itself must mirror the logic of sport.
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649 Giorgio Agamben, 2005 pp.71-73.
650 From Barthes to Foucault and beyond – Cycling in the Age of Empire. A paper to be delivered at 
Foucault: 25 Years On Conference – University of South Australia, 25 June 2009, available at 
http://esodoweb.net/pdf/agempire.pdf
651 Giorgio Agamben, 2005 pp.71-73.
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EPILOGUE 
 
‘Deadline man is exposed to personal crashes.’652 
 
We now all know the end of the Lance story. The multiple figures of Lance 
embody at their various times all of the qualities that we tried to attribute to the 
paradigmatic figure of the Imperial athlete. Lance 1.0, the young, driven pre-
cancer version was that who seized the opportunity provided by the society of 
competition and played that game with verve and vigor. He was already a 
privileged expert and ambassador, already a minister or angel of the new order 
in construction. Being a player was the ticket to fortune and to a life free of the 
trailer park in which he was raised. Lance 2.0 was organised, disciplined and 
resilient, backed by a machine he overcome death to enforce a form of victory 
and dominance that gave him the status of the sport’s patron, but also as an 
archetypical figure for us all: an inspiration. Lance 3.0 was the sovereign who 
returned to give us all hope. Even when he was pursued Lance acted as a 
sovereign as someone beyond the law, refusing right up until the end to 
recognize the law’s power over him. But there is no post-confessional Lance 
4.0. In the end Lance as the outcast, as homo sacer, is simply the bare life, that 
is lance after he stops having to be Lance. 
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652 Dadot and Laval p.291.
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It may be that in this Imperial Age, cycling found its first Zane, not in Lance but, 
in the figure of Floyd. 
 
 
A is for Armstrong.  
 
In the world of doping A is certainly for Armstrong.653 However, the problem is 
where to start. And although in some ways we do start at the beginning it 
might be useful to recall the words spoken in 'Rio Bravo'654 by John Wayne to 
Dean Martin who was at the time sufffering a Homeric hangover: ‘Don't set 
yourself up as being so special. Think you invented the hangover?’ And surely, 
Lance Armstrong, would answer the same as the plaintiff Dean Martin: ‘I could 
sure take out a patent for this one.’ 
  
Armstrong provides the figure with which to grasp both doping and sport in the 
neoliberal age. Armstrong didn’t start doping in sport but it might be said that 
he and his entourage perfected a practice and machine that surpassed 
anything seen previously. In its own way, in its matter of fact naturalness, the 
Armstrong machine was a sporting machine that surpassed in some ways the 
commonly accepted evil of the former East Germany. In the post Cold War era, 
the Armstrong machine manifested the frightening force of the coming together 
of American and Eastern Bloc know-how, the coming together of American 
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653 Deleuze 1996.
654 Hawks 1959.
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management, marketing and social control with the knowledge passed down 
from the former Eastern Bloc doping practices surpassed anything seen in 
cycling before.655 
 
Consistent with this age, the figure of Armstrong is multiple, each having its 
place as a paradigm of neoliberal man in the world of doping and anti-doping. 
Armstrong encompasses the figure of America, an America that has sought 
constantly to surpass its frontiers in order to extend across the globe. 
Armstrong was the figure that globalised cycling and shifted its center of power 
from Old Europe to the new Anglo world and economy. What has been called 
euphemistically, the ‘American Winning Years’ by British TV commentator Phil 
Liggett during the coverage of the 2013 Tour de France, was in fact the 
Armstrong Era, an Era that saw the rapid globalisation and Anglicisation of the 
sport. And just like a defrocked priest, in this context, Armstrong’s evils are 
measured against his good works.  
 
The Americanisation of cycling is not necessarily about ‘opening up’; its 
process does and must contribute to a loss of tradition and respect. Not only 
did one person become bigger than the sport itself and, hence implicitly, the 
peloton, but old European solidarities that had dominated cycling from time 
immemorial were finally broken down. No longer was doping a manner in 
which to keep a band of workers in employment, a means of putting on a 
show, it became simply a means for the pursuit of individual interest, or the 

655 Brissoneau, Christophe, 2010 and Arribas, Carlos, 2010.
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American Dream, Lance gave cycling America and beyond. Lance gave the 
sport and the corporate interests that pushed it – U.S. clothing, bicycle and 
television-spectacle manufacturers; everything they needed to establish their 
global dominions. But just as America individualises everything  - its heroes 
and it villains; when it came to fall, systemic failure was never on the agenda. 
Failure is always personal, individual moral failure. In the world that created 
Armstrong, the same world that brought him down, just as in Margaret 
Thatcher’s world, there is no society; there are no systemic reasons why.656 
 
Lance 1.0 
 
Born in Plano Texas on September 18 1971 Armstrong (or Lance Edward 
Gunderson) was destined to be anything but plain. The son of a broken 
marriage and humble beginnings (possibly what they endearingly call in the 
United States ‘trailer trash’) Armstrong’s only way up was to become a self 
made man – he has, from the beginning, to ‘Just Do It’. By the age of twelve he 
was excelling as a long distance swimmer and at the age of thirteen took up 
the quintessential neoliberal sport, with its total focus upon multiskilling and 
personal bests, of Triathlon. At sixteen he was a professional triathlete and by 
the age of eighteen he became US sprint-course Triathlon champion for the 
first time.  
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At the age of twenty-one Armstrong became a professional cyclist with the 
Motorola cycling team. In his first year as a pro he finished last in the Clasica 
San Sebastian. In his second year as a professional he won ten times. Included 
in these ten victories was Stage Eight of the Tour de France that finished in the 
fortress town of Verdun. Later that year he became the youngest ever winner of 
the UCI Road World Championship held in Norwegian capital of Oslo. The 
following year he was placed second in both Liege-Bastion-Liege and the 
Clasica San Sebastian.  
 
Already he was making his mark. In 1995, as a third year pro, he won the stage 
of the Tour de France that finished in Limoges with his now famous homage to 
his teammate Fabio Casartelli, who had crashed and died on the descent of 
Col de Portet d'Aspet three days earlier. The week following the Tour he 
returned to the green hills of the Basque County, to this time, take out the 
victory in the Clasica San Sebastian. 
 
In 1996 his upward trajectory continued, he won the Fleche Wallone Classic, 
but had to withdraw from the Tour de France after only five days. Following the 
Tour he signed a contract valued at four million US dollars with the new French 
Cofidis cycling team. However, he was never to ride for Cofidis being 
diagnosed with testicular cancer in October 1996. 
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Lance 1.0, the young, driven pre-cancer version was that who seized the 
opportunity provided by the society of competition and played that game with 
verve and vigor. He was already a privileged expert and ambassador, already a 
minister or angel of the new order in construction. Being a player was the ticket 
to fortune and to a life free of the trailer park in which he was raised. His entry 
into professional cycling coincided with the entry into the professional peloton 
of new methods of artificial blood doping with the substance EPO that had 
come to replace the blood transfusions of the 1980’s. Armstrong was 
determined, and in order to live his particular dream he was determined not to 
turn up at the OK Corral with just a water pistol. He was not going to turn up at 
the shoot out without a gun.657  
 
Lance 2.0 
 
Without cancer, I never would have won a single Tour de France. 
Cancer taught me a plan for more purposeful living, and that in turn 
taught me how to train and to win more purposefully. It taught me 
that pain has a reason, and that sometimes the experience of losing 
things — whether health or a car or an old sense of self — has its 
own value in the scheme of life. Pain and loss are great enhancers.658 
 
This is my body, and I can do whatever I want to it. I can push it. 
Study it. Tweak it. Listen to it. Everybody wants to know what I'm 
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657 Hardie, M., D. Shilbury, C. Bozzi, and I. Ware. 2012, p.63.
658 Forbes 2001.
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on. What am I on? I'm on my bike busting my ass six hours a day. 
What are you on?659 
 
The comeback commenced in Spain when Armstrong surpassed all his 
previous achievements and finished fourth in the 1998 Vuelta a España. 
Already things were different. The following year, in 1999 when Armstrong 
miraculously, or incredibly – in the fullest sense of the word - was first on the 
road in the Tour de France, his victory was heralded as the Tour of 
Redemption, a new clean start for pro cycling following the previous year's 
Festina tour which saw a number of riders arrested for doping by the French 
police. In 1999 the young Floyd Landis, who had only watched his first Tour de 
France four years earlier, was ‘pretty convinced’ that Lance was clean.660 
 
In a post-Festina world the figure of the American who had overcome death 
and was not tarnished by the old ways of Europe provided cycling’s overlords 
with the perfect fodder to carry out their own dream; a cycling as a global 
sport. On the back of the Tour of Redemption cycling began its journey from a 
European sport with a cult following elsewhere, to become the ‘new golf’. As 
the American Winning Years progressed more and more white, English 
speaking, middle-aged men (and women) donned lycra and preferably the 
yellow amulet of Lance.  
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The yellow amulet of his foundation Livestrong rendered him present in their 
lives and conferred upon them a certain efficacy, by having the thing with 
them, they were close to Lance and they too are made strong. Lance 2.0 was 
organised, disciplined and resilient, backed by a machine he overcame death 
to enforce a form of victory and dominance that gave him the status of the 
sport’s patron, but also as an archetypical figure for us all – an inspiration. He 
was driven. Driven for revenge against those who had not stood by him, 
against those who had dominated him, and against those in the UCI who had 
not properly administered their own health monitoring rules and not picked up 
the warning signs of his cancer.661 More importantly in the contemporary 
context individualism can mean and emphasise both strength and suffering 
and Lance embodied both. 
 
Armstrong not only changed the way we see cycling and cycling’s nature as a 
product. He changed the way the game was played and the manner in which 
one prepared for the game. Lance gave the sport and the corporate interests 
that pushed it – US clothing, bicycle and television-spectacle manufacturers; 
everything they needed to establish their global dominions. Philosophers 
Deleuze and Guattari compare the royal or aristocratic approach with that of 
the nomadic.662 The Armstrong of the ‘American Winning Years’ was definitely 
royal or aristocratic.  
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662 Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 362-373 and Deleuze 1996.
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Armstrong learnt and appropriated from the way the nomadic Italians and 
Spanish played the game and prepared. The Europeans had ridden like a 
journey-men’s association, allowing each to survive and shine, at times 
allowing each to take their turn in putting on a show. They were nomadic 
bands that sought out and did what was necessary to obtain support from the 
outside (State and corporate) world. Lance 2.0 was fully immersed in both the 
world of the State and the corporation. With the coming of Lance 2.0 what was 
required was a search for constants. To enforce Anglo-American superiority 
chance had to be tamed and in doing so Lance 2.0 assembled a team that 
reproduced himself. The royal approach was a homogenous approach in which 
science and technology was both autonomous and fully integrated. For Lance 
2.0 there was only one race: the Tour de France. The way the team prepared 
and rode the race was scientifically calculated, planned, managed and carried 
out. For all the hype around it the model of racing developed by Lance 2.0 and 
since adopted by the likes of Team Sky, was robotic. Lance 2.0 was a 
carpenter, albeit one with the most up to date technology, in contrast to the art 
displayed by some of his European rivals.663 No one could challenge such 
domination and if they tried they did not survive for long. 
 
From the very beginning there were detractors; those that did not believe. They 
were dealt with. In the case of failed doping controls or suspicious results, the 
complicity of the International Cycling Union, ensured that Lance 2.0 was 
protected. Journalists that questioned him or his success were ostracized and 
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denied access.664 Others simply treated as crazy or bitter. Teammates that 
sought to strike out on their own and take on Lance 2.0 all seemed to suffer a 
similar fate: Hamilton, Heras, Landis all tested positive after leaving the fold. 
And those that denied the strength of the peloton’s omerta were the subjects 
of bullying and on the road enforcement.  
 
The paradigm example is that of Simeoni. The Italian cyclist Filippo Simeoni 
was a former client of Dr Michele Ferrari, the same doctor that treated 
Armstrong and various other former and current cyclists. Ferrari was a disciple 
of the Conconi who had been funded by both the International and Italian 
Olympic Committees to develop testing procedures for EPO. Whilst 
undertaking that research Conconi had been also testing the substance under 
real conditions by preparing various cyclists. The first great EPO victories were 
the result of these early experiments, notably the triple of Gewiss team in the 
1994 Fleche Wallone.665 In 2002 Michele Ferrari faced trial in Italy for the crime 
of sporting fraud. He was convicted principally on the evidence of Fillipo 
Simeoni who had testified that he had begun being treated by Ferrari on 1993. 
By 1997 he was being supplied and instructed on how to use EPO and Human 
Growth Hormone by Ferrari. Ferrari eventually had the conviction overturned 
on appeal. In 2003 Armstrong called Simeoni a liar in the French newspaper Le 
Monde to which the Italian responded with a defamation writ claiming one 
hundred thousand Euros that he said he would donate to charity.  
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The following year on Stage Eighteen of the Tour de France Simeoni formed a 
part of a breakaway that posed no threat to the race’s general classification. 
According to Armstrong ‘in the interests of the peloton’666 he broke from his 
cover in the peloton, where he was protected by his praetorian guard and 
under no threat at all, to chase down by himself the breakaway group. 
Armstrong’s continued presence in the breakaway spelt the end of the move 
as his rival in the General Classification, Jan Ullrich, could not allow the risk of 
having the Texan up the road with the potential of gaining more time on him. 
Without Armstrong the seven riders would have been able to enjoy their day in 
the limelight and possible even go on to contest the stage finale. Armstrong 
would have none of that, on reaching the group he called ‘Bravo’ to Simeoni. 
The burly Navarran veteran, Jose ‘Txente’ Garcia Acosta, understanding their 
fate, pleaded with Armstrong to return to the peloton, but the only conditions 
upon which Lance 2.0 would return to the peloton was with Simeoni in tow. In 
a show of respect for the others in the group the Italian dropped back to the 
peloton with Armstrong who set about handling him, gesticulating and giving 
him a lecture of sorts. Once back in the peloton Simeoni was the subject of 
verbal abuse, he was spat upon and called a disgrace by other riders and 
Lance 2.0 made his infamous ‘zip the lips’ gesture to emphasis that Simeoni 
had broken the omerta and should from now on refrain. Armstrong later said 
that Simeoni did not deserve to win, or it seems have even have the chance of 
winning. In the final stage two days later Simeoni interrupted the victory 
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procession to the Champs de Elysees with constant attacks, each time he was 
chased by Armstrong’s team and again insulted and spat upon.667 
 
By the end of the ‘American Winning Years’ Lance 2.0 was the patron and 
sovereign of cycling and more. Not only had he overcome cancer he had won 
the Tour de France for 7 consecutive years. Lance 2.0 was no ordinary cyclist, 
nor was he any ordinary doper. He had created a following that responded as 
he did to criticism. His was a business model that changed the face of 
professional cycling, perfecting techniques of racing, doping, media 
management and being the vehicle, even the pawn, by which cycling 
administrators globalised the sport.  
 
Lance 2.0 left us with these words: 
 
Finally, the last thing I’ll say to the people who don’t believe in 
cycling, the cynics and the skeptics: I'm sorry for you. I’m sorry that 
you can’t dream big. I'm sorry you don't believe in miracles. But this 
is one hell of a race. This is a great sporting event and you should 
stand around and believe it. You should believe in these athletes, 
and you should believe in these people. I'll be a fan of the Tour de 
France for as long as I live. And there are no secrets — this is a hard 
sporting event and hard work wins it. So Vive le Tour forever!668 
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Lance 3.0 
 
January 2009, the room was filled with television cameras, journalists from 
from around the world, a contingent of Americans in the first row ... This is 
Australia, the eve of the Tour Down Under, the first race of Lance Armstrong 
since his last Tour de France in 2005. Whispers, buzz, the anticipation. They 
bring in a bike, His Bike. A few times suddenly heard: ‘He's coming ... False 
alarm ... Do we have to stand when he enters?’. It was like being in church. A 
dead silence accompanied His arrival. One British reporter commented that the 
reception was as if we were waiting for Jesus Christ after his resurrection and 
the Lance 3.0 quickly responds: ‘I don’t think that Jesus Christ rode a bike’.669 
And he surely didn’t rise from cancer. 
 
Armstrong tells the throng that the ‘desire to succeed is different now’. Lance 
3.0 has returned to promote the Livestrong Foundation. Good news for modern 
man: ‘I have returned to bring the Livestrong message around the world and to 
discuss the burden of this disease.’ On his bike are carved two figures: on the 
downpipe is inscribed ‘1274’ – the number of days since his last appearance. 
The other ‘27.5’, the millions of people who have died of cancer since he last 
spoke to us. ‘A staggering number’ he reminds us, ‘more than the entire 
Australian population’.670 Lance 3.0 appears in the guise of a privatised 
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message of public health. Lance 3.0 is benevolant, he does not charge a fee to 
race, he will not accept prize money. He tells us: 
 
I am calm because I enjoy it, and I do this for free. I do it because I 
love it. During 2004 and 2005 cycling was just a job, but now I have 
regained the passion and that will help cycling and the Livestrong 
foundation.671 
 
He omitted that he would receive around two million Australian dollars each 
year for three years to come to Adelaide to preach the Livestrong message. 672 
His annual fee was enough in fact to keep two rural public hospitals open 
which the State had recently closed down as a result of budgetary constraints. 
However, the economic value of Lance 3.0 was not forgotten. The then Premier 
of South Australia, Mike Rann, had already compared the race gaining Pro 
Tour status with the expansion of the world’s largest uranium mine in that 
state. The Armstrong investment he said was ‘the best investment the state 
could realise’.673  
 
As a cyclist returning from retirement Lance 3.0 should have been subjected to 
the rules that would have required him to be tested for a period prior to his 
return to racing. But as Anne Gripper, the then UCI head of Anti-Doping 
commented in a tete-a-tete with me: ‘Lance is different’ so the rules did not 
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apply. Lance 3.0 was different and importantly his glory irradiated, it emitted 
luminous rays and it reflected upon those that sought to bath in its light.  
 
But by the following year, in California during May 2010 things had started to 
change. 
 
Floyd 
 
Lance Armstrong: How bad do you want to win a stage in the Tour 
de France? 
Floyd Landis: Real bad. 
Armstrong: How fast can you go down hill? 
Landis: I go downhill real fast. Can I do it? 
Armstrong: Sure you can do it ... run like you stole something 
Floyd.674  
 
People are just looking out for themselves and I understand how 
business works and the connections that people like that have, 
[they] have very long tentacles. But some people do become nearly 
untouchable ... It’s hypocritical very, very hypocritical. I’ve come in 
contact with journalists with people who are supposed to be anti-
doping journalists or people who are looking for the thing and 
there’s stuff smack in their face. They still don’t touch. Do you know 
what I mean? There’s two very, very big standards that’s been put 
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out there and they still won’t touch it. You’re a joke, an absolute 
joke. What’s the fastest guy in the world?675 
 
When the Mennonite Floyd Landis first left his world to visit ours, so that he 
could compete in the World Junior Mountain Bike Championships, he felt like 
he had gone to Mars. When he switched to road racing and joined the U.S. 
Mercury team in 2001 he admitted to being ‘still completely against’ doping, ‘it 
didn’t represent what I felt cycling was to me’. He was ‘really confused as to 
how people could just accept that that was the way it is’. He didn’t know then 
that ‘the people at the top could actually manipulate’ the anti-doping system. 
He learnt soon enough that ‘everyone with any power’ was in on keeping the 
lid on the reality of what went on. He didn’t expect that ‘the guys publicly 
decrying the whole thing, and stating that they were the ones trying to fix it, 
were in fact making it happen’. He soon learnt the attitude of those governing 
the sport: ‘We don’t care what the rules are, this is how we do it’. And it was 
here that he first learnt to understand the story that Scorsese was telling in the 
film Goodfellas.676 
 
A year later, in 2002, Landis joined the US Postal team he soon started to talk 
to Armstrong about doping and about how the Italian doctor Michelle Ferrari 
worked. He also quickly learnt that in order to protect oneself at the top one 
had to be able to call on favours from the sports governors. In the course of 
this lesson he was told by Armstrong of the UCI’s cover-up of the Texan’s 
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676 Landis 2011.
412
2001 suspicious test result in the Tour de Suisse. Of his decision to begin to 
dope Landis is candid:  
 
I take responsibility for doing it. I made these decisions. I don’t point 
fingers and no one forced me to do it but the circumstances were 
such that the decision was almost made for me … I just found out 
that things were not as simple as I thought they were. 677  
  
By 2004 Floyd’s relationship with both Armstrong and Bruyneel was in tatters. 
He left US Postal and joined the Swiss based Phonak team. Fast forward 
eighteen months or so, the year after Lance 2.0 retires, and a few days after 
winning the Tour de France in 2006, Landis of course tested positive for 
testosterone. He still denies having used testosterone, raising doubts about the 
competence of the scientific procedures; however, he does not of course any 
longer deny doping.  
 
When faced with the fact that the Holy Grail was being taken from him Floyd 
dug in. This was what the sport expected; deny doping, fight the case and if 
necessary take the ban. And after that return to the fold.  ‘I was assured that, 
whatever I do I need to just not talk and I’ll have a team’. The system 
demanded silence:  
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‘… there is a parallel world where the fans see what’s put in front of 
them and appreciate it for what they believe it to be and beside it is 
the peloton who know the real story … there are no secrets within 
the peloton, management, the UCI and anyone with a financial 
interest in cycling’. 678 
 
That’s how Floyd justified the things he said in his defense.  
 
The advice of the former US Postal rider and now boss of the Garmin team, 
Jonathan Vaughters, was to ‘tell the truth’. But Floyd and Vaughters had 
different conceptions of the truth: ‘in my head the truth is more complex than in 
Vaughters’ head’. The truth for Vaughters was only a truth about yourself; one 
must never say anything about anyone else. The omerta was and as we shall 
see remains strong:  
 
… that’s the problem I have with Jonathan’s statement that I should 
just tell what I know about me. That’s not the story at all. That’s not 
the truth. There is more to it than just doping. And if you don’t see 
the whole picture you don’t know anything. 679 
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The omerta entailed only talking about what you as an individual did. This 
importantly ensured that you did not ‘spit in the soup’,680 that you never 
implicated another person who was not already implicated. It was this Floyd 
began to wrestle with as he began the journey to his coming out in the first half 
of 2010.  
 
Floyd is unable to describe how he felt during his years of deceit. In his mind 
‘there was no difference between saying “I didn’t do it” and telling a half-truth 
like David Millar did: “I did it once and was hoping to get caught …’.681 The 
trophy he had won in 2006 and which he later smashed had turned him into 
someone he was not. By 2010 faced with the reality that he was not going to 
return to the fold, to the security of the peloton, he had decided that was not 
who he wanted to be any longer. 
 
In May 2010 Floyd became the Bartleby of the professional cycling world. 
Herman Melville’s character Bartleby is a figure of dissent, a figure that 
decided he would prefer not to. For Floyd preferring to not to meant rejecting 
the norms and customs of the world that he had found himself within. And in a 
world where cycling had seen the return of Lance 3.0 Floyd decided that he 
would prefer not to be bound by the truth of the peloton any longer. It would be 
the beginning of the unraveling of the myth, which Armstrong may have 
perfected, but which he had never himself invented. 
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It may be that the most decisive moment was not his revelations, his decision 
to speak a truth that went beyond himself, but was in fact his response to the 
legal threats of the former UCI President Hein Verbruggen and the then 
President Pat McQuaid. Both men took umbrage at Floyd’s claim that the 
former had been involved in fixing suspicious test results for Lance 2.0. Faced 
with legal demands and threats of litigation in the Swiss Courts, Floyd decided 
not to play their game. He stepped outside of the law and invented his own, 
fake law firm, called Gray Manrod, which was said to be based in New York, 
Baghdad, and Djibouti, and specialised in Vegetable Rights Abuse Advocacy 
and Pronunciation Mediation, to respond to their correspondence.682 Floyd had 
not only rejected the peloton’s norms, but in response to McQuaid and 
Verbruggen’s legal threats he rejected The Law itself. It took a while for the 
sport’s governors to cotton on. 
 
In the end it was not evangelical anti-dopers or investigative journalists that 
brought down Lance, but it was his own prodigy. Following his positive test 
result in the 2006 Tour De France, Floyd Landis had followed orders. He had 
stuck to the omerta and done what was expected of him; deny and fight. But 
even after serving his time Floyd was still on the outer with no apparent 
prospect of ever entering the big time of pro cycling again. He had put together 
a small band of supporters and knocked around riding the races he could in 
the teams he could. With Lance 3.0 in full flight Floyd sought support to have 
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his team compete in the Tour of California, one of the events outside of old 
Europe, like the Tour Down Under that had gained prominence in a global 
cycling world. That support was denied. 
 
At the 2010 Tour of California Lance 3.0 faced with Floyd rejecting the omerta 
simply stated: ‘We have our truth; we like our truth’.683 
 
Novitsky & USADA 
 
Initially Floyd approached US Anti-Doping Agency (USADA):  
 
There was nothing else for me in cycling. There was no team for me, 
no matter what I do it was going to get worse and worse until I 
leave, not that that’s a deciding factor, but at least I didn’t have to 
consider that any more. And then, the thought process was ‘How do 
I do it? Who do I trust?’ So I went to USADA …684 
 
Floyd’s information was warmly received, the Agency jumped at the chance of 
getting involved taking such a high profile scalp. But his advice was not taken:  
 

683 The Scotsman 2010.
684 Landis 2011.
417
Look, everyone is immune – just tell us what the fuck is going on?’ 
That’s what I suggested to USADA and WADA that they just give 
everyone immunity and just get the facts but they won’t do it. 685 
 
Without such an approach the best USADA would end up getting was 
testimony of the type of truth suggested by Vaughters to Floyd four years 
earlier.  
 
Instead the Landis revelations led to the case being taken up by US Federal 
Food and Drug Agency Investigator Jeff Novitsky. Novitsky had prosecuted the 
U.S. athlete Marion Jones, baseballer Barry Bonds and had been at the center 
of the BALCO case took control of building a case. He initially enlisted Landis 
to go undercover in his pursuit of the U.S. Rock Racing team, home to a 
number of exiled American and European pros including Landis himself and 
others such as Tyler Hamilton, Francisco Mancebo and Oscar Sevilla. Later 
and basing his case around allegations of perjury and defrauding the U.S. 
Postal Service, Novitsky subpoenaed a number of current and former 
Armstrong teammates and staff to testify before the Grand Jury including, 
Yaroslav Popovych, Tyler Hamilton, George Hincapie and Levi Leipheimer. 
Others did their best to avoid the jurisdiction in order not to be forced to give 
evidence. Unlike the baseball players Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens who 
testified before a federal grand jury and were subsequently accused (but found 
not guilty) of lying under oath, Armstrong was not called to testify. Through 
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cooperation with Italian authorities and the WADA Novitsky had also gained 
access to Dr. Ferrari’s computer records. 
 
However, following a twenty month long investigation and secret grand jury 
process, in February 2012, Novitsky was stymied by what may have been 
political pressure which sought to ensure the Armstrong legacy remained 
untarnished. It was as if he, like the banks of the Global Financial Crisis were 
too big to fail. Speculation was rife that there had been political pressure 
exerted on the U.S. Attorney General’s Department to make the investigation 
go away. Armstrong of course was no stranger to the world of politics. His 
lawyer, Mark Fabiani had been Bill Clinton’s lawyer in the Whitewater scandal. 
Lance played golf with Clinton, he went mountain biking with George W. Bush. 
Lance 3.0 was chummy with politicians around the world. He had even 
announced his own political aspirations.686 At that point it seemed as if the case 
against Armstrong was never to be. 
 
Nevertheless, from the beginning USADA had sat in on some of Novitsky’s 
interrogations, allowing them to subsequently build upon his work. Throughout 
2012 USADA built its case interviewing and collecting evidence. In his 
statement of October 2012, announcing the assertions against Armstrong, 
USADA CEO Travis T. Tygart spoke of cyclists who had come forward to speak 
truthfully.687 Closer to reality was the fact that a number of them had not come 
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forward of their own accord, but had done so when faced with the prospect of 
having their careers and reputations destroyed. One cyclist who continued to 
race for the Garmin team, who had spent the previous two years hoping that 
the whole thing would just go away, fearing that he would lose his million dollar 
lifestyle and would spend the rest of his life delivering pizzas, had privately 
expressed his anger at Floyd and the situation he found himself in. In Tygart’s 
world he had decided willingly to be a part of the solution by deciding to 
acknowledge the truth. However, it may be Tygart’s truth may well have been 
coloured by some of those informers seeking to only talk about what was 
already known and to lessen the sanctions they themselves faced. 
  
In announcing the case against Armstrong Tygart made the claim that the: ‘… 
evidence demonstrates that the ‘Code of Silence’ of performance enhancing 
drug use in the sport of cycling has been shattered, but there is more to do’. 688
It was a big claim, as was his claim that the U.S Postal team’s doping program 
was ‘the most sophisticated, professionalized and successful doping program 
the sport had ever seen’. 689 In respect of the latter claim Tygart repeated similar 
words a year or so later when commenting on the case against baseballer Alex 
Rodriguez. In that case Tygart’s hyperbole was that it was ‘probably the most 
potent and sophisticated drug program developed for an athlete that we've 
ever seen …’.690 
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In respect of the type of truth Landis attributes to Vaughters Paul Kimmage has 
said:  
 
The law of silence: it exists not only in the Mafia but also in the 
peloton. Those who break the law, who talk to the press about the 
dope problems in the sport are despised. They are branded as 
having ''crache dans la soupe'', they have spat in the soup.691 
 
The themes of ‘comradeship, loyalty and any instinctive human urge to protect 
oneself and one’s family at any price’ are what form the basis of the omerta 
and Hardie et al warned against seeing the: 
 
closed nature of the peloton’s community in isolation but as an 
aspect of the real dependencies that the peloton has formed as it 
has sought to maintain itself within the bounds of the physical and 
structural conditions of their sport. Thus, the omerta in cycling and 
the community which it has helped to sustain: “was not something 
abstract, floating in the air so to speak, reinforcing or influencing 
actual behaviour. On the contrary ... it constituted a very concrete 
and real part of the behaviour of people who depended on each 
other in specific and fundamental ways’. 
 
As Møller put it quoting the retired Danish cyclist, Jesper Skibby:  
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They could just as well write about comradeship, loyalty and any 
instinctive human urge to protect oneself and one’s family at any 
price. … You just keep your secrets for yourself and avoid pointing a 
finger at others. It is no different from any other workplace. …..692 
 
This ‘Code of Silence’ is the custom of not saying anything about anyone else, 
or at least not saying anything above and beyond what is already known. If one 
examines the affidavits of a number of those that gave evidence to USADA this 
particular characteristic of the omerta is still very much in place. Putting aside 
the fact that the form of the affidavits appear to have been written by the same 
person, in the main they are characterised as not adding anything new to the 
original statements of Landis. No facts, other than those already put out there 
by Floyd, are brought into play. Many appear to give a sanitised and 
incomplete, if not untruthful version of their own involvement in doping. As 
Nietzsche reminds us the past always governs the future and Tygart’s 
shattering of the omerta appears only to be its eternal return in a new guise. 
 
In coming forth some appear to have engaged in the process of gilding the lily. 
Compare the former US Postal team doctor Pedro Celaya’s version of events 
with that given to USADA by Jonathan Vaughters. Vaughters’ version of his 
early days in the team set out in his affidavit was that: 
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[a]t the beginning of the season Dr. Pedro Celaya, the U.S. Postal 
Service team physician and I had a frank conversation about my 
prior use of erythropoietin … EPO use on the U.S. Postal Service 
Team in 1998 prior to the Festina doping scandal at the 1998 Tour de 
France was relatively open. Although a neo-pro such as Christian 
Vande Velde would be more shielded, for others who were already 
using drugs the communications about performance enhancing 
drugs were generally fairly open.693 
 
Celaya was widely regarded within cycling as always having the interests of the 
rider’s health as his main concern. In 2012 when researching the Armstrong 
case I was given a version of events that casts a different light on Vaughters’ 
affidavit:  
 
Vaughters acted like an asshole. He insulted the doctor calling him 
soft and shit and telling him he had no idea how to use EPO. 
Vaughters thought himself wise in the matter. He was buying the 
EPO in Mexico or Andorra with Johnny Weltz, who was the team 
manager. And in the team he was proselytizing, telling everyone they 
had to use EPO ... It was Vaughters who induced Vande Velde to 
start using EPO.694  
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Lance 4.0 
 
The penitent … falls raving to the ground, revealing her sins to the 
Lord, the pastor and the rest of the congregation. Then she is borne 
up, reinforced by other ex-sinners in a transport of therapeutic 
sharing. Forgiveness comes, not from authority, but from mutuality. 
The delight of confession prolongs the pleasure of sin.695 
 
In the scheme of the WADC, the USADA Reasoned Decision (a term that 
comes from the UCI Anti-Doping Rules) was a series of untested, if 
unchallenged by Armstrong, assertions. In that sense it was not a judgment, 
nor did it contain findings. It was in the end an assertion made and in terms of 
the law not proof of anything in itself. Not until the case against Dr Celaya, 
Johan Bruyneel and Pepi Marti was heard in December 2013 were any of these 
assertions tested and challenged. But from Tygart’s (and the WADC’s) 
perspective the fact that Lance did not contest was taken as an acceptance of 
the validity of the process. Armstrong had tried to challenge the USADA 
process unsuccessfully in the U.S. Federal Court.696 But from another 
perspective, we might be assisted by Agamben to view Lance 3.0 as a 
sovereign standing naturally and necessarily outside the law and refusing to 
recognize the law’s power over him. ‘There comes a point in every man's life 
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when he has to say, `Enough is enough,'’ Armstrong said. ‘For me, that time is 
now.’697 
 
In January 2013, Armstrong sought to begin his path to redemption and 
confronted the ‘institutional incitement to speak’698 and headed to Hollywood’s 
home of confessional TV,699 Oprah Winfrey to speak directly to the public; an 
explanation as much as a confession and a plea for understanding of the world 
and place Lance 2.0 inhabited. Admitting that he was a flawed character who 
couldn’t control nor live up to the image of the myth he had created Lance 4.0 
responded to Oprah’s questions ‘I was used to controlling everything in my life. 
I controlled every outcome in my life’. Lance 4.0 admitted the myth had been 
‘so perfect for so long’ that it was ‘mythic perfect story’ but ‘it wasn't true’. He 
continued ‘[m]y ruthless desire to win at all costs served me well on the bike 
but the level it went to, for whatever reason, is a flaw. That desire, that attitude, 
that arrogance.’700 
 
It could have been that there was no post-confessional Lance 4.0. In the end 
Lance could have been like Pantani, like Rasmussen and so many others, and 
continued to live, or die as the outcast, as homo sacer, as bare life. Lance 
could have just been what was left of Lance Armstrong after he stopped having 
to be Lance. But it appears that Lance just cannot stop being Lance, he would 
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not lie down, he still wanted to play his part and to redeem himself in whatever 
way he could, and of course to compete, no longer in cycling but as an 
Ironman. To this end Lance 4.0 continued to be vocal to be visible and to be 
heard. He took on the role of continuing to call for a genuine process of truth 
and reconciliation for cycling and to advocate for what Floyd had suggested 
was the only option when he went to USADA.701 USADA CEO Tygart had said in 
his statement announcing the case against Armstrong noting that ‘no one 
wants to be chained to the past forever, and I would call on the UCI to act on 
its own recent suggestion for a meaningful Truth and Reconciliation 
program’.702 But it is difficult to take this as no more than lip service for that 
same week Tygart said that such a process would never occur. It was not 
realistically on USADA’s agenda.703 
 
In 2014 the UCI announced an Independent Commission to look into the past, 
however, with threats of the ramifications of not coming forward being used to 
induce cyclists to come forward its characteristics appeared to be no more 
than another police operation.704 It was hardly the process suggested by Floyd. 
Nevertheless, Lance 4.0 continued to tell his truth to the world at once 
confirming and putting into context the allegations of the cover up.  
 
‘The real problem was, the sport was on life support. And Hein 
[Verbruggen] just said, ‘This is a real problem for me, this is the 
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knockout punch for our sport, the year after Festina, so we've got to 
come up with something.’  
 
He continued: 
 
Don't think I'm protecting any guys after the way they treated me, 
that is ludicrous,” he said, making clear that he won’t hold back. 
“I'm not protecting them at all. I have no loyalty towards them. In the 
proper forum I'll tell everyone what they want to know. I'm not going 
to lie to protect these guys. I hate them. They threw me under the 
bus. I'm done with them.705 
 
In the end much has been said since the USADA case against Armstrong 
concerning how it set the stage for a new paradigm of anti-doping, based upon 
investigation rather than testing. The case against Armstrong was built upon 
investigation and policing and not the scientific testing that had dominated 
anti-doping discourse up until that time. The Armstrong case in the end is a 
police investigation. But it differs from the other two ‘great’ doping 
investigations of cycling, the Festina Tour and Operacion Puerto, both of which 
resulted in chance findings. In the case of Armstrong it might be said that the 
case illustrates the difference between the mafia’s and cycling’s versions of the 
omerta. They say of the mafia is that it always looks after its own. Was it the 
failure to look after one’s own that finally caused the Armstrong myth to 
unravel? If Armstrong’s case heralds a new method it is a clear that this 
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method requires two principal actors, a disaffected informer and a figure as 
abrasive and self-centred as Armstrong was in order to be able to provoke 
such disaffection. This is a rare combination and one whose importance anti-
doping authorities appear not to have grasped. It may also be that if Armstrong 
had understood the importance of gifts, and grasped their particular 
economy,706 the wheels may not have fallen off in such a spectacular fashion. 
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